User:AlexandreAssatiani/sandbox

Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War
Part of 2006-2008 Georgia-Russia diplomatic crisis
Map of Georgia and its conflict zones prior to the Russo-Georgian war
Date March 6, 2008 (2008-03-06) - August 7, 2008 (2008-08-07) Location Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) Result Russian invasion of Georgia
Belligerents
Georgia	Russia Abkhazia South Ossetia
Commanders and leaders
Mikheil Saakashvili Vano Merabishvili Davit Kezerashvili Davit Bakradze Eka Tkeshelashvili	Vladimir Putin Dmitry Medvedev Sergey Lavrov Anatoly Serdyukov Sergey Bagapsh Mirab Kishmaria Eduard Kokoity Vasily Lunev

• Abkhazia was the first point of tensions, before moving to SO suddenly in late July
• In the wake of Kosovo's independence and the Bucharest summit, preparations were made to invade by bringing in military infrastructure that would facilitate an invasion (Asmus)
• Events from June to August characterized as low-intensity war by some analysts per the IIFFMCG

Background

Russo-Georgian diplomatic tensions

Relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation developed in a difficult context of conflicts and civil strife throughout the former Soviet Union when the latter dissolved in 1991. In the early days of the independent Georgian Republic, its president Zviad Gamsakhurdia maintained a staunchly anti-Russian stance, accusing Moscow of seeking to destabilize Georgia and supporting separatists in South Ossetia. In turn, the Kremlin backed a coup against Gamsakhurdia in the winter of 1991-1992, bringing to power former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze found himself at odds with Russia as the latter backed Abkhaz separatists in a deadly war in 1992-1993 that led to the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia and the displacement of close to 250,000 Georgians. Georgia nonetheless joined the Moscow-led Commonwealth of Independent States in 1993 in exchange for Russia's assistance in helping the Shevardnadze government put an end to the civil war pitting him against Gamsakhurdia.

Under the respective presidencies of Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin, Georgia and Russia sought to build friendly relations. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1994 and Russia supported a global trade embargo against separatist-held Abkhazia in 1996. At the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, Moscow agreed to withdraw its military bases from Georgia by 2001. This trend was however strained as Georgia showed signs of seeking to align with the United States. The rise to power in Russia of Vladimir Putin brought a more assertive Russian position towards its neighborhood, with the new Russian leader postponing the withdrawal of bases from Georgia and unilaterally engaging in a bombing campaign in Georgia's Pankisi Valley in search of hidden Chechen terrorists.

The Rose Revolution of November 2003 that brought to power in Georgia the pro-Western government of Mikheil Saakashvili further complicated ties with Russia, despite attempts by both sides to normalize relations in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, as seen with Russia's assistance in the Palm Revolution of Adjara, the participation of Russian corporations in the major privatization drive at the center of Georgia's economic reforms, and the final withdrawal of Russian bases from Akhalkalaki and Batumi in 2007. Georgia's Rose Revolution was soon followed by Ukraine's Orange Revolution and similar movements across the post-Soviet space, while Saakashvili sought to form alliances with liberal and democratic groups throughout Eastern Europe, seeking to replace the CIS with the pro-Western GUAM and openly declaring Georgia's desire to join NATO. Tbilisi found a close ally in the United States, leading to what US diplomat Ronald Asmus would describe as a "de facto cold war between Moscow and Tbilisi," while the International Independent Fact-Checking Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) would later describe bilateral ties as "the most precarious ever between the Russian Federation and a neighboring state formerly belonging to the USSR." By the time the war began in 2008, there were reportedly 100 permanent American military advisers in the Georgian Armed Forces and more in the power structures and administrative organs of the country. Under Saakashvili, Georgia also sought to integrate into the European Union, with the country being included in the European Neighborhood Policy in 2004.

This foreign policy orientation went against Russia's imposed conditions for a normalization of bilateral ties, which were the renunciation of Georgia's NATO orientation, the recognition of Russia's special interests in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the authorization of a Russian military intervention in the Pankisi Valley. Meanwhile, Tbilisi sought a rapid settlement of the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that would result in their reintegration into Georgia, a position made improvements with Russia, according to the IIFFMCG's analysis, "almost impossible."

Russia considerably increased pressure on Georgia as soon as January 2006, when the explosion of a gas pipeline in North Ossetia caused Georgia to be left without most of its energy resources in the middle of winter. Tbilisi responded by cutting its dependence on Russian gas and developing a strategy to transform the South Caucasus into an independent energy corridor bringing Azerbaijani and Central Asian energy resources to Europe while bypassing Russia. In June 2008, American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski theorized that the Kremlin was seeking to grain control of the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by causing conflict in Georgia. In the spring of 2006, Russia imposed a trade embargo on Georgia, banning the imports of mineral waters and wine in an attempt to apply economic pressure on the country, while hostile rhetoric increased on both sides, with President Saakashvili accusing domestic opposition forces of collaborating with Russia and comparing Russia to the "barbarous tribe of Huns".

In September 2006, Georgian law enforcement detained 10 Georgian citizens and four Russian GRU officers in Tbilisi over espionage charges, causing a diplomatic crisis and Russia recalling its ambassador from Georgia. Days later, the Georgian police besieged the Russian military headquarters in Tbilisi in search of alleged suspects involved in a 2005 terrorist attack in Gori. In response, Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist leaders Sergei Baghapsh and Eduard Kokoity were invited to meet with Putin in Russia, while the latter imposed a travel ban to and from Georgia. The 2006 espionage controversy led to an anti-Georgian campaign in Moscow, with local police launching raids on Georgian-owned businesses, the withdrawal of Georgian-origin students from public schools, and the mass deportation of Georgian migrants from Russia, leading to three deaths in the process. British expert Mark Galeotti believes that Russia drew up plans to remove Saakashvili from power in 2006, when the North Caucasus Military District began staging increasingly elaborate and large military exercises, while Putin later admitted he had ordered the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces to draw up plans for an invasion of Georgia following the espionage scandal.

Military tensions began in March 2007, when Russian helicopters shelled Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley, a high-mountain region within Abkhazia under Georgian control. On August 7, 2007, an unexploded Russian air-to-surface missile was found in the village of Tsitelubani, near the South Ossetian conflict zone, though various theories have surfaced about this latter incident, from that of a false-flag operation by Georgia to a special operation by Russian military hardliners without the direct knowledge of the Kremlin. Two weeks later, Georgian forces allegedly downed a Russian military aircraft over the Kodori Valley.

Despite these tensions, Mikheil Saakashvili used his second inauguration speech in January 2008 to speak at length about the normalization of ties with Russia. He called "spoiled relations with Russia" the biggest regret of his first term and invited Putin to visit Georgia, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the inauguration. On February 21, Saakashvili met with Putin at the latter's residence in Novo-Ogaryovo, agreed on a lifting of the travel ban, and launched negotiations to establish joint border controls at the Roki Tunnel and Psou river, two contentious points with the separatist regions. These negotiations would prove to be fruitless as Russia unilaterally lifted the trade embargo on Abkhazia in March, starting a series of events that eventually led to the war in August. The failure to open joint border checkpoints also resulted in Georgia's refusal to lift its veto on Russia's admission into the World Trade Organization, with Tbilisi suspending talks on the matter on April 29.

In 2008, tensions had reached a low point. One senior Russian official later listed Russia's reasons to engage into a war against Georgia, including establishing full control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia by removing Georgian-held enclaves, pushing the conflict line deeper into Georgian territory, forcing Georgia to sign a non-use-of-force treaty with the separatist republics, weakening Saakashvili's power and strengthening his domestic opposition by putting him under constant internal pressure, and putting an end to Georgia's NATO integration attempts. Meanwhile, historian Ucha Bluashvili analyzed that Saakashvili's will to launch a direct operation to bring the separatist territories back under control was inspired by his original success in Adjara, a belief that the international community would pay closer attention to the South Caucasus in case of military conflict, a conviction within his administration that Russia would not directly intervene and that the next US presidential administration following George W. Bush would not be as supportive of Georgia, and similarities with the 1999 Croatian Operation Whirlwind. However, most experts believed that Georgia would seek to avoid confrontation with Russia as Saakashvili's bid for NATO integration required domestic stability, the Georgian economy would not be able to sustain a protracted military operation, and any military conflict would risk losing the support of the Western bloc.

BLUASHVILI

• Russia's reasons to start a war with Georgia (396)
  • Full control of South Ossetia by removing Georgian enclaves
  • Full control of Abkhazia, including full control of Gali and invasion of Kodori
  • Establishment of a "security zone" near Zugdidi, pushing the conflict line deeper into Georgian territory
  • Forcing Georgia into a Treaty of Non-Use of Force
  • Weakening of Saakashvili's presidency and strengthening of his domestic opposition by putting him under constant internal pressure
  • Ending Georgia's NATO integration dreams
• Georgia's reasons to start a war in South Ossetia (397)
  • Inspiration from the Palm Revolution
  • Inspiration from the Croatian Operation Whirlwind
  • Forcing the world to pay attention to the South Caucasus conflicts
  • Conviction that Russia would not directly intervene, out of shift of focus or weakness
  • Realization that the next US administration would be less keen on supporting Georgia
  • Boosting Saakashvili's popularity

Separatist conflicts

Since the last years of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been rocked by separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two autonomous regions backed by Russia. Open warfare began in South Ossetia in January 1991 when Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia launched the National Guard on its capital Tskhinvali to confront armed separatist groups. The war ended with the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia a year later, resulted in the displacement of 60,000 Ossetians and 10,000 Georgians, while ceasefire terms were negotiated under the Sochi Agreement of June 1992, dividing South Ossetia into Ossetian-controlled and Georgian-controlled enclaves, creating a Joint Peacekeeping Force with Georgian, Russian, and North Ossetian battalions (known as the JPKF), and creating a tripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) to regulate the situation in the conflict zone. In December 1993, an OSCE mission was established to assist with the political settlement of the conflict.

In Abkhazia, years of ethnic tensions between the Abkhaz minority in the autonomous republic and its Georgian majority culminated in an open war when Georgian central troops launched a military operation there in August 1992, under the guise of protecting the Transcaucasian Railway. The war lasted for more than a year and resulted in one of the bloodiest conflicts in the post-Soviet space, with nearly 30,000 deaths and 200,000 Georgian IDPs following the Fall of Sokhumi in September 1993. The Moscow Ceasefire Agreement of May 1994, later endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, created a peacekeeping force of up to 3,000 men supplied by the CIS, although Russia was its sole provider. It also established both demilitarized Security Zones and Restricted Weapons Zones on both sides of the ceasefire line, which was set as the Enguri River. In addition, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was created in August 1993 and strengthened in July 1994 to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire. In December 1993, the UN Secretary General's Group of Friends of Georgia was created by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for international cooperation to mediate the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and in 1997, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed a Special Representative on Abkhazia.

Though the South Ossetian conflict remained mostly frozen throughout the 1990s with no progress in bilateral talks but several high-level meetings between both sides, the Abkhaz conflict remained a high-tense situation over the refusal by Abkhaz separatists to allow the return of Georgian internally-displaced persons. In January 1996, the CIS imposed a trade embargo on Abkhazia to pressure it into compromising with the central Georgian government over the IDP issue, but the lack of political will prevented any settlement and a brief armed confrontation in 1998 forced another 30,000-40,000 Georgians out of Abkhazia. UN Special Representative Dieter Boden proposed in 2001 a conflict settlement solution, known as the Boden Plan and later endorsed by the UN Security Council, that would have granted Abkhazia the status of a sovereign entity within Georgia while rejecting its secession claims and ruling out any unilateral changes to the confederate system, but Sokhumi rejected it and tensions continued to increase until another armed clash in 2001 in the Kodori Valley, a high-mountainous region in northern Abkhazia under Georgian control since the end of the 1992-1993 war, a clash that killed nine UNOMIG officers. By 2003, there were signs of progress in conflict settlement, with the Geneva Process established as a platform for regular direct negotiations between Abkhazia and Georgia under the mediation of the Group of Friends in February and the Sochi Process launched by Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladimir Putin in March to discuss the rehabilitation of the Transcaucasian Railway in Abkhazia.

Though Russia was formally a mediator and peacekeeper in both the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts, it continued to support indirectly the separatists in both conflicts. By 2000, Russia had imposed a visa regime on Georgia but not on Abkhazia and South Ossetia and around the same time, Moscow launched a "passportization" program to distribute Russian passports to locals in both breakaway republics. In 2007, Russia paid 600 million rubles in direct pensions to Abkhaz residents and 100 million to South Ossetians, while Georgia accused Russia of engaging in a "progressive annexation" of the two regions by integrating them into its economic, legal, and security space. The domestic government structures in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi were overwhelmingly ran by the Kremlin, with key power positions handed over to Russian nationals. The IIFFMCG later described the situation in the early 2000s as both regions being "largely under the influence of Russia, if not more directly, then at least by means of a vetoing position." Both the UN and the OSCE agreed to let Russia be the sole peacekeeping force in the conflict zones, something that analysts have argued was done out of a lack of attention in the South Caucasus by Western powers. In 2003, the European Union appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus to help mediate conflicts in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but with little effect. The International Crisis Group later described the European involvement in the region prior to 2008 as "working around the conflict instead of on the conflict." Under the Saakashvili administration, Tbilisi described Russian troops stationed in both regions "not as peacekeeping, but as keeping in pieces," referring to Moscow's alleged blocking of conflict settlement solutions. In July 2006, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a non-binding resolution rejecting Russia's role as a mediator and peacekeeper.

In South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, a strongman described as "fiercely anti-Georgian", came to power in 2001 and soon came at odds with the new Georgian government following the Rose Revolution. By that time, the region had become a safe haven for contraband and local markets became a major point of the drug trade between Russia and the Caucasus, causing Tbilisi to increase pressure on separatist authorities in the summer of 2004. An armed clash in August resulted in a failure by Tbilisi to establish control over Tskhinvali and permanently damaged the conflict resolution process in the region. In September 2004, the Saakashvili administration proposed a three-stage conflict settlement plan involving confidence-building measures, the return of IDPs, full demilitarization, and a broad constitutional autonomy for South Ossetia within a federal Georgian state, negotiations on which plan stalled rapidly. In January 2005, Saakashvili announced in Strasbourg another peace plan that involved constitutional guarantees for an elected autonomous government, an autonomous legislature with discretion on social, economic, education, cultural, law enforcement, and environmental affairs, and automatic representation in all branches of the central government. The plan also envisioned the establishment of free economic zones and the creation of a special commission to investigate war crimes committed in the 1990s. Though that peace plan was originally rejected by Tskhinvali, it was later endorsed in October by both Russia and South Ossetia when Georgia started an international campaign against Russia's peacekeeping status and in December, South Ossetia stalled the plan by making a counter-proposal that would have essentially implemented the same measures but over the span of several decades.

Tbilisi engaged in a double-sided approach towards South Ossetia after the failure of the 2005 peace plan. It increased pressure and isolation of the Kokoity government while engaging in a soft power campaign to win the favors of the civilian population through subsidy programs, pensions, health care, and television campaigns. In July 2005, Georgia organized a donors' conference in Batumi for South Ossetia without the participation of Kokoity. In November 2006, while Kokoity was reelected, Georgia held a parallel election in the territories under its control in South Ossetia, which resulted in the election of Dimitri Sanakoev as an "Alternative President", with jurisdiction over Georgian villages in the conflict zone. Months later, Tbilisi legitimized Sanakoev as Head of a Provisional Administration of South Ossetia based in the village of Kurta and sought to change the JCC negotiating format into a 2+2+2 format (Georgia and Russia, the European Union and the OSCE, and the Kokoity and Sanakoev administrations).

Russia increased its grip over the two regions during the Saakashvili years. In 2006, it built a 2,500-man strong military base near Tskhinvali and renovated the Soviet-era Ugardanta Base in Java, staffing it with troops independent from the JPKF, while shootings between South Ossetian militias and Georgian police became increasingly frequent. In June 2007, Russia and South Ossetia vetoed a third peace proposal that would have made Moscow a guarantor of peace, abandoned Georgia's efforts to change the peacekeeping format, created a special travel regime for South and North Ossetians, and launched major economic programs, with doors left open for a rejection of future NATO integration, an agreement compared to the 1921 Treaty of Kars with Turkey. It was only in 2008 that the OSCE recognized that the "existing negotiating format on South Ossetia was not conductive to conflict resolution." In Abkhazia, tensions increased after a special police operation in the Kodori Valley in 2006 expelled local warlords and allowed Tbilisi to establish full control of the valley, leading Sokhumi to demand the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the region. In March 2007, Russian helicopters fired at Georgian public infrastructure in the Kodori town of Chkhalta, while in September, a skirmish between Georgian special forces and a group of Abkhaz and Russian mercenaries led to the Killing of several Russian GRU officers. In November 2007, a Russian peacekeeping unit tried to forcefully take control of a government-sponsored youth camp in the conflict zone village of Ganmukhuri, leading to Georgia launching a campaign to internationalize the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia.

On the other hand, Georgia was accused of engaging in hostile and militaristic rhetoric, especially related to Abkhazia, with Saakashvili promising IDPs a return to the region before "the next winter" during his 2008 presidential campaign. A January 2008 report by the UN Secretary General talked of a "a widespread sense of uncertainty and alarm was fueled by an almost daily flow of inaccurate reports originating in the Georgian media and the Georgian authorities themselves." Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, before his 2006 resignation, talked publicly of military intervention against Tskhinvali and hinted at plans that would happen "whether the West agreed or not." And yet, that rhetoric came in sharp contrast with the several peace plans made by the Saakashvili administration over the years, Tbilisi's efforts to increase both UN and EU presence in the regions, and Western powers' lack of responsiveness to these initiatives.

BLUASHVILI

• Saakashvili was emboldened by the Palm Revolution and believed another show of force could bring South Ossetia into the fold (392)
• In September 2006, Vano Merabishvili told Rustavi 2 that Russia was "weaker than ever before" (392)
• Bluashvili believes that Saakashvili had been inspired by Croatia's 1991 Operation Whirlwind (393)
• Saakashvili announced already after the Palm Revolution that the South Ossetian issue would be solved like Adjara (393)
• Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili had several comments about military intervention in Tskhinvali, talked about plans, and said they would happen whether the West agreed or not (393-394)
• 17 July 2006: Parliament adopts non-binding resolution rejecting Russia as a peacekeeper (394)
• 28 November 2007: Saakashvili Tells IDPs they would spend the next winter in Abkhazia (394-395)
• The continuous militaristic statements from the Georgian leadership created distrust in the separatist leaderships (395)
• The defense budget of Georgia reached 1,3 billion in 2007 (395)
• For Russia, South Ossetia was strategically very important, as it was in the core of Georgia, just 40 km from Tbilisi (395-396)

Kosovo independence

Tensions between Georgia and Russia also increased in the context of Kosovo's declaration of independence and its Western backing. Vladimir Putin had drawn comparisons between Kosovo on the one hand and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other already in 2006 following the independence of Montenegro, when the Kremlin affirmed "respect toward the principle of territorial integrity", while "pointing out that South Ossetia's right to self-determination is an equally respected principle in the world community.". Speaking shortly thereafter, Putin questioned, "if someone takes the view that Kosovo should be granted state independence, then why should we withhold the same from Abkhazia and South Ossetia?" At the 2006 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Russia and China declared separatism as one of the "evil forces challenging global security.".

Western powers rejected the notion that a recognition of Kosovo could create an international precedent legitimizing separatist movements, despite warnings, among others by EU Common Foreign Policy High Representative Javier Solana who predicted "unintended consequences for Georgia" in case of a Western recognition of Kosovo. Proponents of Kosovo's independence issued verbal reassurances over the years to the Saakashvili administration that there would be no Kosovo-Abkhazia-South Ossetia parallel, despite warnings by Russia that there would be an "asymmetric response". At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin warned Western powers that he would "not allow Russia to lose any more of its periphery." Days before Kosovo's independence declaration in February 2008, Putin announced that Russia had "homework" prepared in response to an incoming declaration.

In the months leading up to Kosovo's independence declaration, Mikheil Saakashvili sought to warn his allies about potential risks for Georgia. In official letters to U.S. President George W. Bush and other Western leaders, he called on them to "keep Georgia and its vulnerabilities in mind" when working on a solution for Kosovo. Tbilisi saw a forced unilateral declaration as the worst possible outcome for its own interests, which made Saakashvili push for a final settlement of the Kosovo crisis with a mutual agreement of partition with Serbia, which would in turn have created a precedent for a peaceful settlement of the Abkhaz conflict. Ronald Asmus criticized the lack of any preventive strategy to "shield Tbilisi or to mitigate such consequences - except for weak diplomatic talking points" and argued that in preparation for a Russian retaliation, the United States and the European Union should pushed for an expansion of UNOMIG and the OSCE mission in South Ossetia to help control dynamics on the ground.

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence and was immediately recognized by the United States and a majority of Western European powers. That same day, an informal gathering of CIS leaders in Moscow allowed Putin to call the development a "terrible precedent":

Essentially, [the Kosovo declaration of independence] is blowing up the whole system of international relations which evolved not only over the past decades but over the past centuries. Undoubtedly, it might provoke a whole chain of unpredictable consequences. Those who are doing this, relying exclusively on force and having their satellites submit to their will, are not calculating the results of what they are doing. Ultimately, this is a stick with two ends and one day the other end of this stick will hit them on their heads.

In private conversations with Saakashvili, Putin detailed his plan to eventually lift the Abkhazia trade embargo and establish relations with both the latter and South Ossetia, moves that precipitated the prelude to the August war, and even threatened to "transform Abkhazia into Northern Cyprus" by establishing a direct military occupation of the province. On February 18, the Russian Federal Assembly passed a joint declaration calling on the Russian Government to change its policy towards frozen conflicts in the near-abroad and on March 13, the State Duma called a special session to discuss the recognition of separatist republics in the post-Soviet space. Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of the State Duma, held a meeting with separatist leaders Sergei Baghapsh and Eduard Kokoity and pledged that Russia would "reshape its relations" with self-proclaimed republics, while both used the Kosovo declaration as an opportunity to forge closer alliances with Russian hardliners. But within days, Putin dismissed allegations he would outright recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Moldova's Transnistria, stating that Russia "would not behave like a monkey."

Putin told Saakashvili on February 17, "You understand, I cannot leave the West without a response after Kosovo, and I'm sorry but you are understood as part of this response," to which the Georgian leader responded with reciprocal threats hinting at supporting independence movements in the North Caucasus. Russian legal experts developed a rhetoric claiming that Abkhazia's case for independence had "more moral, historic, and legal grounds" than that of Kosovo's and rejected the latter's "special case" claim. These arguments were vehemently rejected by Western powers, who themsleves called Kosovo's independence casus sui generis. In a memo, The Heritage Foundation pointed at key differences between Kosovo and Georgia's breakaway republics: Kosovo spent seven years under direct UN administration before declaring independence, its recognition by the UN Security Council was only prevented by a Russian veto, independence for Kosovo was endorsed by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and was backed by the European Union, NATO, most members of the Kosovo Contact Group, and official UN bodies, and while Kosovo was itself a victim of ethnic cleansing, the same could not be said about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Dutch academic Jelger Groeneveld underlined that Kosovo had to negotiate "standards before status", fulfilling over 100 conditions in good governance and securing the right to return to Serb IDPs before declaring its independence. Georgian Professor Levan Alexidze rejected the notion that a "generally recognized precedent undermining the inalienability of the territorial integrity of states" had been created by Kosovo, because of the latter's unique international and humanitarian factors. Marco Siddi of the University of Edinburgh argued that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a violation of international law just as much as that of Kosovo, as secession is only recognized under the principles of decolonization or deoccupation. Gearóid Ó Tuathail of Virginia Tech described Russia's claims of "humanitarian action" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which it compared to Western support for Kosovo, as "cynical", while author Christopher Hitchens called the comparison "moral sloth". Vladimir ðorñević of Masaryk University rejected considering Kosovo's independence recognition as a precedent as that principle was not applied by Russia towards any other separatist debates in the world, despite existing conflicts in Northern Cyprus, Artsakh, Somaliland, and others, while a logical continuation of the Kremlin's arguments would have led to Russia recognizing Kosovo, which it has not to this day. Professor William Slomanson of the Thomas Jefferson School of Law has called for the establishment of an international legal definition of legitimate separatism to avoid drawing similar parallels.

In the wake of the Kosovo declaration of independence, Russia actively changed its policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but not towards Artsakh and Transnistria, indicated the precedent was used to apply pressure on Georgia,. while avoiding similar conflicts with Azerbaijan and Moldova.. European Parliament Member Laima Andrikienė called on Russia to withdraw from the breakaway republics, abandon management of the frozen conflicts to the international community, and seek a "real chance to reach a long-awaited solution in everyone's interest" if it wanted to use Kosovo as an actual precedent. At an UN Security Council session in August 2008, Costa Rica rejected similarities between the cases of Serbia and Georgia because of the use of force by Russia. Russian allies mostly rejected the precedent as well, with Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan admitting they could not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia without doing the same for Kosovo, though some aligned with Moscow's position: when recognizing the independence of Georgia's separatist republics, Nicaragua argued that "Kosovo should have remained part of Yugoslavia but South Ossetia and Abkhazia were different for ethnic, historical, and geographic reasons."

Georgia met Kosovo's declaration of independence by entirely withdrawing from NATO's KFOR mission, while Saakashvili held a meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to discuss the implications of Kosovo's independence on Georgia.

The declaration of independence of Kosovo remains recognized as one of the causes that precipitated Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and its eventual recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Putin announcing a series of "pre-designed plans". Russian leaders later compared Russia's invasion of Georgia with NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force. Saakashvili, however, rejected the notion that tensions were launched by the Kosovo development: at a meeting with EU Foreign Ministers in May 2008, he pointed out to Russian advertisement campaigns pointing out to Abkhazia as a destination in the framework of the 2014 planned Sochi Winter Olympics, allegedly indicating already-existing plans to annex Abkhazia "much earlier than Kosovo's independence was recognized."

Russia would use the case of Kosovo again as international precedent to justify its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in 2022.

BLUASHVILI

• Back in 2006, NATO SecGen Javier Solana had warned the West that a recognition of Kosovo's independence could lead to unintended consequences for Georgia (390)
• At a CIS summit after the Kosovo recognition, Putin told Saakashvili, "You understand, I cannot leave the West without a response after Kosovo, and I'm sorry but you are understood as part of this response (390)
  • Saakashvili responded by warning that an Abkhazia/SO recognition could lead to stronger independence movements in the North Caucasus (390-391)
  • Saakashvili added that Georgia could be an excellent neighbor for Russia, all it took was political will by Moscow, to which Putin responded that all bilateral relations could be restored, but the territorial issues were a separate geopolitical problem related to Kosovo (391)
• Bluashvili believes that Western powers continuously told MS not to worry about Kosovo-Abkhazia parallels (391)

Georgian military build-up

Georgia had considerably increased its military resources in the years leading up to the war, especially since the Rose Revolution and Georgia's announced desire to join NATO. From 2004 to 2007, military spending went from 1% of the national GDP to 8%, with a historical record being reached in 2007 with 1.5 billion GEL, or 9.2% of Georgia's national GDP and a 840% increase from 2004. The number of active troops went from 20,000 in 2004 to 33,000 on the eve of the war, while the Saakashvili administration introduced a reservist training program in 2005 that trained 100,000 reservists by 2008. In December 2006, the Georgian Parliament adopted a law requiring all men from 27 to 40 years old to undergo 18 days of compulsory military training once every two years. Tbilisi justified its military buildup with a general militarization of the South Caucasus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan experiencing higher military expenditures in the same years, and with an attempt to rapidly modernize the Georgian Armed Forces to meet NATO standards. Critics of the latter have argued that official US recommendations at the time pointed out to defense spending increases as being "over target".

In September 2007, a fifth brigade of 2,500 regular troops was added to the Georgian Armed Forces, bringing up the total of active servicemen to 32,000. Around the same time, the Georgian Ministry of Defense started the construction of a new military base in Khoni, near the Abkhaz conflict zone, the rehabilitation of the Kopitnari Military Airfield in Kutaisi, and the reconstruction of outdated military infrastructures in Vaziani, Vashlijvari, and Kobuleti. Describing the overall trend in Georgia's military buildup, the IIFFMCG stated that "few did not see this as a message," while rhetoric from high-ranking hardliners close to the Saakashvili administration did little to quell those concerns. In March 2008, MP Givi Targamadze, the highly-influential chairman of Parliament's Defense and Security Committee, stated his support for the reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia "with the help of our armed forces." During a high-stakes and confidential meeting between Abkhaz and Georgian officials in Sweden in June 2008, MP Nika Rurua added that restoring Georgia's territorial integrity "would be achieved through war or peace."

Much of Georgia's military buildup happened with the direct assistance of the United States and other Western powers, notably Turkey, Germany, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, as well as allies like Ukraine and Israel. According to Russian intelligence reports, before Russia's invasion of Georgia, Georgia was awaiting the delivery of high-technology weapons from France (including Mirage 2000 fighter jets and Mistral missile systems) and several Black Hawk helicopters from the United States. The Saakashvili administration justified the upgrading of Georgia's weaponry with its increased involvement in international security missions, with Tbilisi recommitting its participation in the Iraq war in March 2008 for another six months and announcing at the same time the deployment of 350 soldiers to Afghanistan by September. In turn, Russia criticized the close military ties between Georgia and NATO states, notably the presence of Western military advisers in the country and the holding of international military exercises on Georgian territory. In the months preceding the war, Russian and Abkhaz intelligence accused Georgia of amassing troops in the Kodori Valley and of holding regular military exercises near the Abkhaz conflict line, though these allegations were not confirmed by UNOMIG.

In response to international concerns, Georgia took a series of steps to reform its military. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili appointed the first-ever civilian to the post of Minister of Defense, while the latter's staff soon moved to a mostly-civilian make-up, though critics argued that spending lacked transparency nonetheless. In May 2008, the Government of Georgia published a five-year budgetary plan that showed a progressive decrease in military expenditures to reach 2.3% of the national GDP by 2012. In preparation for the incoming clash, the Government walked back its plan and increased defense spending in June by an additional 300 million laris.

Initial tensions (March-May)

Russian departure from Abkhazia Sanctions Treaty

Within days of Kosovo's declaration of independence, a series of events took place in Abkhazia that led to a rise in tensions between Georgia and Russia. On February 28, Russia announced the creation of voting precincts throughout Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the 2008 Russian presidential election, a move criticized by Tbilisi. Georgian MP Shota Malakshkhia claimed that ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia's Gali district were coerced to vote in the elections, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a formal protest to Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko. On February 29, Abkhaz separatists launched large-scale military exercises in the Ochamchire district, close to the ceasefire line, exercises that would be repeated in late March. On March 5, the People's Assembly of the Republic of Abkhazia held an emergency session to discuss "attacks against residents of Gali, including kidnappings, pogroms, activities of Georgian terrorist and raiding groups, and more," at the end of which it issued a call for the withdrawal of all Georgian presence from the Kodori Valley and for Russia, the United Nations, the OSCE, and "other international organizations" to "influence the Georgian government" against the use of military force and to force them to "put an end to their terrorist activities."

On March 6, in parallel of a NATO informal meeting in Brussels to discuss granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia announced Moscow's departure from the 1996 Decision of the Council of the Heads of State of the CIS On Measures to Regulate the Conflict in Abkhazia, also known as the Abkhazia Sanctions Treaty, a trade embargo on Abkhaz separatists first implemented to pressure them into allowing the return of Georgian IDPs. Though Russia had long been accused of regularly violating the treaty over the years and increasingly since the Rose Revolution, notably in private banking, energy, real estate, and transportation , Moscow justified its departure, citing a "change in the circumstances" on the ground and claiming that Sokhumi had been "fulfilling its obligations" in IDP resettlement, assessing that "most Georgian IDPs" had been returned to Gali, a claim vehemently denied by Tbilisi. In its explanatory note, the Russian MFA also justified its departure from the sanctions treaty with Georgia's "installation of a subordinate administration" in the Kodori Valley, referring to the Government in-exile of the pro-Georgian Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

In withdrawing from the sanctions treaty, Russia called on other CIS member states to follow suit, although none would do so. Alexey Ostrovsky, chairman of the State Duma's Committee on CIS Affairs, argued that other states rejected Russia's call because of fears for their own domestic separatist issue, such as Moldova's Transnistria and Azerbaijan's Karabakh. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, accused Russia of "paving the way for recognition of Abkhazia", a view disagreed by US Assistant State Secretary Dan Fried at the time, calling the idea of recognition "too extreme". US officials, including UN Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, believed at the time that the withdrawal from sanctions were meant to facilitate the transfer of weapons to Abkhaz separatists.

Russian media reported that Vladimir Putin had warned Saakashvili about this decision already two weeks before during a meeting in Moscow. Georgia nonetheless condemned Russia's move. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called it "immoral and dangerous" as, it argued, it legitimized the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia, and declared that a "new phase" was starting in the regional conflict. Parliament Chair Nino Burjanadze accused Russia of being involved in a "formal annexation" of Abkhazia, a comment shared by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. Georgia's UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania called the decision a "serious threat of destabilization" and criticized the United Nations for having "failed to resolve the conflict". Georgian MPs floated the idea of demanding 20 billion dollars from Russia for compensation for losses in Abkhazia and a resolution was drafted condemning Russia's lifting of sanctions and scrapping the CIS peacekeeping format, a resolution eventually dropped in hopes for Russia to walk back its decision.

Russia's withdrawal from the embargo was praised by the Abkhaz separatist authorities, who called on other states to follow Moscow's call. Ambassador Kovalenko called on Tbilisi to also lift its sanctions on Abkhazia, calling it "a way out of the deadlock", though officials in Moscow stated that the decision did not reject Russia's recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity. Leonid Slutsky, Chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, blamed the sanctions for the economic collapse and isolation of Abkhazia and stated that the withdrawal was a form of "encouragement" to promote conflict resolution.

Though many observers believed that the decision in itself did not change the situation on the ground as the sanctions had become inoperative for years, Georgia views the March 6 withdrawal as the first of a series of events that severely increased tensions between Tbilisi and its breakaway regions, eventually leading up to the war in August. This development was also a turning point for many of Georgia's international supporters to adopt a more open stance on Russia's role in the conflict, with the United States starting to back Tbilisi's calls for an internationalization of the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia after March 6. A September 2008 report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated:

It will be difficult to pinpoint an exact date when the tensions started to escalate and develop to a point that military conflict became the option for both parties in the conflict. However, a key date is 6 March 2008, when Russia unilaterally withdrew from the 1996 CIS treaty on the imposition of economic sanctions on Abkhazia.

Despite Russian denials, Tbilisi claimed that the withdrawal of sanctions opened the doors for the large-scale sale of weapons to Abkhazia and at a meeting of the National Security Council on March 7, Mikheil Saakashvili declared a "policy of zero tolerance" towards the militarization of Abkhazia. And though sanctions on Abkhazia were lifted, Russia continued to enforce its 2006 embargo on the rest of Georgia.

On March 7, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia adopted a resolution calling on the international community, and specifically Russia, to recognize Abkhazia's independence. On March 15, during a speech to soldiers at the Gori military base, President Saakashvili rejected the signing of a non-use-of-force treaty with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, one of Russia's demands, as long as "existing agreements are being broken", a statement criticized by South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, who accused Tbilisi of being "incapable" of having a constructive dialogue with the separatists.

