Talk:Battle of Long Tan/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Makes no sense

"The commander of 11 Platoon, national serviceman 2nd Lt Gordon Sharp, was killed and Sergeant Bob Buick assumed command of the platoon. "

This makes no sense. "National Servicemen" ( draftees ) were not 2nd Lieutenants.Eregli bob (talk) 15:00, 3 June 2010 (UTC)

I'm sure the blokes who went through the Officer Training Unit at Scheyville and graduated as 2nd Lieutenants will be rolling in the aisles at this. http://www.otu.asn.au/

Proword (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 03:16, 5 July 2012 (UTC)

ABC just played

"Long Tan: The True Story" and it picked just about every one of the over-blown sources about casualties and unit size. I wonder if that'll result in any edits to the article.--Senor Freebie (talk) 11:50, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

That's a bit insulting, there's no credible evidence to suggest that the figures are particularly 'over-blown'. Hope you have the sense not to utter that nonsense at your local RSL. 58.169.13.178 (talk) 14:15, 23 March 2011 (UTC)

Some suggestions

The reworded article looks really good, though it is rather large. Most of the material in the 'background' section and much of the 'planning', 'opposing forces' and 'preliminary operations' section is more detailed than is needed to explain this engagement, would work best in an article on the war in Phuoc Tuy Province or a detailed campaign history of the Australian Army's role in the war (if need be, this could be a 'holding' article). These sections could be stripped back to the material necessary to provide context for this battle. Nick-D (talk) 08:55, 29 July 2012 (UTC)

Thanks Nick. I fully aggree, its huge - the problem is that I worked on it for so long that every word almost seems "important" to me now. I might need to walk away from it for a bit and then start to move stuff into other articles. I'm going to copy edit bits for a start and merge a couple of paragraphs which may reduce it a little but ultimately wholesale changes will be needed. I'm more than happy if other editors what to jump in and assist though. I'll try and not be too precious. Anotherclown (talk) 09:04, 29 July 2012 (UTC)

Lead following recent rewrite

I notice that the lead of this article keeps getting tagged as being too long (or missing??????). I guess the question I have is what is too long though? I agree it is long and am working on reducing the entire article so I'm a little amused that editors are focusing on the lead. According to WP:LEAD an article of more than 30,000 characters should have three or four paragraphs. This one had four. I guess the question then is how long is a paragraph? Some of the paragraphs in this article are pretty large its true. Anotherclown (talk) 06:59, 19 August 2012 (UTC)

The current length looks about right to me (though it could be a bit longer ;) ). In regards to shortening the article, I still think that this topic would support sub-articles (especially on the events before the battle and its long-term legacy, both of which have been subjects of considerable debate over the years). Nick-D (talk) 07:02, 19 August 2012 (UTC)

G'day, gents, do you think that I've been a bit too severe in my cutting of the lead? If so, I'm more than happy to revert it back to the original, I was just trying to deal with the issue as raised by those that had tagged the article. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 07:32, 19 August 2012 (UTC)

Howdy. Thanks for having a go at this AR - its something I've beeen neglecting. I think it is probably a little severe and maybe leaves out a few important points. I have had another go and have reduced the lead somewhat from the 17 Aug version (was 1,495 words). The version below is approx 260 words shorter at 1,230. Thoughts?

The Battle of Long Tan (18 August 1966) took place near the village of Long Tan, 27 kilometres (17 mi) north east of Vung Tau, in Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The action was fought between Australian forces and Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units after the 108-man D Company, 6 RAR clashed with a force of over 2,000 men from the Viet Cong 275th Regiment, reinforced by at least one North Vietnamese battalion and elements of D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion. The 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) had arrived in South Vietnam between April and June 1966, constructing a base at Nui Dat. After two months on operations 1 ATF had moved beyond the initial requirements of establishing a base and securing its immediate approaches, beginning operations to open the province. Meanwhile, in response to the growing threat posed by the Australians the 275th Regiment was ordered to move against Nui Dat. For several weeks prior Australian signals intelligence (SIGINT) had tracked a radio transmitter from the moving south to a position just north of Long Tan; however, aggressive patrolling failed to find the unit. At 02:43 on the night of 16/17 August Nui Dat was heavily bombarded by Viet Cong mortars, artillery and recoilless rifles (RCLs) fired from a position 2,000 metres (2,200 yd) to the east. While the Australians expected the Viet Cong to have withdrawn, a number of company-sized patrols would be dispatched in response. The following morning B Company, 6 RAR departed to locate the firing points and the direction of the Viet Cong withdrawal. A number of weapon pits were subsequently found, as were the firing positions of the mortars and RCLs.

Around midday on 18 August, D Company took over the pursuit. At 15:40, the lead element clashed with a Viet Cong squad and forced them to withdraw. Shortly after resuming the advance, at 16:08 11 Platoon came under small-arms and rocket propelled grenade fire from a company-sized force after drawing ahead of the other platoons and was isolated. Calling for artillery support, a heavy monsoon rain began which reduced visibility and turned the ground to mud. Beginning as an encounter battle, heavy fighting ensued as the advancing Viet Cong attempted to encircle the Australians. After less than twenty minutes more than a third of 11 Platoon had become casualties, while shortly after the platoon commander was also killed. 10 Platoon attempted to move up on the left but came under heavy fire and was forced to withdraw. With D Company facing at least a battalion 12 Platoon attempted to move up on the right at 17:15, fighting off an attack on their right as they advanced, before pushing forward another 100 metres (110 yd). Suffering increasing casualties, they clashed with several groups moving around their western flank to form a cut-off force prior to mounting a frontal assault. They subsequently opened a path to 11 Platoon yet were unable to advance any further and threw smoke to mark their location. With D Company nearly out of ammunition, two UH-1B Iroquois helicopters from No. 9 Squadron RAAF arrived overhead at 18:00 to resupply them. Meanwhile, the survivors from 11 Platoon withdrew back to 12 Platoon's position during a lull in the fighting, suffering further casualties as they did so. Still heavily engaged, both platoons then returned to the company position under the cover of the artillery.

By 18:10 D Company had reformed into a position of all round defence. With D Company in danger of being overrun, B Company, which was still on its way back to Nui Dat, was ordered to return on foot. Meanwhile, A Company was dispatched mounted in M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) from 3 Troop, 1st APC Squadron. Departing Nui Dat at 17:55, the relief force moved east, crossing a swollen creek before encountering a large Viet Cong force from D445 Battalion forming up to outflank D Company and assault it from the rear. The Viet Cong were caught by surprise as the Australian cavalry crashed into their flank and with darkness falling they broke through to D Company at 19:00, while B Company arrived at the same time. The APCs continued to assault a further 500 metres (550 yd) before being ordered to return to the company location. Arriving at a crucial point in the fighting, the relief force turned the tide of the battle. The Viet Cong had been massing for another assault which would have likely destroyed D Company, yet the firepower and mobility of the armour broke their will to fight, forcing them to withdraw as night approached. The artillery had been almost constant throughout the battle and it also proved critical in ensuring the survival of D Company. By 19:15 the firing had ceased and the Australians prepared for another attack. However, after it became clear that the Viet Cong were not going to counter-attack, they were ordered to withdraw to a position 750 metres (820 yd) to the west from where the casualties could be evacuated by helicopter. With the dead and wounded loaded on to the carriers D Company left at 22:45, while B and A Company departed on foot. A landing zone was subsequently established by the cavalry and the evacuation of the casualties was finally completed after midnight.

