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Goulash Communism (Hungarian: gulyáskommunizmus), also commonly referenced as Kadarism or the Hungarian Thaw, refers to the variety of communism in Hungary following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. János Kádár and the Hungarian People's Republic imposed policies with the goal to create high-quality living standards for the people of Hungary coupled with economic reforms. These reforms fostered a sense of well-being and relative cultural freedom in Hungary with the reputation of being "the happiest barracks"[1] of the Eastern Bloc during the 1960s to the 1970s. With elements of regulated market economics as well as an improved human rights record, it represented a quiet reform and deviation from the Stalinist principles applied to Hungary in the previous decade.

The name is a metaphor derived from goulash, a traditional Hungarian dish. Goulash is made with an assortment of dissimilar ingredients; here, it represents how Hungarian communism became a mixed ideology, no longer strictly adhering to the Marxist–Leninist interpretations of the prior decade.[2]  This period of "pseudo-consumerism" saw an increase of foreign affairs and consumption of consumer goods as well.[1]

OriginsEdit

 
The flag used for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

Hungarian Revolution of 1956Edit

 
János Kádár was the Premier of Hungary during 1956-1958 and 1961-1965.

The historical accounts leading to and including the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 created an atmosphere for Goulash Communism to commence. Mátyás Rákosi headed the Hungarian Communist Party until its demise in the 1956 revolution. Rákosi modeled Hungarian Communism after Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union. In that sense, he helped implement an extensive industrialization of the country. With the quick change to industry brought an initial surge of the economy, but ultimately left many people with worse living conditions. In 1951 the Hungarian people had to utilize a ticket system to purchase basic supplies.[3] After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union wanted a change in leadership in Hungary and recommended Imre Nagy. Imre Nagy took steps in his government towards "political liberalization" so much so in 1955 he was ousted from his position in the government by Rákosi, who had the backing of the Soviet Union. Imre Nagy did come back and lead the government during the 1956 revolt.[4] During the months of October and November 1956 the people of Hungary revolted against the political and economic situation that was thrust against them.[5] The Soviet Union reacted with military force and extinguished the uprising, while also changing the command of the state to János Kádár as general secretary in 1956.

János KádárEdit

János Kádár joined the communist party while it was still illegal in 1931. He was arrested for conspiracy shortly after. A decade later he rejoined the party in 1941 but went unto hiding until the end of WWII, when Hungary was turned communist after the occupation of the Red Army of the Soviet Union, by the "blue-ballot" elections. He started openly practicing communism and worked throughout the new communist government of Hungary until he was arrested for the third time for allegedly being a "secret agent"[6] against the party. After Stalin's death, Imre Nagy released many people from prison, one of which was Kádár. He was released and rehabilitated. He became popular due to being a victim of Stalin's purges, a proof that he stood against the former Rákosi administration. In July 1956 he was elected to the Hungarian politburo. In October 25, 1956 he was elected in the midst of the revolution to the position of first secretary of the party. Finally on October 31, 1956 he was nominated the first secretary of the new Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party. The Politburo of the Soviet Union then summoned him to Moscow where they nominated him to be the new leader of Hungary. He had major influence in the political affairs of the country until 1988.[6]

IdeologyEdit

Goulash Communism showed a far greater concern for public opinion and an increased focus on the present well-being of the citizens than had been the case in the period preceding 1956. It provided a wider latitude for dissent than was the case in the rest of the Soviet bloc, in the words of Kádár, "who is not against us is with us."[7] This modified the role of the Communist Party in the development of socialism, now interpreted as "serving" rather than "commanding", reduced the formality of relations between the party and the populace at large, increased the scope of societal self-expression and self-management, and refined the guiding Marxist–Leninist ideology with modified means of dissemination. Marxist–Leninist ideology is invoked in the desire to reform as seen in Imre Nagy's "Reform Communism" (1955–1956). He argues that Marxism is a "science that cannot remain static but must develop and become more perfect".[8]