NATO Bucharest Summit

Georgia had indicated a desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the 1990s, when it joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994, contributed troops to the Kosovo Force in 1999, and declared its intent to integrate the Alliance during the 2002 Prague Summit. Relations between Tbilisi and NATO increased following the Rose Revolution, with a NATO office opening in Georgia and a special representative of the NATO Secretary General appointed in 2004 and Georgia being granted Intensified Dialogue in 2006. At a January 5, 2008 nationwide referendum, 77% of Georgians voted in favor of NATO membership, which led to Georgia making a formal request for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) on February 14, a step it saw as a guarantee for stability. The Saakashvili administration's eagerness to join NATO was not, however, shared by many Western powers, with German leaders underlining their "skepticism" throughout the process. Regardless, the two sides took several steps to deepen ties in the months preceding the war: on March 12, Georgia joined NATO's Cooperative Airspace Initiative (an airspace control database exchange program) and on March 26, the NATO-Georgia Council met for the first time in Brussels, bringing together ambassadors from each NATO member state and Georgia.

Russia was staunchly opposed to Georgia's integration into NATO, with Foreign Minister Lavrov declaring that Moscow would "spare no efforts to prevent" Georgia's membership. On the one hand, the Kremlin emboldened separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to apply pressure against Tbilisi, Russian NATO Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin warning that the "real secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia" would begin as soon as NATO indicates that Georgia could join the Alliance and arguing that their independence would be legitimized as both territories rejected NATO integration. Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin stated that Georgia would lose the regions "forever" by joining the Alliance. The State Duma held discussions on a resolution calling on Vladimir Putin to recognize the independence of the breakaway republics were Georgia to join the Alliance. On the eve of the Summit, Abkhaz leader Sergei Baghapsh called on NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to take into consideration Sokhumi's concerns before the Alliance made a decision, while Putin addressed both Baghapsh and his South Ossetian counterpart Eduard Kokoity in a letter, pledging "practical, not declaratory" assistance from Russia and calling both leaders "presidents". Moscow also issued indirect threats of conflict in case of the MAP being granted to Georgia and Ukraine: on March 25, Russian President-elect Dmitry Medvedev warned that a decision in favor of Tbilisi and Kyiv would "threaten European security", while Russian diplomats underlined the "risk of war" if NATO were to expand to the South Caucasus.

Tbilisi sought to appease Russian concerns by stating openly that NATO integration was not meant as a threat to Russian interests. Parliament chairwoman Nino Burjanadze recognized that Georgia's NATO aspirations aggravated ties with Russia but expressed hope for an "eventual" improvement in bilateral relations. These comments were in contrast with those of hardliners in the Georgian government, such as Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, who stated openly that NATO membership would allow Georgia to open new energy routes to Europe bypassing Russia. Russian media engaged in a large-scale campaign against Georgia's NATO integration, described by Tajik journalist Oleg Panfilov as "information warfare", claiming that the "political elites" of Georgia were at odds with the views of "the people" and alleging that a new wave of NATO enlargement was part of a plan to launch a direct attack on Russia. In its campaign, Moscow sought to build on open divisions with NATO. On March 15, President Saakashvili stated that "huge pressure is being exerted on some European countries" to reject Georgia's MAP.

Georgia's NATO integration was most backed by the United States, although high-level officials in the Bush administration, namely Condolezza Rice and Robert Gates were at odds with the White House's most ardent neoconservatives, including Vice-President Dick Cheney, over when to grant the country the MAP. On February 14, the United States Senate passed Senate Resolution 439 urging the North Atlantic Alliance to grant both Georgia and Ukraine the MAP and President Bush gave his "unwavering support" on March 19 at a meeting with Saakashvili in the White House. Shortly before the April Summit, the Bush administration issued a formal list of its positions, underling that "NATO must make clear that it welcomes the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine for membership in NATO and offers them a clear path forward toward that goal." During a visit to Kyiv on April 1, Bush once again reiterated his backing for the two countries' NATO integration, believing that granting the MAP would protect them from a growing Russian threat, would encourage them to pursue democratic reforms, and would be a reward for their "courage in being able to confront Russia to join the Western bloc." The United States was joined by a coalition of Central and Eastern European states in supporting granting Georgia the MAP, namely Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and Czechia, who lobbied the Bush administration for more active backing of Tbilisi and Kyiv, as well as Denmark and Canada.

Ahead of the Bucharest Summit, the Alliance was evenly divided. Germany, whose relations with Washington had been strained since its opposition to the Iraq war, led the anti-MAP coalition, arguing that Georgia had failed democratic standards in its latest presidential election and fearing a souring of its relations with Moscow. On March 10, at a meeting with the Bundeswehr command in Berlin, Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected the notion that "states involved in domestic and regional conflicts" should apply for NATO membership and directly stated her opposition to Ukraine's and Georgia's integrations during a press conference with Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Germany was joined in its opposition with France, with Prime Minister François Fillon stating in an interview on French television that Paris would reject Georgia's request. In an attempt to reach a compromise, President Bush opened a back channel for negotiations with Berlin and Paris through his National Security Council and though the sides sought a compromise through a proposal for a "Less than Membership Plan", talks failed when Saakashvili rejected it as "rubbish" and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier forced Merkel to back out of any deal. On April 4, Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy held a press conference ahead of the Bucharest Summit and formally opposed the integration of Georgia and Ukraine into the Alliance. In that, they were joined by Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg, Turkey, and Norway. Some states argued for the Alliance to review the question after the May Georgian parliamentary elections, while the strongest opponents wanted to see a resolution of the separatist conflicts before any decision could be made. Former Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar criticized opponents of Georgia's NATO bid as "discouraging not only Tbilisi but other countries trying to embrace democracy."

The Bucharest NATO Summit took place on April 2-4, 2008 and was described as "the most contentious and dramatic NATO meeting ever." Discussions on Georgia within the North Atlantic Council spanned for more than 36 hours but the sides failed to reach an agreement on granting Georgia a MAP. An original compromise between Bush and Merkel saw the Alliance declare granting Georgia and Ukraine the MAP an "ultimate goal", a draft that was vetoed by Lithuania, Romania, and Poland, who forced the NAC to pledge future membership to the two countries. American foreign policy expert Angela Stent has called this compromise "the worst of both worlds" as it failed to provide a clear timetable, even though the Allies agreed to review the situation at the next summit in December, while sending Russia a signal that it could use existing conflicts to veto Georgia's NATO integration. Asmus criticized the Bush administration for never engaging in an all-out campaign to support Georgia's bid, while some have called the Bucharest Summit the first case of open divisions within the Alliance.

Russia extensively lobbied the Summit against Tbilisi's bid, first through Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko and then by Putin himself, who arrived in Bucharest after the Alliance's final decision and congratulated Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer for "standing up to the Americans", while criticizing promises of future membership for Georgia and Ukraine and calling it a "direct threat" to Russia. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Merkel, and Sarkozy convinced Bush to sit down with Putin during the summit, a meeting during which the Russian leader spoke extensively against NATO enlargement and called Ukraine a "Soviet invention".

The December deadline set by NATO has been described as an incentive for Russia to "do everything" to prevent the integration of Georgia. Days after the summit, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Joint Staff Yuri Baluyevsky announced "steps of a different nature" to block Georgia's path, a statement described as a direct military threat by Georgian officials. Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov discussed publicly the need to refocus Russian manufacture on the "needs for war", while Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, pledged to "respond to NATO's enlargement". The Saakashvili administration, influenced by the Bush White House, sought to put a positive spin to the Bucharest Summit decision, arguing that the promise for future membership was "even better" than the MAP, though privately, Georgian officials saw it as a "window of opportunity" for Russia to "blow up Georgia" before December to make the MAP unattainable. Analysts have argued that the Kremlin was emboldened to intervene in Georgia before the end of 2008 because of the Bucharest Summit. In a speech during the August war, Saakashvili blamed the conflict on NATO's failure to provide Georgia a clear path of integration in Bucharest, comparing the summit to the Munich Agreement:

When in April, in Bucharest, Georgia was denied the Membership Action Plan by some members of NATO, I warned the Western media at that stage that it was asking for trouble. Not only did they deny us the MAP, but they specifically told the world that they were doing so because of existing territorial conflicts in Georgia, basically inviting trouble. And I told the world, this is the worst thing one could say to the Russians, that there will be no NATO as long as there are conflicts, and the more there are of conflicts, less there will be NATO. And immediately after April, immediately after Bucharest – and I can tell you now that Russians perceived Bucharest, and I mentioned it and then some of the Western commentators made fun of me, saying that, oh, it – this hot-headed Saakashvili says this rubbish again. I told them Russia perceives this as a new Munich. Bucharest was perceived by them as a new Munich.

According to Asmus, Russia was emboldened not by the MAP decision, but rather by obvious signs of division within NATO, interpreting it as a sign of weakness in the West. Much like Kosovo's declaration of independence, the Bucharest Summit helped trigger a series of events that eventually led to the war in August, and so despite attempts by Bush to appease Putin at a meeting in Sochi days after the summit. Polish President Lech Kaczyński threatened to veto all future EU-Russia negotiations before Georgia was granted the MAP. On the sidelines of the 34th G8 Summit in Japan, President Medvedev declared NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine a "red line" for Russia and on July 12, a new foreign policy concept paper approved by the Russian government formally pitted Moscow's against Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration. Rogozin warned on July 8, a month before the Russian invasion, that Moscow "would not allow" NATO expansion in its "zone of interest". U.S. Senators Joe Biden and Richard Lugar later criticized NATO's "attempt to appease Russia by denying the MAP to Georgia and Ukraine" as Moscow soon began operations to "sabotage the peace process".

• The Russian information war was filled with propaganda against Georgia joining NATO (Panfilov, 76)

Russian ties with the breakaway regions

Though Russia formally played the role of mediator in the conflicts between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, it enjoyed a strong influence in the separatist governments years before 2008 and exerted control via key security officials and financial assistance to what Tbilisi called "Russian proxy regimes". In Abkhazia, these officials included, before 2008, Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Pavlyushko (previously head of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the region), Chief of General Staff Anatoly Zaitsev (also a high-ranking official in the Russian Ministry of Defense), and Deputy Security Council Secretary Alexander Voinsky (also a Commander in the Russian Navy). In South Ossetia, the power elite was described by Russian journalist Julia Latynina as a "joint business venture between KGB generals and Ossetian entrepreneurs using money allocated by Moscow", while the Kremlin was thought to hold a "direct line" with the office of local leader Eduard Kokoity, though questions remain as to who exerted influence on the latter from the Russian side, and all security-related decisions were made by Russian officers. In early 2008, the key South Ossetian leaders thought to be appointed by Moscow included Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev (a Colonel of the Russian Militsiya), Security Council Chairman Anatoly Barankevich (a Russian Army Colonel), State Security Committee Chairman Boris Atoev (a Russian citizen and former Soviet-era intelligence official), and Border Security Head Valery Chugunov (also a Lieutenant General of the FSB). Kokoity's cabinet staff included high-ranking GRU officials, such as former Russian Deputy Interior Minister Sergey Shadrin, who worked as a law enforcement adviser to Kokoity. On March 1, 2008, Russian Major General Vasily Lunev transitioned from Deputy Commander of the Siberian Military District to Minister of Defense of South Ossetia, a position he later admitted having taken as an "order from his superior".

On March 7, Sokhumi and Tskhinvali both made formal requests for Russia to recognize their independence, a day after Moscow's lifting of the Abkhazia trade embargo. In response, the State Duma held public hearings on the question on March 13, featuring the testimonies of officials from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria in a closed session. In a report following the hearings, the Duma's CIS Affairs Committee issued a series of controversial recommendations, including a deepening of relations between Russia and the three breakaway republics, the establishment of diplomatic missions, the waiving of all trade tariffs on goods made by Russian-owned businesses in those republics, and increasing economic assistance to Russian citizens living there, although Duma Vice-Chairman Leonid Slutsky emphasized that "no decision was formally taken" against Georgia's territorial integrity. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta described the hearings as the "launch of recognition procedures". On March 21, the Duma adopted a non-binding resolution calling on the Putin administration to consider the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to actively defend the rights of Russian citizens in those regions by increasing the size of the Russian peacekeeping forces there. In response to the resolution, Georgia affirmed that Russia had "deprived itself of any political, legal or moral right to claim the role of a neutral and unbiased mediator in the conflict resolution process," though Saakashvili originally sought to downplay the move as a "simple tactic" to pressure Tbilisi and claimed Putin had promised never to recognize the breakaway republics, a claim quickly denied by Lavrov. Shortly after voting in favor of the resolution, MP Konstantin Zatulin handed that any recognition should be postponed to the end of the year to avoid an escalation of tensions in the early months of the Medvedev presidency.

On April 3, just as the North Atlantic Council was rejecting Georgia's MAP bid in Bucharest, Abkhaz leader Sergei Baghapsh visited Moscow and met with high-level diplomats. According to Russian media, his visit included the launch of talks with Russia's Security Council on boosting bilateral ties, including through the provision of low-interest loans by the Russian Central Bank, a double taxation agreement, Abkhazia's integration into the Russian customs system, opening of maritime links, and reopening the Sokhumi International Airport. On April 8, the Russian Ministry of Justice communicated to its Georgian counterpart its intention to launch direct ties with the Abkhaz authorities over the extradition of Russian citizens held in Abkhaz prisons, a move condemned by Tbilisi and met with concern by the Council of Europe. By April 14, Russian media had leaked information that the Kremlin was preparing an executive decree establishing diplomatic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, though Russian commentators feared that such a step would have a "negative impact" on the anti-Saakashvili opposition in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

On April 16, Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing formal relations between the Russian government and local authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for a "comprehensive defense of the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of Russian citizens". The decree instructed Russian federal and regional agencies to cooperate with their counterparts in the breakaway states in economic, social, scientific, and cultural fields, recognized official documents issued by authorities in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, as well as companies registered in the two regions, authorized direct assistance in law enforcement and judicial matters, and deputized the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry's offices in Krasnodar and North Ossetia as consular offices with jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively. Citing Tbilisi's refusal to sign a non-use of force agreement and to withdraw from its positions in the Kodori Valley, the decree also provided for "additional future steps", including military agreements, the deployment of Russian forces in the Gudauta military base of Abkhazia, the reopening of a naval base in Ochamchire, and recognition if Georgia were to join NATO, while blaming Georgia for forcing locals of being "hostages to inter-nationality conflicts". The Kremlin claimed that international law had set precedent for such decrees Despite a sharp rise in tensions following the decrees, Moscow denied having caused any crisis in bilateral relations and rejected the notion that the executive orders were aimed at establishing control over the breakaway regions.

The April 16 decrees were praised by separatist authorities, with Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba claiming that Abkhazia was "very close to recognition" and that Sokhumi was "not afraid of any backlash from Tbilisi" and President Baghapsh convening a Security Council session to discuss next steps. In Tskhinvali, Kokoity praised Putin's decision as "the only right solution to save the lives of Russian citizens" and called on Tbilisi to accept it "with calm". Georgia called the decree a "flagrant violation" of its sovereignty, as well as an attempt to legalize the annexation of the two republics by Russia. At a cabinet meeting held a day later, Mikheil Saakashvili described himself as "astonished and anxious about the provocative nature of Russia's moves" and called on Russia to "revise the decision", while dispatching his European Integration State Minister Giorgi Baramidze to Brussels and his Foreign Minister Davit Bakradze to Washington to mobilize international support. Also on April 17, Georgia formally requested an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, though delays by the South African rotating presidency caused the session to be held only on April 23, by which time most discussions had shifted to the downing of a Georgian drone over Abkhazia by a Russian military jet. Saakashvili convened a National Security Council meeting on April 23, during which he warned that Russia was seeking to annex Abkhazia, and after which he made a televised address accusing Moscow of seeking to "change the world order unilaterally for the first time since World War II" and alleging that hostile actions had started in August 2007 with the Tsitelubani episode.

Reactions of the international community was much stronger following the April 16 decree than previous developments. US State Secretary Condolezza Rice expressed her concern and held a phone call with her Russian counterpart over the matter, while Republican presidential candidate John McCain called the decree "de facto annexation" and US OSCE Ambassador Julie Finley accused Russia of openly siding with the separatists. On May 7, the US House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution condemning Russia's provocative and dangerous actions and calling on Moscow to revoke the decree. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt denounced the decree and expressed his belief that it was done to derail a new Abkhazia peace plan proposed by the Saakashvili administration. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves blamed the decree on NATO's failure to grant Georgia the MAP in Bucharest, while the Riigikogu passed a resolution condemning Russia's decision to establish official links with the separatist authorities. Statements of condemnations were also issued by the leaders of Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia, and British Special Representative Brian Fall. The European Union called on Russia not to implement the decree, while an European Parliament resolution approved on May 28 criticized the decree as "not contributing towards finding a peaceful solution to the Abkhaz conflict." A group of 25 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a joint declaration calling for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to replace Russian forces. NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer urged Russia to "reverse these measures" and called on Tbilisi to "continue to show restraint". The Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General found itself divided for the first time when Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued a joint statement expressing high concerns against Russia, a statement that led Abkhazia's Shamba to criticize the organization as being biased.

In the months leading up to the war, the leaders of the separatist republics also cultivated stronger ties with each other. On April 15, Kokoity traveled to Sokhumi to inaugurate the South Ossetian Embassy in Abkhazia, sign a bilateral customs agreement, and issue a joint declaration accusing Georgia of arming itself in preparation for an invasion of the two territories. Kokoity traveled again to Abkhazia on June 15 to discuss "the military threat from Georgia" and a week later, the leaders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria agreed on a common defense pact. Abkhazia opened an embassy in Tiraspol in July. At the same time, North Caucasus political and civil institutions made public calls for the recognition of independence of the two Georgian secessionist republics, with the South Russian Parliamentary Association approving a resolution calling on Moscow to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Liberal Democratic Party of North Ossetia launching a campaign for a referendum to "unite" South Ossetia to the Russian federal subject, and Abkhaz People's Assembly chairman Nugzar Ashuba visiting Chechnya in July.

Days after the decree was signed by Putin, Russia showed original signs of détente, with the Federation Council refusing to vote on the Duma's resolution calling for the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Putin himself hinted he would lift trade and transportation bans on Georgia, largely out of fear that Tbilisi would delegitimize the Russian military presence in Abkhazia. Upon the inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev as President of Russia on May 7, many thought a formal change in government could deescalate tensions, with Bush asking him to repeal the decree during their first phone call and Saakashvili telling his National Security Council he hoped Medvedev would "reverse course". But these expectations proved to be in vain, as Medvedev himself hosted Baghapsh in Moscow on June 26, the first official bilateral meeting between a Russian president and an Abkhaz separatist leader. One of most ardent supports of Abkhazia's independence in Russia was Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, whose statements led to Georgian MPs Nika Rurua and Irakli Kavtaradze to call for him to be declared persona non grata, while Kokoity engaged directly with other Russian hardliners like communist Gennady Zyuganov and North Ossetian President Teimuraz Mamsurov. On July 1, reports showed that Gazprom was planning an oil and gas exploration survey off the coast of Abkhazia, while the corporation confirmed plans for a Russia-Abkhazia pipeline. The same day, ferry traffic between Sochi and Gagra was resumed after having been interrupted in 2003, while Abkhaz authorities discussed the launch of direct flights with Russia using the Sokhumi airport, despite a ban by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

The April 16 decree was viewed by Georgia as an early step in the prelude to the war, while Russian diplomats hinted that a formal recognition could be possible following a direct military clash. British journalist Robert Parsons suggested that Russia was provoking Georgia into hasty actions. Attempts by Georgian Catholicos Patriarch Ilia II to defuse tensions through direct talks with the Russian Orthodox Church also failed.

Georgian drone program

Part of Georgia's increased military buildup in recent years included the creation of a drone surveillance program, using around 40 Israeli-made Elbit Hermes 450s purchased in 2007. As ties between Abkhaz separatists and Russia increased and as Tbilisi accused Russia of lifting its embargo on Abkhazia as an excuse for the sale of arms, Georgia deployed its UAVs over the region to document Russian troop movements and military reinforcements. Tbilisi had accused Abkhazia of stationing over 1,000 troops in the Gali district, while Sokhumi claimed that Georgian forces had been amassed in Zugdidi and Kodori, denied by a UNOMIG investigation. On May 12, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs unveiled drone footage that showed large Russian troop deployments in Abkhazia, close to the ceasefire line, though Abkhazia continuously argued that the flight of drones was organized to help Georgian forces plan a military operation.

On March 18, the Security Council of Abkhazia announced having downed a Georgian UAV over the boundary line between the Ochamchire and Gali districts, a claim denied by Tbilisi but backed by Russia, which criticized the "build-up of the Georgian military" as evidenced by a "recently shot-down drone in the airspace of the security zone." On April 20, a Georgian drone was shot down over the village of Gagida and that incident was this time confirmed by Georgian authorities, who alleged that a Russian fighter aircraft had been responsible. This incident remains one of the most focal points of the prelude to the war as it represented a direct military clash between Georgian and Russian forces in Abkhazia and led to two UN Security Council sessions and the engagement of the Vienna Mechanism by the OSCE. Though both Sokhumi and Moscow claimed that an Abkhaz-owned aircraft had been responsible for downing the drone, a UN investigation on the ground found that the responsible party was a Russian-originated military jet that had flown back to Russian airspace after the incident. At the time, the UN found both Georgia and Russia responsible for having violated the 1994 Moscow Agreement, one by flying unauthorized UAVs over the conflict zone and the other by using military forces unauthorized by the CIS Peacekeeping Force.

April 20 represented a new peak in bilateral tensions. Presidents Saakashvili and Putin held a phone conversation during which Saakashvili demanded Russia repeal its April 16 decree. On April 23, Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas visited Tbilisi as a show of solidarity, while the United States accused Russia of increasing tensions and violating Georgia's sovereignty. According to later reports confirmed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Georgia and Russia were "dangerously close" to an armed conflict following the April 20 episode and President Saakashvili admitted that French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's mediation "prevented war".

Another two Georgian drones were shot down on May 4 over the Gali district, this time using Buk missile systems, thus proving the presence of unauthorized military weapons in the conflict zone. Another three drones were allegedly shot down between May 8 and May 12, though these shootdowns were denied by Tbilisi. From March 18 to May 12, UNOMIG confirmed five Georgian UAV overflights and two Russian Su-25 military fighter jets over Abkhazia, each incident assessed as violations of the 1994 ceasefire agreement. More drone flights were reported over the Kodori Valley, though both sides denied having been responsible. On May 30, Georgia's UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania announced Tbilisi would unilaterally cease its drone program over Abkhazi

The drone crisis represented a new height in tensions between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia. On March 20, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia passed a resolution accusing Tbilisi of having taken "a course towards preparations for another military invasion", while calling on Sergei Baghapsh to withdraw from the Geneva Process. On April 11, a Georgian priest was expelled from Gali for allegedly criticizing Russian peacekeepers and on April 17, Baghapsh called on the UN to pressure Georgia to withdraw from the Kodori Valley or face "appropriate measures". On May 5, Georgia withdrew from the 1995 CIS Air Defense Cooperation Treaty.

The IIFFMCG assessed that the "intensification of air activities over the conflict zone, including by UAVs and fighter jets was one of the first start of tensions that looked like it could lead to an open conflict," while the flying of warplanes by Russia over Georgian territory constituted an "illegal threat of force".

Russian military buildup in Abkhazia

Tensions increased rapidly in mid-April when the Georgian Intelligence Service reported that several Ural-4320 trucks carrying around 300 Russian mercenaries had entered Abkhazia and were stationed at the Ochamchire naval base on April 17, the same day as a statement issued by Abkhaz leader Baghapsh warning the deployment of Abkhaz troops in the demilitarized zone of the Gali district unless Georgian troops were withdrawn from the Kodori Valley and the Zugdidi Municipality. A day later, Sokhumi alleged that Tbilisi had started reinforcing troops in the Kodori Valley, a claim denied by Georgian authorities and rejected by an UNOMIG investigation. Despite military experts' assessment that the Kodori Valley's high-mountain relief made it impossible for it to be used as a base for a Georgian invasion of Abkhazia, Russia reiterated the Abkhaz allegations on April 29, this time accusing Georgia of dispatching 1,500 soldiers and police officers in the area to prepare an attack on Sokhumi, for a total of 7,000 men coming from various units of the Georgian Armed Forces, the Georgian Special Forces, regular police officers, and counter-intelligence officers, allegedly armed with 122 mm howitzer D-30s. Georgia always denied having stationed any troops from its Ministry of Defense in the Kodori Valley. On April 21, 400 Russian Spetsnaz and paratroopers from the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division were dispatched to the conflict zone without notifying Georgia.

While visiting Moscow on April 25, Baghapsh announced he was ready to sign a military agreement with Russia, later confirmed by his Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba, while the Abkhaz People's Assembly voted on a resolution calling on Baghapsh to formally withdraw from the Geneva Process. A day later, Valery Kenyaikin, Special Envoy of the Kremlin on Georgia, threatened that tensions could "escalate into a military confrontation" between Georgia and Russia. Eyewitnesses reported at least one tank during a Moscow military parade with the inscription "To Tbilisi".

On April 29, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a strengthening of its peacekeeping force in Abkhazia with a 545 men-strong battalion from the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, who were deployed across the Restricted Weapons Zone of Abkhazia up to May 6, bringing the total number of Russian troops to 2,542 men, officially under the legal limit of 3,000 peacekeepers set by the 1994 Moscow Agreement. Georgian intelligence denied those numbers, instead assessing the total number of Russian forces present in Abkhazia at 4,000, while noting that the order to increase the number of troops was signed by General Sergey Chaban, who had been dismissed as chief of the CIS Peacekeeping Force back in February. Russian authorities claimed the troops were equipped with 30 BMD-2s and several ZU-23-2s, which experts observed were not traditionally part of the inventory of a peacekeeping force. Georgian intelligence reported in addition several pieces of heavy artillery, including fourteen 122 mm howitzer D-30s, three Buk missile systems, ten BM-21 Grad, anti-tank cannons, two Mil Mi-24 helicopters, and up to 180 technical specialists to service the equipment. The troops and equipment were stationed not only in existing bases, including the Maiak Military Base in Sokhumi, the Tsebelda Mountain Battalion base, and the Ochamchire Seaport, but also in 15 new checkpoints opened on strategically important roads in Akamara and Arasadzikhi (Ochamchire district) and Nakarghali (Tkvarcheli district). A UNOMIG attempt to monitor at least one checkpoint was obstructed by Abkhaz Militsiya officers.

The deployment of new Russian troops in Abkhazia was strongly condemned by Tbilisi, which argued that it had been done in violation of a number of CIS regulations governing peacekeeping operations. At a hastily-convened National Security Council session, Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze called the reinforcement "aggressors", while Foreign Minister Davit Bakradze told Deutsche Welle that it was the "beginning of full-scale military aggression" that negated Russia's role as a mediator in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Speaker Burjanadze accused Russia of seeking to "directly annex Georgian territories" and called the new troops "categorically unacceptable". Thousands protested outside the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi on April 30, calling for an immediate withdrawal of the new peacekeeping troops, a demand that the Georgian Government would reiterate until the August war. Mikheil Saakashvili, who privately saw the events as the beginning of a full-scale war, made a televised address calling on the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to "defy attempts by outrageous and irresponsible external actors", while seeking to deescalate by stating that Georgia "wants peace."

In the early days of May, rhetoric on both sides pointed at the potential for an imminent military clash between Georgia and Russia. During an electoral speech ahead of the May parliamentary elections, Saakashvili said that, "one part of Georgia is under the occupation of one of the biggest aggressors", using the term "occupation" for the first time to describe Russia's military presence in Abkhazia. In response to his speech, Abkhaz separatist leaders claimed that Tbilisi was preparing a military incursion "in the next few days", while Russian media reported about unconfirmed plans by Western diplomats to evacuate Tbilisi. Abkhaz Defense Minister assessed that in case of war, his troops would "reach Kutaisi in four days" and Abkhaz intelligence reports claimed that Tbilisi was preparing for an attack by May 8. On the other hand, Georgian media outlets reported on an alleged Russo-Abkhaz plan to invade the Kodori Valley and parts of Western Georgia in a special operation code-named "Double Dbar" with high-ranking Russian military officials visiting Sokhumi to coordinate a joint attack. On May 11, the Georgian-aligned Government-in-exile of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, based in the Kodori Valley, warned of an incoming "storming of the valley" by General Sergey Chaban. A delegation of Don Cossacks visiting Sokhumi pledged up to 15,000 troops to support Abkhazia in case of war. Speaking in Brussels, State Reintegration Minister Temur Iakobashvili said that Georgia was "on the verge of war with Russia". On May 6, the Abkhaz separatist government proposed placing Abkhazia under formal Russian military protection, an idea originally endorsed by Russian Air Force Commander Alexander Zelin but denied by Russian diplomats. A few days later, Sokhumi asked Russia to establish a permanent military base in Abkhazia, a request Duma MP Alexey Ostrovsky rejected. Though not all details of the military events of early May are known, both Mikheil Saakashvili and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon later revealed that the situation was "close to an armed conflict". Iakobashvili later thanked French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner for having helped Georgia "avoid war" during those days.

The United States strongly condemned the unilateral Russian decision to increase its peacekeeping force, calling on Moscow to "reconsider some provocative steps" that had "significantly and unnecessarily heightened tensions in the region and ran counter to Russia's status as a facilitator." On May 1, State Secretary Condolezza Rice criticized the developments during a summit with her Russian counterpart Lavrov in London. Other high-level US diplomats, including Dan Fried and Matthew Bryza, criticized the inclusion of heavy artillery in the peacekeeping force's renewed equipment. NATO criticized what it said was a "threat of force that undermined Georgia's territorial integrity", while announcing an upcoming visit by the North Atlantic Council as a show of support. During a meeting with Lavrov, EU Foreign Policy High Representative Javier Solana called the Russian move "not wise", while Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt accused Russia of provoking a war in Georgia. Finnish Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Alexander Stubb declared the troop reinforcement a "priority issue" and sought to negotiate, in vain, a deescalation by holding direct talks with both Lavrov and Saakashvili. Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis called on both sides to "settle disagreements."

On May 18, Georgia released footage captured by one of its drones over Abkhazia showing combat troop movements in the conflict zone, in violation of peacekeeping rules, while Georgian intelligence reported the dispatching of an additional 250 Chechen fighters of the controversial Vostok Battalion, a GRU unit involved in a power struggle with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, in the Gali district, patrolling the villages of Gudava, Primorsk, Meore Otobaia, and Sida. Though denied by Moscow, Georgia reported continuous increases in the armament of Russian troops in Abkhazia from April to June, including a large number of BMP and BTR armored vehicles, howitzers, SA-11 Buks, BM-21 Grad rocket systems, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka systems, with similar weapons were brought into South Ossetia around the same time and stationed in Java. Several Su-25 and Su-27 fighter planes in armed condition were detected at the Bombora Military Base in Gudauta in June by Georgian intelligence. Throughout the month of May, observers noted increases in armed equipment at several Russian checkpoints in the Abkhaz conflict zone, including in Akamara, Rechkhi, Muzhava, Lekukhona, Saberio, Dikhazurga, Chuburkhinji, Pichori, Mabakevo, Otobaia, and Nakarghali. Tbilisi reported that Russia was building a new military base in the village of Agubedia in the Ochamchire district in June, though Russia denied the claim.

Georgian spy accusation

On May 16, Russian media reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) had arrested 34-year-old Ramzan Turkoshvili, a Georgian-born, ethnic Chechen Russian citizen, on charges of espionage. Turkoshvili was alleged to have worked with the Georgian Intelligence Service and paid in US dollars after having been recruited by Zelmikhan Khangoshvili, a Chechen-Georgian nationalist accused by Moscow of promoting Chechen independence on behalf of the Georgian government. Though no evidence of the FSB's allegations were published, the story was covered extensively by Russian and Abkhaz media, in what Dr. Dani Belo of Carleton University called "the first provocations" in a series of steps meant to instigate fear and facilitate Abkhazia's submission to Moscow's orders. According to Russian media reports, Turkoshvili allegedly confessed upon his arrest of aiding anti-Russian rebels in the Northern Caucasus.

According to Moscow, Turkoshvili was tasked with maintaining a line of communication between Tbilisi and separatist groups in the Northern Caucasus, gathering information about local Russian government officials for potential recruitment, and negotiating with law enforcement to ensure the safe passage of militants across the region. Russian officials claimed the story "confirmed the participation of Georgian secret services in terrorist activities in the North Caucasus", while Khangoshvili was accused by Russian intelligence of financing gangs in the North Caucasus to prepare terrorist acts, using individuals from Georgia's Pankisi Valley.

Russia's claims are denied by the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which called them "a continuation of Russia's policy of provocation towards Georgia, which has taken a particularly acute form recently." Georgian officials believed that Moscow was seeking to incite conflict in the Pankisi Valley, a region in northern Georgia that had been the cause of tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow during the Chechen wars. The FSB's original announcement happened just as Georgian State Reintegration Minister Temur Iakobashvili was in Moscow for official negotiations. Movladi Udugov, security official of the separatist Caucasus Emirate, denied the allegations as "Kremlin propaganda".

The Turkoshvili case highlighted the role of the North Caucasus in the conflict between Georgia and Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized Georgia on May 28 for not having implemented a 2006 agreement that envisioned the setting-up of a Joint Russo-Georgian Anti-Terrorism Center. Caucasus Emir Dokka Umarov announced having established a "special group" for the monitoring of tensions and Russian military deployments in the region and gather intelligence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as early as March. Khangoshvili remained a target of Russian intelligence services, surviving two assassination attempts over the years before being murdered in Berlin by a Russian agent in 2019.

Dispatching of Russian Railway Troops

On May 30, Georgia's UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania announced Tbilisi's unilateral decision to pause its drone surveillance program over Abkhazia. At the same time, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Yuri Zubakov visited Georgia to discuss ways to defuse tensions. But just a day later, Moscow announced the deployment of 400 men from the 76th Unit of Russia's Railway Troops to Abkhazia to repair 54 kilometers of railroad from Sokhumi to Ochamchire. The railway had been in a state of disarray since the 1992-1993 war and Russian authorities portrayed the repair of the road as a "humanitarian mission", promised by Vladimir Putin to Abkhaz separatists since shortly before leaving office. And though the Russian Ministry of Defense asserted that the railway troops were not armed, the deployment was met with condemnation as an "aggressive act" by Tbilisi, which accused Moscow of increasing tensions by continuing to station troops illegally on Georgian territory. The deployment came in the midst of bilateral negotiations between Tbilisi and the Kremlin over a planned Medvedev-Saakashvili summit and happened without any prior warning to the Georgian government.