Forming a defensive position ready to repulse an expected attack the Australians remained overnight, enduring the cold and heavy rain. They returned to the battlefield in strength the next day, with 6 RAR sweeping the area and locating a large number of Viet Cong casualties. Although initially believing they had suffered a major defeat, as the scale of the losses suffered by the Viet Cong were revealed it became clear that they had in fact won a significant victory. As the clearance continued two wounded Viet Cong soldiers were shot and killed after they moved to engage the Australians, while three more were captured. The missing men from 11 Platoon were also recovered; their bodies found lying where they had fallen, largely undisturbed. Two of the men were discovered to have survived despite their wounds, having spent the night on the battlefield in close proximity to the Viet Cong as they attempted to evacuate their own casualties. Due to the likely presence of a sizeable communist force nearby the Australians remained cautious as they searched for the Viet Cong. Over the next two days they continued to clear the battlefield, uncovering more Viet Cong dead as they did so. Yet with 1 ATF lacking the resources to mount a pursuit of the withdrawing force, the operation ended on 21 August. Despite being heavily outnumbered, D Company had fought off a large Viet Cong assault of regimental strength supported by heavy artillery fire, before a relief force consisting of cavalry and infantry fought their way through and forced the Viet Cong to withdraw. Eighteen Australians were killed and 24 wounded, while the Viet Cong lost at least 245 dead which were found on the battlefield over the days that followed. A decisive Australian victory, Long Tan proved a major local set back for the Viet Cong, indefinitely forestalling an imminent movement against Nui Dat and challenging their previous domination of Phuoc Tuy Province. Although there were other large-scale encounters between the Australians and Viet Cong in later years, 1 ATF was not fundamentally challenged again. Anotherclown (talk) 08:47, 19 August 2012 (UTC)

G'day, I've got no dramas with using that version, it is probably the right size given the size of the article as a whole. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 10:26, 19 August 2012 (UTC)

FYI - lead is now down to 1,110 words. Anotherclown (talk) 08:13, 11 November 2012 (UTC)

My contributions have been removed, can someone please explain why?

I am new and I believed I provided what you want and that is primary sources. I thought you were not allowed to remove edits that had back up sources. Is there an administrator I can approach? I am just trying to provide a balance here and fear maybe people maybe are ganging up on me because I am trying to include the Vietnamese side of the story. Is that a crime? Can I maybe write to the Wikipedia founder?--94.46.3.195 (talk) 06:43, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

Gday - your additions appear to have been reverted by another IP - 201.161.198.214. I can't speak for them but I would probably have reverted your additions also. I have been rewriting this article for nearly two years and overall the bulk of the information you added is discussed. It is already a very large article (the 587th largest on Wikipedia) so I also don't believe there is any requirement to add, if anything this needs to be reduced further. I will go through your additions though:

• You added: The Vietnamese conceded 30 dead and 60 wounded.<ref>Long Tan and Beyond: Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Charles S. Mollison, Page 133, Cobb's Crossing Publications, 2006</ref>
  • Not in source given. This is actually from Baker, who is quoting McNeill (the official historian). Information already covered, quoting from the restored version of the article: "In contrast Viet Cong losses were claimed to have been significantly lower, with Kiem estimating the total number of dead and wounded as approximately 30, mainly from artillery fire."
• You added: "The weapons recovered were" (edit summary These were the only weapons recovered so I have removed 'included' for it leads readers to believes many more weapons were recoverd)
  • Incorrect. From the article: "A large number of Viet Cong dead were subsequently found around the area, including a 60 mm mortar crew which had been killed by indirect fire." Presumably this wpn (or parts of it) for one was probably also recovered but isn't included in the list provided in the source.
    • Further two of the Viet Cong soldiers killed during the clearance were armed and it doesn't appear they wpn's were included in this total. According to McNeill p. 344 one was armed with a rifle and the other a 60 mm mortar. Anotherclown (talk) 06:54, 18 May 2013 (UTC)
• You added: Mark Baker of the Sydney Morning Herald wrote in 1996, after meeting ex-VC and NVA commanders at Long Tan: "[The] senior [north] Vietnamese officers made the startling claim that only 700 of their men had taken part in the battle—half the most conservative Australian estimate—and that only 30 had been killed."<ref>Mark Baker, "Stilling The Ghosts Of Long Tan" (Sydney Morning Herald, 16 August 1996.)</ref>
  • Already covered above - adds nothing.
• You added: According former Vietnamese captain Le Tranh, D445 was only a small battalion with a strength of only 200 to 250 men.<ref>A Soldier Returns: A Long Tan Veteran Discovers The Other Side Of Vietnam, Terry Burstall, p. 142, University of Queensland Press, 1990 </ref>
  • This would seem to be usable to me. Although it is specifically contradicted by what Kiem and Hong said in 1988. Not sure how to overcome that.
• You added the citation of the PUC.
  • Adds no information that is not already covered in the narrative. Article is extensive so adding this verbatim just makes it even longer.
• You added: Captain Robert O'Neill wrote of the episode: ''"...the battalion had been keyed up to the possibility of a major encounter with the Viet Cong-a battle which would have had a decisive effect on the Viet Cong in Phuoc Tuy Province. Instead all we found was dense jungle with no trace of any large Viet Cong force ever having been in the area."''<ref>Robert O'Neill, 1968, ''Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1966/67'' Cassell, Melbourne, p. 93.</ref>
  • This information is already covered. Quoting from the article: " The operation lasted until 8 September and despite the intensity of the previous fighting little contact occurred, with no evidence of a large Viet Cong force having been in the area uncovered." No requirement to use a direct quote to say what is already said.
• You added: "According to the 6th Battalion war diary recording messages sent and recieved during 19 August 1966, the number of Vietnamese casualties was reported to be 188 by 7.20pm.<ref name="6 RAR Commander's War Diary">[http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/AWM95/7/AWM95-7-6-5.pdf 6 RAR Commander's War Diary]</ref>
  • Already specifically included in the article (so it now says it twice): I quote: "By 18:10 the number of Viet Cong dead had risen to 188 and shallow graves were subsequently dug by the Australians to bury them where they had fallen."
• You added:"When I returned to the battlefield the day after the battle, there were bodies lying all through the area ... Would a shell-shocked digger count an arm, a trunk and a leg scattered over several metres as one body or three bodies? Nobody knew or cared at the time, and certainly not the people doing the counting. ...Looking back I don't really think that I would have seen more than 50 bodies and I spent three days in the area.<ref>Terry Burstall, ''A Soldier Returns'', University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1990, pp 77-79.</ref>
  • Another quote that only serves to make the article even bigger without adding any more information. VC claims of a much smaller casualty figure has already been covered extensively.
• You added:<ref>[http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/forgotten-heroes/story-e6frg8yo-1111117197953 Forgotten heroes of Long Tan, Mark Dodd, The Australian August 15, 2008]</ref><ref>[http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/08/17/1092508472026.html A day from hell, The Age, August 18, 2004]</ref>
  • No requirement to reference a low qlty source (i.e. a newspaper article) for this. This figure is already cited to the definitive academic study of the battle (being McNeill - the Australian official historian). Anotherclown (talk) 07:31, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

BTW I've now reverted you re-addition of this information. This isn't censorship this is an editorial disagreement. You need to discuss your reason for adding information not threaten to ban people that don't see things the way you do. Anotherclown (talk) 07:36, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

Anotherclown's changes seem sound to me - there's no need to repeat information in what's already a very long article. I'd earlier removed the material where you contrasted information from 6 RAR's war diary with later assessments - it's not sensible to compare a primary source written by an officer at the time of the battle with information in subsequent assessments which would have drawn on the war diary as well as other sources. Nick-D (talk) 08:37, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

