Boxcartenant

Haven't been on Wikipedia for long, but I can tell that the people here are really struggling to be unbiased.

Reading some other user profiles, it looks like this is the right place for an argument in favor of my worldview. I'm an epistemological hobbyist, and I would like nothing more than for someone to criticize the framework below. If you wanna do that, put your comments in my talk page and sign it with four squigglies (~).

Major Axioms

1. We (humans) are capable of discerning actual truth about the universe external to us
2. Truth adheres to laws of logic
3. There is only one truth, uniquely consistent with all reality
4. In order for a worldview to justifiably claim to be true, it must allow for, justify, and contain premises enabling its adherents to discern truth (it must include justification for axioms I, II, and III)
5. There exists a knowable and true explanation for epistemological intelligibility as described above.

I contest that all organized thought depends on the truth of Axiom I. Therefore, the specific question my framework is designed to approach is not "can I know truth", but rather, "why can I know truth".

Testing Epistemological Frameworks

The scope of things called "everything" is infinite, and so it may be impossible to demonstrate in a non-infinite time span that any "theory of everything" is universally consistent. However, we know that there is only one true description of the external world, and we know that the true description is universally consistent, and so we know that any false explanation is distinguished by its inconsistencies. Inconsistency (either with itself or with something external) is the primary distinguishing feature of falsehood.

Premisory Observations

1. The function of our rationality (mind) is to interpret sensory data.
2. Our faculties for receiving (senses) and interpreting (rational mind) information are fallible
3. Our faculties are fallible to a finite (non-infinite) degree (i.e. we are receiving true information via our senses, and interpreting it correctly, to some degree)
4. We operate knowing the extent to which our faculties are fallible
5. All information in our minds must have come into our minds somehow (information cannot come from nothing)
6. A fallible tool for measuring cannot alone measure the extent of its own fallibility

Observations "d", "e", and "f" place me in opposition to the common argument that children are blank-slates, utilizing statistical inference to develop a model for the world. Statistical inference depends on prior knowledge about the sample set, and there is no statistical tool which can be used by someone who has absolute-zero information to start with. I've heard the argument several times, but it's based on false premises about the way math works.

Development of the Theory

1. Utilizing the premisory observations, in particular "f", I conclude that there must exist an infallible set of information (hereafter I call it the "reference point"), in our minds, by means of which we are able to approximate the degree to which our senses are fallible, and by which we understand the universality of natural and logical laws.
2. Referring to "b", "e", "f", and "1", I conclude that the reference point, being infallible, must have arrived in our minds by means other than our fallible faculties.
3. Referring to "e" and "1", I conclude that the reference point must have come from a source external to us.
4. [Ref. V, 1, 3] The reference point must include information about its own trustworthiness, and the trustworthiness of its source. (Or else, it can't be known, true, and known to be true)
5. [I, III, V, 2] The reference point is universally, involuntarily received by all thinking beings. (Or else, there's no way to be sure that I have it and am able to know truth)
6. [II, III, V] The information represented by the "reference point" is internally logically sound, consistent, and universally applicable. (Or else, there may be some place in the universe which is unintelligible, and I can't know that I'm not in that place)
7. [III, 5, 6] The reference point delivered to each thinking being is identical from being to being. (The reference point is a minimum set necessary for universal applicability, and so there should be no chance that I can go to some place and find that I am missing a component of the reference point)
8. [2, 3, 5] The reference point does not passively wait for us to act on it in order for it to be learned by us, but it is actively imposed on each thinking person. (So that intelligibility does not depend on any action which we might fail to perform)
9. [3, 4, 8] The source of the reference point must be, in reality, entirely trustworthy and incapable of delivering falsehood. (This implies that the source of the reference point is limited by its own nature)
10. [I, 2, 3, 8, 9] The means of delivery for the reference point must not be naturally reproducible or subject to manipulation by any naturally reproducible process. (Or else the method of delivery for the reference point is a matter of scientific development, and so with time some person may learn to change that method, affecting our ability to know truth, and undermining Axiom I)
11. [7, 9, 10] The source for the reference point must be characterizably singular -- a unified source, performing its function invariably. (If there are multiple components to the reference point, then they can be characterized as functionaries in the whole, because they do not deviate from their function).
12. [4, 6, 9, 10] The source of the reference point cannot be manipulated by any external (and potentially untrustworthy) power.
13. [1, 6, 9, 10] The characteristics (descriptive constraints) of the source represent a larger set of rules than the "natural set" governing the physical world. The natural set is a subset of the constraints on the source. (This is to solve the problem where the source, though governed by its own nature, performs an action which cannot otherwise be naturally reproduced).
14. [III, V, 6, 13] The source does not simply describe the natural set of constraints for us; it prescribes them. (This enables the source to provide information which is knowably universally applicable, without needing to provide an infinite set of information. Ref. Godell's incompleteness theorems)
15. [9, 13, 14] The natural set of laws governing the physical universe are derived from the qualitative character of the source. (As with anything prescriptive)
16. [V, 4, 9, 14] The source must be apprehensible to a minimum extent enabling us to know this information about it.
17. [V, a, e, 16] The information comprising the apprehension of the source must be externally, perceivably available to humanity. (This enables a universe where not everyone is aware of the source, but everyone has the reference point, and a true worldview is knowable)
18. [V, 17] Apprehension of the source must be available to everyone. (Axiom V must apply to everyone, or I cannot know that it applies to me. It must be possible for anyone at all to acquire knowledge of the true worldview.)
19. [14, 15, 16, 17, 18] The method and time of apprehension of the source must be prescribed by the source in every case. (This follows naturally from 14/15, but it is mentioned here to solve the problem of "the remote islander with no access to whatever external stimulus can teach about the true worldview". Given that the information must be accessible to everyone, in order to avoid compromising the axioms, we simply say here that it is within the prescriptive power of the source to enable that remote islander to acquire the information as soon as the islander attempts to access it.)

Summary

So we have a source which is...

• External to us (3)
• Trustworthy (4,9)
• Characterizable (9)
• Active (8, 10, 19)
• Singular (11, 12)
• Omnipotent (10, 13, 14)
• Integral to all nature, prescriptive creator (15)
• Discoverable (18, 19)
• Apprehensible (16)

Necessity of an infallible external source

Rather than self

• Self has no direct access to information about the external world except by means of fallible sensing and reasoning faculties.
• Self alone has no means to validate sensing and reasoning faculties except by referencing them against themselves.

Simply asserting, without justification, that ones faculties are valid is incurious.

Rather than nature/evolutionary processes

Nature exhibits, for our facilitated consumption, the information that we do have sensing and reasoning faculties.

• Nature does not tell us the extent to which our senses and reasoning faculties are trustworthy.
• Nature does not tell us that nature itself is a trustworthy deliverer of said faculties.

For readers

It seems like the philosophical world loves Emmanuel Kant, and praises his Critique of Pure Reason, but ridicules and ignores the actual argument it espouses. It was basically solipsism! Solipsism is a valid challenge for your worldview. You should have an answer for "why" you believe that you are able to know true information. Simply saying that you approximate true information is fine, but it doesn't answer the question -- how do you do it? What basis do you have to suppose that the same result after 1 trial is not as reliable as the same result after 1000 trials? There is information in your head which you use to make that distinction, and you should acknowledge it, and try to work out whether it is trustworthy and why.

I'm not saying you have to agree with the points above, but please try to come up with an alternative! And, if you can't find any alternative, then go with the best explanation you have... but don't settle for an unsupported worldview.

Again, to restate the goal: The purpose of the exercise above is to identify what conditions must be true about the world around me in order for my assumption that I am able to know truth to be justified.