Russia's claim to legitimacy in the deployment was based on a meeting between Putin and former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in 2003, as well as an informal agreement of the Russian-Georgian Intergovernmental Economic and Trade Cooperation Commission of December 2005. Georgia nonetheless viewed the deployment as illegal and Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili proclaimed those troops "occupants" during a visit to Riga, calling for their immediate withdrawal. A formal note of protest was handed to Russian Ambassador Kovalenko, with the Georgian authorities comparing the development to an act of "annexation of Abkhazia from all directions". Deputy Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze rejected Moscow's justification of the deployment as a humanitarian act, stating, "nobody needs to bring Railway Forces to the territory of another country, unless a military intervention is being prepared." On June 2, the Georgian National Security Council met and the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticizing Georgia's reaction as "anti-Russian ballyhoo". Medvedev and Saakashvili held a phone call on June 3 to discuss the issue, with the Saakashvili administration conditioning the normalization of bilateral ties with the withdrawal of illegal military units from Abkhazia and the repeal of the April 16 decree. Political analysts at The Jamestown Foundation theorized that the timing of the deployment raised doubts about the level of involvement of President Medvedev in the decision-making process, hinting that Putin may have unilaterally ordered it to assert his power as the new Prime Minister of Russia. On June 6, Saakashvili met with Medvedev on the sidelines of an informal CIS summit in Saint-Petersburg, where he stated his hopes for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. During that meeting, Medvedev asked Georgia to sign a non-use of force agreement with Abkhazia and to withdraw from the Kodori Valley, and may have demanded a formal rejection of NATO integration as a guarantee of deescalation, with Georgian officials openly declaring following the meeting that no breakthrough had been achieved, while Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov rejected the proposal to hold further high-level meetings in the near future.

Georgia called on its Western partners to increase assistance to Georgia. The United States State Department said it was "dismayed" by the deployment of railway troops to Abkhazia, calling it a violation of Georgia's territorial integrity and "particularly difficult to understand in light of [...] President Saakashvili's constructive efforts to invigorate the Abkhaz peace process." NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer called it a violation of Georgia's national sovereignty with no legal basis and urged "both sides" to launch a high-level and open dialogue to deescalate tensions. EU foreign policy head Benita Ferrero-Waldner told the Russian Duma that Moscow's recent actions had undermined stability in the whole region. Mostly however, Georgia's international protests fell on deaf ears. In an interview on Georgian television, President Saakashvili said he was not against restoring the Abkhaz railway, but that the context of the deployment indicated a prelude to a direct military intervention and that improvements done to the infrastructure of Abkhazia was in preparation for an invasion.

Early estimates of the work were set at four months but later revised down by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov to two months, indicating a withdrawal of the railway troops by August 6. The rehabilitation work was mired with a series of incidents that contributed to increase tensions in the region. On June 13, Russian troops claimed having found an anti-tank mine close to a work site, claiming it to be an attempt toward a "subversive-terrorist act" against the battalion. On June 18, two explosions on the railroad near Sokhumi caused Abkhaz authorities to increase security measures along the railway. Tbilisi officials claimed the explosions were part of a false-flag operation to discredit Georgia and legitimize the presence of the Russian Railway Troops. An additional 50 Russian workers were brought in to work on railway bridges in the Ochamchire district in early June. In total, the mission repaired 54 kilometers of railway, eight railway bridges (including over the strategic Kodori and Mokvi rivers) and 44 smaller bridges, 20 tunnels, 55 buildings, and 12,000 ties, going as far as just 35 kilometers from the ceasefire line.

On July 21, Russia reported having finished the restoration of the railway two weeks ahead of schedule. On July 30, General Sergei Klimets of the Russian Railway Troops, visited Abkhazia and opened the new railroad in a public ceremony, after which the deployment was ended and soldiers re-stationed at the Gumaria base just a few kilometers of the Abkhaz border. Germany hailed the early departure of the troops as a "positive development" in the conflict, even though both Abkhaz and Russian authorities started discussing a redeployment to rehabilitate the Sokhumi-Psou section of the same railway.

The deployment of additional Russian forces in Abkhazia contributed to a serious increase in tensions and fears by Georgia of an incoming Russian military operation in the region. Temur Mzhavia, the Tbilisi-loyal head of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, claimed that Russia had planned to recognize the independence of the breakaway republic in September. In June, Georgian intelligence noted the presence of Russian Su-27 and Su-25 fighter jets at the officially-closed Gudauta military base in Abkhazia, leading to Georgian attempts to purchase FIM-92 Stingers from the United States, which Washington refused.

Abkhaz separatist leaders publicly claimed that the railway reconstruction efforts were needed to help transport building material from Abkhazia to Sochi ahead of the 2014 Winter Olympics. That claim was denied by most military experts, who noted that the deployment of Russian Railway Troops often preceded larger military interventions (Chechnya in 1999 for example). Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer stated at the time that, "where railway troops go, military action follows." Indeed, during the August war, the refurbished railways would help move Russian forces and their supplies both in Abkhazia and from Abkhazia to other regions of Georgia. At least 4,000 Russian troops landing on the beaches of Ochamchire on August 10 were then transported, along with heavy equipment, to launch a direct offensive on the Kodori Valley. During the war itself, Saakashvili recalled the deployment of railway troops as a direct prelude to the conflict:

Immediately, they started to bring in railway troops to bring – to build railway in depopulated, ethnically cleansed areas of Abkhazia, cynically claiming that they are doing this for humanitarian purposes.

PANFILOV

• NATO SecGen condemned the dispatching of Russian Railway Troops as a violation of Georgia's national sovereignty (73)
  • The Georgian MFA called on Western partners to increase assistance to Georgia, as it was facing Russia's annexation of Abkhazia (73)

Escalations (May-July)

Tensions in South Ossetia

Most tensions between Georgia and Russia in the first half of 2008 centered around Abkhazia, while the other breakaway republic of South Ossetia remained largely out of international headlines. Russia expert Mark Galeotti has written that Moscow "seemed to neglect South Ossetia compared to Abkhazia during the tension build-up because when it did strike, it wanted to have some pretext and it knew both that Georgia was actively preparing its own offensive to try to retake the region, and that Saakashvili was a hothead." Saakashvili later admitted he was convinced that war would start in Abkhazia and was surprised when tensions progressively shifted to South Ossetia in the early summer.

Nonetheless, sporadic shootings and clashes characterized the situation in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. On March 14, a shootout caused one civilian injury in the Georgian-held village of Eredvi, with Tbilisi alleging the shooting was caused by South Ossetian forces. The same day, separatist South Ossetian authorities launched a wave of arrests in the region of individuals it had identified as "national security risks" for their opposition to local strongman Eduard Kokoity and the Georgian government condemned "unprecedented punitive measures and repressions carried out against those with dissenting opinions." Days later, pro-Kokoity forces alleged having uncovered an arms cache in the town of Java with more 3,500 bullets, accusing the Georgian government of planning an internal armed rebellion. On March 23, a car explosion in the Ossetian-held village of Okona, injuring one North Ossetian peacekeeper and one South Ossetian soldier traveling together, was attributed by Kokoity to a Georgian special operation targeting a South Ossetian secret service officer, calling it a "terrorist act with traces leading to Georgia," a claim vehemently denied at the time by Tbilisi. On March 27, a car explosion targeting separatist prosecutor Teimuraz Khugayev killed one civilian in Tskhinvali, although the Georgian Interior Ministry alleged the blast was the result of an internal power struggle, comparing the region to a "black hole ruled by bandits and illegal groups."

In each incident, Georgian authorities accused the JPKF of failing to properly investigate the circumstances and placing due blame. Tbilisi often established new peacekeeping posts in the conflict zone in response to serious incidents, such as after a serious row on March 24-25 between both sides saw 40 Georgian workers detained in Tskhinvali and up to 60 Ossetians detained in Ergneti, before all were liberated after Georgian forces imposed a short-lived blockade around Tskhinvali. On March 31, the JPKF accused Georgian forces of shelling a South Ossetian irregular post in Okona for up to 40 minutes using small arms and grenade launchers but causing no injury, though Tbilisi denied having any involvement in the incident and instead blamed internal criminal organizations. On the other hand, Tskhinvali separatists accused the OSCE mission on the ground of being biased, notably after alleging that the Organization directly assisted Georgian forces in shelling one of its posts in the village of Andzisi on April 2. On April 3, a Georgian police officer was injured after stepping on an anti-personal mine in a forest on Georgian-held territory in the conflict zone, leading to direct accusations by Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili of Russia being responsible for placing the mine. Two days later, an Ossetian civilian bus was fired at in Znauri.

There were early attempts to defuse tensions at a high political level, Merabishvili floating early on a potential Saakashvili-Kokoity summit, though Kokoity rejected the proposal early on. A Georgian-Ossetian civil society forum held in Turkey on April 20 bore no result, and neither did an announcement by the Saakashvili administration of launching a presidential scholarship fund for up to ten South Ossetian students to study abroad. On April 16, Tskhinvali authorities arrested 20-year-old Yana Bestaeva-Kandelaki, a half-Georgian, half-Ossetian civic activist promoting medical cooperation, on charges of espionage. In May, North Ossetian Head Taymuraz Mamsurov and Eduard Kokoity publicly floated the idea of Russia annexing South Ossetia in order to unite it with its northern counterpart, while Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili accused the near-1,000-strong Russian peacekeeping force in South Ossetia was engaged in "gross encroachment of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity." In June, Georgia fined Russian phone operator MegaFon for illegally operating in the region.

Skirmishes continued throughout the month of May, especially after a May 14 declaration by Kokoity warning of "terrorist attacks" being planned against Georgian civilians and peacekeepers by Georgian special forces to "incite hysteria". This statement, which was interpreted by Tbilisi as a direct threat, was followed within days by an explosion near the Ergneti Public School in a Georgian village and a second explosion near the village of Eredvi causing one Georgian policeman to be injured. On May 29, a blast in Tskhinvali injured five South Ossetian officers outside the headquarters of the Special Forces of the South Ossetian Interior Ministry.

Khurcha incident

The May 21 Georgian parliamentary elections took place at a height in tensions and saw a coordinated effort by Tbilisi authorities to encourage Georgians living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to participate, something that separatists in Abkhazia were strongly opposed to. Prior to the elections, Sokhumi closed down all voting precincts established in the security zone by Georgia and blocked off the Enguri Bridge, the main checkpoint between Abkhazia and Georgia proper, as to prevent Gali-based Georgians from crossing the administrative boundary. In a last-minute push, the Georgian authorities set up special voting precincts for Abkhazia residents in the city of Zugdidi (in Georgian-held territory) and offered transportation to any voter that could reach on their own the village of Khurcha, on the Georgia-Abkhaz border.

In the morning of May 21, villagers from the Abkhaz-held village of Nabakevi who had gathered in a football field in Khurcha to await for transportation to the voting polls came under intense small arms fire, while the two buses stationed there were attacked by rocket-propelled grenades. Georgian law enforcement officers arrived on site ten minutes after the attack and engaged in a firefight with the assailants, leading to a 20-minute gun battle. Three civilian women were injured in the clash, including one requiring serious medical help. A UN report would later call the battle "the most serious incident that occurred" in the area up to that point, while the whole episode was recorded by journalist crews who had been covering the transportation of voters from Khurcha from the pro-government Georgian Public Broadcaster and Rustavi 2 channels.

Tbilisi immediately accused Abkhaz separatists of having perpetrated the attack to scare Georgian civilians away from participating in that day's elections and the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a special notice to the CIS's General Secretariat protesting the role of Russian peacekeepers in the region, who were thought to have failed to prevent the attack. Interior Ministry officials indicated that the gunmen had fired from the direction of Abkhazia, while the Defense Ministry alleged cooperation between Abkhazia militiamen and Russian peacekeepers. Sokhumi immediately denied having had any role in the attack, Sergei Baghapsh at the time being in Moscow and comparing the episode during a press conference to "a Hollywood show", stating that his forces "do not do such things." Abkhazia asked Russia to deploy more peacekeepers in the security zone in response to the clash.

Upon request by the Georgian government, UNOMIG launched a ground investigation the same day and established that RPGs had been fired at a distance of approximately 100 meters from the stationed buses, thus indicating that the gunmen had crossed into Georgian-held territory, or five meters away from the Abkhazia boundary. The revelation that the shooting had taken place within Georgian territory raised questions about the accuracy of Tbilisi's version of events, while the UN questioned the coincidence of Georgian journalists being on the ground during the shootout. UNOMIG could not directly point fingers at Abkhazia for the attack and pledged to continue its investigation, although neither that one nor a separate investigation by the Georgian Interior Ministry were brought to an end.

Weeks after the attack, Georgian investigative outlet Studio Reportiori released a documentary that alleged that the Khurcha incident was organized and staged by the Georgian government as a false-flag operation. In its investigation, SR alleged that television crews had been brought to the scene well in advance, so as to have time to prepare set up their equipment before the attack began. It also revealed previously-unaired footage by the Public Broadcaster of the RPG attack on the buses, footage whose steadiness indicated it had been recorded on a fixed tripod despite active gunfire. Online news agency Batumelebi featured interviews with local villagers who claimed that unidentified individuals had asked them to come to the Khurcha football field to take part in a video shoot. Questions were raised about why journalists were stationed in Khurcha instead of the voting precinct in Zugdidi, who had organized the bus transportation, the speed at which Georgian law enforcement responded to the attack, and the fact that the RPGs were launched from Georgian-held territory, indicating an incursion by Abkhaz militants. Paul Rimple, a journalist with Eurasianet, revealed a series of inconsistencies in eyewitness reports, including those journalists who were covering the attack on the ground. Two days after the attack took place, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee published a report raising doubt on the Georgian government's official version of events, while Rusudan Pachkoria, a lawyer with the NGO Legal Protection Institute, accused Georgian media of providing "biased coverage" that overshadowed that day's elections. The Human Rights Committee, a prominent civil society in Georgia that documented human rights abuses under the Saakashvili administration, accused "rogue elements" within the Georgian government of being behind the Khurcha incident, calling it a "sheer act of Machiavellian malfeasance at first impression" and called for an independent investigation, although "Georgian authorities and their sponsors" made that kind of investigation impossible. The HRC, however, stated that a final and accurate depiction of the event was not possible as long as Abkhaz authorities themselves refused to cooperate in formal investigations.

The Khurcha incident continued to divide the Georgian political spectrum over the years, with opponents of Mikheil Saakashvili openly accusing him of having staged the attack to bolster support during the parliamentary elections. After Saakashvili's departure from power in 2013, the new government led by Bidzina Ivanishvili called the Khurcha attack a "terrorist act" perpetrated by Georgia itself and Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili declared the prosecution of MIA officials involved with the planning of the clash a "priority". In October 2013, Roman Shamatava, who served as Head of the Abkhazia branch of the Department of Constitutional Security within the Ministry of Internal Affairs during the attack, and Malkhaz Murgulia, then-officer with the Special Tasks Department of the Samegrelo and Zemo-Svaneti region, were arrested. Murgulia avoided jail time after entering a plea agreement, while Shamatava was jailed and remains in prison to this day.

Skirmishes with Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia

Throughout the spring of 2008, and particularly after the deployment of additional Russian troops in Abkhazia in late April, Georgia increased its rhetoric against Russia's status as a peacekeeper in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, arguing that Moscow's open support for the separatist authorities made it a side to the conflict, a view shared at the time by much of the international community. The Saakashvili administration had long hoped for an internationalization of Russia's peacekeeping missions, engaging in direct talks with the OSCE, the European Union, and individual countries like Ukraine, but received little support except verbal statements. Tensions over the peacekeepers in Abkhazia increased significantly on May 18 when six Russian soldiers were detained in the Georgian town of Zugdidi after their armored personal carrier hit a Georgian civilian vehicle.

The episode was highly disputed between Tbilisi and Moscow, with Russian officials alleging at the time that the incident had been staged by Georgian law enforcement who placed a damaged car on the path of the Russian peacekeeping convoy as it was traveling on a road between Zugdidi and the village of Urta, while the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that the accident had caused a civilian woman to be injured and blamed the Russians' drunk driver, who remained in detention after the other five peacekeepers were released following UNOMIG and CIS mediation. Russia's Foreign Ministry released a statement condemning Georgian police as "true street bandits" for using force against the peacekeepers and calling the incident a provocation meant to discredit their work. A day after the episode, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that Russian peacekeepers had been authorized by Moscow to undertake military action independently to ensure stability in the security zone, a claim that Abkhaz authorities did not deny at the time. The militarization of the Abkhaz conflict zone increased in the subsequent weeks, with UNOMIG noting an increase in the number of Georgian law enforcement exercises in the Security Zone and the Restricted Weapons Zone in early June, and media reports signaling the establishment of a new Russian military base in the village of Agubedia, in the Ochamchire district, where heavy weaponry was stationed. Some activity by UNOMIG was reportedly restricted by Russian officers. On May 28, Georgian media reports claimed two separate attacks on individual peacekeepers by Chechen servicemen.

On June 17, another four Russian peacekeepers were captured and their military vehicle seized on the road between Zugdidi and Urta, on the Georgian side of the Security Zone, by Georgian law enforcement officers who confiscated 20 anti-tank missiles, 35 crates of ammunition, and unguided aircraft missiles being transported without prior approval. Georgian peacekeeping chief Mamuka Kurashvili accused Russian forces of attempting to set up an illegal base in Urta, while Russian officials accused the arrests of being "in violation of all regulatory norms", claiming Georgian officers were wearing civilian clothes and used violent methods to detain and humiliate the Russians in front of Georgian television cameras. Lieutenant General Alexander Burutin of the Russian Armed Forces threatened that any future similar arrest would result in the Russian peacekeepers opening fire. After nine hours of interrogation, the Russian officers were eventually released but the military hardware remained confiscated, Tbilisi claiming that the CIS PKF had failed to provide proper documentation for the equipment ahead of transportation, which Moscow later admitted. On June 18, Mikheil Saakashvili and Dmitry Medvedev held a phone call over the incident, with Medvedev threatening that Russia would not tolerate "further provocations" against Russian peacekeepers and Saakashvili calling on Moscow to "refrain from unilateral actions and to follow agreed procedures for transporting weapons." At a speech at the Saint Petersburg State University days later, President Medvedev warned Georgia of open conflict if similar incidents were to repeat.

Tensions increased again after the June 17 incident. On June 23, Abkhaz breakaway authorities announced closing off all sea routes for Georgian ships. On June 24, Russian peacekeepers declared a curfew in the Gali district of Abkhazia and took complete control of all local roads. On June 24, Abkhaz and Russian forces conducted their first-ever joint exercises near the Kodori Gorge. Within days, Abkhaz Defense Ministry officials were awarded high-level medals by Russian military structures. Tbilisi sought a high-ranking diplomatic solution to the crisis and a direct meeting between Medvedev and Saakashvili, although the former rejected the offer and met instead with Abkhazia's Sergei Baghapsh on June 26, a meeting condemned by Tbilisi but downplayed by Saakashvili. The situation was described as a 'war of nerves' by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

• On June 15, the Abkhaz exile government accused Russia of establishing a new military base in the village of Agubedia in Ochamchire, equipped with tanks and howitzers, and Soviet-era air defense systems (Panfilov, 72-73)

June 14 South Ossetia clashes

Tensions shifted progressively from the Abkhaz to the South Ossetian conflict zone in June 2008 as skirmishes between Georgian and Ossetian forces increased. On May 29, two separate clashes coinciding with South Ossetia's Independence Day celebrations caused at least nine injuries, including six when a car parked in front of the separatist Interior Ministry exploded, an attack that Eduard Kokoity called a "terrorist attack aimed at escalating the conflict" and blamed on Georgia. The same day, a car transporting civilians was shelled on the Muguti-Avnevi road in the conflict zone. In both cases, Tbilisi denied any involvement. On June 11, JPKF posts in the northern outskirts of Tskhinvali were shelled from the Georgian position of Tamarasheni, causing damage to civilian infrastructure and resulting in a counter-attack shelling the Tamarasheni base; though the attack caused no casualty, it was condemned as a gross violation of the ceasefire by the JPKF. Two days later, a Georgian civilian in the village of Kekhvi was injured after tripping on a tripwire and triggering a small explosion.

On June 14, 14-year-old Karlo Inauri, from the Georgian village of Ergneti, was killed after stepping on a South Ossetian-installed landmine in a field. Tensions following his death resulted in a deadly clash between South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali and Georgian Interior Ministry officers in Ergneti, Nikozi, and Prisi, a battle that killed one and injured seven Ossetians over an hour and a half, while several houses in Georgian villages were destroyed. Both sides accused each other of having fired the first shot, the first in a long list of mutual accusations over clashes that eventually led to the war in August. Tskhinvali and the North Ossetian battalion of the JPKF accused Georgian forces of having fired first from its base in Ergneti in retaliation over the death of Inauri, while Tbilisi claimed having only responded to a barrage of gunfire hitting Georgian villages. In the night of June 15, a joint JPKF-OSCE team on the ground near Ergneti to investigate the causes of the clash came under fire. Georgian police blocked roads leading in and out of Tskhinvali a day after the clashes and South Ossetia accused Georgian forces of setting up unauthorized posts in the Georgian-held villages of Mejvriskhevi, Sveri, Andzisi, and Ergneti.

Tensions increased following the June 14-15 clashes. Georgian intelligence reported eight Russian armored trucks loaded with anti-tank rockets entering Tskhinvali as early as June 16, while General Alexei Maslov, Commander of the Russian land Forces, visited Tskhinvali and met with separatist officials days later. Kokoity visited Sokhumi and issued a joint statement with his separatist counterpart Baghapsh accusing Georgia of "seeking war". On June 23, the Tbilisi-accredited ambassadors of France, Romania, Estonia, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Czech Republic were expelled from a mediation effort in Tskhinvali after it was revealed they had previously met with pro-Georgian South Ossetian leader Dmitry Sanakoev on June 23.

A continuous source of accusations during this period were reports by the JPKF of unauthorized military aircraft flying over the South Ossetian conflict zone in violation of previous ceasefire agreements. At least five such military jets, including an SU-25, were allegedly reported between May 23 and June 28, leading to a call by Moscow for the installation of a military radar station in South Ossetia.

Bombings across Abkhazia

See also: 2008 Abkhazia bombings

On June 13, less than two weeks after the deployment of Russian Railway Troops in Abkhazia, the Ministry of Defense of Russia claimed having discovered a TM-62 anti-tank mine planted under a rail close to the village of Tamishi in the Ochamchire district, which Moscow called an attempt at a "subversive-terrorist act". Though Russian military spokesman Alexander Drobishevsky claimed that the bomb had been placed there "10 to 30 days ago", Abkhaz media quickly rejected the allegation, instead assessing the mine as having been left over from the 1990s. The discovery of the mine and subsequent comments happened just as Georgian and Abkhaz high-level officials were holding a secret, EU-mediated meeting in Sweden. On June 18, two bombs exploded along Sokhumi's Kelasur District section of the railway in what separatist authorities called a "terrorist act directed against the Russian Railway Forces." No injury was reported, but the blasts were the first of a series that spread throughout the region in the early summer of 2008. Just two days later, Abkhaz security official Eduard Emin-Zade was injured after his car was attacked by unknown assailants near a railway station.

On June 27, another blast took place along the railway station near the Ministry of Defense building in Sokhumi, causing no injury. However, two explosions in the resort town of Gagra took place on June 29 within five minutes of each other and caused six injuries. Though no group claimed responsibility for the attacks, Abkhaz de facto authorities accused Georgia of pursuing a "policy of state terrorism", targeting Russian tourists spending their summers in Abkhazia and the profitable tourist season in the region, a view that was shared by Georgian analyst Paata Zakareishvili. In turn, Tbilisi rejected all affiliation with the attacks, with MP Nika Rurua alleging the blasts were aimed at increasing anti-Georgian sentiments in the region. An investigation by separatist authorities resulted in four arrests, including one ethnic Armenian and three Abkhaz war veterans.

Another two blasts took place close to the central market of Sokhumi on June 30, wounding nine civilians (including a one Russian tourist), just as French, German, British, Russian, and American diplomats were meeting in Berlin to discuss a peace plan. Abkhaz breakaway Interior Ministry officials once again accused Georgia of being behind the attacks, in order to thwart the tourism season. Tbilisi pointed at a potential power struggle between various local criminal groups vying for influence over the business sector, with some officials even accusing Sokhumi of planting the bombs itself in a false-flag operation to discredit Georgia and use it as an excuse to escalate tensions. Speaking from the blast sites, Baghapsh announced the closure of all five checkpoints with the rest of Georgian territory on July 1, a step that was criticized as an isolation of the Georgian population of the Gali district, many of whom were given 72 hours to return back to Abkhazia. On July 2, another incident saw a Russian peacekeeping post in the Security Zone targeted by a bomb thrown off a car that had allegedly originated from Georgian territory and had avoided Georgian checkpoint control. Alexander Diordiev, an official of the peacekeeping force, accused Georgian secret services of being behind this blast, while secessionist authorities accused Tbilisi of seeking to scare Russian tourists away. Russian experts invited to investigate the blast site claimed having found pieces of a Georgian military uniform among the debris, indicating that the bomb may have been wrapped in it.

An explosion also took place in Sochi on July 2, killing two civilians, although Russian officials rejected any connection with the Abkhaz attacks.

The deadliest bombing took place on July 6 at a cafe in the predominantly-Georgian town of Gali, when a blast took place at 22:58 in a cafe where a local family was celebrating a birthday. The attack killed four, including Jansukh Muratia, the head of separatist security services in the Gali district, a border guard, a cafe worker, and a translator working for UNOMIG. Within hours, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the violence and demanded an "immediate and thorough investigation of the incidents" to bring to justice those responsible, while calling "on all parties to exercise maximum restraint". Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis condemned it as a "terrorist attack", while the French Presidency of the European Union called on the sides to show "the utmost restraint and resume dialogue as quickly as possible." The United States called for an immediate halt to tensions, urged Sokhumi and Tbilisi to resume talks under the mediation of the Group of Friends, and noted "the urgent need for an international police presence". Sokhumi quickly accused Georgia of being engaged in "state terrorism" and severed all communications with Tbilisi, de facto Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba declaring a withdrawal of all international talks and calling on the international community to "take appropriate measures to prevent the threat of terrorism coming from Georgia." Baghapsh convened a National Security Council session, during which he declared that the series of bombings had been carried out by Georgian intelligence services as "part of an information campaign designed to prepare the international community for Georgia's possible aggression against Abkhazia." Georgian civilians who were in Abkhazia at the time of the attack had their travel permits confiscated and were banned from leaving Abkhazia. On July 11, Sokhumi investigators announced having identified high-ranking officials in the Georgian MIA responsible for the attack, though their names remained classified. Georgia itself denied all involvement in the bombings, once again pointing out at a potential local power struggle that may also have involved North Caucasian elements, while calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Ochamchire and Gali districts to have them replaced by an international police force. The family of Jansukh Muratia, the high-ranking separatist official killed in the blast, rejected the notion that Georgia was responsible for the attack.

The series of terrorist attacks was met with concern and questions by the international community. In a later interview, Mikheil Saakashvili called them "strange explosions" that reminded him of the "Chechen scenario", a reference to the 1999 Russian apartment bombings used by the Putin administration at the time to justify an intervention in Chechnya, while his cabinet purposely refused to react strongly to the blasts, officially to avoid provoking a war of words. Following the July 6 Gali explosion, the Georgian government released a statement condemning the blast and indicating that the series of attacks were in "the interests of forces hoping to prolong the presence of illegally deployed Russian military forces in Georgia." Some analysts also saw the bombings as part of a domestic political standoff between Baghapsh and his vice-president Raul Khajimba. Overall, Abkhazia saw a reduction in the number of tourists in June 2008 by 30%.

The Council of Europe warned that the situation may "spin out of control" due to the new height in tensions in Abkhazia. In late June, Abkhaz forces conducted military exercises with the participation of the Russian General Staff and Russian mercenaries. On June 26, Baghapsh met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev for the first time in the latter's presidency and once again called for the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the Kodori Valley, the signing of a non-use of force agreement by Georgia, and a re-commitment to Russian peacekeepers in the region. On July 9, an Abkhaz militsyia point in the village of Lata, near the ceasefire line, is fired up on, causing two injuries. A report by the International Crisis Group released at the time stated that Tbilisi was "covertly conducting military preparations" and that "several influential advisers and aides to President Saakashvili seem to be convinced more than ever that a military operation in Abkhazia is viable and necessary." Despite that, Saakashvili proposed on July 10 the creation of a Russo-Georgian committee to provide a safe environment for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.

Achamkhara incident

In Abkhazia, Sergei Baghapsh himself faced criticism, both from within his cabinet and his opposition, for not being enough of a hardliner on Georgia. His own vice-president Raul Khajimba called him "too soft" as his government was considering engaging in a new format of direct negotiations with Tbilisi under EU mediation, while Aruaa, a large political organization made of veterans of the 1992-1993 war and closely affiliated with Khajimba, condemned Baghapsh's alleged "multi-vector foreign policy", instead calling for closer ties with Russia. Khajimba himself publicly supported a military intervention to take over the Kodori Valley. This pushed local officials to at times use polarizing rhetoric, such as a statement by Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba calling Abkhazia a "Russian protectorate". Baghapsh traveled to Moscow to seek the opening of a Russian embassy in Sokhumi and declared that he had "incontrovertible evidence" that Tbilisi was intending to invade the region, leading to threats by the Russian Ministry of Defense to use force against Georgia. While Sokhumi claimed that Georgia was planning a two-sided assault on Abkhazia from Zugdidi and the Kodori Valley, Tbilisi continuously denied the claims, while UN reports showed no evidence of a Georgian military buildup.

On 9 July, a clash took place on Mount Achamkhara, an uninhabited mountain in the Kodori Valley separating Georgian-held from separatist-controlled territories, once home to a Georgian police outpost until the UN demanded its dismantling, and described as a buffer zone by Georgian police authorities. The clash took place hours before Georgia opened up the local Kvabchara Valley (where Mount Achamkhara is located) to UNOMIG monitoring, with a first visit by UN inspectors expected at 11:00 that morning. Instead, in the early hours of July 9, a Georgian police team of ten officers patrolling the area between the villages of Deluki, Achamkhara, and Kvabchara to ensure the safety of the field ahead of the UNOMIG tour came under fire, leaving three policemen injured. According to the Georgian MIA, four Abkhaz soldiers were killed during the clash and though Sokhumi acknowledged the incident, it claimed only two of its officers were wounded. The Abkhaz separatist government alleged that the clash was caused by Georgian "saboteurs" launching an attack on a nearby separatist outpost with grenade-launchers in order to increase tensions ahead of a visit to Tbilisi by State Secretary Condolezza Rice, though Abkhaz troops were able to repel them after a brief exchange of fire. The Georgian side claimed that Russian peacekeepers may have been involved in the battle and immediately called for an investigation by UNOMIG, which was only launched a day later after being blocked off by Abkhaz troops and a demand by Russia to have its troops involved in the investigation, and though an investigation was formally launched on July 10, Tbilisi argued such a delay would bring no clarity and the results of the investigation were never published. Leaked US diplomatic cables discussing the incident described it as proof of an "increase in the the number of Russian soldiers, military equipment, military trainings and intelligence activity near the Kodori Gorge indicates the interest of Russian forces."

Also on July 9, a separate incident saw a grenade attack attack against a Georgian MIA unit patrolling the Shamgona-Akhali Abastumani road on the ceasefire line. Though no one was injured, Abkhaz authorities alleged that Tbilisi had staged the incident itself to "artificially escalate tensions in the region on the eve of the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State." The Georgian government saw these incidents as a scenario aimed at destabilizing Georgia and distracting the international community's attention from the "real problems", referring to the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zones.

Following these incidents, tensions continued to increase around the Kodori Valley, where Georgian and Abkhaz troops stationed respectively in the Maruki Pass and the Adanga Pass (both beyond the scope of UNOMIG monitoring) faced each other directly. At least eight drone flights were reported over the Valley between April 8 and July 5, although no side claimed responsibility. Georgian media reported during that time that Baghapsh's June visit to Moscow was made to finalize a potential attack on the Kodori Valley. Meanwhile, the Georgian government continuously rejected calls by Sokhumi and Moscow to replace Georgian military and Interior troops with international peacekeepers in the Valley. On July 26, the Kvabchara Gorge, a difficult-to-access region of the Kodori Gorge barred from UNOMIG jurisdiction, was shelled by mortar fire. Though the UN started an investigation into the incident, it was never finalized as the war began less than two weeks later.

Prelude to the war (July-August)

Tensions in Abkhazia

In June-July 2008, the hot spot of tensions progressively shifted from the Abkhaz conflict zone to South Ossetia. Despite that, threats of open conflict continued in Abkhazia throughout July, especially surrounding the Kodori Valley. Unconfirmed media reports in both Georgia and Russia contributed to increasing the tense rhetoric, such as a claim that Baghapsh had visited Moscow in early July to plan for an upcoming invasion of the valley with Russian forces on August 11. Abkhaz separatist army officials themselves alleged that a deployment of Russian troops in the southern edges of the Kodori Valley, coordinated by Georgian warlord Emzar Kvitsiani, had taken place, claims confirmed by Georgian media on July 19. A few days later, Baghapsh rejected all negotiations with Georgia under any format whatsoever until the latter withdrew from the Kodori Valley altogether. Sokhumi firmly rejected the notion of internationalizing the peacekeeping force, a key demand of the Georgian government, while the Union State of Russia and Belarus announced considering both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as potential members. On July 12, Georgian-loyal Abkhaz autonomous Republic officials claimed that a group of 90 ethnic Chechen peacekeepers had deserted their posts in the towns of Saberio and Muzhava after refusing to take part in attacks against Georgian positions. After the war, President Saakashvili claimed that officials in the Abkhaz separatist government had warned his cabinet that Russia was encouraging skirmishes with Georgia.

These reports came amidst an increase in Russian military installations in the region, specifically after a report by the SVR recommended Moscow to designate Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "Zones of Vital Interests of Russia". In early July, construction of the Russian base in the village of Okhurei, in the Tkvarcheli district, was finished and was equipped with four BTR-70s, four BDRM-2s, and several anti-aircraft systems, along with additional Russian soldiers. Several hundreds more of soldiers were detected by Georgian intelligence at the Bombora military base in Gagra, along with 44 military vehicles and several fighter jets. On July 11, the Russian Ministry of Defense announces measures to "increase combat readiness" for its peacekeepers in Abkhazia, including the strengthening of its bases and revisions to its firearm use policy. The Russian Navy based in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk was placed on full preparedness and its ships were deployed off of Georgian territorial waters. By the end of July, Mikheil Saakashvili was briefed of the entry into Abkhazia of another 200 Russian tanks, though he chose not to respond in what he calls a strategy to "avoid provocations".

UN-led attempts to negotiate a conflict settlement failed, despite visits to Abkhazia by Secretary General special emissaries Bertrand Ramcharan and Jean Arnault. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner told the European Parliament he would visit Abkhazia "soon", though that visit would never take place.

On July 6, the ceasefire line was struck with four simultaneous explosions close to the town of Ganmukhuri, one of them striking the car of a Zugdidi police official, though Russian peacekeepers claimed the blasts were a false-flag operation by Georgia itself. Another series of explosions took place on July 19: the villages of Akhali Abastumani and Shamgona (Zugdidi district) and Nabakevi (Gali district) were targeted, with an Abkhaz officer killed by a defective grenade in the latter; a third blast took place at night when Abkhaz officers stationed near Russian peacekeeping positions shelled a Georgian police post in the village of Napati. In each case, Sokhumi denied any involvement. Sokhumi also denied having caused the death in custody of an elderly Georgian civilian beaten by Abkhaz police officers in Gali on July 25, an incident taking place in the midst of last-minute attempts by the international community to negotiate a peace settlement. On July 27, a mine explosion in the village of Taglioni near Gali caused one Georgian civilians to be killed and four others injured, as a result of which Tbilisi called for the region to be placed under international protectorate. One day later, the UN Security Council held an emergency session during which Ban Ki-moon expressed direct concern over the escalation of tensions.