94.46.3.195 - can I ask if you actually know of any Vietnamese sources on this battle? As far as I am aware there are not any secondary sources available (other than those already included in the article - i.e. interviews with Loc, Kiem, Hong and Nguyen Nam Hung). Above you wrote: "I am trying to include the Vietnamese side of the story" but you have only added a number of cherry-picked Australian sources (a quote from Burstall, an except from the 6 RAR War Diary which has been taken out of context and a quote from O'Neill who was an officer in 5 RAR who was involved in subsequent operations after the battle). Whilst all of these sources are reliable in there own right they don't add anything to what is already in the article. By all means if you know of Vietnamese sources that are reliable then pls add them (although I would ask you respect the principles of undue weight). Anotherclown (talk) 11:26, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

Nui Dat Co-ordinates

Great article so far. Have read down to a few paragraphs before the actual battle. Briefly: Incorrect co-ordinates for Nui Dat. In the 1st Paragraph of the lead, Nui Dat is a link to another Wikipedia article. The Co-ordinates from this article are about 50kms ENE of the Long Tan area, in the Ham Tan District. Fortunately your helpful "terrible" map of the battle allowed me to work out where the base actually was, and when viewed on google maps (satellite view) looks like a likely location for a base ... perhaps still showing signs of mechanised earth works. I noticed you are also a contributor for the Nui Dat article, so maybe you can fix it. I think the Co-ords should be 10.556 107.222 or N10° 33’ 30” E107° 13’ 30” This is my first post on Wikipedia, after being a passive reader of many articles over recent years ... I don't know how to fix it and am reluctant to try to edit another's article. --PlainsSoarer (talk) 09:22, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

Gday PlainsSoarer. This is well spotted. From looking at the map those new co-ords certainly look more correct than the original so I have adjusted them now. Thanks very much. Anotherclown (talk) 10:36, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

Hope you don't mind me refining the co-ords. My suggestion above only went to 3 decimal places in DD.ddd°, which I then rounded to convenient DD MM SS units without checking. This put the point on some low ground beside the Nui Dat "clay hill". Hope my assumption is correct. --PlainsSoarer (talk) 13:55, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

No worries, look good to me. Thanks again. Anotherclown (talk) 10:55, 1 May 2013 (UTC)

weather contradiction

Hi folks, one section of the article refers to cold weather but another refers to hot weather, during the battle. I attempted change the language in the lede to something "temperature-neutral" but was reverted. I am adding a clarification needed template to the page and removing all references to temperature until such time as this situation is figured out... 208.100.189.155 (talk) 00:12, 19 August 2013 (UTC)

G'day, I understand that you are trying to help, however, your tag does not appear correct to me. The body of the article shows that it was hot during the day and cold during the night (and this information is referenced). Quoting directly from the body of the article:

• in the Patrolling east of Nui Dat section: "Despite the heat the company moved at a fast pace, traversing the low scrub, swamp and paddy fields as they closed in on B Company's position.[130]"
• in the Relief of D Company section: "Forming a defensive position ready to repulse an expected attack the Australians remained overnight, enduring the cold and the heavy rain.[221]". Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 07:51, 19 August 2013 (UTC)

I notice that your change has been reverted again, which to be honest I think is correct, although perhaps the edit summary might have been a bit more civil. If you have more concerns, please discuss rather than continuing to tag the article. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 07:51, 19 August 2013 (UTC)

Encyclopedia of Vietnam War (Oxford) full spelling in lead

I added the â to the name, and also "what was then Phước Tuy Province," in front of the province:

The Battle of Long Tân (18 August 1966) took place near the village of Long Tân, in what was then Phước Tuy Province, South Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

On the basis of Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. Oxford University Press. Article "Australia" p32 "Long Tân" In ictu oculi (talk) 07:15, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

And I reverted this as the many other works on the battle use "Long Tan". Nick-D (talk) 07:23, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

A single source does not indicate the common usage in English language sources and I think the available literature ought to be reviewed before making such changes. Although I wasn't the editor that reverted your change here I agree with that reversion (per my edits at Binh Ba and Suoi Bong Trang). There is no requirement for diacritics on English Wikipedia per WP:DIACRITICS and "Battle of Long Tan" is clearly more appropriate per WP:COMMONNAME. The majority of the sources I have seen use "Long Tan" and none use diacritics. By way of a sample of the sources available see for instance:

• McNeill (1993) To Long Tan
• McGibbon (2010) New Zealand's Vietnam War
• McAulay (1986) The Battle of Long Tan
• McGibon (2000) The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History (uses "Xa Long Tan")
• Dennis et al (2008) The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (uses "Xa Long Tan")
• Kuring (2004) Redcoats to Cams
• Ham (2007) Vietnam: The Australian War
• Mollison (2005) Long Tan and Beyond: Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67"
• Coulthard-Clark (2001) The Encyclopedia of Australian Battles
• Horner and Bou (2008) Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment

These are just the sources I have close at hand but doubtless there are many more which use the same format. Anotherclown (talk) 07:39, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

• Hi User:Anotherclown, User:Nick-D,

All Vietnam article editors are very well aware that many English sources do not have Vietnamese fonts, in fact most of these sources do not even appear to have French accents.

couple of requests:

(1) can you please provide a source for Long Tân which uses Vietnamese font for other Vietnamese place names but doesn't use them for Long Tân .

(2) can you please provide an example of a WWI or WWII battle (First Battle of Târgu Frumos 1944) where Latin alphabet local place names have been excluded from the article lead and infobox.

Thank you. In ictu oculi (talk) 08:07, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

The First Battle of Târgu Frumos does not seem to be relevant here: I presume that the article uses the common name for that battle, and if not that's a separate discussion which is not related to the common name of this particular battle. Nick-D (talk) 08:12, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

Nick-D, it's highly relevant. I picked that example at complete random simply as it shared the same vowel with this Battle. But in fact a quick Google Book search initially shows zero support for the en.wp title (OCR errors may later reveal there were some) and 30 results without the Romanian diacritic.

In my experience that is typical, Wikipedia editors do not strive to reproduce typographic limits from 52 character typography sources (as per 7-bit Basic ASCII, ABCabc set), instead Wikipedia editors use the full local fonts - we do this for Romania, we do this for Vietnam.

Therefore the question (2) is highly relevant. We need to establish whether the issue is Vietnam Battle articles or all Battle articles, in which case we need to notify not just the editors on the original Vietnam geo names RFC but also WikiProject Romania, Poland, Lithuania, France, etc. So please, per (2) can you please provide an example of a WWI or WWII battle where Latin alphabet local place names have been removed. The point is not for you to find one (I doubt you will) the point is for you to see what en.wikipedia reality is. Sorry if this sounds like homework, but seeing is believing and if I tell you all en.wp articles have local Latin fonts you probably won't believe me without checking, so please check. In ictu oculi (talk) 08:29, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

It's completely irrelevant: there isn't some kind of organised block of editors going around carefully selecting the names of articles on battles in non-Anglo countries which I am either part of or going up against. We're dealing with the name of this battle here, and it boils down to what the available reliable sources call it. Nick-D (talk) 08:40, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

What the rest of en.wp does is relevant.