He attributes Marx to having created a method, meant to guide yet not entirely encompass socialism or its development. "The theory of Marx – as Lenin stated – gives general guiding principles, which must be utilized in Britain in another fashion than in France, in France differently than".[8] This interpretation was not shared by the Soviet leadership, Nikita Khrushchev's response to Hungary in 1956 and Leonid Brezhnev's to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the resulting Brezhnev Doctrine stating that though "each socialist country had the right to determine the concrete form of its development along the path of socialism by taking account of the specific nature of their national conditions… the Soviet Union would not tolerate deviation from the principles of socialism and the restoration of capitalism".[9]

In 1962, six years after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the 8th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party declared the period of "consolidation of socialism" after 1956 to be over and that the "foundations for the establishment of a socialist society" had been achieved, which enabled a general amnesty of most people sentenced in connection with 1956. Under János Kádár, the party gradually curbed some of the excesses of the secret police and repealed most of the restrictions on speech and movement enacted in the Mátyás Rákosi era. In their place, the party introduced a relatively liberal cultural and economic course aimed at overcoming the post-1956 hostility toward the Kádár government.[10] In 1966, the Central Committee approved the "New Economic Mechanism" which eased foreign trade restrictions gave limited freedom to the workings of the market and allowed a limited number of small businesses to operate in the services sector. Though liberal in comparison to Soviet socialism, the first relaxation of economic control was far from posing the same threat as the 1956 reforms. Official policy employed different methods of administering the collectives, leaving the pace of mechanization up to each separately.[10] Additionally, rather than enforcing the system of compulsory crop deliveries and of workdays credit the collectivizers used monthly cash wages.[10] Later in the 1960s, cooperatives were permitted to enter into related and then general auxiliary businesses such as food processing, light industry and service industry.[10]

The result was a regime that was far less authoritarian than other Communist regimes, and certainly less so than the first seven years of undisguised Communist rule in Hungary. Generally, Hungarians had much more freedom to speak, write, and travel than their counterparts in the Soviet bloc. For instance, samizdat publications were tolerated to some extent, and conversations with foreigners did not attract much official scrutiny. However, while Kádár's regime was somewhat more humane than most of its counterparts, it was not a liberal one either. As in all Communist countries, the MSZMP retained a monopoly of power. Under the principles of democratic centralism, the National Assembly did little more than give legal sanction to decisions already made by the MSZMP and its Politburo. While having somewhat more latitude than in other Communist regimes, the media were still subjected to restrictions that were fairly onerous by Western standards. The secret police operated with somewhat more restraint than in other Communist states, and far more restraint than the AVH, but were still a feared tool of control.

PolicyEdit

Internal AffairsEdit

Soon after János Kádár gained power following the military intervention by the Soviet Union, he had to control the state and force the peace. He did this through violence, he had his government imprison or execute protesters. There were even mass shootings of people, in the end he was responsible for hundred of deaths. After having quelled the uprising Kádár and his government released they had to create a major break from the past regime of Mátyás Rákosi. The goal of their "soft dictatorship"[6] government was to create peaceful and prosperous living conditions for the people of Hungary through reform. In a show of his change of character he gave a speech with his famous line, "Who is not against us, is with us," in 1961.[6]

In 1962, six years after the Hungarian Revolution, the 8th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party declared the general amnesty of revolutionaries imprisoned since 1956.[10] In 1968, the Central Committee approved the New Economic Mechanism, an act to reform the economics of Hungary. It influenced businesses, letting businesses grow in a horizontal integration instead of only vertical. In turn businesses were able to source their raw material and export excess product. The Act loosened central planning allowing businesses to have more say in their suppliers and economic decisions. The New Economic Mechanism achieved the goal of raising living standards throughout the state.[3] Throughout the majority of the 1960s and 1970s the people enjoyed more cultural freedoms and a reduction of ideological pressure from the state.[4] Hungary's economic resources were mobilized to better satisfy consumer demand by providing a more extensive assortment of consumer goods. Some economic reform measures were introduced to integrate limited market mechanisms into the framework of the planned socialist economy. An unfortunate result of this policy were rising economic stresses and high indebtedness which became evident by the late 1980s.[3]