Clashes in South Ossetia

As tensions shifted from Abkhazia to South Ossetia in the months of June and July, both sides noted an increase in troop movement and heavy artillery present on the ground. While Tskhinvali reported an increase in Georgian military equipment on Georgian-controlled positions, a clear Russian buildup involving troop deployment, tents, armored vehicles, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and artillery guns started in early July. At the same time, the South Ossetian separatist government imposed restrictions on the free movement of cars and people through the various villages of the conflict zone, while OSCE monitors reported difficulties in accessing South Ossetian posts. This situation created a fertile ground for clashes and skirmishes, such as an explosion in the morning of July 2 at a Georgian Peacekeeping Force (PKF) post, causing no casualty.

Mikheil Saakashvili draws links between a visit by South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity in Moscow in late June and the start of open clashes on the ground, clashes that became increasingly difficult for Georgian forces to avoid. The July 2 formal rejection by the Kremlin of a last-minute proposal by Mikheil Saakashvili to partition Abkhazia into Russian and Georgian spheres of influence also cemented the path to conflict. Hours after a bombing killed separatist militia official Nodar Bibilov in the village of Dmenisi on July 3, an IED targeted the convoy carrying pro-Tbilisi South Ossetian alternative leader Dmitry Sanakoev on the Tskhinvali Bypass Road in a failed assassination attempt that was followed by a gunfight between Sanakoev's bodyguards and separatist militants stationed on the heights of Sarabuki and Kokhati, leading to three Georgian law enforcement officers wounded. In parallel, a Georgian school bus and police car came under attack in the conflict zone, though no injury was reported there.}} In response, Georgian forces launched a special operation to neutralize some of the most strategic posts of the separatists, taking over within hours the Sarabuki Heights and firing at the South Ossetian positions in Kokhati and Ubiati, killing one separatist soldier. Several more South Ossetians were killed by Georgian snipers as they sought to dislodge the new Georgian bases throughout the evening. Around 23:30, the Georgian-held villages of Nikozi, Ergneti, Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, Vanati, Tamarasheni, and Avnevi came under fire, after which Tbilisi launched a direct shelling of the southern neighborhoods of Tskhinvali, killing three and wounding eleven, including one South Ossetian cameraman.

The July 3 battle escalated further when Kokoity declared a mobilization of his troops in the early hours of July 4, while the JPKF reported two Georgian military jets and six drones flying over the conflict zone. In Sokhumi, Abkhaz troops were placed on combat alert readiness. Kokoity, who accused Georgia of trying to start a war, called on Russia to deploy troops and threatened to violate previous agreements banning the deployment of heavy artillery in the conflict zone. Sporadic shootings continued on July 4, with South Ossetian forces seeking to attack a Georgian PKF checkpoint on the Tskhinvali Bypass Road, gunfire between the South Ossetian-administered Ubiati and the Georgian post in Nuli, and another failed attempt to take over the Georgian position on the Sarabuki Heights, attacks that the Georgian Ministry of Defense assessed were done to prevent a ground investigation by the OSCE. Russia, which openly claimed that the attack on Sanakoev was staged and had threatened to dispatch North Caucasian volunteers against Georgia, gave control of several pieces of heavy artillery to South Ossetian militia forces, transporting them from the Java District to the conflict zone, all while dispatching Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin to Tbilisi. By late afternoon, Kokoity rescinded his mobilization order and tensions dissipated temporarily as Georgian troops set up several new peacekeeping posts around Tskhinvali and abandoned their posts at the JPKF headquarters in Tskhinvali until July 15. Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis said at the time that "someone is sitting on a powder keg and playing with fire." On July 4, Georgian intelligence reported ten Russian armored vehicles entering South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel.

Another clash took place on the night of 5-6 July, when Georgian positions in Nuli and Kekhvi and the South Ossetia post of Ubiati came under fire, which grew into a small battle using RPGs and automatic firearms between Tskhinvali and Georgia's Ergneti, causing one South Ossetian to be injured. In response to this skirmish, Kokoity declared wanting to "exercise wisdom, calmness, and restraint to aid the collapse of the regime of Saakashvili." Following this clash, South Ossetian authorities claimed that Georgia had evacuated 300 civilians from nearby villages, indicating preparations for a war. Just a day later, Georgian authorities reported having prevented a group of ten separatist saboteurs from mining the Tskhinvali Bypass Road. Tensions increased further when Georgian police detained a 14-year-old Ossetian teenager on charges of espionage on July 7, causing a war of words and the abduction of four Georgian soldiers near the ceasefire line, dubbed as "spies" seeking to "adjust artillery fire" near the South Ossetian village of Okona. At a televised National Security Council session, President Saakashvili ordered his Interior Ministry to launch a special operation to free the Georgian soldiers. Both the Ossetian teenager and the four Georgian soldiers were freed by the end of July 8 after a mediation mission by the OSCE.

On July 8 at 20:10, four armed Russian military jets flew above the South Ossetian conflict zone for nearly 40 minutes. This was met with serious concern by Tbilisi and the international community, especially as the flights coincided with the arrival to Georgia of U.S. State Secretary Condolezza Rice, although Moscow stated in its official declaration that the overflights of the conflict zone had been done "to let hot heads in Tbilisi cool down." The flights, thought to be in violation of a 2002 JCC resolution requiring pre-approval of all flights over the area, was severely condemned by the Georgian government, with Parliament Chairman Davit Bakradze accusing the "Russian syndrome of impunity", Saakashvili calling the incident "one of the wildest episodes since World War II", and several MPs proposing the shootdown of any future Russian plane flying illegally in Georgian airspace. This was the first open violation of Georgian airspace by Russia willfully admitted to by the Kremlin, a sign that many in the international community saw as a warning, although Moscow insisted the flights were done to prevent a Georgian special operation to free its detained soldiers in Tskhinvali. On July 10, Tbilisi recalled Ambassador Erosi Kitsmarishvili, its ambassador in Russia, for consultations over "Russia's aggressive policies", while requesting a UN Security Council session be held, a session that would take place only on July 21 after days of Russian attempts to block the session. An OSCE Permanent Council special session was also held over the incident on July 14 in Vienna. Russian officials doubled down during these sessions, rejecting the notion of IDPs returning to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "unrealistic" and asking Georgia to sign a non-use of force agreement and unilaterally withdraw from the Kodori Valley.

The rhetoric exchanged between Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, and Moscow in the days that ensued was described by Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky as a "pre-war state of affairs". The North Caucasus Military District Commander, Colonel General Sergey Makarov, announced already on July 10 that his forces were ready to assist the South Ossetian civilian population against Georgian attacks. South Ossetian Russia envoy Dmitry Medoyev called for the deployment of additional Russian peacekeeping troops, while the North Ossetian battalion added another 50 soldiers on July 14. Former separatist prime minister Oleg Teziev alleged that Tskhinvali was capable of detonating a portable nuclear device. By mid-July, Georgian intelligence reports noted an increase number of Russian troops and heavy artillery crossing into South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel. On July 19, Kokoity formally rejected a proposal by the European Union to organize direct, bilateral talks in Brussels. Tskhinvali's complaints over the title of Reintegration State Minister Temur Iakobashvili led to his appointment instead as "Presidential Envoy on Conflict Resolution", though that proved to be insufficient for a resumption of negotiations. By July 31, separatist Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev had admitted to building a large number of military fortifications in the conflict zone in violation of previous ceasefire agreements.

Sporadic skirmishes continued throughout the month of July. A South Ossetian militia post in Avnevi came under fire on July 10. The village of Kemerti was rocked by an explosion on July 13. On July 20, Georgian authorities detained four South Ossetian civilians on their way back to Tskhinvali on charges of drug trafficking, which led to Tskhinvali forces detaining a Georgian civilian in the village of Nikozi, who would later be released after close to 50 Georgian civilians protested and blocked the Ergneti-Tskhinvali Road. On July 25, a radio-controlled mine killed one man in Tskhinvali in what separatist officials called a "planned terrorist attack". On July 28, the Ministry of Defense of Georgia hoisted the Georgian flag over the Sarabuki Heights, hours before an attack on the post by South Ossetian forces. Ossetian militias also fired at OSCE observers trying to enter the village of Cholibauri where Tbilisi claimed they were building illegal fortifications. Still on July 29, Georgian authorities reported the shelling of its positions in the village of Sveri (and the subsequent firing at OSCE monitors on the ground) and on the Sarabuki Heights, the latter attack causing one South Ossetian soldier to be wounded.

• The overflights incident was the first overflights officially recognized by Russia, although Georgia had reported others before and Russia claiming Georgia was bombing itself (Panfilov, 76)

Information about incoming war

• The Kavkaz Center reported on 4 July that Chechen separatists had intelligence data that Russia was preparing a military operation against Georgia in August-September 2008 which mainly aimed to expel Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge; this would be followed by the expulsion of Georgian units and population from South Ossetia.
  • The decision to attack Georgia had been made by Putin before Medvedev became president and the preparations had been ongoing for the several months.
  • Provocations would antecede the start of the war.
• On 5 July 2008, the article was published by the Russian online paper Forum.msk.ru with the headline "Russia is on the verge of a great Caucasian war", stating that the war with Georgia had never been so close.
  • The chief editor of the paper, Anatoly Baranov, just returning from the North Caucasus where he had spoken with Russian officers stationed in Rostov-on-Don, stated that "the army wants to fight" as the officers were seeing the war as the only solution to Russia's internal problems.
• Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh claimed that Abkhaz military counterintelligence became aware of the Georgian plans to attack Abkhazia in April-May 2008
• Aleksandr Dugin, who was known for his strong ties with the Russian military and intelligence, visited South Ossetia in late June 2008. On 30 June, he said at a press conference:

"Russia has practically decided to recognize [Abkhazia and South Ossetia], and you have perfectly prepared everything for this. [...] The last formal hook of opponents of the recognition of South Ossetia is, perhaps, the lack of a project for the integration of Georgian enclaves inside South Ossetia. This card will be played many times, pressurizing and attacking Putin and Medvedev, that the unresolvedness of problem is a fundamental obstacle to the recognition of South Ossetia. [...] this is a pretext that can not be ignored. [...] If Russia recognizes independence of South Ossetia and deploys there not peacemaking but Russian border troops, the issue of Georgia joining NATO either will be removed from the agenda for a long time, or this will mean direct conflict with the United States. [...] So, we must recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia before December."[147]

• On 11 July 2008, Aleksandr Khramchikhin wrote for Nezavisimaya Gazeta that Georgia's only chance at winning the war was "swift decapitating blow" to neutralize the separatist leadership, which required complete surprise, "so it should be carried out not during the next aggravation of the situation, but, on the contrary, when tension is minimal."
  • Saakashvili knew well that Georgia would finally lose the territories if the war with separatists was lost for the second time.[254]
• On 14 July 2008, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) reported that NG had gained a possession of the secret report which was read at a closed session of the State Duma's security committee in the Spring of 2008 and contained an analysis of the situation in Georgia.
  • The report stated that Russia had several options, among them to "passively wait as the process of aggravation of the situation takes place, and to take decisive action by intervening at the stage of armed conflict."[259]
  • Russian political scientist Sergey Markedonov wrote that several journalists had called specific dates of alleged hostilities between Russia and Georgia.[260]
• Head of the Government of South Ossetia Yury Morozov told Komsomolskaya Pravda that "we have an excellent aviation" against Georgians, adding that he meant "our, Russian planes".
  • The journalist observed that columns of the Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks were deployed near the Russo-Georgian border, from which march Towards Tskhinvali required half a day.[261]
• On 15 July, a spokesman for the Union of Russia and Belarus said Abkhazia and South Ossetia had talked about joining the Union, but that they would need to be recognized as independent and become observers before they could join the Union as members.[262]
• On 18 July, Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that the construction of the gas pipeline from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali would be completed by the year's end and Georgia was finally losing Tskhinvali.[263]
• Russian journalist Maxim Kalashnikov wrote that Georgian military attack on Abkhazia and South Ossetia could lead to Russia losing the North Caucasus and the only solution to this problem was the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
  • Kalashnikov stated that Russia's 1991 borders "do not correspond to the interests of security and development of the Russian civilization" and Russia had to begin "reformatting" of the post-Soviet space by solving of the "Georgian question" first.
  • Kalashnikov admitted that Russia was involved in the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
  • Kalashnikov wrote that after the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia had to aid the self-determination of Mingrelians and Adjarians.
  • He noted that pro-western Ossetian activists had emerged who were seeking to separate North Ossetia from Russia and Russia had to act quickly
• Georgian Defense Ministry claimed Russian troops occupied strategic passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge and were battle-ready.
• On 27 July 2008, US presidential candidate John McCain said that Vladimir Putin still ruled Russia and Russia was "putting enormous pressure on Georgia in many ways".
• Georgian president Saakashvili told The Times, "situation is precarious and the things they [Russia] are doing are outrageous. Unfortunately, they are not opposed by the Europeans and other players." When asked about the possibility of war, Saakashvili responded: "The point is that every day we are waking up with some surprises and when sometimes I think it can’t get any worse, then it does get worse."
  • Ronald Asmus wrote that Russia was trying "to provoke Tbilisi into actions that could lead to further Russian military intervention." He also wrote, "In the short term, we need to prevent a conflict from starting this summer." Asmus suggested that Russia would then focus on Crimea.
• Russian human rights activists began collecting signatures against the escalation of the Russian-Georgian tensions. They were of the opinion that the conflict was looming to transform into war between the two countries.

ASATIANI

• Russian State television were ctive in creating an image of a bloodthirsty Georgian enemy (478)
• Sociological queries showed Georgia as the number one enemy (478)

• At the Yalta Summit in July, Saakashvili attended and he said he was greeted "like a death convict" (Glucksmann, 20)

PANFILOV

• In the weeks leading up to the war, there was a proliferation of blog posts in favor of South Ossetia and posting about alleged war crimes by Georgian forces, though all IP addresses linked back to Russia (47)
• On 5 August, Izvestia published an article with the title "Georgian snipers are killing Ossetian children". After the war, the article disappeared from Izvestia's website. (51)
  • The article asked readers to take part in an online poll: "Why is Georgia promoting conflict in South Ossetia?", with a majority of respondents blaming the war on the Georgia-US relations (51-52)
• The information warfare spread by Russian state-controlled media in the days leading up to the war was meant to justify Russia's "intervention" to stop Georgia's "aggression" against South Ossetia (53)
• "when seeking to find who wanted a war between Russia and Georgia, what we need to do is look at the information war that preceded the military action, and we see that Russia was hungry for war." (69)
• On 20 June 2008, Gruzia Online published an article called "Will Vladimir Putin start a war with Georgia in August?" with Russian military expert Pavel Felgengauer stating that Putin had already decided about a war in "late August" (70-71)
• In June 2008, Russian platform iamik.ru was describing how the conflict could degenerate into a war that Russia would "have to intervene" in (71-72)
• In the days prior to the war, Russian media exponentially increased its criticism of the NATO-Georgia relations, posing it as a threat to Russia's national security and justifying the Kavkaz exercises (76-77)
• On August 3, the State Duma's CIS Relations Committee Chair Vadim Gustaev wrote an op-ed to Gazeta.ru in which he said Georgia was seeking war against South Ossetia to show the need for NATO intervention before the Alliance makes its decision in December (77)
• On August 5, Moscow Duma MP Mikhail Moskvyn-Tarkhanov wrote on Gudok that Russia was intending to annex South Ossetia (77-78)
• Countless Russian media outlets and articles were used to promote the ideas that Georgia was seeking war and Russia would have to intervene from June to August (78-101)

• The Plengengauer prediction was about a "special military operation" against Georgia (Bluashvili, 392)

ASMUS

• Kremlin pundits hinted on television about assassinating him (24)
• At the onset of the war, the country's leadership still did not expect any war. Kezerashvili was out of the country, his two key deputies were getting ready to go on vacation, the armed forces were at their lowest level of readiness became commanders had been allowed to grant units leave after months of mobilization (28)
  • Saakashvili was at a spa in Italy with his family and was planning to go to Beijing (28)
  • It was only in early August that Saakashvili returned to Georgia after Russian media coverage intensified (28)
• During a Yalta conference, MEP Elmar Brok recalled how Russian EU Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov reacted to his plans to visit Georgia in September, telling him to "go earlier, September May be too late" (164)

IIFFMCG II

• Apart from the “Kavkaz-2008” exercise, there were a number of signals from the Russian side that it would intervene in case of a Georgian military operation in South Ossetia. (207)
• On July 20, Saakashvili's website was shut down for 24 hours (218)
• On August 7, several Georgian servers and the Internet traffic were seized and placed under external control (218)

IIFFMCG III

• 11 July: Squadron of SU-27 fighters moved from the Leningrad Military District to the North Caucasus Military District (Georgian intelligence) (20)
• 13-14 July: 13 T-72 type tanks are reported move from Alagir in NO towards Roki Tunnel, as well as 6 Ural type trucks loaded with soldiers were driving from Zaramag (NO) towards Roki (intelligence) (20)
• 23 July: 120 Russian medica dispatched to Tskhinvali hospital (Georgian intelligence) (21)
• By the end of July, Georgin intelligence had reported tents being set up for 1500-2000 people at the northwestern Tskhinvali Russian base, with some peacekeepers reporting they were for the 33rd Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade of Botlikh (61)

• Valery Kenyakin, Russian Special Envoy for CIS countries, said on April 25 that "if Georgia starts a military conflict in Abkhazia and SO, Russia will have to react through military means" (https://civil.ge/archives/114843)
  • The statement was condemned by Tbilisi, who warned the world of a incoming "military aggression" by Russia (https://civil.ge/archives/114846)
• Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Council of Federation, said on April 28 that Russia would "protect its citizens inAbkhazia" (https://civil.ge/archives/114855)
• ICG June report: https://civil.ge/archives/116487
  • Georgia remains determined to restore its territorial integrity, and hawks in Tbilisi are seriously considering the military option
  • It, however, also notes that moderates within President Saakashvili’s administration still hold the upper hand.
  • The report quotes an unnamed “well-connected source” as saying that Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze argued against the use of force at a National Security Council discussion over recent Russian moves in Abkhazia.
  • According to the report, those within the Georgian administration in favor of a military offensive in Abkhazia think it should occur either in response to a Russian provocation or after “an arranged incident,” so as to regain as much territory as quickly as possible and then partition the region until such time as all Abkhazia can be regained.
  • Tbilisi called the report unfair and incorrect (https://civil.ge/archives/116500)
• Georgian diplomats spent much of the first half of July organizing meetings with Western diplomats in hopes to raise awareness over the rise in tensions due to Russia's provocative actions, citing the need for more important engagements (https://civil.ge/archives/116763)
• In mid-July, Georgia increased the cap on its armed forces from 32,000 to 37k (https://civil.ge/archives/116771)
• On August 5, SO reported that two of its news websites had been hacked (https://civil.ge/archives/116892)
  • The front page of the website of the news agency, OSinform – osinform.ru – which is run by the breakaway region’s state radio and television station IR – retained the agency’s header and logo, but otherwize the entire page was featuring Alania TV’s website content, including its news and images. Alania TV is supported by the Georgian government, and targets audiences in the breakaway region.
  • Another website of the breakaway region’s radio and television station – osradio.ru – was also hacked.
  • Alania TV has denied any involvement, saying it was itself surprised to see its content on the rival news agency’s website.
  • Original content on the osinform.ru website was restored at about 2:30pm local time on August 5.
  • Meanwhile, Dmitry Medoev, the South Ossetian secessionist envoy in Moscow, told the Regnum news agency that the attack on the websites came shortly after they had run news that 29 Georgian servicemen were allegedly killed during the recent flare-up on August 1 and 2 in the region. Medoev claimed that Tbilisi was trying to cover up the deaths. The South Ossetian side has claimed that the Georgian servicemen were killed after a truck carrying them was hit by a South Ossetian SPG anti tank gun. The Georgian side has insisted it suffered no fatalities as a result of the recent violence. It says only one policeman and six civilians were injured.
• Israeli daily Maariv reported on August 5 that Israel had halted the sale of military equipment to Georgia after Russia had sent Israel a letter of protest over the April 20 drone shootdown (https://civil.ge/archives/116898)

• Already on April 28, Sergey Mironov said that Russia had the right to use force if there was a threat to the lives or "any other threat" to Russian citizens (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/137696)

Military exercises

Kavkaz 2008

• Anatoly Barankevich, Secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that the Russian exercises in the North Caucasus were connected with the situation in the Caucasus.
  • He accused Georgia of financing the Chechen insurgents and of waging an undeclared war against Russia
• On 3 July, the Russian Federal Security Service border troops staged an exercise near the Georgian border in North Ossetia in which they repelled an armed attack on the Nizhny Zaramag border crossing.
  • Russian Defense and Interior Ministry troops also participated in the simulation.
  • This kind of training was staged for the first time since the 90s
• On 5 July 2008, the Russians began military training, named Caucasus Frontier 2008, in the North Caucasus
• In early July 2008, OSInform Information Agency published several articles where the participation of the Russian army in the future "peace enforcement" operation in Georgia was discussed.
  • One of the articles said that the planned Russian exercises were not accidental and this suggested a military operation on the foreign soil
• On 15 July, the United States and Russia began two parallel military trainings in the Caucasus, though Russia denied that the identical timing was intentional.
  • The Russian exercise was named Caucasus 2008 and units of the North Caucasus Military District, including the 58th Army, took part.
  • The exercise included training to aid peacekeeping forces stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
  • The Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla also participated in the exercises
  • A Russian military spokesman Igor Konashenkov said that the exercise would use around 700 military hardware.
  • He also said, "In connection with the aggravated situation of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts... we will also work on participation in special operations to bring peace to zones of armed conflicts."[303][304]
  • The paratroopers from 76th Airborne Division arrived in the North Caucasus on 16 July.[301]
  • Russian Airborne Troops emphasized the fact that the paratroopers were not sent to Abkhazia.[305]
  • Russian Airborne troop detachments arrived in the area near the Roki pass.
  • Posts of logistical and medical supplies were established along the routes of the deployment.
  • The participants in the exercises had an air support.[306]
  • Georgia called the exercises a demonstration of Russian aggression against it.[301]
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry said in a statement: "Not a single document on conflict resolution authorises Russian armed forces to carry out any kind of activity on the territory of Georgia."[307]
• On 18 July, the Roki and Mamisoni Passes on the border with Georgia were taken by 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Pskov and 7th Guards Airborne Division from Novorossiysk.[308]
  • According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the fact that the exercises were spread across 11 regions of Russia was an evidence that the number of participating troops were higher than officially declared number.
  • Russian General Yuri Netkachev said that the number of participating soldiers in the Russian exercises was "officially underestimated" to avoid attention of international monitors.[309]
  • The second stage of the Russian exercises, which were a response to US-Georgian exercises, began on 22 July.
  • The Russian fleet would also participate in the exercises.[310]
  • Igor Konashenkov, assistant commander of the North Caucasus Military District, said on 23 July that the exercises gave the Mechanized infantry regiment of the Vladikavkaz division the task of securing the state border near the Roki Pass and all units of the division were deployed to the designated area and replaced the Air Assault battalion of the Pskov division.[311]
  • During exercises, a pamphlet named "Soldier! Know your probable enemy!" was circulated among the Russian soldiers.
  • The pamphlet described the Georgian Armed Forces.[312]
  • The Russian exercises ended on 2 August.[313]
  • Russian troops stayed near the border with Georgia after the end of their exercise on 2 August, instead of going back to their barracks.[314]
  • Later, Dale Herspring, an expert on Russian military affairs at Kansas State University, described the Russian exercise as "exactly what they executed in Georgia just a few weeks later [...] a complete dress rehearsal."[315]

ASATIANI

• The military exercises were a demonstration of Russia's power (478)
• They involved 8,000 soldiers and 700 pieces of military equipmeent (478)
• Aim was to prepare for "special operations to establish peace by force" in Abkhazia and SO (478)
• Though the trainings ended on August 2, they never went back home (478)

GALLEOTI

• They left behind two reinforced battalions of the 19th Motor Rifle Division just 30 km from the border, or 1,500 troops (126)
  • They were supported by 14 T-72B tanks, 16 2S3 152 mm self-propelled guns and an additional battery of nine BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launch systems that could deploy into SO within hours (127)
• Other units, including paratroopers, were on 24-hour readiness (127)
• Plans for air attacks on Georgian strategic targets had already been made and distributed (127)

• Russian troops stationed in the Shali and Khankala bases of Chechnya had been regrouped in North Ossetia on 5-6 August (Glucksmann, 13)
• When the military games ended on August 2, the 58th Army stayed on the north side of the Roki Tunnel, a fact attested by Russian media (Gachechiladze, 538)

IIFFMCG I

• The exercises took place from July 5 to August 2 (19)
• They were held in the North Caucasus Military District, including close to the border and on the Black Sea (19)

ASMUS

• The purpose of the exercise was "detecting, blocking, and eliminating of terrorist groups in the local mountainous terrain" (21)
• It involved 700 combat vehicles, fighter aircraft, and part of the Black Sea Fleet (21)
  • This led to questions about how it was linked with terrorist groups (21)
• The exercise scenario involved Russian forces having to intervene in a fictitious breakaway former Soviet republic to protect Russian peacekeepers and citizens (21)
• "It was a de facto war game to invade Georgia" (21)
• The briefing materials given to soldiers said "Soldier, know your potential enemy!", which was identified as Georgia (21)
• Troop gathering by the border started as soon as the games ended. By the end of August 5, close to 12,000 soldiers were amassed at the border, ready to strike Georgia (21)
• On August 2, as the games ended, Nikolai Pankov, the deputy chief of intelligence and commendaer in chief of the 58th Army, visited So to meet with local leaders and the commander of the Russian and NO peacekeeping forces, finalizing the plan of action for these units (21)
• In mid-July, Georgian intelligence received reports of Russian fighter aircraft being moved to North Ossetia (23)
• Either on August 4 or 5, Moscow pre-deployed additional military aircraft from the Ivanovo base outside of Moscow to the Mozdok air base in North Ossetia (23)
  • That included the war place A-50, capable of directing an air war against Georgia (23)
• Parts of the Black See Fleet based in Sevastopol had left port several days before August 7 and was preparing for a major operation. (23)

• From 15 July to 2 August 2008, Russian troops carried out large-scale training exercises known as “Kavkaz-2008” (Caucasus-2008) in the North Caucasus Military District, near the Russian Georgian border and on the Black Sea. The Russian exercise officially involved approximately 8 000 Russian troops. [Some analysts believe that the number of troops involved “may have been intentionally understated”]. (IIFFMCG II, 207)

IIFFMCG III

• 15 July-2 August: Kavkaz 2008 exercises. 8000 soldiers and 700 armored vehicles mainly from the North Caucasus Military District participate in these trainings, including airborne units, air force units, it defense units, Black Sea and Caspian Sea fleets, federal security service and interior troops. Airborne units fromm Pskov and Novorossiysk (that later took part in the invasion) practiced at the Roki and mamisoni passes connecting Russia with Georgia. (20)
  • Leaflet called Know Your Enenmy distributed to the soldiers participating in the training, listing the composition and armaments of the Georgian Army as their main target (20)
  • Most of the troops participating in the exercises did not redeploy after the end (20)
  • Deputy Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, General Viacheslav Borisov, who was put in charge of the Russian armed forces grouping operating on the SO and Central Georgian directions in August 2008 also confirmed that just one week earlier the units under his command had undergone military trainings in those areas where the actual hostilities took place and hence Russian airborne troops carried out a March on Tskhinvali much better than other units of the Russian army (20)
• By the end of July, large tens were set up on the new Russian military base in the northwestern part of Tskhinvali for 1500-2000 people, allegedly for the 33rd Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade from Botlikh (Daghestan) (Georgian intelligence) (21)
• The exercises involved 8,000 troops, including the 58th Army, the North Caucasus Military District, units of Airborne Troops, 4th Russian Air Army, and air defense, and at least 700 heavy equipment and 30 aircraft (57-58)
• It stimulated the invasion of a "neighboring state" (58)
• Ended on August 2 (58)
• After the war, General Viacheslav Borisov, Deputy Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, said in an interview that airborne troops were already on the ground in SO "a week prior to August 7" and that he was in charge of the "South Ossetian and Georgian sectors" (61)
• On December 24, 2008, Medevedev said on Russian TV that Russia had been preparing a military operation against Georgia (90)
• In the Spring, The Russian Black Sea Fleet performed eight military exercises focusing on infantry shore landings. (174-175)
• In early June, the Zelenchuk Mountainous Infantry Brigade of the NCMD, deployed in the immediate vicinity of the border, began a 10-day exercise to "perfect its actions on unknown territory and at a distance from its permanent base." (175)

• On July 10, Colonel General Sergey Makarov, the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, said that the SKVO was ready to provide assistance to Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and SO if needed (https://civil.ge/archives/116748)
• When the exercises were launched, Russian land forces official Igor Konashenkov said, "In connection with an escalation in tension in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflict zones, issues related to involvement in special peace enforcement operations in the zones of armed conflict will also be worked out during the exercises" (https://civil.ge/archives/116782)
  • 700 pieces of military hardware were involved in the exercises
• When the exercises were launched, the Georgian MFA said it was a continuation of Russia's aggressive policy that threatened peace and stability in the entire Caucasus region. "Not a single document on conflict resolution authorizes the armed forces of the Russian Federation to carry out any activities on the territory of Georgia,” the Georgian Foreign Ministry said in a statement on July 16. “Hence, the mentioned statements of Russian military officials cannot be considered other than a threat of military intervention and aggression against a sovereign state." (https://civil.ge/archives/116786)

• Jamestown Foundation: "While the tracks were repaired and peace negotiations stalled, the Russian military has been running major military maneuvers Kavkaz-2008 in the North Caucasus close to the Georgian border since July 15. It was announced that some 8,000 servicemen, 700 pieces of armor and artillery, and 30 aircraft are taking part in the exercises that officially are to prepare for encounters with terrorists. But there have been reports in the Russian press that the number of troops is substantially higher (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 18). The maneuvers involve airborne, motor-rifle and mountain troops of the North Caucasian Military District as well as paratroopers from the 76th airborne division from Pskov and marines of the Black Sea and Caspian fleets. Paratroopers were deployed on the border with South Ossetia on the Roki and Mamisoni mountain passes of the main Caucasian ridge. The paratroopers were reinforced by mechanized and mountain troops. Black Sea fleet marines landed near Adler, supported by airpower and Black Sea battle ships firing artillery and antiaircraft missiles—all, allegedly, to prepare to fight “terrorists” (ITAR-TASS, July 23)."