Anyway have requested (1) (2), will check back in a week to see if anyone supplies them. In ictu oculi (talk) 08:44, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

Why would they? As Nick said they are irrelevant. The policy that applies is WP:COMMONNAME and as you said above "All Vietnam article editors are very well aware that many English sources do not have Vietnamese fonts..." One wonders why is this is even being discussed. Anotherclown (talk) 08:47, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

See above. In ictu oculi (talk) 08:55, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

G'day everyone. My first thought is to wonder why we are spending time on this. It seems like an awful lot of work to add a few lines/dots/etc. Most English language readers won't know what they mean anyway (I don't, but that doesn't necessarily mean anything, of course), so I guess I wonder why are they being added and why it matters? That said, who am I to question what editors spend their time on so long as they have good intentions, follow policy and treat others with respect etc.? I have no doubt that all involved are doing their best to meet these expectations, so in the spirit of good faith, I will get involved in this discussion if it will help. In this regard, I have checked what paper sources I have that deal with the Vietnam War in English. I looked at the following: Odgers, Army Australia: An Illustrated History; Coulthard-Clark Where Australians Fought; Drez and Brinkley Voices of Courage: The Battle for Khe Sanh, Vietnam; and Palazzo Australian Military Operations in Vietnam. All seem to present this battle as "Long Tan", without diacritics. That said, these are all Australian or American publications, so maybe other English language publishers (British, Canadian and New Zealand etc) have a different take? I don't know. Further, a request for comment has been mentioned as the authority for these changes. I think it is this one: WP:VN DISTRICT NAMES RFC. I can't say I've been to that page before, but to me it seems that the RFC was very specifically related to articles on Vietnamese places/districts (I quote from the closing statement "articles in Category:Districts of Vietnam" - which I don't believe includes this article), so I have three points about this. Firstly, use of diacritics at the place name article may indeed be acceptable (it being the proper name of the place after all). Secondly, given that many editors won't know how to create diacrtics, we run the risk of internal inconsistency if we promulgate the change encyclopedia-wide. Having worked as a reviewer and a writer at GAN, A-class and FAC, this is one thing that is constantly pointed out. If someone adds diacritics to an article I write, but miss a few words, I've got know way of knowing how to make it consistent. So when someone points out the inconsistency, I'm either doomed to not fix it, have to beg someone else to fix it (which they may or may not, in a timely fashion or not), or more simply, will probably just have to remove it. Thus it seems a self-defeating effort. Finally, I don't think an RFC on a single talk page trumps an encyclopedia-wide guideline, in this case WP:DIACRITICS. If the argument is being made that all of these names are to be changed across the entire encyclopedia I would like to see a much wider RFC than the one that is currently being relied upon. So, my final point. I have no dramas with them being added to the place names if there is consensus to do so, which it seems that there probably is for Vietnamese places as per the linked RFC, but beyond that, I'd either like to see a broader consensus for wholesale changes (maybe at the MOS?), or local consensus at the articles that are being affected before further moves/changes are made. Sorry for the wall of text ... feel free to TLDR. Take care. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 10:13, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

User:AustralianRupert

Thanks for the courteous response. No need to apologise for the wall of text.

If Vietnamese names are truly troublesome and "distracting" (AnotherClown) then there may be a case for making Australian military actions in Vietnam (and indeed US military actions in Vietnam) an exception from all other Vietnam articles, something like a kind of 7-bit ASCII bubble inside the Vietnam article corpus.

However such a decision will also be a bubble from other Military history articles since en.wp articles about battles don't have special rules for titling and follow the local geographical articles: Battle of Víðines 1208, Battle of Örlygsstaðir 1238, Battle of Szőlős 1527, Battle of Köbölkút 1663, Battle of Knjaževac 1913, Battle of Tolvajärvi 1939, Battle of Åndalsnes 1940, Battle of Şırnak 1992, ... I'm not very familiar with battle articles but browsing through the categories Category:Battles by country I cannot see a single geographical placename that has been rendered into simple 52-character ABC/abc font. Category:Battles by country looks to be consistent with normal en.wp geographical names, which all use full unicode Latin fonts.

Remember also that these are not battles which took place with Vietnamese troops fighting in Australia, these were battles that took place in Vietnam. Which is why sources with full fonts, such as those published by Oxford University Press or University of California treat the Vietnames names just like any other geographical name, Turkish, Magyar, Norse. In ictu oculi (talk) 11:45, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

BTW - "why we are spending time on this" - due to precision, Vietnamese place names are difficult to distinguish and impossible to pronounce without full script. Without them it's a bit like "I took a train to M--stown" (is that Morristown or Moorestown?) I have no further comment at this point. In ictu oculi (talk) 11:45, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

"I cannot see a single geographical placename that has been rendered into simple 52-character ABC/abc font..." - actually the majority of our battle articles are. "Vietnamese place names are difficult to distinguish and impossible to pronounce without full script..." - perhaps only to a native speaker of Vietnamese. To the vast majority of native English speakers these squiggles clearly mean nothing and assist in pronunciation in no way. Logically as this is English Wikipedia that represents the bulk of our readership (not to mention our editors). Anotherclown (talk) 12:20, 28 September 2013 (UTC)

@Anotherclown: I have to say on the scale of sensible discussion here User:AustralianRupert rates highest and your contributions rate lowest. Your comment "actually the majority of our battle articles are." is another example of you not taking the trouble to read what is written and talking WP:Patent nonsense. If you do not understand the meaning of the word "wikt:rendered into" please consult Wiktionary. If you are not familiar with wikipedia's usual article leads in such situations please look at some of the examples linked above. In ictu oculi (talk) 00:44, 29 September 2013 (UTC)

G'day again, In ictu oculi. Anotherclown is an editor in high standing in the Milhist project whose opinion I respect highly. He is also responsible for improving this article greatly (he is the article's main contributor, not myself) and is more familiar with the literature on the topic (i.e. the Battle of Long Tan) than most people IMO. I understand that you have good intentions, but frankly the tone you are now adopting seems confrontational to me, whether that was your intention or not. That said, I'm a fan of avoiding drama and prefer to pursue compromise solutions where possible, so I'd be more than happy to listen to a proposal that seeks a compromise, but only in so far as it relates to this article. If you are wishing to pursue wholesale changes beyond the scope of the RFC you linked to, a much broader consensus should be sought, IMO. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 05:59, 29 September 2013 (UTC)

Okay AustralianRupert thanks, I take your comments on board. However there is no excuse for some of the comments AnotherClown has made - he himself is being confrontational - and calling foreign names "squiggles" sounds exactly like what it sounds like.

I intend to leave the subject here. I already said that if there was such strong objection to usual practice of fully spelling local names in the leads and infoboxes of articles in Category:Battles by country, as seen in Battle of Víðines 1208, Battle of Örlygsstaðir 1238, Battle of Szőlős 1527, Battle of Köbölkút 1663, Battle of Knjaževac 1913, Battle of Tolvajärvi 1939, Battle of Åndalsnes 1940, Battle of Şırnak 1992, then these articles could remain without local names in the lead and infobox. But this "squiggles" talk needs to stop. In ictu oculi (talk) 07:40, 29 September 2013 (UTC)

Good thing I'm not sensitive I guess, although clearly someone else is. Will refrain from calling them "lines and squiggles" in the future if you really do find it offensive. All the best. Anotherclown (talk) 09:08, 29 September 2013 (UTC)

I don't find it offensive. I just don't want to waste my time dealing with this level of dialogue.