Foreign AffairsEdit

After the reconciliation of Hungary from the revolutionaries János Kádár's government created a deal with the Soviet Union where they would control foreign affairs while Kádár could employ his domestic control. Through this compromise the Soviet Union used Hungary as a rare opening between the Communism East and the Capitalist West.[11] Hungary started trading and enacting transactions with the West. Much of the capital fuelling the Goulash Communist period came from Western capital.[3] Also fueling the reforms was an oil trade between Hungary and the Soviet Union. One main reason why Hungary could not keep Goulash Communism into the 1980s was the reliance on these foreign revenues. In the mid-1970s an oil crisis hit Hungary forcing them to draw more loans from Western countries to pay the inflated oil prices. This oil crisis led to price increases of basic commodities across Hungary and in turn by 1985 the standard of living started decreasing for the first time since the introduction of Goulash Communism.[3]

The increase in cultural freedoms coupled with increase of living standards and a relative openness to foreign affairs led to an increase of consumption of consumer goods through Hungary. For example people started buying private televisions, cars and dreamed of owning and consuming more. Their demand was not easily met and the phrase "Kicsi vagy kocsi" was used to express frustration, it means "the choice between a baby and a car." Even so there were influxes of Socialist cars and other consumer items all across the state. In 1964 multiple foreign embassies opened in Budapest. Also being a comparatively well-off country in the Eastern bloc, Hungary was the destination for tourists from other communist nations for whom visits to the West were much more difficult.[1]

See alsoEdit

ReferencesEdit

  1. ^ a b c Nyyssönen, Heino (2006-06-01). "Salami reconstructed". Cahiers du monde russe. 47 (1–2): 153–172. doi:10.4000/monderusse.3793. ISSN 1252-6576.
  2. ^ Matveev, Yuri V.; Trubetskaya, Olga V.; Lunin, Igor A.; Matveev, Kirill Y. (2018-03-23). "Institutional aspect of the Russian economy regional development". Problems and Perspectives in Management. 16 (1): 381–391. doi:10.21511/ppm.16(1).2018.36. ISSN 1727-7051.
  3. ^ a b c d e Benczes, István (2016-02-26). "From goulash communism to goulash populism: the unwanted legacy of Hungarian reform socialism". Post-Communist Economies. 28 (2): 146–166. doi:10.1080/14631377.2015.1124557. ISSN 1463-1377.
  4. ^ a b Stearns, Peter N. (1993-12-21). "Encyclopedia of Social History". doi:10.4324/9780203306352. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  5. ^ Guha, Martin (2008-09-19). "International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2nd edition)2008298Editor‐in‐Chief William A. Darity. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2nd edition). Detroit: Thomson Gale 2008. 9 vols., ISBN: 978 0 02 865965 7 $1,080 Also available as an e‐book (ISBN 978 0 02 866117 9)". Reference Reviews. 22 (7): 17–19. doi:10.1108/09504120810905060. ISSN 0950-4125.
  6. ^ a b c d "Merriman, Nicholas John, (born 6 June 1960), Director, Manchester Museum, University of Manchester, since 2006", Who's Who, Oxford University Press, 2007-12-01, retrieved 2019-04-22
  7. ^ Citation needed
  8. ^ a b Stokes, Gale, ed. From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945, (Oxford, 1996), pp. 81-93.
  9. ^ Janos, Andrew C. East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands From Pre- to Postcommunism, (Stanford, 2000), pp. 267.
  10. ^ a b c d e Stokes, Gale. The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 81-7.
  11. ^ Poggi, Isotta (January 2015). "The Photographic Memory and Impact of the Hungarian 1956 Uprising during the Cold War Era". Getty Research Journal. 7: 197–206. doi:10.1086/680747. ISSN 1944-8740.

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