• Many have compared the Kavkaz 2008 episode with Russia's pre-Ukraine exercises (https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/22/russia-ukraine-invasion-georgia-2008-south-ossetia-tskhinvali/)
• Brian K. Johnston calls the exercises "undoubtedly a rehearsal to their invasion weeks later" (https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ISR/student-papers/AY21-22/Scope_Complexity_Russian_Military_Exercises_Johnston.pdf)
  • The exercise featured joint multi-domain operations with 8000 Russian forces counterattacking by air, land, and sea to reinforce "peacekeepers" stationed in the region to protect Russian citizens and provide humanitarian aid.
  • The exercise featured mobilization of paratroopers from the Western military district, integration of the Black Sea Fleet, and air support in both close air support and air interdiction roles. Following the exercise, Russia kept some of these forces deployed.
  • The subsequent invasion mere weeks later featured many of the same tactics and techniques employed during the exercise; with airstrikes crippling Georgian airfields, the Black Sea Fleet deploying troops in Abkhazia and blockading ports, and the Russian 58th Army seizing key towns and cities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia while working its way towards Tbilisi.
• The Kavkaz 2020 ended a day before Azerbaijan's offensive (https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/wars-changed-south-caucasus/)
• Exercise KAVKAZ was conducted with the participation of 8,000 troops. However, General Yuri Netkachev said in an interview with Independent Gazette at the time that the figures were “officially underestimated” to avoid inviting international observers. (https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2017/12/14/zapad-2017-and-euro-atlantic-security/index.html)
  • There were parallels with ZAPAD 2017
  • The real number of participating troops was estimated at 40,000
• Officially, the exercise activated 8,000 troops, 700 combat vehicles and more than 30 aircraft and attack helicopters, just below the threshold for inviting international observers. (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2020.1776615)
  • Prominent Russian and western analysts saw Kavkaz 2008 as a rehearsal for a military operation in the region (Felgenhauer Citation2008; Shanker Citation2008).
  • In Tbilisi, the suspicion was that the exercise was intended to conceal Russian mobilization along the Georgian border
  • Kavkaz 2008 not only had an escalatory effect on the Georgian government but also pre-positioned troops and equipment for the military invasion.
  • In Ukraine, the sequence of snap readiness exercises in the spring of 2014 provided cover for the simultaneous mobilization for the Crimea operation. These exercises kept Georgia and Ukraine guessing when the Russian military would “shift from exercises to preparation for war”
• After the Kavkaz 2008 exercises, Russia left two motorized rifle battalions near its border with South Ossetia. These forces were able to mobilize in a matter of hours after Georgia’s August 7 incursion into South Ossetia. (https://mwi.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Analyzing-the-Russian-Way-of-War.pdf 42)
• There has been speculation in the Russian media that since the present Georgian regime of President Mikheil Saakashvili "is a terrorist organization" it would be logical to use the "Kavkaz-2009" antiterrorist troop concentration against it (www.segodnia.ru, June 17). (https://jamestown.org/program/russian-military-chief-accuses-georgia-of-preparing-aggression/)
• Servicemen were deployed in 11 areas of the Russian Southern Federal District. (https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97421/09_january_georgia_russia.pdf 4)
  • The 42nd Motor Rifle Division (MRD) in Chechnya, in a state of permanent readiness, could alone account for more than 15,000 servicemen. (4-5)
  • Fully trained servicemen from 58 Army stationed in Vladikavkaz, two mountain brigades based in Dagestan and Karachayevo-Cherkessia and 7 Mountain Division of the Airborne Forces also took part. (5)
  • Subunits from 76 Airborne Division from Pskov were flown to Mozdok to take part in the same exercise. (5)
  • From Volgograd the assault regiment of 20 motor rifle division (MRD) was also dispatched to Krasnodar kray. (5)
  • Federal border troops and internal troops were also involved. (5)
  • Netkachev said that the exercises would cover practically all the mountain passes of the Great Caucasus Range along the length of the Russo-Georgian border including the Rokskiy pass (Roki tunnel) and Mamisonskiy pass further to the West. (5)
  • The General Staff confirmed that on the passes considered to be ‘problematical’ from a security viewpoint, Russian servicemen participating in “Kavkaz-2008” would be given exercise combat tasks of ‘blokirovaniye’, detecting, isolating and destroying bandit formations. (5)
  • The exercises were mainly subunit manoeuvres, but not ones that exercised the command functions of higher headquarters in the military district. (Exercising this higher level might have avoided some of the criticism that was directed at formation commanders and above in the FDW.) (5)
  • There was, however, also a large naval and amphibious landing element to “Kavkaz-2008”, which included the large assault ship (BDK) “Tsezar’ Kunikov” of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Such amphibious task force exercises just off the Black Sea coast would be another form of pressure on the Georgian president. (5)
  • The menace of a heavily-armoured force sitting along the Transkam, positioned between Nizhniy Zaramag and the entrance to the Roki tunnel could have given encouragement to the South Ossetians to step up their campaign against Tbilisi and increase nocturnal raids and small arms fire.
  • Another factor which could have been instrumental in giving the South Ossetian population encouragement to step up activity was the fact that elements of the Chechen-manned Battalion Vostok (East) had served repeated three month tours of duty over the previous 18 months in deployments to the unrecognised republic. (6)
  • BDK “Tsezar’ Kunikov” of the BSF participated. For command and control purposes in the amphibious assault phase a mobile headquarters was embarked on the BDK. From Novorossiysk naval base the BDK proceeded to Cape Maliy Utrish, the designated embarkation area for the leading detachment of naval infantry from Novorossiysk naval base which completed a 120 km march there. Having loaded combat equipment on board, the BDK set sail to a rendezvous with nine ships and vessels of a naval amphibious task force from the BSF. Having shaken down and successfully completed the first phase of the exercise the task force moved to an amphibious tactical assault area on 24 July. (11)
  • Over in the east of NCMD similar amphibious landings from the Caspian Flotilla took place on the Russian Caspian coast on 23 July. (11)
  • On the territory of Krasnodar kray a battalion tactical exercise took place with live firing with subunits of the assault regiment of the Volgograd motor rifle formation [20 MRD]. Having completed a combined march to the exercise area and engineer positions, the desantniki isolated a bandit formation and in coordination with federal border service organs and the North Caucasus regional command of internal troops destroyed the bandit formation. (11)
  • Subunits of the Budennovsk motor rifle brigade [205 Separate MR Brigade] in the Niklo-Aleksandrovskiy training area exercised as part of a combined troop grouping in the destruction of a bandit formation and setting up military control of the liberated territory. (11)
  • Subunits of the separate motor rifle brigade (mountain) [33 Separate MR Brigade (Mountain)] based in Botlikh (Dagestan) carried out reconnaissance-sweep operations and successive isolation and destruction of a bandit formation in forested-mountainous terrain in coordination with internal troops and border organs. (11)
  • Subunits of the separate motor rifle brigade (mountain) [34 Separate MR Brigade (Mountain)] based at Zelenchukskaya (Karachayevo-Cherkessia] in the course of a company tactical exercise stealthily moved into a forested-mountainous location in the area of an isolated bandit formation and conducted a sweep for and destruction of terrorist groups, and pursuit of bandit groups attempting to break out of the isolated area. After the series of tactical exercises in the mountain passes desantniki completed a several kilometre march to the Dar’yal training area (North Ossetia – Alania) and Sernovodsk training area (Stavropol’ kray) where fortification of positions was carried out. In the course of a battalion live firing exercise conducted with artillery fire support, front and army aviation desantniki worked through the questions of isolating a bandit group’s area followed by pursuit and destruction. Bombs and artillery strikes were inflicted on a collection of boyeviki with the aim of preventing their breaking through the battalion battle order. (11-12)
  • At Dal’niy (Dagestan) a battalion tactical exercise with live firing was carried out by subunits of the Buynaksk motor rifle brigade [136 Separate MR Brigade]. Brigade subunits completed a march to the exercise area and in the course of the battalion tactical exercise smashed and forced out a bandit formation from its area of operation. Motor-riflemen were supported by fighter aircraft and army aviation helicopters. (12)
  • On the Molkino training area (Krasnodar kray) desantniki discovered and isolated a large bandit formation in a forest area. (12)
  • Subunits of the motor rifle regiment of the Vladikavkaz formation having completed a march to the area of the Rokskiy pass carried out operations for repulsing bandit formations breaking through the state border. (12)
  • In Ingushetia subunits of a motor rifle regiment carried out a training combat task against terrorists attempting to capture a populated point. The terrorist group was isolated and destroyed by a motor rifle battalion. (12)
  • Having completed a march to the area of the Mamisonskiy pass, a battalion of the Prokhladnyy motor rifle regiment [135 MRR] isolated and destroyed bandit formations attempting to break through onto Russian territory. (12)
  • Special-tactical exercises included different logistic and administrative subunits – rear, technical, medical and others. At the Tarskoye training area in North Ossetia a special tactical exercise was carried out by a special-designation medical detachment belonging to NCMD permanently based at Rostov-on-Don. (12)
  • • A tactical exercise with live firing was carried out by subunits of the NCMD Buynaksk separate motor rifle brigade [136 Separate MR Brigade]. In the scenario a bandit formation up to 300 boyeviki captured a populated point. At the Dal’niy training area (Dagestan) subunits of the motor rifle brigade, nominated for dealing with anti-terrorist tasks in conjunction with federal internal troops subunits, isolated the populated point inflicting strikes from artillery formations and army aviation helicopters. As a result of the combined operations of the brigade and subunits of internal troops the enemy was dispersed and destroyed. (12)
• “The most dangerous period within which a new full-scale war with Georgia might occur,” writes Novaya Gazeta columnist Pavel Felgenhauer, will be “while the invasion forces are already deployed and poised for action, under the cover of Kavkaz 2009.” Felgenhauer predicted Russia’s August 2008 attack on Georgia, which came on the heels of Kavkaz 2008. (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/rumors-of-war-in-georgia/)
• Captain Denis Sidristy of the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment stated that, after the completion of Kavkaz 2008 military exercise, his unit stayed near the border with Georgia and, on 7 August, they received the order to move to the Tskhinvali region, which they did on the same day. (https://euromaidanpress.com/2014/08/08/how-the-russo-georgian-war-of-2008-started/)

Immediate Response 2008

• The US exercises were called "Immediate Response 2008" and included servicemen from the United States, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.
  • According to the officials, the exercises had been planned months in advance.
  • The exercises were held at the former Russian military base in Vaziani.
  • 127 American participating troops served as trainers in the exercises.
  • Counter-insurgency action was the focal point of the joint exercise.
  • The Georgian brigade was trained to serve in Iraq.
  • A total of 1,630 servicemen, including 1,000 American troops, took part in the exercise, which concluded on 31 July.
  • American troops had already left Georgia when the Russian invasion of Georgia began in August 2008.

IIFFMCG I

• Immediate Response was an annual exercise (19)
• It took place at the Vaziani base (19)
• It involved around 2000 soldiers from Georgia, the US, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine (19)

ASMUS

• In an early May NATO-Russia consultation, Russian Defense chief General Yury Baluyevsky warned that there could be a war in Georgia in the summer and asked NATO to cancel the exercises or risk having soldiers caught in the crossfire (149)

IIFFMCG II

• Tskhinvali: "In late July a joint US-Georgian military exercise entitled “Immediate Response” was held in the territory of Georgia. The exercise was designed to test the tactics of running a military operation against South Ossetia. The Georgian army units that took part in the exercise were redeployed towards the South Ossetia border following the completion of the exercise. At the same time the Georgian Government continued to evacuate ethnic Georgian population on a massive scale from the future area of hostilities." (195)
• In mid-July, a yearly U.S.-led military exercise called “Immediate Response” took place at the Vaziani base outside Tbilisi, involving approximately 2 000 troops from Georgia, the United States, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. (207)

• About 2,000 soldiers, mainly from the United States and Georgia, launched military exercises Immediate Response-2008 at the Vaziani base outside Tbilisi on July 15. (https://civil.ge/archives/116782)
  • Smaller units from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine are also taking part in the exercises.
  • U.S. Brigadier General William B. Garrett told journalists in Vaziani that the main purpose of the exercises was to increase the cooperation between U.S. and Georgian forces.
  • The exercises, which were planned by the U.S. European Command, were first announced in January, 2008.

• The exercises kicked off on July 15 (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/139236)
  • 1000 US troops, 600 Georgians, and 10 each from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine
  • Two US Air Force helicopters involved
  • Field training and command and staff exercises
  • WIlliam Bigaret, head of US forces in Southern Europe, said that the exercises were not related to the growing tensions with Russia but were about enhancing cooperation between US and Georgian forces
  • Kavkaz 2008 started the same day

• According to United States European Command, "Immediate Response is an annual, bilateral security cooperation exercise conducted between U.S. and NATO and coalition partners. It is a longstanding Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercise focused on interoperability training and theater security cooperation, and is designed to promote understanding and cooperation between military forces of the United States and our allies."
  • The 2008 exercise was reportedly conducted jointly by the USA and Georgian Armed Forces at the Vaziani Military Base between 15 July and 31 July.[2]
  • Planned by the United States European Command and financed by the U.S. Defense Department at a cost of $8 million.[3]
  • Georgian servicemen totalling 1,630 participated, including representatives of the Joint Staff, Land Forces Staff, IV Brigade, the 41st and 42nd Battalions and Engineer Battalion Company.
  • From the USA, 1,000 military servicemen took part in the exercise including the United States Army Europe, 3rd Battalion 25th Marines, 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry Regiment, Georgia Army National Guard (Atlanta, Georgia) and 5045th Garrison Support Unit.[4]
  • Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Ukraine each had 10 servicemen participating as well.[2]
  • On July 21, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was personally present and addressed the servicemen, saying: “The main task of Georgian officers and soldiers is training. This international exercise is a unique case as we have the possibility to hold trainings along with the representatives of the best army in the world for a month. I think that we have created a new military school in Georgia in recent years. Believe that what all of you have learned now will remain in our country and will be shared with the future generations. That is why we have to train theoretically and practically as this is a precondition of victory. The main thing is to get acquainted with independent decision-making and free thinking."
• Officials said the exercise, called "Immediate Response 2008", had been planned for months and was not linked to a stand-off between Moscow and Tbilisi over two Russian-backed separatists regions of Georgia. (https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL15565899/)
• IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 2008 is an annual, bilateral security cooperation exercise conducted between the U. S., NATO and coalition partners. It is a longstanding Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercise focused on interoperability training and theater security cooperation, and is designed to promote understanding and cooperation between military forces of the U. S. and our allies. (https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/573370/georgia-army-national-guard-soldiers-arrive-in-georgia-for-international-milita/)
  • Highlights of the joint training exercise include marksmanship, patrolling and combat lifesaving exercises. A day is devoted to gathering sergeants together from the various countries to train together. on the particular challenges of being non-commissioned officers.
• HRW: "Military exercises conducted by both sides also contributed to rising tensions." (https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/23/flames/humanitarian-law-violations-and-civilian-victims-conflict-over-south)
  • Upon completing its military exercise, Georgia concentrated its entire artillery brigade in the city of Gori, just 30 kilometers from Tskhinvali
• It also effectively used Russian television to portray Georgia as a Western surrogate by showing U.S. equipment from the recently concluded exercise Immediate Response ‘08 as “proof” that American forces had assisted the Georgians in planning and executing their intervention in South Ossetia (https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130048/pub1069.pdf 47-48)

Shelling of Georgian villages near Tskhinvali

AUGUST 1

• A Georgian police car was blown up at 08:05 on the Eredvi-Kheiti road.
  • Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) commander's media assistant Captain Vladimir Ivanov reported that JPKF military observers from all three sides and OSCE representatives investigated a bomb attack.
  • The explosion, which had been probably engineered by South Ossetian separatists, injured five Georgian policemen.
  • 122 mm artillery shells had been used to make the bombs, according to Russian peacekeepers.
• According to the Russian peacekeepers, a Georgian sniper from near to the village of Prisi killed one South Ossetian militia member at about 18:17.
  • South Ossetian de facto leader Eduard Kokoity claimed late that day that a "sniper war" was being conducted by Georgia and accused Ukraine and the United States of being responsible for this.[28]
• Ossetian separatists began shelling Georgian villages on 1 August at the earliest, with a sporadic response from Georgian peacekeepers and other troops in the region
  • During the night of 1/2 August, the worst outbreak of violence in the past four years happened.
  • South Ossetia accused Georgia of firing first.
  • South Ossetian authorities reported that the number of killed Ossetians was six (including one North Ossetian peacekeeper), and the number of injured was fifteen.
  • Georgian Interior Ministry stated that the Georgian villages of Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Nuli and Ergneti were shelled.
  • The Georgian casualties were six injured civilians and one injured policeman.
  • Georgian defense ministry official Mamuka Kurashvili said that the Georgians only responded to the South Ossetian shelling and suspected that Russian peacekeepers were also involved in the shelling of the Georgian villages.[28]
• In the evening, Georgian forces kill 6 SO militiamen, including four via sniper (Asmus, 26)

3 AUGUST

• On 3 August, the Russian government said that the situation was becoming more and more dangerous.
• The South Ossetians began evacuation from probable war into Russia, which resulted in twenty bus-loads of refugees leaving the region on the first day.[29]
  • According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1,100 refugees arrived in North Ossetia by bus in early August.[30]
  • According to the former secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia, Anatoly Barankevich, about 35,000 people were evacuated from South Ossetia.[31]
• It was reported on 3 August that five battalions of the Russian 58th Army were moved to the vicinity of Roki Tunnel in North Ossetia.[32]
• South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity said on 4 August that about 300 volunteers had arrived from North Ossetia to help fight the Georgians, and thousands more were expected from the North Caucasus.[citation needed]
• Georgian minister Temur Iakobashvili travelled to South Ossetia to propose direct talks.
  • He was not let into Tskhinvali and the separatists refused to meet him.
  • Iakobashvili met with the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Marat Kulakhmetov and Georgian commander Mamuka Qurashvili at the Ergneti checkpoint.
  • Iakobashvili earlier had told a Georgian newspaper that the Georgian government would begin direct talks with the South Ossetian separatists "without any conditions", but would only agree to "a solution founded upon respect for Georgia's territorial integrity."
• SO authorities organized a massive evacuation of civilians in front of 50 Russian journalists (Glucksmann, 23)
• The evacuation was done under the guise of "vacationing in North Ossetia" (Gachechiladze 2017, 540)

4 AUGUST

• OSCE spot report notes that the fighting since August 1 had been the most serious since 2004 (Asmus, 26)
• Deputy FM Grigol Vashadze sneaks into destroyed village of Nuli and proposes taking the diplomatic corps there to let them see the destruction (Asmus, 27)
  • EU Special Representative Peter Semneby attested back to Brussels that there was evidence of mortar fire by South Ossetia against Georgian positions (Asmus, 27)
  • In his report, he added "at this stage, it does not look like the sides are interested in a large-scale military conflict but a small local conflict with fatilities Is highly likely." (Asmus, 27)
• The OSCE was much more distressing, warning that the situation on the ground was becoming dangerous (Asmus, 27)
  • The world's attention was on the Beijings Olympics. (Asmus, 27)

5 AUGUST

• On 5 August, Georgian authorities had organised a tour for journalists and diplomats to demonstrate the separatist-caused damage.
  • Russian ambassador-at-large Yuri Popov declared that Russia would intervene on the side of South Ossetia.
  • South Ossetian president Kokoity blamed Georgia of "attempting to spark a full-scale war".[33]
  • The South Ossetian presidential envoy to Moscow, Dmitry Medoyev, declared that volunteers were already arriving, primarily from North Ossetia, to South Ossetia. He said that the regions of North Caucasus and the Cossacks were ready to help South Ossetia. He claimed that Tskhinvali relied mostly on its own forces.[34]
• On 5 August, Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia agreed to hold negotiations on 7 August, with Georgian minister Temur Iakobashvili attending talks in Tskhinvali.
  • However, Georgia still opposed to the format of the Joint Control Commission.[32]
  • The Georgian state minister for reintegration Temur Iakobashvili said that a meeting between him and Boris Chochiev was decided and chief Russian negotiator over South Ossetia, Yuri Popov, would be attending.
  • However, later the South Ossetians denied any agreement for such meeting.[35]

6 AUGUST

• On 6 August, the South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported that Boris Chochiev said that the South Ossetians had agreed to "a consultative meeting" in Tskhinvali on 7 August.
• However, later the South Ossetians refused to participate in bilateral talks, demanding a JCC session.[35]
• On 6 August, it was reported that the South Ossetian claim of having killed twenty-nine Georgian servicemen in the clashes in the past week was not proven.[32]
• Kokoity made a televised address in military uniform, warning the Georgian government to leave all of South Ossetian territory or face attack (Asatiani, 479)
• Kokoity's address calls for the ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages (Glucksmann, 24)
• For the first time since the 1990s, Russians take over control of the Georgian side of the Roki Tunnel (Glucksmann, 24)

ASATIANI

• In shelling Georgia villages, Ossetian forces used artillery among others (478-479)
• In the first days of August, hundreds of Kazak and North Caucasian paramilitary fighters were broght in SO from Russia, shown Russian TV as heroes going to fight for their Ossetian brothers (479)
• Meanwhile, Tskhinvali was evacuated of women and children, a move that looked somehow inadequate at the moment (479)

GALLEOTI

• South Ossetia started shelling Georgian villages on August 1 (125)
• The aim was to provoke Saakashvili into some kind of action that would force a Russian invasion (125)

• The blowing up of the police car on July 31 (August 1?) was what started the conflict that degenerated into a full-blown war (Panfilov, 74)

BLUASHVILI

• From July 29 to August 7, 6 Georgian policemen, 11 Georgian peacekeepers and 14 civilians were injured in the shellings (398)
• On August 6-7, Saakashvili sought to call Medvedev several times, but failed (399)

ASMUS

• By August 7, according to Andrei Illiaronov, there were some 1,200 Russian soldiers, medical and communication units already stationed in South Ossetia illegally by August 7 (22)
  • Another 12,000 troops were stationed on the other side of the border "ready to immediately cross the border to provide assistance to the peacekeepers of South ossetia", as one Russian official put it, since the end of the military games (22)
• Sources, including Russian media ones, talked about the presence of elements of the 135th and 693rd Regiments of the 58th Atmy and the 22nd Special Forces Brigade and several tank units, moving into SO between August 2 and 7 (22)
  • These were in addition to the North Ossetian, Chechen, and Cossak volunteers officially mobilized by Moscow and registered by Russian military authorities before being sent across the border where a number of them were assigned to the NO peacekeeping battalion on August 3 (22)
    • Many of these volunteers would be the very ones to implement the ethnic cleansing later during and after the war (22)
• "When South Ossetian paramilitary forces opened fire on Georgian positions and villages on July 29, those barrages were more systemic and lethan in previous summers" (26)
  • They included 100 mm and 120mm artillery, heavier weaponry officially banned in the conflict zone and never before used there, indicating their Russian origin (26)
• On August 4, Kulakhmetov confirmed the use of banned weapons against Georgian villages (26)
• Intercepted phone calls between Russian and NO peacekeepers showed them collaborating with South Ossetian militia to target Georgians and hide evidence (26)
• Six Georgian policemen, 11 peacekeepers, and 14 civilians had been wounded (26)
  • 2 Georgians were KIA and two more died later
  • Georgian villages were shut down, cut off, and destroyed (26)
• Controversial use of "human shields" by the South Ossetian militia, although using peacekeepers (26-27)

IIFFMCG II

• From 24 to 28 July, several explosions occurred in the southern environs of Tskhinvali and in the Georgian-administered village of Avnevi, close to the post of the Georgian Peacekeeping Force (PKF) battalion. (206)
• From 29 to 31 July, exchanges of fire were reported between the Georgian-administered village of Sveri and the South Ossetian-administered village of Andzisi in the Sarabuki area, where the Georgian and Ossetian JPKF battalions established their posts after the events of 3 July. (206)
  • On the same day, exchanges of fire also took place in the area of Khetagurovo between the South Ossetian militia post and the Georgian police post on the Georgian Avnevi-Zemo Nikozi by-pass road. (206)
• On 29 July, a Joint Monitoring Team of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) came under fire, but neither side admitted responsibility for the incident. (206)
• In the meantime, both sides started to strengthen their positions and to build new fortifications in various strategic locations in the conflict zone, including in the villages of Tliakana, Khetagurovo, Zemo Prisi, Didi Gromi, Kverneti, Kusireti, Chorbauli and the Tsunarishba reservoir on the Ossetian side and, on the Georgian side, in the village of Prisi and close to the Georgian by-pass road running from Avnevi to Zemo Nikozi. (206-207)
  • Also reported were the completion of construction by a Russian company of a military base (Ugardanta) in the Java district and a so-called military rehabilitation centre in the north-western part of Tskhinvali. (207)
• On 1 August, an improvised explosive device that went off on the Georgian Eredvi-Kheiti road by-passing Tskhinvali left five Georgian policemen injured. (207)
  • During the evening and night of 1 2 August, a series of intense and extensive exchanges of fire including sniper fire and mortar shelling occurred in the conflict zone, causing fatalities and casualties. (207-208)
  • The events on 1-2 August were assessed by the OSCE Mission to Georgia as the most serious outbreak of fire since the 2004 conflict. Exchanges of fire continued in the nights of 2-3 and 3-4 August. (208)
• Beginning in the afternoon of 6 August fire was exchanged along virtually the whole line of contact between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides, with particular hotspots in the Avnevi Nuli-Khetagurovo area (west of Tskhinvali) and the Dmenisi-Prisi area (east of Tskhinvali). (208)

IIFFMCG III

• 29 July, 0500: Two tank platoons of SO irregular forces placed close to village of Andzisi per Georgian intelligence (21)
  • 1000: SO irregular forces open fire at members of the KPKF and an OSCE observer group moving near Andzisi (21)
  • 1600: SO irregular forces shell the GE-controlled Big Liakhvi villages for 40 minutes with mortars and grenade launchers
  • 2200: SO irregular forces shell the Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint on Sarabuki heights with 100 mm and 120 mm artillery. This big caliber used for the first time since the end of the hostilities in the 1990s (21)
• 1 August, 0805 and 0812: Toyota pickup truck carrying six police officers of the Georgian MIA hit by two remote control explosive devices on the Eredvi-Kheiti bypass road, severely injuring five police officers. The road is closed for civilian use, isolating the Georgian villages in SO (21)
  • 2130- : SO irregular forces shell Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikoxzi, Avnevi, Ergneti, Eredvi and Zemo Prisi with mortars and cannons. Shelling goes on all night and stops in the morning of Aug 2. August 4 report of the JPKF confirms the incident. Six civilians and one policeman are injured (21)
• 2 August, 1223: SO announces evacuation of civilian population from Tskhvinvali and villages. Evacuation continues till Aug. 6 (22)
• 3 August, 0630: SO irregular forces deployed in Velebi, Znauri district open fire towards Georgian police checkpoint near Dvani in Kareli district (22)
  • SO MIA Mikhail Mindzaev threatens to bomb tGori and Kareli (22)
  • Georgian intelligence reports units of the reconnaissance battalion of the 19th Motor Rifle Division of the 58th Russian Army to have been deployed in Java District through Roki Tunnel (22)
• 4 August (22)
  • Early hours: 10 units of armor (BTR/BMP vehicles) are brought into SO from Russia and distributed among the irregular forces. 2 vehicles were handed over to the irregular units in Dmenisi
  • 0730: SO forces based in Dmenisi opened fire towards Georgian peacekeeping checkoing in Sarabuki Heights. Exchange of fire for 30 minutes
  • Kokoity tells Caucasian Knot that 300 volunteers from NO arrived in SO and their number would increase to 2,000
  • At 1840, Kokoity receives a telegram from Viktor Vodolatsky, Comamnder of Don Cossack Forces and member of the Duma, promising himmilitary support. Nikolai Kozitsin, Commander of the Second Don Cossack Forces, announces being able to send 10,000-15,000 volunteers to SO (22)
• 5 August: 0015: SO irregular forces shoot 3 grenades from Ubiati (Znauri) towards Georgian police station in Nuli (Frone Valley), with two hitting the building (23)
  • 0130: SO forces fire at Georgian peacekeepers located at Sarabuki heights until 0630. Two Georgian peacekeepers are wounded (23)
  • 0901: Georgian MIA intercepts phone call with SO's Mindzaev ordering a massive attack and the elimination of the Georgian villages of Dvani (23)
  • 1000-1700: MIA organizes tour of Ergneti, Nikozi, Avnevi and Nuli for international media and foreign missions (inc. Russian Ambassador) to witness firsthand the damage. Tour include visit to all peacekeeping and police checkpoints. No build up is observed contrary to Russian claims (23)
  • 1510: 150 North Caucasus volunteers arrive in Tskhinvali.
  • 1805: Vladimir Voronin, Deputy Commander of DOn Cossack Forces, announces in an interview that volunteer battalions had been formed in Southern Russia and were ready to be deployed in SO, while Dmitry Medoev (representative of SO in Moscow) declared that the first squads of volunteers from Russia had already reached SO (23)
  • Throughout the day, 40 units of self-propelled artillery and a reconnaissance battalion of the 33rd Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade from Botlikh are deployed in SO through the RT, in addition to that 30 artillery guns are brought into the Java district. Some units of the 58th Army are reportedly mobilized near the RT in NO, including the 135th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment from Prokhladniy and the 693rd Motor Rifle Regiment from Zaramag (Georgian intelligence) (23)
  • In the evening, several tanks and military trucks with armed soldiers are detected by Georgian intelligence moving towards the Georgian villages of Avnevi (24)
• August 6: In the early hours, several units of armor including BTR and BMP vehicles and self-propelled artillery systems are brought into SO from Russia and deployed near the southern entrance of the RT per Georgian Intelligence (24)
  • In the morning, Russian military base employees in Tskhinvali are furloughed and all local shops are closed (24)
  • 1600: SO forces open mortar fire from Prinevi, Ubiati, and Khetagurovo against the GE villages of Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli. Georian police and peacekeeping checkpoints in Nuli are targeted by armored vehicle and machine gun fire. Attack lasts three hours. (24)
  • 1800: SO forces attack Sarabuki heights where Georgian peacekeepers were stationed woulding 3 members of the Georgian battalion of the JPKF (24)
  • 2000: Artillery attacks from Khetagurovo on Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli until 0600 of next day
  • JPKF ends monitoring in the conflict zone, despite request by Georgian battalion (24)
• August 3: Georgian intelligence reports thatt units of the separate reconnaissance battalion of the 19th Motor Rifle Division of the 58th Army are deployed in the Java District (61)
• August 4: At night, Georgian intelligence reports 10 units of armor (BTR/BMP vehicles) brought into SO and distributed to SO forces, including two sent to Dmenisi (61-62)
• 5 August: Georgian intelligence reports 40 units of self-propelled artillery and one reconnaissance battalion of the 33rd Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade are deployed in SO and 30 artillery guns brought into the Java District. (62)
  • Some units of the 58th Army are reportedly mobilized near RT including the 135th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment from Prokhaldniy and the 693rd motor Rifle Regiment from Zaramag (62)
• August 6: At night, several units of armor (BTR BMP vehicles and self-propelled artillery systems) are brought into SO (62)
• July 29: 1600: SO forces shell the Big Liakhvi villages for 40 minutes using mortars and grenade launchers (64)
  • 2200: Georgian peacekeeping checkpoing on Sarabuki Heights shelled with 100 mm and 120 mm artillery (64)
• 1 August: 2130-: SO forces shell Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Avnevi, Nuli, Ergneti, Eredvi, and Zemo Prisi with large caliber artillery, till the next morning (64)
• The 4 August JPKF report confirmed the shelling of the previous days but did not state who did the shelling (64)
  • Despite previous phone conversations by the North Ossetian battalion leadership reported by Georgian intelligence knowing full well who did the shooting. Other phone calls by the NO battalion showed coordination in the shelling (65-66)
• 6 August: JPKF ends all monitoring despite Georgian request (66)
• Russian point of view:
  • Night of 1-2 August, Georia opens sniper fire targeting law enforcement checkpoints in SO. Several residential neighborhoods in Tskhinvali are fired upon, leading to six civilians deaths. (506)

• July 20: Tskhinvali alleges Tbilisi detains four Ossetians in response to the detention of a Georgian man by Tskhinvali over suspicions of murder (https://civil.ge/archives/116815)
  • The arrest were confirmed by Tbilisi and justified with the illegal possession of arms and drugs (https://civil.ge/archives/116819)
  • Tbilisi released two of them on July 22 as a result of OSCE negotiations and Russian peacekeepers (according to Tskhinvali, with a prisoner swap, which Tbilisi denied) (https://civil.ge/archives/116820)
  • The arrested Georgian, Teimuraz Goginashvili, was accused of a crime dating back to the early 1990s (https://civil.ge/archives/116827)
  • The other two Ossetians were released on July 22 as well at night, but Goginashvili remained in prison
  • Goginashvili was released on July 24 (https://civil.ge/archives/116835)
• 25 July: Tskhinvali civilian is killed after two remote explosive devices hit his car in the outskirts of Tskhinvali at 1720 on the road to Nikozi, just 300 m from a Russian peacekeeper post (https://civil.ge/archives/116842)
• 29 July: Georgian posts come under SO fire early morning. No injury is reported. This came a day after Ramaz Nikolaishvili, Deputy MOD, placed the Georgian flag on top of the strategic height of Sarabuki. The same July 28, SO troops prevented peacekeepers and OSCE observers from monitoring the village of Choliburi, where SO militia claimed to be setting up fortifications (https://civil.ge/archives/116849)
  • The observers of Choliburi were threatened at gunpoint
• 29 July: Tskhinvali accuses Tbilisi of opening fire at 0500 on thee SO village of Sarabuki, and Andisi at 0800. Fire was launched from Sveri. No one was injured. Tbilisi claimed the fire was a response to an SO attack on the strategic Sarabuki height (https://civil.ge/archives/116851)
  • The same day, Russian peacekeepers claimed they came under fire from Sveri with OSCE observers
• 29 July: Late. Tskhinvali claims attacks by Georgia on Sarabuki and Tliakana, leading to one injury. Tbilisi claims that it was responding to an attack on its Sarabuki post at 2200 (https://civil.ge/archives/116855)
• 31 July: SO MIA Mikhail Mindzaev confirms the installation of military fortifications in the conflict zone in violation of existing agreements (https://civil.ge/archives/116862)

• August 1: 5 Georgian police officers are injured when their pickup vehicle is hit by two remote control explosives at 0800 on the Tskhinvali Northern Bypass Road (https://civil.ge/archives/116864)
• Night Six dead and 22 wounded in the worst violence in years. (https://civil.ge/archives/116867)
  • Tskhinvali sources talked of six dead and 15 injured after Georgian fire
  • Russian command of PKF said one SO militiaman was killed by sniper fire coming from the Georgian post in Prisi at 1817
  • Russian PKF said another three people were killed after Georgian snipers shot into Tskhinvali at 2100
  • Tskhinvali came under mortar fire from Ergneti and Zemo Nikozi
  • Additional shelling and shooting resumed in the early hours of Aug 2
  • One of the victims was a NO PKF soldier
  • Kurashvili affirmed that the Georgian side had opened fire in response to SO shelling of Georgian villages causing seven injuries, including six civilians, in Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Nuli, nd Ergneti
    • Kurashvili alleged that Russian peacekeepers were involved in the shelling
  • Kokoity claimed that Tbilisi was engaged in a sniper war and said it was an attempt to engage SO in a large-scale military conflict. Ukraine and the US are also responsible for previous arming of Georgia.
• August 2:
  • Injury figures revised to seven Georgians. Over a dozen Georgian houses in the villages are damaged by shelling (https://civil.ge/archives/116870)
  • Russia denied having any involvement of its peacekeepers in the shootout, calling Kurashvili's statement a "provocative, dirty misinformation" (https://civil.ge/archives/116871)
  • NO's Mamsurov pledges to provide assistance to SO in repelling aggression in a phone call with Kokoity (https://civil.ge/archives/116872)
    • SO reports it is ready to evacuate children and women from Tskhinvali and Dmenisi
  • The Russian MFA in the afternoon says it "is taking vigorous measures to prevent further escalation of armed confrontations between the Georgian and SO sides" (https://civil.ge/archives/116869)
  • Kokoiity says in the afternoon that in the case of further escalation in tension, he would declare a general mobilization of its troops, including volunteers from NO (https://civil.ge/archives/116873)
  • Iakobashvili meets Kulakhmetov. Iakobashvili rejects Kurashvili's previous comments about Russian peacekeepers being involved. SO rejects mediated talks with Tbilisi (https://civil.ge/archives/116874)
  • Valery Evtukhovich, Russian Airborne Troops Commander, tells Russian media that he is ready to intervene to help Russian peacekeepers if needed and if decided by Medvedev or the Russian NSC (https://civil.ge/archives/116875)
  • Stubb condemns the deadly fights (https://civil.ge/archives/116876)
  • Kokoity accuses the Georgian side of having staged the provocations as an excuse to boycott the JCC (https://civil.ge/archives/116877)
• August 3:
  • Relatively calm early hours with sporadic shooting reported. Mugut and a couple other small villages in Znaur District come under fire around 0300. Tbilisi accuses Tskhinvali of having first shot at Dvani, close to Mugut. No casualty reported. (https://civil.ge/archives/116877)
    • Evacuation numbers: 819 people, including 548 children (https://civil.ge/archives/116889)
  • Russian MFA claims that the threat of large-scale conflict is becoming more real (https://civil.ge/archives/116880)
• 4 August:
  • Vashadze and Karashin hold a phone conversation. Moscow accused Georgia of using disproportionate force (https://civil.ge/archives/116879)
  • Iakobashvili accuses Russia of creating an illusion of war to derail international conflict settlement efforts (https://civil.ge/archives/116868)
  • Iakobashvili rejects JCC format but expresses hope for a new format of talks to be launched "soon", with Russian mediation (https://civil.ge/archives/116885)
• 5 August:
  • Reuters reports of a Georgian troop build-up near the conflict zone. NATO says it is unaware but calls on the parties to deescalate the tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/116896)
  • In order to prove there was no troop buildup, Tnilisi gives a tour of the conflict zone to foreign reports and diplomats, organized by the MIA. Kovalenko was yelled at by a Georgian villager woman during the trip. Kurashvili told Kovalenko to not try to fool the people. (https://civil.ge/archives/116897)
  • Popov says, "If events develop in the worst possible way, with the use of force, Russia will not be able to stand by, seeing as Russian citizens live in South Ossetia." The US State Dep calls for both sides to resume talks and deescalate (https://civil.ge/archives/116901)
• 6 August:
  • Tskhinvali claims Georgian forces shoot at Khetagurov. Russian PKF states shooting begins at 1630, calling it a "massive shootout in the vicinity of Avnevi and Khetagurov". Tbilisi claims Tskhinvali first shot at Avnevi, Nuli, and Dvani using grenade launchers (https://civil.ge/archives/116905)
  • Tskhinvali claims having destroyed a Georgian APC in a clash close to Nuli. Tskhinvali also claims having taken over the heights close to Nuli overlooking an Ossetian-controlled road linking Tskhinvali to Znauri. This is denied by Tbilisi and the Russian PKF. Tbilisi had been denying military buidup (https://civil.ge/archives/116906)
• After the August 2 clashes, the US called for the setting up of a joint Georgian-Russian monitoring of the RT to curb illegal arms trafficking and for an immediate halt to violence. (https://civil.ge/archives/116890)
  • The OSCE started an investigation