As to whether you are sensitive or not, by all means go into a Vietnamese restaurant in Cabramatta and tell them that their sign http://aussietrueblue.com/ngoc-an-vietnamese.jpg and menus are full of meaningless squiggles. It's possible that the waiters will laugh about it and find the comment charming. It's no more offensive than a visitor to Australia refering to the Southern Cross in the fly half of the flag of Australia as "those meaningless white blotches and spots" In ictu oculi (talk) 11:00, 29 September 2013 (UTC)

Actually its more like someone disagreeing with the addition of English language characters to Vietnamese Wikipedia... Anotherclown (talk) 11:49, 30 September 2013 (UTC)

Changes per Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion

Gday 110.175.151.20 and thank you for the help you have provided on this article. You will note I have removed some of your recent edits. I'm not fundamentally opposed to the addition of material from Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion but there will need to be discussion first to ensure this is done appropriately, without undue weight. A few points:

• Chamberlain is a self published book so there are some issues as to whether it is consider a reliable source under our policys. Knowing something of the authors background I believe he is an authority on the subject but think some caution is needed here.
• The material itself is likely being added by the author himself (who has edited Wikipedia in the past as User:Erniechamberlain, User:Ernieacorn and now I believe as an IP, which again I don't have a problem with, but think warrants some care.
• The article is written using the majority of the reliable sources available in the area, including the official history, with all material cited extensively. The changes you made were not cited and changed the meaning of referenced material, while other cited material was deleted.
• One thing that needs to be avoided is adding material to the lead which is not used in the body of the text (and supported by a reference).
• I am happy to discuss each of the points you feel need to be incorporated into the article though.
• To deal with one of your specific points I don't believe the article ever claimed 274 Regt was actually involved, but it highlights the concern that speculation of its presence caused, which affected Jackson's response to the action at Long Tan, and the possible role it might have had to ambush a relief force from Blackhorse.
• Kiem's actual posn as the commander of the Chau Duc District Unit in Aug 1966 is specifically already mentioned in the article.
  • Pls see footnote 1 ref this. Anotherclown (talk) 22:01, 12 October 2013 (UTC)
• IRT the Operation Marsden document never being cited by Intelligence Officers - happy with adding the description "reportedly". Do you have a page reference to the Chamberlain source on this so it can be added? Anotherclown (talk) 21:56, 12 October 2013 (UTC)
• Incidentally Wicken's name is listed as "Brian" in McAulay but "Bryan" in Ham (and in a few photo captions in the AWM) so have adopted "Bryan" per your edit. Thanks for that and for pointing out the typos. Anotherclown (talk) 22:24, 12 October 2013 (UTC)

Hi All (excuse errors in my first use of the talk page). In mid-August, I presented at the AWM's "Vietnam Perspectives" conference on "The Enemy" (for an abstract and bio, Google chamberlain war memorial speakers). I included a "handout" - Long Tan Reviewed" - copy available on request. On accounts in the Official Histories, I have passed my corrections to Ashley Ekins. Many articles state incorrectly 274 was to be involved - and on the Internet there is even an article with a map showing 274 located within two km of Nui Dat 2. There was no US unit at Blackhorse in August 1966 - to my knowledge. 274 activities and plans are known - I have translated Nguyen Nam Hung diary entry for 18 August 1966. Although Nguyen Van Kiem was a "regroupee", he was not a PAVN officer - as currently indicated in the article. On NVA/VC casualties, these are discussed in detail in a dedicated Annex E to D445: Their Story; and 275 is at Annex J (incl D605 etc). On the "Marsden" NVA/VC KIA figure, see D445: Their Story, Annex E, p.6 f.32; and the "handout". An intelligence colleague deployed to the Marsden AO in December 1969 specifically to deal with captured documents. Recently, 275 Regiment's casualties at the Battle (name, dob, unit, nok - including addresses) have been made available - see my August 2013 Conference "handout", Have just published D440: Their Story, and am finishing a history of 33rd NVA Regiment. Happy to discuss further. Ernieacorn (talk) 23:06, 12 October 2013 (UTC)

• Gday again Ernie. Excellent point about Blackhorse - have clarified this now. 3 Sqn 11 ACR had arrived in Long Khanh province on 12 Aug and the remainder of the regiment arrived in Sep. Don't believe they occupied Blackhorse until a few month later. Thanks for the page number re Marsden - will look at this now. Anotherclown (talk) 23:33, 12 October 2013 (UTC)
  • Unfortunately the annexes of your book aren't available online as far as I can tell. Is there a place I can access these? Anotherclown (talk) 23:38, 12 October 2013 (UTC)

Suggestions moved from article to talk

"Reaction in Nui Dat": 274 VC Regiment element in Duc My on 11 August 1966 ? The "pre-Long Tan" section relates an attack on "Duc My" on 11 August 1966 by a battalion of 274 Regiment. Duc My is a hamlet on Route 2 on the southern approach to Binh Ba village - ie about 4km north of the Nui Dat 1ATF base. On 11 August 1966, 5RAR was conducted a cordon and search-type operation in Binh Ba - including handing out books and detaining over 160 suspects (Operation Holsworthy). However, on 11 August 1966, 274 Regiment reportedly attacked the village of Phu My - ie on Route 15 on the border of Phuoc Tuy/Long Thanh District (of Bien Hoa Province). The initial probing occurred on 10 August. Phu My was beyond the range of 1ATF artillery. References include the 1ATF Operations Log (Sheets 672, 673, 676 and 677)and the 1ATF INTSUMs No. 70 (10 Aug 66), 71 (11 Aug 66) and 72 (12 Aug 66).

Binh Gia or Phuoc Hoa ?: In the "Opposing Forces" section, the attack by 275 VC Main Force Regiment on a Ranger battalion "near Binh Gia" on 11 November 1965 is mentioned (with a footnote citing Ian McNeill's "To Long Tan" p.222 as a reference). That engagement on 11 November 1965 by 275 Regiment's 3rd Battalion against the 52nd Ranger Battalion and an RF Company is described in some detail in the 5th VC Division History (1991 and 2005). The ambush of the Rangers occurred not near Binh Gia (which is just off Route 2 to the east) but at the Ba Hao bridge at Kim Hai Hamlet of Phuoc Hoa village on Route 15 (nowadays Route 51). The Binh Gia reference is probably confused with the major engagement during the "Binh Gia Campaign" (early Dec 64-Jan 65)that involved 271 (Q761) and 272 (Q762) Regiments (incidentally - Nguyễn Thới Bưng (aka Út Thới - who later commanded 275 Regiment at Long Tan was at the Binh Gia battle with 271 Regiment). Ernieacorn (talk) 23:00, 14 October 2013 (UTC)

Gday again Ernie. Thanks for taking the time to read through the article and make suggestions / corrections. Unfortunately I'm having quite a bit of trouble finding a copy of your book (there only seems to be a few copies in libraries in Canberra and Victoria according to Worldcat.org and none available through the usual online bookstores). I believe it may be available through the Defence Library Service and will see if I can get access to it in the next few weeks (going on cse shortly though so it may take a while). IRT your cmts above - will go back through my sources now and see what I come up with. All the best. Anotherclown (talk) 10:06, 15 October 2013 (UTC)

Re "Reaction in Nui Dat". A check of the source reveals McNeill does state Duc My (which the article currently reflects). That said Davies 2012 Vietnam: The Complete Story of the Australian War p.213 states "An enemy battalion attack Phu My camp along Route 15 on 11 and 12 August." This action confirmed that 274 Viet Cong Regiment was in the western district of Phuoc Tuy". As such I agree with your assessment that McNeill is wrong here when he uses "Duc My", and will change to "Phu My". Anotherclown (talk) 12:14, 15 October 2013 (UTC)  Done

Re "Binh Gia or Phuoc Hoa". McNeill does indeed state it occurred at Binh Gia so the current wording is correct per that source; however, I suspect you are right. Rowe 1987 Vietnam: the Australian experience pp 62-63 states it occurred "near Nui Thi Vai" (obviously a lot closer to Phuoc Hoa than Binh Gia). As you identify above we currently have an article Battle of Binh Gia (December 28, 1964 – January 1, 1965) and it is possible McNeill may have got these mixed up. To add some confusion though Anderson 2002 Where the Scorpion Stings p.11 also states the incident occurred "near Binh Gia on Route 2" although I would say its likely he is using McNeill here. Given the need to cite to a source I was think if adopting the information from Rowe, do you think this would be correct (to state it occurred near Nui Thi Vai)? Anotherclown (talk) 11:57, 15 October 2013 (UTC)

