Template:Voting criteria table long

Criterion


Method
Majority loser Condorcet winner Condorcet loser Smith Smith-IIA IIA/LIIA Clone­proof Mono­tone Participation Truncation-resistance Turkey resistance Sincere favorite Ballot

type

Anti-plurality Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Single mark
Approval No No No No No Yes[Tn 1] Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Appr­ovals
Baldwin Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Ran­king
Black Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Ran­king
Borda Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Ran­king
Bucklin Yes No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Ran­king
Coombs Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Ran­king
Copeland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Ran­king
Dodgson No Yes No No No No No No No No No No Ran­king
Highest median Yes No No No No Yes[Tn 1] Yes Yes No[Tn 2] No Yes Yes Scores
Instant-runoff style="background:#FFC7C7;color:black;vertical-align:middle;text-align:center;" class="table-no"|No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes Yes No Ran­king
Kemeny–Young Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes LIIA Only No Yes No No No No Ran­king
Minimax No Yes[Tn 3] No No No No No Yes No No[Tn 3] No No Ran­king
Nanson Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Ran­king
Plurality No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Single mark
Random ballot No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Single mark
Ranked pairs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes LIIA Only Yes Yes No[Tn 2] No No No Ran­king
Runoff Yes No Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No Single mark
Schulze Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No[Tn 2] No No No Ran­king
Score No No No No No Yes[Tn 1] Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Scores
Sortition No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes None
STAR Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Scores
Tideman alternative Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Ran­king
  1. ^ a b c Approval voting, score voting, and majority judgment satisfy IIA if it is assumed that voters rate candidates independently using their own scale. For this to hold, in some elections, some voters must use less than their full voting power despite having meaningful preferences among viable candidates.
  2. ^ a b c In Highest median, Ranked Pairs, and Schulze voting, there is always a regret-free, semi-honest ballot for any voter, holding all other ballots constant and assuming they know enough about how others will vote. Under such circumstances, there is always at least one way for a voter to participate without grading any less-preferred candidate above any more-preferred one.
  3. ^ a b A variant of Minimax that counts only pairwise opposition, not opposition minus support, fails the Condorcet criterion and meets later-no-harm.