Georgian response and Russian invasion

• Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) reported that events in South Ossetia could only be assessed as war.
• Starting with the night of 6–7 August, there was continuous fire.
• At 6 AM on the morning of 7 August, firing resumed.
• A reporter concluded that assault rifles, heavy artillery and grenade launchers were used.
• Tskhinvali hospital had been receiving the wounded all night.
• According to the Tskhinvali hospital, they received 14 wounded people.
• Anatoly Barankevich, the secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia, claimed that the clashes began when the Georgians unsuccessfully attempted to seize a key height near the village Nuli on 6 August.
  • According to Barankevich, Georgian special troops from the ministry of defense attempted to capture the Prisi Heights on the morning of 7 August.
• The hotel administrator in Tskhinvali refused to accept payment from a NG reporter, saying, "Maybe, here something will happen, that you will have to leave prematurely. So the bank won't work, and we won't be able to refund your money."
• JPKF commander's assistant Vladimir Ivanov told NG that the peacekeepers had documented five illegal overflights of the Georgian Su-25 jets from the Gori district towards Java and three drones during the night of 6–7 August.
• Nezavisimaya Gazeta also reported that Russian troops were being pulled towards the Georgian border, however Russian military claimed that they continued their exercises.
• According to the phone calls intercepted by the Georgian intelligence, regular (non-peacekeeping) Russian military entered South Ossetia in the early hours of 7 August through the Roki Tunnel.
• Later that day, even the state-controlled Russian TV showed Abkhazia's de facto president Sergei Bagapsh, who said at a meeting of the Abkhaz National Security Council: "I have spoken to the president of South Ossetia. It has more or less stabilized now. A battalion from the North Caucasus District has entered the area."[38]
• Although South Ossetian separatists initially said in the morning that six people were wounded after fire exchange during the night and morning, later they said that the casualties were increased to eighteen.
• The Georgian Interior Ministry said the Georgian villages of Eredvi, Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani and Nuli were shelled on late 6 August and two Georgian peacekeepers were wounded.
  • The South Ossetians claimed that fire recommenced at about 10.[39]
  • According to Russia Today, after Russian peacekeepers intervened in the conflict, fire exchange stopped for 40 minutes.
  • South Ossetian de facto president Kokoity said that "South Ossetia stopped shooting for 40 minutes".
• Around 14:00, the South Ossetians renewed their shelling and killed two Georgian peacekeepers in Avnevi.
  • According to Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze, these were the first Georgian deaths in South Ossetia since the nineties.[40]
• At about 14:30, Georgian tanks, 122 mm howitzers and 203 mm self-propelled artillery began heading towards South Ossetia to dissuade separatists from additional attacks.[41]
• According to The Washington Post, Georgian infantry left their bases in late afternoon and began moving toward South Ossetia.
• During the afternoon, OSCE monitors recorded Georgian military traffic, including artillery, on roads near Gori.[40]
• In the afternoon, Georgian personnel left the Joint Peacekeeping Force headquarters in Tskhinvali.[42][43]
• Georgian official said that South Ossetian militia blew up an APC by a rocket propelled grenade and three Georgian peacekeepers were wounded.[44][45]
• Temur Iakobashvili had refused any talks in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) format, since the commission "is responsible for what is happening in the region," adding if Russian "puppets" would not be forced to negotiate then Russia's status as a mediator would be "in doubt."
• A Russian co-chairman of the JCC, Yury Popov, said in Tbilisi he was going to visit Tskhinvali with Iakobashvili: "We have not yet arranged a trip to Tskhinvali...The negotiations will be held if the situation allows it."
  • South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity had earlier warned Popov that his visit to Tskhinvali would be "dangerous".
  • Georgian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling on Russia to force the separatists to stop the systematic shelling and saying, "Responsibility for the latest events lies with Russia."
  • The Georgian diplomats said that mercenaries and military hardware were moving to South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel.
• In the afternoon South Ossetia claimed that lots of Georgian troops were advancing towards them.
• Abkhaz Defense Minister Mirab Kishmaria had said earlier: "The Abkhazian Security Council held a meeting [earlier] today, where our republic's Commander-in-Chief Sergei Bagapsh gave me instructions to put our troops on combat readiness."[46]
• At 16:00, Temur Iakobashvili arrived in Tskhinvali for a previously-arranged meeting with South Ossetians and Russian diplomat Yuri Popov;[41] however, Russia's special envoy, who blamed a flat tire, did not appear;[5] and neither did the Ossetians.[42]
  • Temur Iakobashvili met with General Marat Kulakhmetov (the Russian commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force), who said that Russian peacekeepers could not stop Ossetian attacks and Georgia should implement a ceasefire.[41] "Nobody was in the streets – no cars, no people," Iakobashvili told journalists several days later.[40]
• According to Russia Today, by the evening four people were reported to have been killed and more than two dozen wounded.
  • Later it was reported that about 12 people were killed and more than 20 injured on 7 August.[47]
• At 18:10, Russian peacekeepers told the OSCE monitors that Georgian artillery was fired on Khetagurovo.
  • But independent verification of this report was impossible.[48]
• At around 19:00, Georgian President Saakashvili, ordered a unilateral ceasefire and no-response order.[49]
  • "A sniper war is ongoing against residents of villages [in the South Ossetian conflict zone] and as I speak now intense fire is ongoing from artillery, from tanks, from self-propelled artillery systems – which have been brought into the conflict zone illegally – and from other types of weaponry, including from mortars and grenade launchers," Saakashvili said in a live TV address at 19:10.
  • Saakashvili called for negotiations "in any type of format," reaffirmed the offer of "unrestricted autonomy" for South Ossetia, proposed that Russia should become the guarantor of that solution, offered a general amnesty, and pleaded for international help to stop the hostilities.[49]
  • Ceasefire was announced after a skirmish that had killed up to ten Georgian peacekeepers and civilians, according to the Georgian authorities.[50]
• Russia regarded the ceasefire as an attempt to buy time to deploy Georgian forces for an offensive.[40]
  • The separatists shelled Tamarasheni and Prisi after Saakashvili's ceasefire.
  • They destroyed Avnevi and a police station in Kurta (seat of the Provisional Administrative Entity of South Ossetia).
  • The escalated attacks forced civilians to flee the Georgian villages.[3][5]
  • Georgian Interior Ministry official later told the Russian newspaper Kommersant (on 8 August) that after this, "it became clear" that South Ossetians wouldn't stop firing and the Georgian casualties were 10 killed and 50 wounded.[51]
• Georgian foreign minister Eka Tkeshelashvili called the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, Daniel Fried.
  • She told him that Russian tanks were moving towards South Ossetia, but Fried replied that war must be avoided.[1]
• Georgian forces returned fire after the separatist shelling.[3]
  • Mamuka Kurashvili, head of the Georgian peacekeeping operations, told journalists late on August 7 that the South Ossetian violation of a unilateral ceasefire forced Georgia "to restore constitutional order".[52]
  • Georgia said the operation against the separatists would establish a "durable peace". South Ossetian envoy to Moscow, Dmitry Medoyev called the ceasefire that was announced on 7 August a "smokescreen".[53]
• The United Nations Security Council meeting was organized on 7 August at 23:00 (US EST time) upon Russias's request. Georgia participated in a follow-up open meeting held at 01:15 (US EST time) on 8 August. A discussion for a press statement calling for an end to hostilities did not reach a consensus.[54]

ASATIANI

• Georgian intelligence confirmed that Russian military with heavy equipment and artillery crossed the border, starting the Russian invasion (479)
• Saakashvili only then ordered Georgia's advance into Tskhinvali (479)

GALLEOTI

• The original Georgian plan (which was provoked by Russia) was to seize Tskhinvali and block the Roki Tunnel and the Transcaucasian Military Highway to prevent the arrival of reinforcements (126)
• Tbilisi hoped to have seize the main settlements in the region within four days, such that they could install a new friendly local administration and turn policing and mop-up duties to a force of reservist soldiers and police (126)
• The 4th Georgian Brigade was to seize Khetagurovi (West of Tskhinvali), while the 3rd Brigade was to take the Prisi Heights (East of Tskhinvali), meeting at Gupti to the north and encircling entirely Tskhinvali (126)
• The plan was to then race along the S10 highway to capture Java and close off the Roki Tunnel (126)
  • The responsibility for taking Tskhinvali was given to the MIA (126)
• Just before midnight on 7 August, Georgian started to bimbard Tskhinvali with more than 100 mortars and artillery pieces and 30 MRLs (127)
• The goal was to target strategic locations, but the reality was messier. Some civilian targets were hit (127)
• Among the collateral damage was the compound of the Russian peacekeepers under Lt. Colonel Konstantin Timerman, which Tbilisi wanted to avoid (127)
• This was called an illegal act of aggression by Moscow (127)
  • But Russian troops had already been on the move when that happened (127)
    • They were given orders around 0100 on August 8 to move into Georgia (127)
    • Around 0200, a battalion from the 693rd Motor Rifle Regiment crossed the border, followed by another from the 135th Motor Rifle Regiment (127)
    • Their mission was to secure the Roki Tunnel and the S10 highway for further Russian troops (127)

GLUCKSMANN

• "The goal in itslf was not to take Tskhinvali but to neutralize the enemy positions that had been bombing for days our lines and villages under our control and to block the advance of Russian troops that had entered the Georgian territory via the Roki Tunnel 20 hours before" (11)
• Saakashvili claims having recordings of South Ossetian border guards via cell phone describing the entry of Russian forces via Roki at 0352 on August 7 (12)
• The NYT did an investigation that confirmed the recordings (13)
• Saakashvili described the assault on Tskhinvali as a "simple invasion of a sovereign country by the army of Moscow, followed by a Georgian counter-attack (13)
• Russia alleged that the 7 August troops were peacekeepers, although Georgia rejected this claim, on the ground that all peacekeeping rotations must have a preciding notice (14)
• Saakashvili was in his office with Iakobashvili and faced the choice of either looking like the victim and not reacting to the Russian troops, or risk losing face and prevent a full-blown invasion by giving the world time to react (15)
• Saakashvili then gave the order to blow up the Roki Tunnel, with avoiding civilian deaths at all costs. (16)
• What Saakashvili predicts would have happened without his reaction would have been a direct annexation of South Ossetia and claimed lands (17)
• Saakashvili refused to bring to the SO front the Western troops, which were meant to keep stability in the Abkhaz conflict zone. He also rejected proposals to bring home troops in Iraq on August 7 (24)
• Shelling was coming from the Russian peacekeepers base (25)
• In the afternoon of August 7, General Kulakhmetov, head of Russian peacekeepers, told Georgian authorities that the Ossetians had become "uncontrollable" (25)
• Iakobashvili arrived for last minute talks in Tskhinvali around 1500 (25)
  • Iakobashvili was told by Russian peacekeepers that they were not planning to intervene in the Ossetians' shelling (25-26)
  • Yuri Popov, head negotiator of the Russian side, refused meeting with Iakobashvili (26)
• At 1800, Iakobashvili was ordered back to Tbilisi to announce a unilateral ceasefire (27)
• Tbilisi was told by Russia that the Russian troops' arrival was only meant to keep calm between Ossetians and Georgians (27)
• After hours of unilateral ceasefire and continuous shelling, Saakashvili gave three orders: neutralize shelling targets in the north of Tskhinvali, stop the Russians South of Roki, avoid the shelling of civilian neighborhoods (27)
• Saakashvili on how he knew the Russian forces' arrival into SO was not for peacekeeping purposes: "The massive character of the troops' entry, of tanks and armored vehicles, the unusually violent and continuous shelling of our positions around Tskhinvali, the crazy declarations of Kokoity on Georgian villages to recuperate and cleanse, the obvious refusal to start any serious negotiation with us, the mass hysteria on Rssian television" (28)
• At 2030, Saakashvili Tells Kezerashvili: "Even if our soldiers die, do not open fire" (28)
• His military advisers said that a barrage of fire was necessary to help evacuations on the ground (28)

• Batu Kutelia said later that Georgian forces had received the "green light" from Russian forces to neutralize Ossetian militias (Zourabichvili, 317)

BLUASHVILI

• On August 7, two Georgian soldiers were killed and another two would later die from injuries (398)
• Kulakhmetov admitted on August 7 that Ossetians were shelling Georgian positions from bases near the Russian peacekeeper base, but "they could not be controlled" (398)
• At 19:00, Saakashvili gave a unilateral ceasefire order and a "no-response order" (399)
  • At 2030, Merabishvili called Saakashvili and briefed that the shelling of villages was continuing, to which Saakashvili refused to lift the ceasefire order (399)
  • At 2230, Kezerashvili briefed Saakashvili that heavy artillery bombing of Georgian positions made the evacuation of injured soldiers and civilians impossible, to which MS still refused to break the ceasefire (399)
• Russian troop reinforcements had already entered South Ossetia on August 7 at 1530 (403)

• Georgian forces started shelling with heavy fire Tskhinvali at 23:55 (Gachechiladze, 541)

IIFFMCG I

• "The shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August 2008 marked the beginning of the large-scale armed conflict in Georgia, yet it was only the culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents." (11)
• The beginning of the war is considered by the IIFFMCG to be the Georgian military operation launched against Tskhinvali with a massive artillery attack (19)
  • Mamuka Kurashvili originally called it "restoring constitutional order in the territory of South Ossetia" (19)
• The order was given at 2335 on August 7 by President Saakashvili to launch a defensive operation "to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia as well as the security of Georgia's citizens" (19)
  • The order asked for the protection of civilians in South Ossetia, the neutralization of firing positions firing against civilian Georgian targets, and halting the movement of regular Russian units through the Roki Tunnel (19-20)
• The IIFFMCG found that the Georgian allegations of a Russian invasion were supported inter alia by claims of illegal entry into South Ossetia of a large number of Russian troops and armour before the launch of the Georgian operation (20)
• Russia claims that its forces entered Georgian (SO) territory at 1430 on August 8, along with a Russian air force and artillery campaign (20)
• The IIFFMCG confirms that there were Russian forces in South Ossetia other than the peacekeeping battalion before 1430 on Aug 8 (20)
  • Air bombing campaigns by Russia started already in the morning of August 8, before 1430 (20)

ASMUS

• Besides the Russians entering through the Roki Tunnel, the 2335 order included the Russian column coming from Java (19)
• The orders were given by phone to his command (19)
• In the morning of August 7, at 0400, South Ossetian border guards were discussing in an intercepted phone call the entry of Russian troops and the takeover of the Roki Tunnel by Russian border guards (19-20)
  • Georgian intelligence estimated as many as 150 pieces of armor to be transported through the tunnel (20)
  • The intercepts talked about the arrival of the 693rd Regiment of the 19th Division of the 58th Army, not authorized in Georgia, as well as elements of the 135th Regiment (20)
  • Georgian intelligence estimated as many as 550 men to have entered through the Roki Tunnel that night (20)
  • Also on that 6-7 Agust night, Georgian peacekeepers noted the movement of Russian heavy artillery from Java to Tskhinvali and when Tbilisi asked Marat Kulakhmetov for explanations, the latter never gave any (20)
  • Georgian intelligence believed that more Russian forces would enter through the Roki Tunnel on 7-8 August night unless stopped (20)
  • ASMUS calls "the final straw" the Russian artillery column going from Java to Tskhinvali (20-21)
• Asmus calls the claim that Russia entered Georgia at 1400 on August 8 "simply not credible", though the exact moment of Russia's entry remains passionately disputed (21-22)
  • This is because the Roki Tunnel was entirely controlled by Russia and there was no chance for international monitors to back Russia's claims (22)
• Krasnaya Zvezda published an article after the war featuring an interview with a wounded Russian captain from the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment admitting that his battalion was already in SO on August 7 (22)
  • That article was eventually retracted and the captain disappeared from the public view (22)
• Throughout the day on August 7, Georgian intelligence reported Russian units gathering both north of the Roki Tnnel and around the Ugardanta military base outside of Java, thought to have been disbanded years ago (23)
• Throughout the day, Saakashvili sought to call Medvedev but failed (23)
• Despite US warnings, Saakashvili's main fears were as follows: (24)
  • Shelling of Georgian villages in the Didi Liakhvi Valley that Tbilisi had pledged to protect
  • Loss of Kurta, key to Georgia's soft power towards Ossetians
  • Expectation that a Russian intervention would not be limited to South Ossetia and would aim to topple him (24)
• At 1300, Saakashvili convenes a NSC meeting with Merabishvili, Kezerashvili, Adeishvili (at the time chief of staff), Ugulava, and Lomaia. (31)
  • Absent and out of the country were Bakradze, Rurua, Bokeria, Tkeshelashvili, and Bezhuashvili (31)
  • Held at Presidential Guest House in Tserovani (31)
  • When asked, every member of the NSC agreed that Russia had crossed a red line with all the recent developments, including entering through the Roki Tunnel (31)
  • It was during that meeting that another Georgian peacekeepers was killed (31-32)
    • Saakashvili gave the order to deploy Georgian troops to the edge of the conflict zone in case they were needed and at 1430, the MOD gave the public mobilization order (32)
    • At 1800, those forces were deployed to the edge of SO (32)
• On August 7, the MOD ordered the Fourth Infantry Brigade was ordered to end its US-led pre-deployment training for Iraq and to move to Gori to prepare to fight the Russians (32-33)
• Besides Popov's inability to meet, South Ossetian representatives had refused to meet with Yakobashvili on Aug 7 (33)
• Yakobashvili met with Kulakhmetov in the Nizhniy Gorodok, the HQ of the Russian command of the peacekeeping mission (34)
• Yakobashvili's announcement for a ceasefire was at 1840 and it was done on TV because it was the only way to reach SO (35)
  • Georgian forces were deploying to the conflict zone in the meantime (35)
• At 2030, Merabishvili told MS that the shelling had refused (35-36)
• At 2230, Kezerashvili told MS that the shelling had intensified and more villages were being shelled (36)
• Third report of increased shelling at 2330, in addition to scout reports of a Russian military column heading from Java to Tskhinvali (36)
• The order to stop the Russian columns and suppress Ossetian shelling and minimize civilian casualties was given to Zaza Gogava at 2335 (36)
• According to Georgian intelligence reports, the first units of the 58th Army were in Tskhinvali by 0144 on Aug 8 (36)
• Prior to launching the Tskhinvali assault, Kurashvili phoned Kulakhmetov to let him know that Russian peacekeeping positions would not be targeted as long as they remained neutral (43)
  • Peacekeepers were stationed at 14 differnt stations in the region (43)
• The first Russian peacekeepers were killed when exchanges took place on the ground around 0600 on August 8, when Russians fired from the Verkhniy Gorodok base, where some members of the SO leadership had sought refuge (43-44)

IIFFMCG II

• The Georgian view of the events: "On August 7th 2008, the Russian Federation launched a large-scale invasion on Georgia’s sovereign territory. This use of force was illegal and unjustified under international law. It constituted an egregious breach of Georgia’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. It violated also the key principle of non-intervention in international law and relations, and its magnitude and scale made it an act of aggression." (186)
  • None of the existing (collective authorization, self-defence, consent) or purported (humanitarian intervention, protection of nationals, protection of peacekeepers, force in support of a legitimate self-determination claim) exceptions to this general prohibition justify or render lawful the Russian invasion. (186)
  • "The first military clash between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian forces occurred at about 6 a.m. on August 8, while the large scale military deployment of the Russian troops started in the early morning of August 7." (187)
  • Moreover, the Russian peacekeeping base attacked by Georgian forces was directly participating in the hostilities and they no longer enjoyed the protection normally accorded to them under international law. It must once again be noted that only those peacekeeping regiments and infrastructure have been attacked by the Georgian forces, which directly participated in hostilities, whereas other Russian peacekeeping posts continued to function throughout the hostilities and have never been subject to attack. (187-188)
  • It needs to be noted that the first casualties in the peacekeeping contingents were incurred from the side of Georgian peacekeepers. Two Georgian peacekeepers Shalva Trapaidze and Vitali Takadze were killed and five wounded on August 7 at around 14:00 as a Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint was shelled with 100 and 120mm artillery from the proxy regime-controlled village Khetagurovo. A proxy militant reported to superiors the fact of killing Georgian peacekeepers in a telephone conversation also intercepted by the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs on 07.08.2008. (188)
  • "Finally, the Georgian response to the Russian armed attack was confined entirely to its own

sovereign territory, was reluctantly undertaken, and was a proportionate, necessary and wholly justified exercise of its customary and Charter right to use force in self-defence. " (188)

• Russian View: Does not address details of what time it entered Georgian territory. Claims its intervention was done to stop Georgia's attack against South Ossetia (188-190)
• After a short break in the morning, firing, involving mortars and artillery, continued on 7 August, reportedly causing human casualties and fatalities. The same day, international observers could see significant movements of Georgian troops and equipment towards Gori from the east and west. Other troops and equipment were observed stationary north of Gori, just outside the zone of conflict. (208)
  • Diplomatic efforts were undertaken on 7 August, involving the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration, Temuri Yakobashvili, the Russian Special Envoy for the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Ambassador Yuri Popov and the Commander of the JPKF, Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov. They aimed to arrange for high-level Georgian-South Ossetian peace talks but did not bring any positive results. (208)
  • In the afternoon of 7 August, Georgian representatives left the JPKF Headquarters in Tskhinvali. (208)
• At 19.00 hours (Tbilisi time) on 7 August, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili stated in a televised address that he had just ordered Georgian troops to unilaterally cease fire. He called on the South Ossetian and Russian sides to stop the bloodshed and to meet at the negotiating table in either bilateral or multilateral format. (208)
  • For some hours, the ceasefire seemed to be stable and was also observed by the South Ossetian side, until firing was reportedly resumed again at around 22.00 hours. (208-209)
• 2335: Georgian artillery units begin firing smoke bombs (209)
• 2350: Georgian artillery opens fire on both fixed and moving targets of the enemy forces on South Ossetian territory (209)
  • The interval between 2335 and 2350 was to allow the civilian population enough time to leave dangerous zones or to find protection/shelter (209)
• In the early morning of 8 August, Georgian troops launched a ground attack against Tskhinvali as well as operations on the left flank of the city and on the right flank. The flank operations seemed to aim at occupying important heights surrounding Tskhinvali and then at moving further northwards to take control of the stratetically important Gupta bridge and the roads, including the Ossetian-controlled Dzara bypass road, leading from the Roki Tunnel to Tskhinvali to block movements of the Russian troops from the North. (209)

IIFFMCG III

• Here are the developments of August 7 as viewed by Georgia
  • 0015-1000: SO forces attack Eredvi, Zemo Prisi, and Vanati with artillery including mortars and grenade launchers (24)
  • 0325: Georgian MIA obtains communication according to which a Russian military unit including tanks and military trucks loaded with soldiers entered the RT (24)
  • 0341: Large number of armored vehicles, tanks, and military trucks of the Russian regular army stream into the RT and are deployed in the Java District as confirmed by two mobile telephone conversations intercepted by the Georgian MIA. (24)
    • Multiple Russian media sources confirm that parts of the 693rd and 135th Motor Rifle Regiments of the 58th Army entered SO prior to August 8 (24)
    • SO authorities report that in the early night hours of August 7, Kokoity traveled to Java to meet with "representatives of the Russian MOD" (24-25)
  • 1042: In an interview to Russian TV, Kokoity threatens to "wipe out" Georgian forces (25)
  • 1100: SO forces resume shelling of Nuli and Avnevi from Khetagurovo (Znauri). Georgian police returns fire. (25)
  • 1200: Baghapsh announced putting the Abkhaz armed forces on alert to provide military assistance to SO and confirmed that a battalion of the NC Military District had already entered SO (25)
  • 1230: Saakashvili calls on Russia to recall its officials serving in the proxy regimes from the military hospital in Gori (25)
  • 1400: Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint in Avnevi is heavily shelled with 100 mm and 120 mm artillery by SO forces from Khetagurovo. Two Georgian peacekeepers (Shalva Trapaidze and Vitali Takadze) are killed and their armored vehicle is destroyed. Georgian police and peacekeepers return fire. A latter intercepted phone call confirms the use of a cannon to blow up the vehicle. The shelling lasts for two hours. (25)
  • Russian troops that stayed behind after Kavkaz 2008 are put on high alert in the afternoon and are given orders to prepare to move towards the Georgian border (25)
  • 1430: Georgian MOD declares mobilization of its forces, including armored vehicles, tanks, and artillery towards SO (25-26)
  • 1500-1700: Yakobashvili visits conflict zone to seek meetings with SO officials, who refused, after which he meets with Kulakhmetov, who states that he could not reach Kokoity and that the peacekeepers could not stop the attacks by SO forces. (26)
  • 1700: Kulakhemtov refuses to give additional security guarantees to the Georgian peacekeeping battalion in Tskhinvali. Kurashvili orders his officers to leave the JPKF HQ (26)
  • 1710: Georgian police and peacekeepers unilaterally cease fire to defuse tensions. (26)
  • 1910: Saakashvili announces unilateral ceasefire on television and calls on Russia and de facto regimes to negotiate (26)
  • 1955: Georgian MIA intercepts phone call of SO forces planning an artillery attack on Georgian villages (26)
  • 2030: SO forces resume the shelling of Georgian peacekeeping and police officers in Avnevi from Khetagurovo. OSCE MMOs confirm the breaking of the ceasefire. (26)
  • 2230: SO forces fire at Zemo Prisi and Tamarasheni from Tskhinvali and the Tliakana Mountain (26)
  • 2330: SO forces intensify artillery fire on all positions of Georgian police and peacekeepers in Avnevi, Nuli, Tamarasheni, and Kurta (Big Liakhvi, Little Liakhvi, and Frone Valleys). Police station in Kurta is destroyed (26)
  • 2335: Saakashvili issues three orders to the Joint Staff of the MOD: (27)
    • Protect civilians in SO
    • Neutralize firing positions from the fire against civilians and units originates
    • Halt movement of regular Russian units through Roki Tunnel and inside SO
    • This begins the militaryy action (27)
  • Also at 2335: Georgian Armed Forces artillery units start firing smoke bombs and at 2350, open fire at both fixed and moving targets of enemy forces in SO (27)
• 7 August, 1400: Georgian checkpoint in Avnevi heavily shelled with 100 mm and 120 mm artillery by SO forces based in Khetaurovo, destroying an armored vehicle and killing two Georgian peacekeepers, and wounding five others. (66-67)
• The Nizhiniy godorok HQ of the JPKF was where all the power ministers of SO gathered since late afternoon on August 7 (68)
  • Anatoly Barankevich, Security Council Chairman of SO, called for help to evacuate him from the base (68)
• Russian View of the chronology: Conflict begins on August 7 at 0040, when the Georgian side opens cannon artillery fire on the Sarabuki and Dmenisi area until 0057 (341)
  • At 0213, Georgian artillery is said to have opened fire from the Kere area at Tskninvali (341)
  • At 0940: Ubiati came under mortar shelling (341)
  • At 1430: Georgian officers leave the Combined Headquarters of the JPKF and duty stations are abandoned by observers from the Georgian side. (341)
  • At 1445: Mortar shelling on Nuli and Avnevi (341)
  • From 1543 to 1615: Georgian armed forces in Avnevi fired from cannon artillery, tanks, and IFVs towards Khetagurovo, Sveri, Zemo Nikozi, and the southeastern outskirts of Tskhinvali (341)
  • 1900: Shelling of Tskhinvali behins
  • 2330: Kurashvili announces start of combat operations against Ossetian separatists, followed 10 minutes later by a massive fire attack on Tskhinvali (341)
  • Russian forces intervened only at 1430 after an appeal by the SO SC (342)
• Russian point of view:
  • A JCC Co-Chairmen's meeting is cancelled after the Georgian side refused to meet with Popov (506)
  • At 2300, a massive artillery strike and Grad fire are unleashed against Tskhinvali, shortly after Kulakhmetov received a phone call from Tbilisi informing him that the ceasefire had been suspended and that an army operation would ensure immediately, while advised not to interfere in the hostilities (506)
  • According to the Russian point of view, 11 Russian peacekeepers were killed by Georgian shelling in the night of 7-8 August (506-507)

• Plans for tripartite negotiations to be held on August 7 were agreed upon by Iakobashvili and SO chief negotiator Boris Chochiev on August 5 (https://civil.ge/archives/116893)
  • Shortly after the same day, the report was denied by Tskhinvali and said it would only agree to talks under the JCC format (including NO) (https://civil.ge/archives/116894)
  • The sides said they had agreed on the August 7 meeting in the morning of August 6 (https://civil.ge/archives/116900)
  • Kokoity then rejected once again the bilateral meeting format later that day (https://civil.ge/archives/116904)
• In the morning of August 7, the Russian MFA condemned Tbilisi's 'military preparations' (https://civil.ge/archives/116854)
• Early hours clashes led to 20 wounded. Tbilisi claims two of its peacekeepers were injured after mortar fiere on Eredvi, Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli. Tskhinvali reported 18 injuries, including four women and one elderly man, after massive shelling of Khetagurov, Dmenisi, Sarabuki, Ubiat, and Tskhinvali. (https://civil.ge/archives/116909)
  • Saakashvili said Georgia showed maximum restraint in the aftermath of the first clash of the day as he visited the Gori Military Hospital (https://civil.ge/archives/116912)
• Around 1200, Georgia reported new shelling of Avnevi and Nuli (https://civil.ge/archives/116914)
  • While Russian media reported seeing military convoys heading from Kutaisi to Gori.
• The Georgian MFA called on Russia to use its influence over SO secessionist authorities to persuade them to stop shelling Georgian villages and to engage in direct talks with Tbilisi (https://civil.ge/archives/116915)
  • Yuri Popov confirmed there would be no talks outside of the JCC frame (https://civil.ge/archives/116916)
• Around 1500, three Georgian servicemen were injured after an infantry combat vehicle of the Georgian PKF was blown up (https://civil.ge/archives/116917)
• Around 1700, SO reported that Tbilisi had launched a "large-scale military aggression against SO", reported by NSC Secretary Anatoly Barankevich (https://civil.ge/archives/116918)
  • SO reported that Khetagurov and Tskhinvali were being shelled by numerous Georgian military units are moving towards the border and had deployed 27 multiple rocket launchers close to the border
  • Tbilisi claimed that Tskhinvali had shelled Avnevi
• In the early evening, reports were made that evacuation of women and children had begun in Gerogian villages close to the conflict zone (https://civil.ge/archives/116920)
• Iakobashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire at 1840 (https://civil.ge/archives/116923)
• Saakashvili makes a televised address confirming the ceasefire at 1910. He confirms that intense fire is ongoing in the conflict zone. Confirmed there were dead and wounded. Stated that the Russian PKF admitted having lost control. He also authorized any type of negotiation under any format and was ready to offer unrestricted autonomy for SO, with Russia acting as a guarantor of that autonomy. He called Georgia a :natural ally for Russia" He offered a full amnesty to the separatists and those engaged in criminal activity if they immediately cease fire. "IMMEDIATELY CEASE FIRE, PLEASE" (https://civil.ge/archives/116922)
• 2030: Avnevi still under attack with casualties (https://civil.ge/archives/116924)
• 2100: Civil Georgia claims 10 Georgians killed in heavy fighting, including civilians (https://civil.ge/archives/116921)
• OSCE deplored that the planned August 7 meeting between negotiators had not taken place and called for direct talks (https://civil.ge/archives/116925)
• 2200: SO claims two civilians killed in Khetagurov, while 20 Ossetians are injured overall (https://civil.ge/archives/116927)
• 2200: Popov announces bilateral talks between Iakobashvili and Chochiev on August 8 (https://civil.ge/archives/116928)
• 2215: Prisi comes under attack from SO forces. Several wounded (https://civil.ge/archives/116929)
• Solana called for talks an end to violence (https://civil.ge/archives/116930)
• Prisi was followed by Tamarasheni. And by 23:49, all Georgian positions around Tskhinvali were under heavy fire (https://civil.ge/archives/116931)

Diplomatic negotiations

2008 Abkhazia Peace Plan and attempted direct talks

• On 28 March 2008, the Office of the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration summmoned an international conference "The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Processes of Reintegration in Georgia".
  • The conference was attended by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili.
  • Saakashvili announced new initiatives on the Abkhaz conflict, which were a joint free economic zone, Abkhaz representation in the central government and an Abkhaz vice-president, the right to veto all Abkhaz-related decisions, limitless autonomy and various security guarantees.[324][325][326]
  • However, the initiatives were dismissed by Abkhaz separatists.
• On 17 April 2008, Georgian minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration Giorgi Baramidze said if Abkhazia allowed the return of refugees, then Georgia would sign the treaty on non-use of force.[329]
• On 1 May 2008, Georgian Finance Minister Nika Gilauri announced that $150 million from the sale of Georgian-issued Eurobonds would be transferred to the Fund of Future Generations, which was intended to finance the development of the former breakaway regions after the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity.
• Georgian and Abkhaz sides were talking about deescalation of tensions in early May. However, each side had different vision, with Georgians focusing on recent peace plan proposed by Saakashvili and the Abkhaz demanding the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge and abolition of Georgian sanctions.
• On 12 May 2008, Georgia's UN envoy Irakli Alasania visited Sukhumi to discuss peace plan with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh.
  • The peace plan included proposals on the Georgian commitment not to use force and Abkhaz commitment to allow the return of Georgian refugees.
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba commented that Abkhazia was not completely against this plan.
  • Bagapsh planned to visit Moscow on 19 May to get approval for the Abkhaz-Georgian peace plan.
• On 15 May 2008, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution underlining the right of return of all refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia in addition to their property rights.[343]
  • Russia voted against the Georgian-sponsored resolution.[344]
  • The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Georgian proposal was "a counterproductive step".[345]
• On 16 May 2008, Georgian minister for reintegration Temur Iakobashvili arrived in Moscow and proposed to hold an international conference on the settlement of the conflicts.
  • Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that the US and the EU involvement indicated that Georgia did not want the real solution to the conflicts.[346]
• On 23 May 2008, Temur Iakobashvili said after his visit to Moscow for the discussion of Saakashvili's peace plan that Georgia wanted to revise peacekeeping formats not because "we are expelling the Russians."
  • He added that "Russia should be one of the parties to the settlement, and not have the exclusive right to peacekeeping."
  • He said that additional Russian troops in Abkhazia were not peacekeepers, but "illegal armed formations."
  • Sources in the administration of the Russian president said that Russian peacekeepers would not leave Abkhazia even if Georgia demanded their withdrawal; instead Russian troops would remain as allied forces per future military agreement with Abkhazia.[347]
• In late May 2008, Vladimir Putin said that Saakashvili's peace plan regarding Abkhazia was acceptable.[348]
  • Putin said the plan was "correct", but it needed an approval of Sukhumi.
  • Putin stated that Russia had asked the Abkhaz authorities to allow the return of 55 thousand Georgian refugees.[349]
• The Russian Foreign Ministry source said that Irakli Alasania negotiated the meeting between Georgian and Abkhaz presidents in May 2008; however, the interested parties organized the blasts in Abkhazia, which caused this meeting to be cancelled

• Saakashvili admitted later having written to Putin to propose a Cypriot model, where Abkhazia would be divided and Georgia would receive the southern section, while rejecting NATO (Zourabichvili, 312-313)
• During the 6-7 July CIS Summit in Astana, Saakashvili sought at several times to speak alone with Medvedev to talk about the brewing conflict, which Medvedev refused (Bluashvili, 398)