Gday Ernie. Further re Binh Gia vs Phuoc Hoa - I still can't find a precise source for this (stating it occurred at Phuoc Hoa). The nearest I can find is Davies and McKay p. 190 who wrote: "In November 1965, 274 Viet Cong Regiment attacked ARVN installations at Phuoc Hoa on Route 15..." is this the same incidence? I note they say 274 Regt not 275 Regt. If this cant be cleared up I'll probably just have to use the Rowe reference and reword as "near Nui Thi Vai" but would prefer to get it right. Could you pls provide some advice here? Re your book: I checked the DLS catalogue but it doesn't appear to be available. Thanks again. Anotherclown (talk) 21:25, 18 October 2013 (UTC)

Hello Earnie (if you are still watching this page) - I've now acquired a copy of Rowe - unfortunately it actually also says the action on 11 November 1965 happened at Binh Gia, and the ref is on page 64 (not 62-63), so the wiki articles for VC 5th Division and 275th Regt are actually not quite right here. Suspect the ref to the Nui Thi Vai is probably from this website - [1]. Regardless, still think the incident is likely to actually have occurred near Phuoc Hoa on Route 15 as you state I just can't find a reference for this anywhere. Do you think Davies and McKay p. 190 are actually referring to the 275th Regt (noting that your connection with that publication hopefully you might be able to assist here) and could this be used as a reference? Anotherclown (talk) 07:20, 14 November 2013 (UTC)

Ok - its taken me a while but I managed to track down the US Presidential Unit Citation that the ARVN 52nd Ranger Battalion received for the action on 11 November 1965 - copy here [2]. It confirms that the action occurred around Kim Hai hamlet. As such I have amended the text per the comments above by Ernie. Anotherclown (talk) 10:30, 18 December 2013 (UTC)

Too long, missing information

The article is far too long and detailed on the battle action, but is also missing historical context, why this battle was important and historiography and social importance over time. -- Green Cardamom (talk) 23:37, 30 November 2013 (UTC)

Gday - thanks for taking the time to make some cmts. The article discusses many of these topics although perhaps more could be added - is there specific information that you feel is missing and can you suggest a source? Thanks. Anotherclown (talk) 06:03, 12 December 2013 (UTC)

Battle of Long tan

Dear Another Clown

Thank you for your message. You probably know who I am, and my interest is to see a faithful rendition fo the facts, not the facts in hindsight by people who were not there, such as Charles Mollison, and to show an example, look at the Battle Map in the Offical History and compare it with his map. There were no 275 Regts in the South, just two companies of D445 with the rest at Xa Lo0ng tan (also told to Buick and Sabben in 2006). As Ernie Chambedlain discovered, Kiem the supposed CO of D455 at Long Tan was not with D 445 in August 1966 and most of the enemy history is propganda to cover up their defeat. There is no evidence that any of D445 fought in the main D Coy battle area. The only D445 soldier captured was at the APC encounter area, along with eight D445 bodies found on the morning of the 19th.

Colonel Peter Dinham AM (Retd) was the 2 Platoon Commander and he insists only one group of eleven men got off/out of his Pl HQ and Section APC, not the whole platoon. Mollison in his AAR gave the impression that all of A Coy dismounted - not correct. Peter Dinham is also adamant that the artillery barrage they ran through was east of D Coy as the APCs chased the enemy. Arty HQ would not have permitted me to fire south on the APC route, which I did not.

And as the APC Commander Roberts tells, Mollison was not aware from down in the APC that any of his men had dismebarked, delaying the move forward. Mollison's book has good stories about his men, but he was only with the Company for three months, moved on by Late OC Peter Smeaton in July; called back from LO Hoa Long in August when Peter was wounded, thus he was A/OC at Long Tan, and then moved out again by Late Owen O'Brien in early October to Bn HQ as Adjutant for the rest of his tour. He was sacked from the syndicate of the Commanders' book because his stories exaggerated his own part (protected inside an APC) and were a vehicle to criticise and demean my men and myself - because he was not decorated. There is agood book review by Gary McKay MC which was written for the MHSA which I can send you by E mail if you give me an address. You will note Mollison vilifies Bob buick for killing a mortally wounded enemy but in the next paragraph tells that Pte Dave Harwood did the same - but of course Bob Buick was in Harry Smith's Company - shame.

I have to say that much of the Official History is faulty, as are the accounts by Mollison and Davies. Mollison was only with the APCs and did not arrive until after the enemy had withdrawn.

I have no idea where I said Pith helmets - never heard of them until this week in your writings.

I am not comfortable in amending your article, and if you wish to ring me we can touch base and discuss things and get them sorted out. 07-41249951.

Harry Smith — Preceding unsigned comment added by 123.211.238.225 (talk) 23:41, 31 January 2014 (UTC)

Gday again Harry. So others can follow, this continues on from a discussion here - User talk:Oldratcatcher#Long Tan - which raised a number of valid issues with the text. I've made quite a few changes [3] now on the basis of this (which hopefully has addressed some of the concerns you raised there at least).

• Just to clarify the issue of the pith helmets - McNeill in footnote 52 to page 316 (which appears on page 547) wrote: "In an interview in 1984 Harry Smith stated that the enemy dress included webbing, camouflage, and Chinese communist pith helmets. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith, Videotaped Interview, 1984, copy OHC, AWM. On the other hand the after action reports specifically states 'no equipment' and does not mention head-dress or camouflage. Smith, D Company After Action Report: 'Operation Smithfield'..." Given your cmt though - and the fact that my original wording was admittedly imprecise (as it clearly wasn't Gordon Sharp who reported this I agree) - I removed mention of them altogether.
• Ack your cmts about no 275 Regt in the south and only two Coys of D445, that there was no evidence of D445 Bn operating in the main D Company battle area, and Kiem not being the commander (all of which I believe - *hope* - are reflected in the article currently so pls tell me if I've got this wrong).
• Note your cmt about the artillery barrage being to the east not the south on the route used by the APCs and the issues there, although it is specifically mentioned in McNeill repeatedly (and included on the map as mentioned). Do you know if this issue is covered in a book or article somewhere? If so I am more than happy to include that in the article and highlight the discrepancy with the official history (unfortunately the requirement to be able to verify information means personal recollection - even from a participant - is not enough it must be in a published source).
• Re the cmts on Mollison's book I'm really not in a posn to agree or disagree (as I obviously wasn't there) and have used the work in good faith (although hopefully I haven't overused it or given it undue weight - only using it for the details of A Coys involvement). However, if there is specific information that I have referenced to Mollison that you believe is incorrect pls let me know and I will cross reference and amend if spt'd by other sources. By and large though the account is based primarily on the Australian official history (which may of cse also contain some errors as you say) and a few other sources like McAulay, McGibbon, Horner, Palazzo and Kuring etc.
• This article mentions that there was some criticism of Bob Buick's action (which is attributed to those that made that criticsm), but only to the point of saying that that criticism occurred and what it entailed (req'd for balance due to Wikipedia's WP:NPOV policy). Given your cmt above about what you see as the vilification of Buick in Mollison's book do you believe this topic has been incorrectly presented in this article? I only ask because no impeachment in any way is intended by what is written here and will look to reword if warranted.
• Davies has only been used sparingly to cover possible VC ORBAT and the attack at Phu My on 11 August (not for the details of the Long Tan battle itself). Likewise with Chamberlain (also used to reference that Kiem was not CO D445 in contradiction to the AS official history).
• I will look further at the issue of only one section from 2 Platoon dismounting (as opposed to the entire platoon as stated in McNeill and as currently reflected in this article) and see if changes can be spt'd by sources. Do you know if this is covered in Robert Grandin's book by any chance (I'm going to order this now to try get to the bottom of some of these issues).

