User:Daask/sandbox/The Tyranny of Science


The Tyranny of Science is a book by Paul Feyerabend.

Publication history edit

based on lectures Feyerabend develived in 1992 at the University of Trent, Italy which were for a general audience, and presuppose no knowledge of his work [1] published in Italian in 1996, in German in 1998, and in English in 2011 [2]

historical fiction about major figures in the history of science[2]

Claims edit

The widespread idea that science is successful Scientists and philosophers sometimes present science as a unified worldview, a monolith (or a monster, depending on one's preferences). It is not. Science is both incomplete and quite strongly disunified. science can easily be used to justify socio-political atrocities [3]

1) argues science should focus more on the concerns of human life, such as social issues, bringing world peace and making people more loving 2) ignores meaning, which is left to philosophy and religion 3) crudely claims supremacy over other worldviews without justifying this superiority 4) falsely claims to have been successful 5) falsely claims to offer a single scientific worldview, obscuring the pluralism within science 6) research follows money and power. Views that succeed do so because they appeal to or serve elites and influencers, not because of intrinsic merit. 7) Against academic freedom 8) society needs to be protected from the influence of scientists [4]

The application of science is a social and political process. One must consult thosewho are affected by scientific knowledge and products as much as with those who produce them. [5]

Notes edit

against academic freedom[2]

"the traditional view [of science], held by most scientists and members of the public, that science provides a uniquely valid road to truth based on the ideal of objectivity. Therefore, society should welcome scientific findings and associated technological developments because they derive their authority from nature, of which scientists are the authorised interpreters."[6]

Feyerabend offers no guidance for the methodology of scientists[7]

"do the success and the benefits of science and technology warrant or require a social arrangement which privileges the highly specialized development of certain human faculties at the expense of others" Nordmann, Alfred (1990). "Goodbye and farewell: Siegel vs. Feyerabend∗". Inquiry. 33 (3). Informa UK Limited: 317–331. doi:10.1080/00201749008602226. ISSN 0020-174X. summarizing Feyerabend, P., & Feyerabend, P. K. (1987). Farewell to reason. Verso.

instead of respecting and leaving alone diverse cultures and traditions as required by his views, Feyerabend fails to honor the right of people in several ways by formulating from afar abstract principles of cultural autonomy


What’s bothering Feyerabend is not rationality per se but an overkill of rationality that leads to dogmatism and complete abstraction. Emotions are subjective and as good rational scientists we need to abstract from them. Feyerabend’s point is that -if taken to the extreme- this view blocks out many other ways of understanding the world (poetry, dance, ..) that are not objective and rational, can’t be pressed in a unified theory and thus are not a model of what the sciences think is the real world. [8]

Reception edit

excellent example of public lecturing - "engaging, educative, and entertaining"[9]

"posed a couple of questions and presented some arguments which every scientist, philosopher and fan of them should consider at least once in a lifetime."[2]

goal of science is not necessarily world peace[10]

Feyerabend's procedure, his insistence on treating the views of his opponents in terms of their ancestry, contains a strong suspicion of what such opponents would undoubtedly think of as a genetic fallacy. It also depends quite heavily on his alleged personal preference for stories over arguments. If his opponent cleaves to arguments, it's hard to see how Feyerabend can do any more than reassert his own preference. After all, he can hardly argue that there's no such thing as a decent argument, or even that stories are somehow objectively preferable. [3]

Feyerabend’s frustration is not that the sciences have surpassed philosophy in their power to explain how the world works, but that they have fled into an abstract, rational world-view that excludes subjective human emotions and suffering. Confronted with problems that are real and that are on the news every night the sciences claim ‘That’s not our business.’ [8]

"Sometimes I suspect that this is what Feyerabend wants, that his commitment to pluralism amounts to a thoroughgoing scepticism about the notion that any one idea (theory, framework, etc.) is really better than any other, epistemically-speaking. That would leave only non-epistemic modes of assessment, such as the assessment of how conducive to happiness views are. At other times I get the impression that Feyerabend thinks that if we could somehow make the competition between ideas fair, then we could say that one such view is epistemically-preferable to another. It's not clear whether the historical strategy is being used to show merely that certain views are undeservedly popular, or whether it's being used to show that no view could ever really deserve (epistemic) credit." [3]

Editions edit

See also edit

Citations edit

  1. ^ Lechthaler 2013, p. 386,389.
  2. ^ a b c d Lechthaler 2013, p. 386.
  3. ^ a b c Preston 2012.
  4. ^ Lechthaler 2013, p. 387f.
  5. ^ Kidd 2011, pp. 577. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKidd2011 (help)
  6. ^ Martin 2012, pp. 118.
  7. ^ Martin 2012, pp. 120.
  8. ^ a b Markowetz 2011.
  9. ^ Kidd 2011, pp. 576. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKidd2011 (help)
  10. ^ Lechthaler 2013, p. 389.

References edit

Further reading edit

External links edit