ASMUS

• For Saakashvili, the key to solving the Abkhazia issue was in Moscow, but Russia was not interested in making any deals (142)
• Saakashvili was disheartened by the fact that the EU was not aiming to solve the Abkhazia conflict (142)
  • Meanwhile, Saakashvili received various signals from Washington in terms of armed solution (143-144)
• Saakashvili was convinced that Putin was preparing for war since his February post-Kosovo meeting (144)
• Saakashvili hoped that Medvedev would be more willing to talk than Putin ever was (159)
• Saakashvili and Medvedev talked on the phone on June 2 (159)
• They met in St Petersburg on the sidelines of a CIS summit on June 6 (159)
  • during the meeting, Saakashvili sought to find common ground, talk about reforms in both countries. But Medvedev directly raised the issue of conflicts himself (159-160)
  • The meeting lasted 45 minutes and Medvedev ended it shortly, though opening to the idea of a future meeting. Saakashvili proposed a bilateral summit before the end of summer (160)
• June 21: Saakashvili writes secretly to Medvedev about a bold peace plan. Proposes an interim solution to split Abkhazia into two spheres of influence, with Georgia controlling Gali and Ochamchira as a FEZ jointly administered by a mixed Georgian_Abkhaz or an international administration that would allow the Abkhaz to trade with the outside world (160)
  • Tbilisi also proposed mixed law enforcement agencies with international involvement and supervision to deal with local organized crime (160-161)
  • In return, Tbilisi would unilaterally sign a non use of force pledge, abandon efforts to end the CIS Peacekeeping mission, and accept the presence of a redeployed and strengthened Russian peacekeeping presence, while wirj with Moscow to make the Sochi Olympics a success (161)
  • It was meant as an interim solution (161)
  • It was termed as "soft partition" (161)
• The plan was hand-delivered in Moscow on June 23 without the usual diplomatic channels (161)
• July 3: Karasin hand delivers Moscow's official response to Vashadze in Tbilisi. The letter rejected any hope for a soft partition. Instead, it set new preconditions for further talks (161)
• Tensions immediately started on July 4 (161-162)
• July 6: Saakashvili in Astana and hopes for meeting with Medvedev but the latter refuses despite persistent attempts. At one point, Saakashvili caught Medvedev at dinner and pushed him over bilateral summit, which Medvedev rejected. Saakashvili said the situation could hardly get worse. Medvedev said "it can get much worse" and walked away (162)

IIFFMCG II

• Saakashvili presented a peace plan on March 28: unlimited autonomy and wide federalism, supported by international guarantees, broad Abkhaz political representation in the official

structures of Georgia, including a new post of Vice-President to be occupied by an Abkhaz; the Abkhaz right to veto legislation and decisions related to the constitutional status of Abkhazia, and to issues related to Abkhaz culture, language and ethnicity; the establishment of jointly controlled free economic zones in the Gali and Ochamchira districts; and the gradual merger of law enforcement and customs services. (90)

• • It was rejected by Abkhazia (90)
• Another peace plan was proposed by MS in May 2008 (90)
• High-level bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz talks were held in May 2008 (Sokhumi) and June (Stockholm) (90)
• June 23: Saakashvili sends a letter to Medvedev with concrete proposals. At the first stage, the following:
  • Free economic zone in Gali and Ochamichira, a joint Georgian-Abkhaz administration and joint law enforcement agencies there, and the return of IDPs to these two districts
  • Withdrawal of the CIS PKF and its redeployment along the Kodori River
  • Reopening of the Moscow-Tbilisi-Yerevan railway
  • Reopening of sea communications between Sokhumi and Trabzon and other communication lines
  • International guarantors including Russia
  • Agreement on the non use of force and the return of IDPs to other parts to be concluded later (91)
• July 1: Medevedev rejects the peace plan, instead calls on Tbilisi to negotiate directly with Sokhimi, to sign a non-use of force agreement, and to withdraw from Kodori (92)

• On March 18, Saakashvili met with Ban Ki moon and announced he would outline a new peace plan. (https://civil.ge/archives/114547)
  • The details were released on March 28 during a meeting hosted by GFSIS, similar but extended from the 2006 peace plan: https://civil.ge/archives/114633
  • Joint Georgian-Abkhaz FEZ in Ochamchire and Gali that would add to the planned Poti and Anaklia FEZs
  • Abkhaz representation in "all bodies of the Georgian central authorities"
  • Post of Vice-President of Georgia with the right to veto all decisions that concern their constitutional status and other preconditions related with the preservation and further development of their culture, language, and ethnicity. This would require a constitutional amendment
  • "Many security guarantees"
  • Gradual merging of law enforcement structures
  • Joint customs-border space but full autonomy on the ground
  • "Unlimited autonomy", wide federalism, with the support of international guarantors
    • This was all against "an obscure and risky future" for both Georgians and Abkhazians
    • Russia would act as a mediator and not a party in the conflict, including changing the peacekeeping format
    • Sokhumi rejectedd the peace plan on March 29 as "part of propaganda ahead of the NATO summit" (https://civil.ge/archives/114635)
    • Burjanadze believed that Russia had pressured Abkhazia to reject the proposal (https://civil.ge/archives/114636)
• Formal proposal for a joint police was made on April 12 and involved a force in the security zone (12-12 km from ABL) and was presented by Yakobashvili, who hoped for details to be worked out during talks (https://civil.ge/archives/114724)
  • Baghapsh once again rejected the proposal on April 13, saying "we don't even pay attention to those discussions in Tbilisi. We have already made our choice." (https://civil.ge/archives/114728)
• On April 12, MS ordered Bakradze, Sharashidze, Gvaramia, Iakobashvili, and Lomaia to work on details of the peace plan (https://civil.ge/archives/114726)
• The original peace plan was "strongly supported" by the US, as stated by Zalmay Khalilzad, who urged "the de facto authorities in Abkhazia to seriously consider these initiatives" (https://civil.ge/archives/114745)
• When Russia announced more peacekeepers in end of April in Abkhazia, Saakashvili made an address to Abkhazians and South Ossetia to "stand together" in order not to let an "outrageous and irresponsible external force trigger bloodshed" and to jointly resist Russian intervention and to build a unified state (https://civil.ge/archives/114874)
  • Baghapsh and Kokoity both rejected the offer (https://civil.ge/archives/114877)
• On May 12, Alasania as UN Ambassador, paid a surprise visit to Sokhumi (https://civil.ge/archives/116272)
  • This visit came a day after the Bryza visit, which many thought had failed
  • This was the first time that a direct Georgian-Abkhaz contact was made in Sokhumi since 2007 when Bakradze visited
    • On May 19, Kommersant reported that Sokhumi and Tbilisi had agreed in general to strike a deal on the return of IDPs v. non-use of force agreement. Saakashvili said he would sign any agreement if theree were clear guarantees that IDPs would return to Abkhazia (https://civil.ge/archives/116318)
• On May 15, the UNGA passed the Georgia IDP Resolution on Abkhazia (https://civil.ge/archives/185624)
• In an interview iew with le Monde, Putin said Saakashvili's peace plan was "a right paln" but he needed Abkhazia's consent to implement it (https://civil.ge/archives/116458)
  • It was labeled as historic by MS (https://civil.ge/archives/185626)
  • MS claimed that the Russian MFA sought to pressure around 30 countries to vote against the resolution (https://civil.ge/archives/116310)
  • Sokhumi condemned the resolution as one-sided (https://civil.ge/archives/116313)
• On June 9, the Russain MFA officially backed Baghapsh's demands (NUFT and Kodori) to de-escalate tensons and launch bilateral talks (https://civil.ge/archives/116529)
• ON June 27, Kommersant reported that Tbilisi proposed to Moscow a division of Abkhazia into zones of influence, with Gali and Ochamchire under Tbilisi's control and the rest under de facto Russian control, along with the replacement of Russian peacekeepers with a joint Georgian-Abkhaz police force in the Georgian-controlled districts. Meanwhile, Tbilisi would reject NATO integration. This solution was portrayed as a win-win-win (Georgia returns territory, Abkhazia gains independence, Russia defeats NATO expansion) (https://civil.ge/archives/116639)
  • Baghapsh and Medvedev May have met over the proposed deal according to Russian media reports, although Baghapsh denied such talks took place and said he discovered about the plan from the media (https://civil.ge/archives/116644)
  • Botk Kovalenko and Kitsmarishvili denied reports that there were ongoing talks over the partition (https://civil.ge/archives/116645)
  • Lavrov denied that there was a deal in place over the partitioning and reiterated that Kodori and NUFT were the only ways forward, while Georgian politicians continued to deny such a deal (https://civil.ge/archives/116646)
• Astana July meeting: Kremlinclaims that Medvedev tels Saakashvili that fermenting tension in Abkhazia was unacceptable (https://civil.ge/archives/116709)
• On July 31, Baghapsh announced that Sokhumi would not engage in direct talks with Tbilisi (https://civil.ge/archives/116861)
• The Saakashvili Abkhazia Peace Plan was scheduled on August 4 to be formally tabled and proposed as a comprehensive package of measures, including legal acts, drafts of constitutional amendments, in mid-September. Presented to Russia, Sokhumi, and the international community (https://civil.ge/archives/116886)

• The peace plan was made before the NATO Summit, indicating that everything was on the table
• Saakashvili presented the peace plan through UNOMIG, but Sokhumi refused its delivery from UNOMIG, denouncing it as shallow rhetoric (https://d-nb.info/993910750/34, 115)
  • Besides the Kodori and NUFT requests, Abkhazia was also demanding the establishment of sea and train connection with Turkey
• Putin welcomed a plan by Saakashvili to grant Abkhazia autonomy rather than full independence, according to Le Monde. He said he was counting on the fact that the plan "will gradually take root, because on the whole it is a good plan." (https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/world/europe/01iht-georgia.4.13373464.html)
• On April 28, Iakobashvili said "we now have two paths before us" the implementation of these peace initiatives or war. There is no third option. The status quo no longer exists" (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/137681)
  • Iakobashvili sought for direct talks between Georgians and Abkhazians
  • He said that it was Georgia's responsibility to ensure the survival of the Abkhazian people
• During the June 6 meeting between Medvedev and Saakashvili, Saakashvili proposed Russia be involved in restring the infrastructure of the conflict zones. Russia's response was that NUFT and Kodori withdrawal were necessary beforehand (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/139458)
• The idea of splitting Abkhazia in two was originally proposed by the Republican Party in 1997. That plan envisioned the signing of a constitutional agreement by Abkhazia that would designate the whole territory a demilitarized zone (with the exception of Russian peacekeepers), while allowing Georgian IDPs to return to the South of the Kodori River (https://www.rferl.org/a/Bombs_Political_Bombshells_Rock_Abkhazia_Dispute/1181992.html)
  • Part of the splitting idea was Russia canceling the April 16 agreement
  • The deal allegedly enabled all sides to save face
  • The fact that the deal was leaked to Kommersant May indicate that Russia did it on purpose to force Georgia into a denial
• At a joint press conference with Rice on July 10, Saakashvili proposed the creation of a joint Russian-Georgia committee to ensure the security of the Sochi Olympics (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/139019)
  • Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev called the proposal "inappropriate" and that Russia was able to ensure security on its territory (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/139029)

Steinmeier Solution

• Members of the Abkhaz parliament adopted a declaration to halt peace negotiations with the US, the UK, France and Germany because the "Group of Friends of the Secretary-General" was biased towards Georgia. In early May, Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Abkhazia was disappointed in the West and approved the parliament's stance.
• On 23 June 2008, Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze visited Moscow in order to organize a meeting between Georgian and Russian presidents.
  • The Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Davit Bakradze said that Georgian president would discuss the situation in Abkhazia.
  • Bakradze hoped that the situation would improve.[354]
  • Vashadze met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and talked about the situation in Abkhazia.[355]
  • On 27 June 2008, Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that Georgia had proposed Russia to divide Abkhazia into Georgian and Russian spheres of influence.
  • Georgian refugees would return to Gali and Ochamchira District and the line of contact would be moved from Enguri river to Kodori river in the north.
  • Russia would win by Georgia's cancelation of bid for the NATO membership.
  • When Abkhazia's leader Sergei Bagapsh arrived in Moscow on June 26, he also met with Grigory Karasin to discuss this plan.[356]
  • Abkhaz authorities rejected the proposal on Abkhazia's division.
  • Abkhaz official Ruslan Kishmaria suggested that Abkhazia might demand the return of Abkhazia's historical medieval capital Kutaisi.[357]
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied that Russia was considering the plan to divide Abkhazia.
  • However, an anonymous source in the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed the existence of such plan.
  • Later, the Ministry called the report as "deliberate leak of information."[358][359]
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry denied the report on proposed spheres of influence in Abkhazia.

• On 25 June 2008, Saakashvili met with high-ranking German officials in Berlin to discuss a new peace plan.[361]
  • Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel met with Saakashvili.
  • She said that Georgia would become a member of the NATO, but NATO membership depended on the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia.
  • She said that "the Russian peacekeeping mission should continue until new variants can be found in talks" and Germany would also be involved in the peace process.[362]
  • Saakashvili was planning to visit a summit of the leaders of the member parties of the International Democrat Union in Paris.[363]

• Patricia Flor, German ambassador to Georgia, was planning to meet with Sergei Bagapsh and other high-ranking officials in Sukhumi on June 27.[364]

• On 28 June 2008, the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE supported Georgia's territorial integrity, with OSCE PA President Göran Lennmarker saying: "We want to find a compromise and a peaceful resolution of this issue."[365]
  • On 30 June, American representative said that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly urged Russia to respect Georgia's sovereignty by refraining from relations with the governments of the separatist territories.[366]

• On 30 June 2008, U.N. Secretary-General’s Group of Friends discussed the Abkhaz conflict in Berlin.[367]
  • A three-part peace plan was announced by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, according to which a trust-building and the repatriation of around 250,000 refugees to Abkhazia would be followed first by the rebuilding of the infrastructure and then by a settlement of the conflict.
  • Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, along with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, endorsed the German plan.
  • Georgian president Saakashvili also accepted the plan.[368]

• On 14 July 2008, Sergei Bagapsh met with special envoy of the German Foreign Ministry for Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Hans-Dieter Lucas. Peace plan was discussed.[377]
  • On the same day EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby met with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh in Sukhumi.
  • Bagapsh said that he studied a draft plan on the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict that was worked out by the U.N. Secretary-General’s Group of Friends, but he suggested that it was unacceptable for Abkhazia in its current form.
  • Bagapsh stressed that the main condition for resuming the dialogue with Georgia was "the withdrawal of all armed units from the Kodori gorge and the signing of an agreement on non-use of force".
  • He also said that he was "not going to discuss Abkhazia’s status with anyone" because Abkhazia was "an independent, democratic state."
  • Peter Semneby also met with Prime Minister of Abkhazia Alexander Ankvab and foreign minister Sergei Shamba.[378]
  • Sergei Shamba said that "more preparation" was required.[379]

• German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon.
  • Then Steinmeier had a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who said Russia wanted both Georgia and Abkhazia "to accept obligations not to use force," and the withdrawal of the Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge.

• On 16 July 2008, Georgian National Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia said that "polishing" of the new German plan was still needed despite of "positive elements" being present there.
  • Lomaia also said that the return of IDPs could not start until the Russian peacekeeping force was pulled out.[385]
  • David Bakradze said that if a German plan for resolving the conflict did not get large support, Georgia would be forced to "unilaterally bring an influence to bear on the deployment of armed forces in Abkhazia."

• On 17 July 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the repatriation of refugees to Abkhazia was "entirely unrealistic at this stage", adding "the situation first needs to be improved and trust restored."[389][390]
  • German Foreign Minister Steinmeier met with his Georgian counterpart Eka Tkeshelashvili in Tbilisi.[391]
  • Steinmeier said in Tbilisi that due to recent multiple incidents, the international community had "growing anxiety" and there were no more "frozen conflicts."
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Georgia first had to withdraw its troops from Kodori Gorge before Abkhazia would begin negotiations.
  • On the evening of the same day, Saakashvili said at a briefing that there were no plans in Tbilisi to use force to restore control over Abkhazia.
  • Saakashvili called Lavrov's statement on the refugees "shameful" and said that blocking the return of refugees would be "inhumane and barbaric decision."
  • Steinmeier met with Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili in Batumi.
  • Saakashvili said at a joint briefing that the conflicts of the 20th century must be solved with "modern European methods".
  • Steinmeier said that Germany viewed Abkhazia to be Georgia's inalienable part.
  • Steinmeier said that he wanted "a peaceful resolution based on the territorial integrity of Georgia".
  • Sources from the German delegation called the talks with Saakashvili "difficult
  • The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated on 18 July that Russia was seeking to legalize the results of the Russian-sponsored ethnic cleansing.
• On 18 July, Steinmeier met with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh in Gali
  • After his meeting with Steinmeier, Bagapsh said that Abkhazia still would not consider German peace proposal and he intended to present his own plan
  • Chairman of Georgian Parliament Davit Bakradze called the Abkhaz refusal "just a political game" and said that the Russian position would be "decisive
  • On the same day, Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. Lavrov suggested an international "road map" on Abkhazia, however, he resisted the German plan since Georgian refugees would return to Abkhazia at the beginning of conflict resolution.
  • Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also received Steinmeier
  • Medvedev insisted that Georgia must withdraw its forces from the Kodori Gorge otherwise there would be no peace between Georgia and Abkhazia.[402]
  • According to the source of the Russian newspaper Kommersant, Lavrov admitted to Steinmeier that the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge was less likely in the near future.[403]
  • American diplomat Matthew Bryza said that Russian and Abkhaz rejection of the German peace plan was alarming.
• On 30 July 2008, a German Foreign Ministry spokesman said that efforts were made by Germany to organize a meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz officials.
  • Abkhaz separatists had earlier rejected to attend talks in Berlin scheduled on July 30–31.[430]
• On 31 July 2008, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh said there would be a separate meeting between Abkhazia and the Group of UN Secretary General's Friends on Georgia (the U.K., Germany, Russia, U.S. and France).
  • Bagapsh said that Georgia would hold a separate meeting with the Group.
  • Bagapsh also said, "The meeting was initially planned for July 28–29.
  • However, this didn't suit us. We have settled on August 15–20 for the meeting."
• By 22 July 2008, Georgian intelligence had given the West some proof of Russian military build-up in Abkhazia.
  • The Georgian government stated on 22 July that "the German plan in its present form does not address the proximate cause of the recent, dangerous escalation in the conflict zones: the role and actions of Russia, a central player in degrading security in Georgia."
  • On 24 July, analyst Vladimir Socor criticized the German plan and stated that Germany was more sympathetic towards Russia's position on Georgia's territorial integrity.

ASMUS

• Germany was the leading power in Europe articulating and shaping policy to the east (155)
• Close ties and economic partnership with Msocow, but historical ties with Georgia (155)
• Chairman of the Group of Friends (155)
• Feared that a conflict would force Germany to pick sides (155)
• The Steinmeier Plan involved three steps: Georgia issues a non-use of force pledge up front in return for a general agreement on the principle of refugee return and a mutual withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge, cnfidence-building measures between the Abkhaz and the Georgians in the economic real to be backed up by an international donors conference to finance specific practical projects, and a settlement of Abkhazia's political status with the help of international mediation (155)
  • Washington had some misgivings but ended up endorsing it (155)
  • Washington wanted to see Germany take the lead on the conflict (155)
• Tbilisi did not trust Germany and vice versa (155-156)
  • Tbilisi believed that Berlin was naive about Russian intentions and was too willing to accept Moscow's claim to a special sphere of influence in the Caucasus, and still were bitter over Bucharest (156)
  • Tbilisi also believed the plan was skewered against Georgia, with Georgia asked to make the first major steps with too little in return (156)
• A criticism was that Berlin negotiated the plan with the Group of Friends before Tbilisi, and the GoF included Russia, making the plan automatically disfavorable to Georgia (156)
• Tbilisi nevertheless agreed initially to the plan, hoping details would evolve once Steinmeier saw the situation on the ground (156)
• Reasons for failure:
  • Lack of Western unity over the plan and how to approach it towards Tbilisi, especially between both sides of the Atlantic (156)
    • Europe wanted Washington to be stricter towards Georgia and force it into submission, which Washington believed would only anger Tbilisi more and make it more prone to violence (156-157)
  • The second reason was Russia, who continuously sought to undermine the deal along the way (157-158)
• On July 9, Rice and Saakashvili renegotiated the Steinmeier Plan, which Rice got the endorsement of Berlin for (162-163)
  • Berlin was really not OK with the negotiated plan but could not complain that Washingto got Tbilisi to agree to fold (163-164)
  • Steinmeier traveled thento Sokhumi to meet with Baghapsh and then met with Russian leaders in Moscow. He got the sides to agree to meet at the end of July in Berlin (164)

IIFFMCG II

• Three-stage plan developed within the framework of the Group of Friends (31)
  • First stage: measures to rebuild trust between the conflict sides to lead to their signing of an agreement on the non use of force and the initiation of a process to bring Georgian IDPs/refugees back to Abkhazia
  • Second stage: Reconstruction work financed by donor states
  • Third stage: Tackle Abkhazia's political status, meant to be at the end
• Baghapsh rejected the plan, instead setting conditions for talks with Georgia: Withdrawal from the Kodori Valley and signing of an agreement on not resuming military operations (31)
• There was a Group of Friends meeting in Berlin in June 2008 that was aimed at addressing crisis settlement (91)
• The UN SG appointed a former high ranking UN official to undertake an assessment of the peace process and to explore the possibility of reviving it, but it proved to be "too late" in the summer of 2008 (92)

• 18 July: Abkhazia and Russia reject the plan and refuse to attend end-of-month peace talks scheduled in Berlin (IIFFMCG III, 21)

• Steinmeier first talked about the conflicts with Lavrov in Yekaternburg on May 13-14 (https://civil.ge/archives/116287)
• Medvedev's first visit to Germany after his inauguration in early June seems to have approached German attempts to negotiate a peace settlement (https://civil.ge/archives/116497)
• On June 11, Bush and Merkel talked about Russian provocations in Georgia in Berlin (https://civil.ge/archives/116548)
• On June 19, Karasin met in Moscow separately with US and German diplomats over the need for deescalating the situation in Abkhazia and SO. The US side was William J. Burns and the German side was Dieter Lukas (https://civil.ge/archives/116591)
• On June 6, Medvedev poured cold water on German attempts to mediate, when he said "I think we ourselves will be able to resolve all issues we face today" (https://civil.ge/archives/116607)
• On June 25, Saakashvili met with Rice in Berlin, hours before he met with Merkel (https://civil.ge/archives/116626)
  • At the Merkel-Saakashvili meeting, Merkel said that Germany would seek to play an active role in resolving the conflict through negotiation with Russian participation (https://civil.ge/archives/116629)
• On June 30, the GoF met in Berlin to talk about Abkhazia (https://civil.ge/archives/116647)
• On June 27, German Ambassador Patricia Flor visited Abkhazia (https://civil.ge/archives/116638)
• On June 24, Georgian television reported that Germany had proposed a three-stage plan, involving revolving the April 16 decree, economic rehabilitation including a free economic zone in Gali and Ochamchire and eventually a political settlement (https://civil.ge/archives/116659)
  • The plan was welcomed by Tbilisi but Moscow said no plan had been elaborated
• On July 7, Der Spiegel reported details of the SP. It talked of Phase one (year of trust-building measures including a NUFT and the beginning of the return of IDPs). Phase two was the beginning of reconstruction work with Berlin organizing a donors' fundraising conference. Phase three would be political status. (https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/calming-the-caucasus-germany-proposes-peace-plan-for-abkhazia-a-564246.html)
  • The plan was discussed by the GoF on June 30 in Berlin
  • Shamba and Jean Arnault discussed it in Sokhumi on July 4
  • The Georgian version implied that the process began with the removal of additional Russian troops and the repeal of the April 16 decrees (https://civil.ge/archives/116716)
    • On July 11, Moscow reported it would not withdraw its April 16 decision and added it was against western nediation (https://civil.ge/archives/116756)
• On July 10, AFP reported that senior diplomats from the GOF and Georgia were set to meet later this month to help defuse tensions, as was agreed during Rice's visit to Tbilisi (https://civil.ge/archives/116753)
• On July 11, Moscow outlined its two demands for the peace process to move forward: Kodori and NUFT (https://civil.ge/archives/116758)
• Hans-Dieter Lukas, Special Envoy of the German MFA for Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, visited Tbilisi and Sokhumi on July 12-14 (https://civil.ge/archives/116768)
• On July 15, Baghapsh rejected formally the Steinmeier Plan despite attempts by Peter Semneby of the EU to pressure by coming to Sokhumi a day prior. He refused to discuss Abkhazia's status "with anyone" nd reiterated his demands (https://civil.ge/archives/116776)
• On July 15, Steinmeier and Lavrov held a phone conversation, wile Lukas met Karasin in Moscow (https://civil.ge/archives/116791)
• Steinmeier visited Tbilisi and Sokhumi on July 17-18 (https://civil.ge/archives/116793)
  • Germany chaired the GOF
  • The point of the visit was to find with all the affected parities ways out of the logic of escalation, out of this spiral of constantly escalating incidents
• On July 17, Lavrov said that an IDP return Treaty is unreal for now and that Russia would discuss this only after the signing of a NUFT (https://civil.ge/archives/116797)
  • In response, Saakashvili said that the unconditional return of IDPs was an essential part of the conflict resolution (https://civil.ge/archives/116802)
  • Tbilisi added that the Lavrov comments implied that Moscow was seeking to "Legalize ethnic cleansing" (https://civil.ge/archives/116809)
• On July 17, Russia formally rejected the SP before the signing of a NUFT (https://civil.ge/archives/116799)
  • Saakashvili rejected the NUFt because all previous agreements allowed Russia to take more foothold in Abkhazia and were all eventually violated by both Moscow and Sokhumi (https://civil.ge/archives/116803)
• On July 17, Steinmeier said that direct talks between Abkhazia and Tbilisi were needed. (https://civil.ge/archives/116805)
  • By that time, it seemed that the SP was almost abandoned, as MS said at the press conference that the SP was not the final one
• On July 17, Shamba also added to Abkhaz media that he was against the economic part of the SP and instead favored establishing direct commercial links with the EU and MSs (https://civil.ge/archives/116806)
• Steinmeier and Baghapsh meet in Gali on July 18 instead of Sokhumi, allegedly due to bad weather. Baghapsh tells him his plan is unacceptable (https://civil.ge/archives/116808)
  • Tbilisi downplayed the Abkhaz rejection and said that Moscow's response would be the decisive one (https://civil.ge/archives/116810)
• Steinmeier traveled to Moscow on July 18, met with Medvedev, who rejected the SP (https://civil.ge/archives/116811)
  • But some pundits believed that Moscow was leaving doors open for the plan to be implemented (https://civil.ge/archives/116816)
• On July 21, at a UNSC session, US Ambassador Khalilzad said that the SP was 'not dead'. Alasania endorsed it once again (https://civil.ge/archives/116823)
• The plan's name was Georgia/Abkhazia: Elements for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict (https://civil.ge/archives/116826)
  • It was distributed at the EU Council's Political and Security Committee meeting on July 11
  • It was leaked to the Jamestown Foundation
  • It did not mention territorial integrity and it accepted the continuation of the CIS PKF (these were the 'corrections needed' that Tbilisi was talking about)
  • The first phase would be 15 months and would be about the exchange of declarations on NUF
  • This would be followed by a framework for direct high-level dialogue with the facilitation of UNOMIG and the GoF drawing on existing bodies. Internationalization if the parties so agree
  • Both sides can consent to the deployment of an international police, but priority is given to the existing mechamism to avoid a military conflict
  • Recognizes the right of IDPs to return
  • Open economic opportunities for the Abkhaz to trade with Georgian an dinternationla partners
  • In the second phase, a donors' conference in Germany with the sponsorship of the UN, EU, OSCE, international financial organizations, Russia, and the US to raise funds for economic and social rehabilitation.
  • The second phase would see continuation of IDP return
  • Only in the third and final phase would a working group be created to draft the political status of Abkhazia, cnstitng of the parties assisted by international facilitators and guarantors
• Tbilisi wanted to prioritize the reversal of Russia's moves in the SP, including railway troops, additional peacekeepers, April 16 decree, withdrawal from sanctions (https://civil.ge/archives/116830)
• On July 25, Baghapsh rejected an offer by Bryza in person to resume talks in Berlin (https://civil.ge/archives/116839)
  • Churkin also wanted the meeting stalled, while Abkhazia hinted it would attend but in August, not before (https://civil.ge/archives/116856)
• On July 31, the German MFA stated that efforts to arrange high-level talks between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides would continue (https://civil.ge/archives/116859)
• On August 3, Baghapsh rejected all future talks in Berlin, accusing Georgia of sending forces to the South Ossetian border, and announcing a revision of our decision. (https://civil.ge/archives/116882)
  • The meeting had been planned for August 15.

Peacekeeping proposals

• On 17 June 2008, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that Georgian attempt to revise the peacekeeping operation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone could "unfreeze" the conflict. According to him, due to this, the situation could "slip out of control" in the wider region.
• On 5 March 2008, Georgia left the Joint Control Commission for Georgian–Ossetian Conflict Resolution and suggested a new negotiation scheme which would include the EU, OSCE and the Sanakoyev government.
• On 24 April 2008, Georgian president Saakashvili announced that Georgia would discuss with allies how to revise the peacekeeping format and increased involvement of other countries in the peace process because "the presence of the Russian [peacekeeping] contingent there [in Abkhazia and South Ossetia], as well as [Russia’s] recent actions, is a risk factor in the conflict zone."
• On 30 April 2008, Member of the European Parliament Marie Anne Isler Béguin said that Russian peacekeepers were ineffective and the peacekeeping format should be changed.
  • The EU was asked by Georgia to consider the deployment of European peacekeepers to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone.
• Georgian president Saakashvili and President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko issued a joint statement criticizing recent Russian actions.
  • Ukraine announced willingness to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Georgia and approved Saakashvili's new peace plan on Abkhazia.
• On 8 July 2008, David Bakradze, chairman of Georgia's parliament, said that he raised the issue of changing the peacekeeping format in Abkhazia with UN envoy Bertrand Ramcharan. He added that if the peacekeeping format did not change, then Georgia would make a unilateral decision regarding the Russian peacekeepers.
  • Ramcharan arrived in Abkhazia on 11 July to negotiate resumption of Abkhaz-Georgian talks.[374]
• On 9 July 2008, European diplomats stated 2 criteria for the European Union to become involved in the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. These criteria were: security for the foreign personnel and mutual consent from the conflict sides.[375]
• On 11 July 2008, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution urging the international community to back Georgian peace proposals.
  • The resolution said, "Otherwise, the Georgian side will be forced to undertake appropriate legal measures in the nearest future for the de-legitimization and for the prompt withdrawal of the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the conflict zones."
  • The Western officials earlier had told Georgian authorities to pause the demand for the removal of the Russian peacekeepers.
• On 21 July 2008, REGNUM News Agency reported that the western mediators were proposing to replace Georgian troops in the Kodori gorge with international police force. This force would exclude Russia.[406] Matthew Bryza said that currently there was no need to deploy international force in Abkhazia and the United States was working to establish direct dialogue between Georgian and Abkhaz sides.[407] Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that the replacement of Georgian troops with international force was his initiative.