I greatly appreciate your help improving this article and ensuring its accuracy but am uneasy about contacting you directly (either by phone or email) due to the nature of my current employment. If you are willing though I am more than happy to continue to discuss anything on this talkpage. Anotherclown (talk) 03:40, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

Dear Anotherclown from Oldratcher. I added more comments yesterday but they do not seem to be here ?

As to your questions 31 January, I regret I have been away and I added more text yesterday. Now, to soem of your questions.

Books are not the end of the story. I do not see Grandin's Book 2004 "Long Tan by the Commanders" mentioned ? Even this book, written by Grandin from the text by the participant sub-unit commanders at the battle is now questionable in parts due particularly to the events outlined in enemy history told by Ernie Chamberlain, Ernie agrees that they are only "translations" and may not be truthful, such as the 3 day shelling of Nui Dat base to lure the tiger from the mountain into the 3kn ambush set along the Long tan - Long Phouc road - that never happened, and the shelling was for just 22 minutes. And the NVA Battlion may have been part of 275Regt ? The NVA soldiers may not have known their batalion was renamed. As to other books, such as McAuley, Mollison and Davies, they can not be taken as gospel as the authors were NOT at the battleground where the main battle was fought by Delta Company. Soldier's stories are often out of context and I see in "Danger Close" 3 Para in Afghanistan, the author, CO, makes the point that after a contact or IED it was almost impossible to get the correct facts as soldiers only saw what happened in their immediate field of view. In McAuley, one soldier tells that OC D Coy relieved a dead VC officer of a pearl-handled Colt .45 pistol so another General George Patton, but the pistol was a black steel 7.62mm Tokarev as related in Grandin's book. The pith helmets issue has been solved - neither Gordon Sharp nor I reported them. As to his report it is contained in Grandin's Book page 121 "AAR 2. 181540 D Coy Contact with 6 to 8 enmy dressed in greens, possibly wounding one. Remainder fled east". There is mention elsewhere of enemy being in khaki -and like the pith helmets, both are incorrect. B Company. OC D Coy radio'd Noel Ford, his OCS room-mate and asked him to return - Grandin Page (Top) 125. OC BCoy was tol by HQ 6RAR not to hold, not move back. As with not releasing the APCs, Jackson may have told Townsend to hold them. It was only after Noel Ford asked 6RAR why they could not move back - about 1800hrs, they were given the OK to move back, arriving with D Coy at 1850hrs. THey saw enemy to the south of D Coy and they waved at each other, no shots fired, other than some on top of APCs that got ahead firing at them and slightly wounding one B Coy soldier who continued to carry his M60. When Noel arrived he was placed in defence on the west by OC D Coy. They then walked around and discussed what the enemy might be doing. But we now know the enemy were withdrawing, as ordered by their commander and most had gone east when the APCs reached 300m south of D Coy and CO6RAR arrived. He instructed Roberts to chase the enemy seen withdrawing east. This is when they ran through artillery fire, not en route from the South. In 1999 the Arty Log was examined at AWM and there were no missions fired to the south and no doubt Arty HQ would not have permitted them on the APC route. OC D Coy did not order arty on D445 as is said, to the south as they were some 1100m and 800m south, and he did not know what was goping on with the two APC encounters until afterwards. Relief is to be relieved to go home - Oxford Dictionary. ATF SOPs required a Reaction Force on Standby. Reaction Force is FFV 2 Terminology used in SVN. Roberts and the APC crews were critical of the A Coy men not being mounted ready to move when the order was finally given at 1730hrs. It took them another 15 minutes to mount up as they were having a Bar B Q and showers after returning from patrol. See Garndin book. As to A Copy dismolunting en route. Mollison's AAR suggests the whole company dismounted. It was only the two on top and nine inside thatdidsmunted from the far right APC, Sgt Alcorta and his Gunner Brett rolled off the top and Lt Dinham and his HQ group and Section got out the back door after reluctance to open the door. Grandin Pages 179-180. Total 11 men dismounted from one APC and attacked D445 in the long grass. In McAuley's book Alcorta says they were "disorganised, threw way gear and fled".

5 March 101.162.73.21 (talk) 03:08, 5 March 2014 (UTC)

Gday you mention some cmts made yesterday that aren't here. I think you may have accidently posted them to User talk:Oldratcatcher so I have copied them below so that we can keep the discussion in one place. By the way I have acquired Grandin's book and am in the process of reviewing it per your cmts for possible changes / additions. I will be heading off on cse fairly soon though so it may take some time. Thank you for sticking with this. Anotherclown (talk) 11:54, 5 March 2014 (UTC)

Cmts moved from user talk page

The following cmts have been moved from User_talk:Oldratcatcher with this edit [4] so as not to fragment the discussion:

From Oldratcher. Regret been away and have just looked at your article again.

There are obviously errors in the Official History by McNeill, like the Pith Helmets, which is reasonable, given the enormous amount of work and witnesses interviewed. I would have to go through the text in detail, but the glaring errors are the right hand section of APCs (Sgt Richards with 2 Platoon) got ahead and approached to within 100m of 10 platoon then turned around and went back to the Troop. By that time most of the enmy had already withdrawn, and the enmemy history by Chamberlain states the Commander gave the order to withdraw as they had taken too many casulties; unable to overrun D Coy; their time had expired, and were aware of reiniforcements approaching - probaly started to withdraw about 1845hrs as OC B and D Coy were able to walk around under high tracer and discuss enemy intentions after B Coy arrived at 1850hrs. The high tracer was the enemy firing back west at the pursuing APCs.

2 Platoon was not dismounted as stated, but stayed on board their APCs until after they returned to the Troop then chased the withdrawing enemy out east, which is where they ran the gauntlet through artillry fire, probably the US 155s (Not in south. There is is no fire mission to the south in the Arty Fire Log examined at AWM in 1999. Colonel P Dinham, OC 2 Platoon, statement). When the APCs arrived at D Coy postion from the eastern foray at 1910hours, 2 Platoon dismounted, followed by the other platoons, followed by CO6RAR's party. CO 6RAR then discussed the situation with Harry Smith and then ordered Charles Mollison to move his platoons across D Coy eastern our front as a screen, and this was unopposed - not one angry shot fired then, that night, or during the next three days. There was no sniper fire after the APCs returned, as suggested. The only shots fired on the 19th were by Bob Buick and Dave Harwood ( A Coy) shooting two mortally wounded enemy out of compassion.

OC D Coy did not call in air support to silence the enemy 60mm mortars, that had already been done by Arty fire, but to lay Napalm and Rockets across the front of 11 Platoon. That was not possible because the airborne FAC (via VHF radio to D Coy) could not identify where we were due cloud and rain, and OC D Coy requested the aircraft be taken away and the guns to fire again. Ops HQ 6RAR organised the USAF ordnance drop to the east on enemy rear areas.

I will leave this for now and look for your comments. Oldratcher 58.164.172.208 (talk) 02:27, 4 March 2014 (UTC) 4 March 14

Have just lost an hour of work adding comments, finger trouble, and am going to have a red wine. Oldratcher 5March. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 101.162.73.21 (talk) 06:51, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

From Oldratcatcher to Another Clown: I am going to copy the complete LT article and try and amend it where required and then paste it back into Talk. THis would appear the best option. 7 March. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 101.162.73.21 (talk) 23:42, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

Hello again. IRT the issue with 2 Platoon I have now reworded this section per the cmts above. Whilst the official history clearly states the whole of 2 platoon dismounted I agree this does not appear to be correct and Dinham's recount contradicts this. McNeill p. 334 wrote: "Dinham ordered Gross to open the rear hatch and the section pour out to protect Alcorta. They were joined by the whole of 2 Platoon from the other carriers and quickly shook out into an assault line." However, according to Grandin, p. 180 "the remainder of those with the APC, consisting of Platoon HQ plus Corporal Lou Stephens and his section, debussed and formed up in an extended line on the right...", and later quotes Dinham who states: "It is hard to believe that twelve of us, supported by the APC .50 cal machine-gun took on a numerically superior force and caused it to flee, helping to save Delta Company." As the commander on the ground Dinham would seem to be the more reliable source. As such I have made this change.

In addition to address some of the other comments made above by Oldratcatcher above, specifically:

1) Use of the term "relief force" in this article;

2) The veracity of the claim that Richard's APC moved through an arty barrage to the south of D Company; and

3) Whether B Coy was ordered to return or if OC D Coy asked Ford to return.

Although I have previously addressed the first two issues, with both supported by the official history and several other sources, having now gone through Grandin as suggested I am still of the opinion that this is representative of the literature available. Firstly the term "relief force" is used extensively in Grandin, including the chapter by Harry Smith. For instance on page 139 "...But the relief force move had to be approved personally by Brigadier Jackson". Secondly, quoting Adrian Roberts, Grandin p. 202 wrote: "Sergeant Richards had actually driven through falling artillery, reached the south-west of Delta company, realised we weren't with him, had done an about-face and driven back to meet us." Unless sources can be provided that contradict these points we are left with using the information in the sources available. IRT B Coy being ordered to return Oldratcatcher previously wrote: "B Company. OC D Coy radio'd Noel Ford, his OCS room-mate and asked him to return - Grandin Page (Top) 125. OC BCoy was tol by HQ 6RAR not to hold, not move back." McNeill p. 321 wrote: "Meanwhile the depleted B Company patrol, which had stopped at the sound of the firing when some 2300 metre on the way back to base, was ordered to turn about and rejoin D Company." Grandin p. 125 includes an extract from the After Action Report which stated: "AAR4. 181600 B Coy was warn to hold movement at YS458665." Unfortunately neither of these sources support the fact that OC D Coy asked OC B Coy to return although I agree this may well have occurred. Anotherclown (talk) 06:32, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

Further re Dinham and 2 Platoon. Interestingly in previous statements even he seems to mention the platoon dismounting so the confusion is not surprising, for instance see McAulay p. 103 where he is quoted as saying: "I had the platoon out, forming an extended line, and while we were doing it there were dozens of the enemy, some dressed in pith helmets, some in floppy hats, a lot with a form of netting hanging over the bacvk as a type of camouflage." Also interesting is his comment about the pith helmets which is relevant given previous discussion on this topic (this also appears on McNeill p. 334). Anotherclown (talk) 07:19, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

274 Regiment to possibly ambush 3 Squadron 11 ACR on Route 2 - No

Dear All, Hi, regarding 3 Sqn 11ACR being in Long Khanh on 12 Aug 66 - your comment on the site of 12 Oct 13, in mid-August 3 Squadron was in the "mid-Pacific". The late Ian McNeill's error at pp.369-370 in To Long Tan (1993) results from a typo in a US publication. I've checked the detailed official 11ACR movement instruction/table to Vietnam - 3 Sqn departed Oakland on the USNS Barrett on 23 Aug and completed off-loading at Vung Tau on 12 Sep 66. I will include further detail in a new book on D445 later this year. The 33rd Regt NVA book is now free-to-read on Scribd together with a two-page paper on which NVA/VC elements were - and were not at the Battle of Long Tan. Regards to all, Ernie 5 May 2014 Erniechamberlain (talk) 00:26, 5 May 2014 (UTC)

Gday its an interesting issue. The possible Viet Cong plan to ambush an element of 11 ACR should it have attempted to relieve 1 ATF is included in numerous works on the battle so has been included in the article as it is reflective of the literature available. Given that it appears in the official history my assumption is that this interpretation was that made by 1 ATF at the time so it would be interesting if 11 ACR was not actually in South Vietnam at the time. For what it is worth Grandin also includes this theory, writing on p. 284: "The forces most likely to come to the aid of the base if under threat or attack were the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the US 11th Cavalry Regiment... The 11th Cavalry could move from their base twenty kilometres to the north, but there was only one rout south to the Australian base and that was along Route 2. This was ideal for VC ambush activities and several French and RVN convoys had already been ambushed along this route in previous years. Their reaction time would be less than the 173rd, but they would be at much greater risk." Anotherclown (talk) 07:03, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

Decisive?

What's the point in considering this battle decisive? Ruddah (talk) 06:37, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

Other than the fact that it is specifically referenced? Anotherclown (talk) 06:55, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

So do you really think an one hundred men could be decisive in the context of the Vietnam War? Ruddah (talk) 14:31, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

G'day all, for me it comes down to how its described in reliable sources. "Decisive" appears cited (although it might be best to add a cite to the infobox if you decide to keep it there), so I don't have any dramas with it, although perhaps a compromise solution would be to change "decisive Australian victory" in the infobox to simply "See Aftermath" and link to the Assessment section. Just a suggestion. Again, AC, thanks for your hard work on this article. Cheers, AustralianRupert (talk) 21:47, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

Ruddah - I guess it depends on your definition of "decisive" but in the context of the war in Phuoc Tuy yes I would. Regardless, its not really for those that write these articles to determine such things but what the literature reflects. As I said above it is referenced and is covered in the body of the article. From the article: "A decisive Australian victory, Long Tan proved a major local set back for the Viet Cong, indefinitely forestalling an imminent movement against Nui Dat and challenging their previous domination of Phuoc Tuy Province. Although there were other large-scale encounters in later years, 1 ATF was not fundamentally challenged again."[218][Note 5] Anyway you seem to disagree so perhaps you might care to outline your concern. Do you have sources which state otherwise? If so they could be incorporated. Anotherclown (talk) 21:49, 7 June 2014 (UTC)

In addition to my cmts above and the additional ref I added a few other sources which would seem to support this interpretation include (I've included Google Book links where available):

• Fergusson, Aussie War Heroes, "Battle of Long Tan, which is often regarded as being Australia's most decisive contribution in the Vietnam War." [5]
• Sadler and Hayllar, In the Line of Fine p. 280 "The 108 Australians won a decisive victory over the 2500 attacking Viet Cong" [6]
• Coulthard-Clark, The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles, pp. 284-285 "The Australians stunning victory did more than simply enhance their fighting reputation, since unquestionably the enemy force encountered by D Company had been preparing a decisive action against 1 ATF..."
• Kuring, Red Coats to Cams - A History of Australian Infantry 1788-2001, p. 327 "The infantrymen of D Company and their relief force had, through a mixture of good luck, determination, bravery and tactical skill, combined with excellent artillery support, won a great victory against the Viet Cong in Phuoc Tuy Province."
• Palazzo, Australian Military Operations in Vietnam, p. 70 "Long Tan was a comprehensive Australian victory... When 6 RAR ran into the VC in the plantation they interrupted an enemy build-up the objective of which was the annihilation of the Australian base. The victory not only pre-empted this offensive, but the magnitude of the success mean that the VC never again planned a serious challenge to Nui Dat." Anotherclown (talk) 04:52, 8 June 2014 (UTC)