IIFFMCG II

• According to Tskhinvali, Geogria withdrew from the OSCE-brokered quadrilateral negotiations set up under the 1992 Dagomys Agreement on March 4, 2008 (194)
  • Tskhinvali saw that as an attempt to denounce the DA and ti eliminate the legal basis for the peacekeeping operation (194)
• After the Russian reinforcement to the Abkhazia peacekeeping force and the deployment of railway troops in May, Tbilisi argued that the Russian Federation was a party to the conflicts and could not longer serve in either a mediating or a peacekeeping capacity. (202)
  • Tbilisi intensified thereafter its calls for a change in the format and the replacement of the existing peace operation with a joint Georgian-Abhaz police force under EU and OSCE supervision and training, without excluding the possibility that Russia might play a role (202)
  • Tbilisi threatened that if substantial change in the format did not happen, it was ready to make a formal requests for the withdrawal of the CIS PKF (202)
• Sokhumi argued that the CIS PKF was strengthened in response to Georgian plans to carry out a military action, opposing any change in the format and warning that a withdrawal from the CIS PKF would lead to a resumption of hostilities. (202)
  • Sokhumi also threatened that it would propose a military cooperation agreement with Russia if Georgia withdrew its consent from the CIS PKF (202-203)

IIFFMCG III

• Georgia claims that a majority of the NO JPKF battalion was manned by SO representatives, something that was confirmed by COlonel Kazbeg Friev, Commander of the NO Battalion (109)
• In addition, the NO battalion was a unit of the Russian Federation, entirely selected and funded by Moscow (109)
• It was made of 500 soldiers (109)
• Tbilisi has alleged that the NOB was in close coordination with the SO MOD, including by giving equipment, arms, and transportation to irregular forces, loaning their facilities to train SO soldiers, and providing intelligence (109)
• On July 20, Georgian intelligence intercepted a call by Arsen Kverzerov, Deputy Commander of the 7th Battalion of SO MOD in which he admitted his forces were digging trenches using tools provided by the NOB (110)
• There were regular intelligence showing how NOB officers and SO forces were in communication throughout the shelling in early August (112)

• On March 11, Iakobashvili met with the OSCE SecGen Marc Perrin de Brichambaut in Vienna to brief him on the idea t scrap the Quadripartite JCC format with a 2+2+2 formula, including the OSCE, EU, and Sanakoyev) (https://civil.ge/archives/114498)
• UNSC Resolution 1808 was adopted on April 15 by the UNSC's 5866th Meeting and extended UNOMIG's mandate till October 15 and noting the Russian peacekeepers' "important stabilizing role" (https://civil.ge/archives/118995)
• On April 24, after the launch of Moscow-Sokhumi-Tsknhinvali ties, Saakashvili announced the launch of intensive consultations with its partners and friends over the expediency of the further presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. He favored a replacement of the CIS force with an international one (https://civil.ge/archives/114834)
• Yuri Baluevsky, chief of general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, stated on May 16 that Moscow would not oppose a change in the internationalization of the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia if both sides could agree on it (https://civil.ge/archives/116305)
• Iakobashvili visited Moscow on May 16 to push Russian leadership to change the peacekeeping format (https://civil.ge/archives/116308)
• On May 28, Lomaia said that before Georgia formalized its decision on peacekeepers, they were waiting for a Medvedev-Saakasshvili meeting in June (https://civil.ge/archives/116435)
• On June 4, the Ukrainian Defense Minister visited Georgia and said that Ukraine had "great experience" in peacekeeping operations and confirmed that Kiev was considering (https://civil.ge/archives/116479)
• Shamba rejected the idea of Turkish-mediated Georgian-Abkhaz talks during a visit to Turkey on June 5 (https://civil.ge/archives/116481)
• The European Parliament passed a resolution on June 5 calling for a revision of the Russian-led peacekeeping format in Abkhazia and calling on the EU to send a border mission there (ESDP border mission) and called for conflict resolution to be firmly raised at the EU_Russia summit (https://civil.ge/archives/116485)
  • Solana visited Tbilisi that same day and confirmed that Tbilisi's will to replace the Russian forces with an international police force will be on the agenda when he meets the Georgian leadership (https://civil.ge/archives/116489)
    • He added that any change of the format needed to be done through a change of the 1994 agreement by the parties.
    • He brought up the issue with baghapsh as well, who was opposed to the idea
• On June 9, Saakashvili said on Rustavi 2 that Georgi had prepared the legal ground to formally demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from the Abkhaz conflict zone but did not say he would go on with it (https://civil.ge/archives/116528)
  • Bokeria then added that the demand would be made in the nearest days unless Russia withdrew its railway forces and its April 16 decree a (https://civil.ge/archives/116537)
  • The Russian MFA stated that the reckless decision by Tbilisi to demand a pull out from Abkhazia would lead to more tensions in the entire Caucasus region. (https://civil.ge/archives/185630)
  • ON June 23, Reuters reported that Tbilsii had agreed to shelve the plan to deligitmize the peacekeeping force following talks with the EU and US, who had asked Tbilisi to give them the chance to work with the Russians (EU-Russia Summit in near days) (https://civil.ge/archives/116616)
• Tkeshelashvili said on June 17 that Russaian behavior and plans are the sole cause of tension in Abkhazia, that neither Tbilisi nor Sokhumi were increasing tensions, and that the peacekeepers absence would not bring anything negative (https://civil.ge/archives/116572)
• After the Galu blast on July 6, the US State Dep said there was an urgent need for an international police force in Abkhazia, something that both Sokhumi and Moscow opposed openly (https://civil.ge/archives/116724)
  • Baghapsh rejected the proposal because the US was "always taking a one-sided, pro-Georgian position" (https://civil.ge/archives/116725)
• On July 11, Georgia again rejected taking part in the JCC meeting, as it pulled out in March to push for a 2+2+2 format (https://civil.ge/archives/116760)
  • This was followed by a Kokoity-Lavrov meeting, where the two called on Georgia not to undermine the JCC (https://civil.ge/archives/116772)
• On July 14, after Russia violated Georgian airspace, the US State Dep said "such actions raise questions about Russia's role as a peacekeeper and facilitator of the negotiations and threaten stability throughout the entire region" (https://civil.ge/archives/116775)
• On July 15, the NATO SecGen released a statement stating that the overflights "raise questions about Russia's role as a peacekeeper and facilitator of negotiations" (https://civil.ge/archives/116781)
• On July 11, the Parliament of Georgia passed a unanimous statement calling on the international community to provide tangible support in Tbilisi’s drive to internationalize peacekeeping efforts, otherwise, it said, Georgia would have to unilaterally take measures and demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. (https://civil.ge/archives/116766)
• After the August 2 clashes, Estonian FM Urmas Paet called for an EU peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and SO. Estonia shared the opinion with Sweden and Finland, and called on the French Presidency and the EU Commission to react fast if needed. (https://civil.ge/archives/116888)
  • France and Germany were the largest opponents of an EU peacekeeping force
  • The French EU Presidency expressed grave concern over the increased tensions but in a formal statement, called for the 'existing negotiating formats' (JCC) to be used for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts (https://civil.ge/archives/116899)

• A Congressional Research Service report highlighted that the US shift in its stance towards Russian peacekeepers, starting to support Georgia's call for internationalization, came after Russia's withdrawal from the sanctions (https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL34618.html)
• In May 2008, the Georgian Government sent a letter to the Secretariat of the CIS demanding consultations on the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and noted that Tbilisi reserved the right to withhold its consent for the force (https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/georgia-russia-new-abkhazia-standoff)
  • After a month had passed, Saakashvili said he was free to raise the issue at any time.
  • Russian foreign ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko warned against such a move, saying, 'The Georgian leadership ought to be aware that this irrational step would inevitably inflame the situation and 'thaw out' the conflict, which could destabilise the situation in the Caucasus as a whole.'
    • De facto Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh was even blunter, saying, 'We are not planning any negotiations with the Georgians. As far as Abkhazia is concerned, it will never return to being part of Georgia. The main point is that we will never agree to the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the conflict zone.'
• On April 24, Saakashvili spoke at an ambassadorial event at the Avlabari palace in which he announced Georgia was beginning consultations with international partners on revising the format of the UNOMIG, strengthening the Mission, and strengthening the role and status of mediation efforts of countries that are friends of Georgia. He stressed there needed to be different approaches for the two conflict zones (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/137562)
• On April 30, the Presidents of Georgia and Ukraine issued a joint statement condemning Russia's actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and declaring Ukraine's readiness to take part in peacekeeping operations (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/135786)
• On May 7, at a closed meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Baramidze called for the introduction of a real independent peacekeeping force that would cosnsit of police officers who would protect the Georgian population from Russian aggression. Baramidze said the Georgian government would send a corresponding request to the EU (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/136120)
• On June 4, Senators Joe Biden, Mel Martinez and McCormack issued a joint statement calling for the international community to reconsider the composition of the peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, accusing Russia of not being a neutral party or an honest broker (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/137386)
• After a meeting between NATO SecGen and Saakashvili on June 20 in Brussels, NATO denied that it would send peacekeepers to replace Russia (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/138197)

US efforts

• The 110th United States Congress passed a resolution on 6 May that said the recent Russian actions were "provocative" and Russia "impedes reconciliation between those regions and the government of the Republic of Georgia".
• On 8 May 2008, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried stated at the Congress: "While we have urged restraint on Georgia, there is a difference between a very small vulnerable country and a very large country that we have to keep in mind."[51]
• In May 2008, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza said that Russia’s "provocative actions" was seen "as working against cause of peaceful settlement" of the Georgian-Abkhaz issue.
  • On 12 May, the Russian Foreign Ministry denounced Bryza's statement.
• President of the United States George W. Bush discussed Georgia with his Russian counterpart Medvedev at the 34th G8 summit.[211]
• On 8 July 2008, the statement was made by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts would be settled by Georgian NATO Membership Action Plan.
  • The statement caused a negative outcry in Moscow: Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov responded, during his meeting with the de facto Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh, that Georgia's accession to NATO "may undermine the conflict resolution".[230]
  • Rice arrived in Georgia on 9 July.
  • She put the blame for the escalation on Russian inflammatory actions over the past months and said that Georgia "has to be treated like" an independent country.[231]
  • Rice stated on July 10 in Tbilisi that Russia "needs to be a part of resolving the problem and solving the problems and not contributing to it."[232][233] Saakashvili said at a joint conference that Georgia and Russia should work together to ensure the safety of the Sochi Olympics.[234]
• On 11 July 2008, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze called for an immediate UN Security Council session on the conflict zones.[251] A closed meeting was held on 21 July by the U.N. Security Council to review the overflights; however, no resolution was adopted. The "pro-Georgian bias" of some Security Council members was condemned by Russian representative Vitaliy Churkin.[252][253]
• On 11 July 2008, the Kremlin dismissed the US offer to help in deescalating the Russo-Georgian crisis.[255]
• On 29 July 2008, RBK Daily reported that Russia toughened its rhetoric against the United States and a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry threatened that Russia would halt negotiations on "substantial issues of interest to the American side."
  • The source said that Russia was sick of the US "telling us how to behave, with whom to be friends, with whom to fight."
  • American support of Georgia's push to restore its territorial integrity and NATO membership of the former Soviet states were quoted as major reasons behind Russia's escalation.
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza declared at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute: "Nobody wants such a development of the situation, when Georgian and Russian soldiers will face each other."
  • He said that he did not have an "impression that Georgia is 100 percent right" and added: "Leaders of Georgia also need to work a lot more on peace proposals so that Abkhazians stop feeling fears."[330]
  • Bryza also said that the existing peace formats for Georgia's breakaway regions no longer worked and "we need to rejuvenate [friends'] process."
• On 10 May 2008, Matthew Bryza and the US ambassador to Georgia John F. Tefft met with the Abkhaz leadership. According to Bryza, Georgian drone overflights over Abkhazia were justified.
• On 7 July 2008, the United States Department of State called on the central Georgian government and the Abkhaz de facto authorities to resume negotiations.
  • The Department of State also called on Russia to stop "provocative" actions and proposed the deployment of International Police Force to Abkhazia.[369]
  • However, Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh denied the possibility of removal of the Russian peacekeepers.
  • The State Department spokesman also said that Condoleezza Rice would visit Georgia to support a peaceful settlement to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts.
• On 14 July, the U.S. Department of State said in a statement it was "deeply troubled" by Russia’s acknowledgement that Russian military plane flew over South Ossetia because "Such actions raise questions about Russia's role as peacekeeper and facilitator of the negotiations and threaten stability throughout the entire region."[380]
  • That day, a special session was held by the OSCE Permanent Council.
  • The need for the resumption of talks regarding peace between Georgian and South Ossetian authorities was hightlighted.[381] On 15 July 2008, NATO said it was concerned by Russian military flights. Russia's peacekeeping and mediating duty was questioned.[225]
• On 23 July, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, stressed that Georgia’s territorial integrity and the return of refugees to Abkhazia were the key principles, and promised that the removal of Russian peacekeepers would be discussed.[409][410] Russian foreign minister Lavrov told Condoleezza Rice that the return of the refugees to Abkhazia must be postponed to the later phase of the peace settlement.
• On 23 July 2008, the meeting of the EU foreign ministers, after hearing German Foreign Minister Steinmeier's report on Abkhazia, recognized that Russia was a party to the conflict in Georgia.[411]
• On 24 July 2008, Matthew Bryza said that Russia "has taken steps that are deeply provocative and have led to some people in Georgia calculating that their only way forward is through escalation, and that is a path that cannot succeed."[412] Bryza arrived in Georgia on July 25 and was planning to visit Sukhumi together with Patricia Flor, German Ambassador to Georgia.
• On 25 July, the Abkhaz separatists met with Matthew Bryza. Bryza declared in Sukhumi that Russia was "more or less" in favor of the German plan approved by the Group of the Friends of the UN Secretary General.[416]
  • Lack of progress in peace settlement alarmed Bryza.
  • Abkhaz officials suggested that the German project was irrelevant to Abkhazia regardless of which country supported it.[417]
  • Bryza tried to persuade the Abkhaz authorities to unanimously agree to talks in Berlin the following week, but Abkhaz officials refused.[418]
  • Later that day, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh hinted that the Abkhaz could meet with the Group of Friends in Berlin.
  • Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba also said that the Abkhaz "in principle" did not oppose talks in Berlin.
  • However, according to Shamba, Abkhazia would not resume direct negotiations with Georgia's central government.[419]
  • Russian ambassador to UN Vitaly Churkin said that Russia objected to urgent meeting of the UN Secretary General's Group of Friends on Georgia.[420]
  • According to the Jamestown Foundation, the Western involvement "may help steer the process away from the Russian-controlled formats. This is why Moscow encouraged Sukhumi to thwart the German-proposed consultations."[421]
  • Russian editorial opined that the Western initiatives contradicted Russia's interests and the placement of American bases in Abkhazia could lead to the loss of the North Caucasus for Russia.[422][423]
• On 26 July, Matthew Bryza, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, left Sukhumi and arrived in Tbilisi. He said that Georgian and Abkhaz separatist officials must start direct unconditional talks.[424]
  • Georgian Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia said after meeting with Bryza that the United States proposed a new peace plan combining elements from Saakashvili, Steinmeier and Rice plans.[425][426]
  • Bryza denied media reports that he had demanded the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge.
• On 23 July, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, stressed that Georgia’s territorial integrity and the return of refugees to Abkhazia were the key principles, and promised that the removal of Russian peacekeepers would be discussed.[409][410] Russian foreign minister Lavrov told Condoleezza Rice that the return of the refugees to Abkhazia must be postponed to the later phase of the peace settlement.

• On June 18, US Deputy State Secretary Fried accused Russia of increasing political and military pressure against Georgia during a Senate hearing, questioning Russia's role as a peacekeeper (Panfilov, 73-74)

BLUASHVILI

• Dan Fried told a Georgian delegation that "if you invade Abkhazia, you might win the first battle, and you might win the second battle. But that will be your last victory. Russia will absolutely intervene and will finish the entire job by singing and dancing" (399-400)

GACHECHILADZE 2017

• Condolezza Rice quote about Saakashvili and provocations (539)
• Saakashvili confirmed later Rice's statements (540)

ASMUS

• Though the US continuously warned Georgia against responding to provocations, Tbilisi stated it had its own red lines that Moscow could not cross without a Georgian response (28-29)
• Following the April developments, NSA Stephen Hadley started a diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict from devolving into war in Abkhazia (152)
• Hadley saw the problem was to portray the image to Georgia as a lose-lose situation where Tbilisi either acquiesced or lost a military conflict (152)
  • Hadley's aim was to show that Russia would lose diplomatically any conflict it starts by becoming isolated, while giving Tbilisi guarantees of a light at the end of the tunnel for good begavio (152)
    • This was done in three elements: encourage MS to formulate his own peace plan endorsed by the West, increase European and international elements in the peacekeeping force while Georgia signs a non-use-of-force agreement in exchange for the return of IDPs, and increased the level of negotiating format for Abkhazia (153)
      • It was part of that third element that Bryza went to Abkhazia in mid-Nay (153-154)
  • But critics say that what missed from the plan was showing Russia it would suffer consequences (154)
• The US and EU convinced Georgia not to cancel the peacekeeping mandate in Abkhazia, which Tbilisi wanted to do to declare the Russian troops as occupying by international law (158)
• In June, Georgian and Abkhaz leaders met in Sweden under NGO auspices to discuss the Bryza-Alasania plan developed earlier (159)
  • The plan involved a free economic zone allowing Abkhazia to establish external economic ties, a pull back of security forces from the demarcation line, an international civilian police presence in several ethnic Georgian districts in Abkhazia along the border to deal with organized crime and a non-use-of-firce pledge by Tbilisi (159)
    • Sokhumi told EU diplomats they welcomed greated European engagement on the ground (159)
• 9 July: Rice lands in Tbilisi, with four Russian fighter aircraft violating Georgian airspace (162)
  • By then, MS had lost faith in a Western-brokered solution (162)
  • Rice told MS to unilaterally agree to a non use of force pledge, which Saakashvili was open to as part of a brokered package. That same night, the US and Georgian delegations sought to draft a package deal that resulted in a modified Steinmeier Plan (162-163)

• When Russia established ties with Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, Obama, Clinton, and McCain strongly criticized Russia (https://civil.ge/archives/114831)
• Speaking at a Helsinki Commission hearing, Dan Fried said that he did not believe either of the countries wanted war (https://civil.ge/archives/116255)
• Bryza and Tefft visited Sokhumi on May 10. They had a "very frank and very sharp exchange of views" with Baghapsh. Baghapsh said that Sokhumi would only negotiate if Georgia withdrew from the Kodori Gorge (https://civil.ge/archives/116265)
  • Moscow accused Bryza of being biased towards Tbilisi (https://civil.ge/archives/116275)
• Bush talked about Georgia in his first phone call with Medvedev on May 12 (https://civil.ge/archives/116273)
• On May 14, MS traveled to Israel to meet with Bush to talk about developments, including his phone call (https://civil.ge/archives/116291)
• Fried and Karasin held a phone call on May 15 to talk about the crisis (https://civil.ge/archives/116301)
• The US was pushing for the EU to be more involved in conflict resolution in June. To some extent it worked. After the US-EU Summit in Slovenia on June 9, in which Bush brought up the Georgia issue, namely peace initiatives on Abkhazia (https://civil.ge/archives/116484), the EU got more involved. European Parliament passed a resolution, Solana visited Tbilisi and backed the internationalization of the peacekeeping force, and brought up Georgia at the EU-Russia Summit.
• The NATO-Russian Council took place in Brussels on June 14 and NATO MODs brought up Georgia, though Serdyukov did not respond (https://civil.ge/archives/116563)
• Members of the Atlantic Council visited Sokhumi on June 16 and met with Abkhaz NSC Secretary Stanislav Lakoba, who told them that Sokhumi had to prepare for possible military hostilities. TGhe visit was aimed at seeing if the efforts of the UN and the intl community to resolve this conflict (https://civil.ge/archives/116571)
• On June 18, Dan Fried said that Russia was increasing political and military pressure on Georgia during a Congressional hearing (https://civil.ge/archives/116582)
  • He added that Russian investors were buying property in Abkhazia in disregard of Georgian law, Russian banks launched ties with unregulated unauthorized Abkhaz banks
• In the post-summit joint statement, the EU and US said they were ready to work with all appropriate parties to resolve the conflicts in Georgia and called on Russia to respect Gerogia's territorial integrity and soverengty. The summit was in Brdo, Sovenia (https://civil.ge/archives/116534)
• On July 8, Russia tabled a resolution at the UNSC to demand Georgia to sign immediately a NUFT with Sokhumi and to respect the existing negotiation format and to withdraw from kodori (https://civil.ge/archives/116738)
  • The resolution failed because of US resistance (https://civil.ge/archives/116821)
• Bush brought up Georgia to Medvedev during the July 6 Japan meeting. According to the Kremlin, Medvedev told Bush Russia was ready to normalize ties (https://civil.ge/archives/116711)
• Ahead of her July 9 visit, Rice said that Russian steps had increased tensions in the breakaway regions. She was in Prague. She said "Georgia is an independent state. It has to be treated like one." (https://civil.ge/archives/116728)
• Rice's visit: Official meeting scheduled for early July 10, but the two have dinner on June 9 at night. (https://civil.ge/archives/116735)
  • She reiterated US support for the MAP and Georgia's territorial integrity, called for the repeal of the April 16 decision, and the withdrawal of the Russian Railway Troops
  • She called for an "elevation of the discussions at a higher level" (https://civil.ge/archives/116751)
• Lavrov and Rice talked about the conflict zones during a phone conversation on July 16. The same day, Karasin spoke with Fried (https://civil.ge/archives/116795)
• Lavrov and Rice met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Singapore on July 23 and talked about Abkhazia (https://civil.ge/archives/116829)
• Bryza visited Abkhazia on July 25 to meet with Baghapsh, Shamba, Lakoba (https://civil.ge/archives/116832)
  • The aim of his visit was to convince Sokhumi to agree to a meeting in Berlin next week with the participation of the GoF (https://civil.ge/archives/116833)
  • The Abkhaz demand was that Georgia pulled out of Kodori and signed an NUFT, which they discussed with Bryza (https://civil.ge/archives/116843)
  • On July 26, Bryza called for talks on Abkhazia without preconditions. He was rejected by Sokhumi and Moscow (https://civil.ge/archives/116845)
• Fried and Karasin talked on the phone after the August 2 clashes, with Moscow hoping the US would constructively influence Georgia to help defuse tensions. (https://civil.ge/archives/116883)
  • Bryza was dispatched to Moscow, trying to convince the sides to sit down on the talks in Abkhazia immediately

EU support for Georgia

• On 12 May 2008, the Foreign Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Sweden and Slovenia visited Georgia.
  • Saakashvili spoke alongside the ministers and presented a Russian leaflet promoting the Sochi Olympics as a proof of Russia's design on Abkhazia.
  • Saakashvili said that Russia's escalation was "a prelude to the act of annexation and act of occupation".
  • Saakashvili said that when Georgia was occupied in 1921, Russia then attacked other European countries; Saakashvili expressed hope that "Europe will never again makes the similar mistake".
• On 12 May 2008, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus issued a joint statement supporting the territorial integrity of states, including Georgia.
• On 5 June 2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which condemned the deployment of Russian forces to Abkhazia and endorsed Georgia's territorial integrity.
  • The resolution called on Russia to pull out those additional forces and stated that the peacekeeping structure should be changed because Russia was no longer an unbiased player.
  • A "deeper European involvement in these frozen conflicts in order to move the peace processes forward" was advised.
  • Russian officials did not comment on the resolution.
• On 7 June 2008, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh said after meeting with EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Javier Solana that Abkhazia would never consider the replacement of the Russian peacekeepers because "there is no alternative" and Abkhazia would insist on the continued presence of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia.
  • Solana said that Russia had a significant role and there would be no conflict resolution without Russia.
  • A two-day visit to Abkhazia by fifteen EU ambassadors was finished that day.[352]
  • Giorgi Baramidze, the Georgian deputy prime minister and minister on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, said: "Georgia is ready to sign a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia if it is guaranteed by the European Union."
  • Baramidze said that the loss of Gagra, Sukhumi and most of Abkhazia for Georgia was caused by absence of an effective guarantor of earlier agreements.
  • He added, "We want to carry out our peace plan."[352]
• Pro-Russian authorities of South Ossetia announced to have expelled 12 European ambassadors from South Ossetia due to their meeting with pro-Georgian government of South Ossetia on June 22.
• The visit of OSCE ambassadors and the Danish foreign minister to Georgia began on 7 July, which would last until 9 July and separatists would also be visited.[372]
• On 17 July 2008, the Georgian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that France supported the active involvement of the EU in the process of peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Georgia.
• On 25 July 2008, the South Ossetian separatists rejected proposal by the OSCE chairman-in-office Alexander Stubb to hold Georgia-South Ossetia meeting in Helsinki.
  • The separatists had previously refused to participate in talks in Brussels arranged by the EU on 22 July.[414]
    • According to Kommersant, the South Ossetian decision to refuse participation in Brussels talks was coordinated with Moscow.
• On 23 July 2008, the meeting of the EU foreign ministers, after hearing German Foreign Minister Steinmeier's report on Abkhazia, recognized that Russia was a party to the conflict in Georgia.

• Saakashvili continuously warned European partners of the risk of war, of his fear of Putin, of evidence of an incoming invasion. He was met with calls to calm down (Glucksmann, 14-15)

ASMUS

• European Council meets in May and decides to launch a parallel diplomacy campaign to the US (154)
  • Javier Solana travels to the region in early June to offer more EU role, welcomed by all sides (154)
  • Following weeks, the EU offered a series of confidence-building measures, including holding conferences in Sokhumi and Brussels and sending a border support team and offering to host additional meetings in Brussels to bring the conflicting parties together (q54-155)
    • But internal divisions prevented the EU from taking bolder steps (155)
    • And Tskhinvali and Sokhumi backed out at the last minute (155)

IIFFMCG II

• On May 6, 2008, Yakobashvili said in Brussels that "We literally have to avert war", which raised alarm of the situation on the ground in the international community (30)
  • In the next few days, the French FM sought to prevent an armed conflict (30)
  • The EU announced a group of Fms that would go to Tbilisi to explore ways of halting the hostile actions and rhetoric that marked the Russia-Georgia relations (30)
  • The EU was supportive of Tbilisi, aspored to a peacekeeping role, and was unwilling to commit to any actions that would set it in opposition to Moscow (30)
• In June 2008, the EU Parliament passed a resolution stating that the Russian troops could not longer be considered neutral and impartial peacekeepers and that the peacekeeping format should therefore be revised (202)

IIFFMCG III

• 22-24 July: EU seeks to mediate talks between SO and Georgia with the participation of Russia. SO originally refuses to attend Brussels because of Yakobashvili's title as "Minister of Reintegration". Tbilisi changes his title to Special Envoy to Conflict Resolution, but Tskhinvali rejects anyways (21)
• Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, in his capacity as OSCE Chairman in Office proposes peace talks in Helsinki between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali for early August but SO refuses (21)

• Alexander Stubb of the OSCE told the OSCE Permanent Council on April 10 that the OSCE needed to reenergize efforts over the frozen conflicts, after Russia's decision to open links with Abkhazia and SO. Point that this included also the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (https://civil.ge/archives/114714)
• The EU expressed concerns over Russia's move to Legalize Ties (https://civil.ge/archives/114756)
• Saakashvili told Reuters on May 1 that the moment of truth for Europe had come and he called on the EU to use "all its diplomatic arsenal to deter the aggressive instincts of some politicians in Moscow" (https://civil.ge/archives/114896)
  • Saakashvili stated that the attack by Russia was an attack on the values of democracy and freedom and recalled that the tensions started because of Kosovo
• On May 2, the EU Slovenian presidency stated it was seriously concerns by "the recent series of events that have raised tensions between Georgia and Russia" (https://civil.ge/archives/114903)
  • But Rupel, the Slovenian FM, added that the EU would "not take sides in the Georgian-Russian dispute" (https://civil.ge/archives/116261)
• The Lithuanina, Latvian, Polish, Swedish, and Slovenian FMs visited Tbilisi on May 12. Saakashvili urged for the EU's help because Russia's recent actions were a "prelude to an act of occupation" and feared the EU's blind eye (https://civil.ge/archives/116270)
  • He said "EUrope left Georgia alone in 1921. Europe did not even speak out... Georgia's occupation was followedd by the attack on Poland, occupation of the Baltic States, and by bloody war in Finland. I hope that history will not be repeated so tragically"
  • He said "Europe has not faced such a challenge since the end of the Cold War"
• On May 14, Iakobashvili said that war had been averted thanks to Kouchner, although details were not known. A few days prior in Batumi, MS said that "we were very close to war" (https://civil.ge/archives/116283)
• EU FMs meet as part of the External Relations Council in Brussels on May 26: "The Council emphasised that all parties should tone down public rhetoric and abstain from provocations and implementation of decisions that undermine the above principles" (https://civil.ge/archives/116416)
  • It also announced it would start works on negotiating a DCFTA
• Ambassadors of France, Netherlands, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Lithiania, Romania and Sweden and other EU diplomats were scheduled to visit Abkhazia on May 30 to meet with Baghapsh and tour Gagra and Gali (https://civil.ge/archives/116441)
• Ahead of the Solana visit to Sokhumi in June, Baghapsh said that his conditions (NUFT and Kodori) to resume talks with Tbilisi had not changed, regardless of Solana's visit (https://civil.ge/archives/116493)
• Solana visited on June 6, met with Baghapsh whom he called president, and expressed readiness to have the EU get deeper engaged in the conflict resolution, while keeping the doors open for Russia as an important player in the process. Baghapsh reiterated his demands (https://civil.ge/archives/116498)
  • Baghapsh also rejected proposals to internationalize the peacekeeping force, which it seems that Solana was pushing to some extent
• Abkhaz media reported that Baghapsh visited Paris on June 19 (https://civil.ge/archives/116590)
• A number of EU diplomats visited Tskhinvali on June 23 to assess EU-funded economic rehab projects in the region (https://civil.ge/archives/116598)
  • They met with FM Murat Jioev and chief negotiator Boris Chochiev in Tskhinvali and Sanakoev in Kurta. The latter meeting was dubbed counter-productive.
  • It seems their visit was a follow-up to the OSCE CiO Stubb's consideration of new negotiating format - point out here to the 2+2+2 format
• Georgia was one of the priority agenda items of the EU-Russia SUmmit in Khanty-Mansiyvsk on June 26 (https://civil.ge/archives/116632)
• News of the secret Sweden meeting was broken on June 19 in a press release by Solana's office (https://civil.ge/archives/116597)
  • The press release stated that "Mr. Solana welcomed the recent direct talks in Sweden between Georgian officials and Abkhaz representatives and underline the importance on maintaining direct dialogue between Tbilisi and Sukhumi"
  • Media revealed that Iakobashvili took part in the meeting, although Tbilisi was largely silent
  • This took place as Abkhaz press had reported about Baghapsh's Paris visit
• Details of the visit: Secret meeting held in Sweden on June 15-17 (https://civil.ge/archives/116599)
  • No concrete result but useful talks
  • Georgia represented by Lomaia, Alasania, Iakobashvili, Rurua
  • Abkhazia represented by Shamba, VPM Leonid Lakerbaia, Tax Minister Vakhtang Pipia
  • Meeting an EU initiative
  • The sides had agreed to keep the meeting secret
• ON July 9, the EU indicated that before sending its own peacekeeping mission to Abkhazia, two conditions were necessary: security on the ground and an agreement from both sides (https://civil.ge/archives/116752)
• Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU External Relations Commissioner, suggested during a speech at the European Policy Center on July 11 that a Quartet of international powers was needed, similar to the one in the Middle East (https://civil.ge/archives/116759)
• Javier Solana expressed his disapproval over the overflights and said he had instructed his diplomats to raise the matter with Moscow (https://civil.ge/archives/116765)

• The EU Foreign Ministers' meeting of March 2008 included the development of the situation in Georgia. Sweden and Poland actively sought for the EU to do more to stabilize Georgia ahead of the legislative elections. Ferrero-Waldner suggested the EU could make it easier to get visas and launch a trade pact (https://www.dw.com/en/europe-russia-headed-for-confrontation-over-abkhazia/a-3183705)

• There was an EU Parliament resolution

• Poland pledged to help Georgia lobby for Russia to repeal its April 16 decree (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/135266)
• On April 25, British Ambassador to Georgia Denis Keefe visited Abkhazia and met with Speaker Nugzar Ashuba, PM Ankvab, and Shamba (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/137572)

Effect on Georgia's domestic politics

• Saakashvili aimed to position the parliamentary elections as a choice between old Soviet days and him (Asmus, 142)
• All political parties completely supported the president's approach towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia (IIFFMMCG II, 8)

• On the eve of Russian withdrawal of sanctions, Irakli Okruashvili, leader of the Movement for United Georgia Party, criticized Saakashvili for "having no desire to reunite Georgia", calling his administration "not the kind of people capable of restoring control over Abkhazia" (https://civil.ge/archives/114447)
  • He criticized inconsistencies observed in Saakashvoli's rherotirc
  • He admitted having had a plan to invade Abkhazia in 2006 but Saakashvili rejected the idea of reunification through war
• After the Sanctions withdrawal, the Republican Party accused Saakashvili for an 'empty brag' on Abkhazia and said Tbilisi should have preempted the move by softening sanctions on its own end (https://civil.ge/archives/114462)
  • Republicans said that Saakashvili wanted a "pseudo-patriotic wave" that would escalate tensions as one way to save its power.
• In response to the post-sanction withdrawal criticism, Saakashvili made a speech calling for national unity in the face of "a very important moment for Georgia" (https://civil.ge/archives/114464)
  • "Georgia’s response should be calm, it should demonstrate strength and self-assurance, but first of all, it should be a response of the united nation. Journalists, ordinary citizens, policemen, the president, government and opposition should also assume their share of responsibility."
  • "On the other hand, I think this is a moment when the government and the opposition should sit together and discuss all the issues related to our response regarding Russia’s moves. We should demonstrate our unity as never before, we should demonstrate that there are values which are above political views."
  • "I want to tell the opposition – we can dispute many issues – the opposition is a significant part of the democratic system – in most cases we may fail to reach agreement, but there are issues on which it is impossible not to agree."
  • "I want to call on them to sit down with me, with the Georgian government and develop our joint response, our joint position in response to this provocative, dangerous act of Russia’s. I think this will be correct; this will be unexpected for our opponents, wherever they are, and this will be a demonstration of political maturity and the unity of the Georgian nation against a key challenge. Georgia is undefeatable when it is united on key issues."
    • The Republican Party rejected the call for unity, instead calling on Tbilisi to immediately withdraw from the CIS (https://civil.ge/archives/114470)
    • The New Rights Party rejected all negotiations with Saakashvili
    • The Labor Party rejected all unity and called for Saakashvili's resignation
    • The 8-Party Opposition Coalition under Gachechiladze held a protest rally on March 9 to reject the proposal. calling Saakashvili illegitimate, calling for the immediate withdrawal from the CIS, and illegitimizing peacekeepers (https://civil.ge/archives/114472)
      • They then announced a hunger strike, which Burjanadze responded to by a call to end the strike and focus on Abkhazia together (https://civil.ge/archives/114481)
    • The only two parties that agreed to work with MS to form a joint response was the Party of Future (Gia Maisashvili) and the Industrialist Party (Gogi Topadze) (https://civil.ge/archives/114503)
• Saakashvili reiterated his call for unity, calling for an end to the hunger strike on March 16, and to work together in the campaign for NATO membership (https://civil.ge/archives/114530)
  • In response, the Republican party issued a statement calling on NATO to grant Georgia the MAP (https://civil.ge/archives/114644)
• When Georgia was denied the MAP, Davit Berdzenishvili MP said that the fault was on the Imedi TV raid (https://civil.ge/archives/114668)
• Ahead of the May 2008 parliamentary elections, the Reoublican Party said "we will not let civil war in this country, we will not let war break out in Abkhazia, Tskhinvali, or in any other part of Georgia." (https://civil.ge/archives/114720)
• On April 23, after Russia opened links with the territories, Saakashvili proposed opposition parties to launch "regular meetings" to be briefed on national security issues and on the crisis with Russia and called for unity (https://civil.ge/archives/185587)
  • Saakashvili claimed that the provocations by Russia were linked with the elections
  • Most oppo parties rejected MS's call as a PR stunt (https://civil.ge/archives/114832)
    • MP Gamkrelidze of the NRP called him an "imposter" with "no legitimacy to talk about these issues", rejecting any meeting with him
    • MP Dzidziguri of the Conservative Party called it a "electoral trick"
    • Usupashvili said he was ready to meet with Burjanadze or Gurgenidze, but not MS and called the proposal "electoral agony"
    • Labor Party said it would only meet to negotiate MS's resignation

• On April 30, MP Kakha Kukava (9-Party Bloc) said there was a "serious suspicion" that the Saakashvili administration was using tensions with Russia and developments in Abkhazia to distract public attention (https://civil.ge/archives/114889)
  • He compared it to Eduard Shevardnadze launching the Abkhaz adventure because he had problems with supporters of Gamsakhurdia
• Some in government made allegations that opposition leaders were cooperating with Russian intelliengence in an attempt to destabilize Georgia and even overthrow the government (https://civil.ge/archives/116804)

• Government changes section
• Bakradze had to resign as FM to run for Parliament but he was appointed as "Special Presidential Envoy to the International Community on Conflict Issues", though it seemed he continued to function de facto as FM until a replacement was appointed (https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230523233055/https://www.refworld.org/docid/482457c62b.html)
  • The United Opposition claimed the Government was trying to use the Russian troop deployment to win votes in Georgia's upcoming May 21 parliamentary polls. Kukava claimed Saakashvili was "exaggerating the Russian threat for political purposes"

• Irina Sarishvili of the Imedi Party opposed NATO integration, calling it "tantamount to the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia", and called on NATO Member States to oppose Georgia's MAP (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/134460)
• The Republican Party warned against the pro-Kosovo faction in the Saakashvili government, including PM Gurgenidze (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/134504)
• Republican MP Ivliane Khaindrava criticized the Abkhazia peace plan as "four years too late" (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/134744)
• On May 5, Republican Tina Khidasheli accused the Georgian government of artificially increasing tensions in Abkhazia ahead of the elections (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/135968)
  • She said both Shevardnadze and Saakashvili used the topic of Abkhazia to arouse hostility towards a common enemy
  • She called on the Saakashvili administration to stop its rhetoric against peacekeepers

Bibliography

• Galeotti, Mark (2022). Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. Bloomsbury USA. ISBN 1472847547.
• Stent, Angela (2019). Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and With the Rest. Grand Central Publishing. ISBN 1455533017.
• Gachechiladze, Revaz (2013). საქართველო მსოფლიო კონტექსთში [Georgia in the Global Context] (in Georgian). Tbilisi: Sulakauri.
• IIFFMCG (2009a). Report (PDF). Vol. I.
• IIFFMCG (2009b). Report (PDF). Vol. II.
• IIFFMCG (2009c). Report (PDF). Vol. III.
• Asmus, Ronald (2010). A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. Macmillan + ORM. ISBN 9780230102286.
• Asatiani, Nodar; Janelidze, Otar (2009). History of Georgia. Tbilissi: Publishing House Petite. ISBN 978-9941906367.
• Bush, George W. (2011). Decision Points. Crown. ISBN 9780307590633.
• Glucksmann, Raphael (2008). Je vous parle de liberté [I am speaking about liberty] (in French). Paris: Hachette. ISBN 978-2012376489.
• Silverman, Jeffrey (2008). Khurcha Incident – “Factual Event or Machiavellian Conspiracy?” (PDF). Human Rights Centre.

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