Draft:First Panjshir Offensive

  • Comment: I have tried to help and made things very clear with examples for the creator of the article to follow as the result and casualities are disputed in the sources specifically by Galeotti. Galeotti says both sides claimed victory in the source about this offensive and I do not see other source by Barry claiming Mujahideen victory but even if he did that I missed, it is still disputed result with different narratives in both sources. I am going to leave this for other reviewer's to review. RangersRus (talk) 14:46, 27 October 2024 (UTC)


First Panjshir offensive
Part of the Soviet–Afghan War

Map of the Panjshir Valley
Date9 April 1980 - 12 April
Location35°21′N 69°35′E / 35.350°N 69.583°E / 35.350; 69.583
Result

Mujahideen Victory

  • Soviet and DRA Retreat
Belligerents
 Soviet Union
Afghanistan Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
Commanders and leaders
Soviet Union Captain Leonid Khabarov Ahmad Shah Massoud
Strength

Soviet Union 6,000 Soldiers

Afghanistan DRA 1,000 Soldiers and Security Police

Jamiat-e Islami 1,000 men

  • Poorly equiped with outdated rifles
Casualties and losses
  • 100 casualties
  • ten helicopters shot
  • eight tanks and other vehicles damaged (Mujahideen claim)
  • 4 killed (Michael A. Barry & Mujahideen Claim but dubious according to Galeotti)
  • Not seriously affected (Mark Galeotti claim)
  • High Casualties (Soviet claim)
  • The First Panjshir Offensive, also known as Panjshir I, occurred in April 1980, just four months after the Soviet Union deployed forces to Afghanistan.[1] It was a significant engagement between the Afghan Mujahideen, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, and a combined Soviet and Afghan government force.

    The Battle

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    The Soviet contingent, comprising three battalions, included the 4th Battalion of the 56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade, commanded by Captain Leonid Khabarov.[2] The Soviet force numbered approximately 6,000 men,[3] supplemented by around 1,000 Afghan soldiers and security personnel.[2] The mujahideen numbered no more than 200 according to Afghan sources,[4] while Soviet intelligence and other sources suggest their number slightly exceeded 1,000, largely consisting of local villagers. Despite being poorly equipped with antiquated rifles and lacking formal defensive fortifications, the Mujahideen had laid mines along the single road into the valley.[5][6][3]

    The initial phase of the operation unfolded smoothly for the Soviets. They successfully cleared the mines, repaired damaged bridges, and advanced deeper into the Panjshir Valley. They soon reached Massoud’s headquarters in the kishlak of Pasishah-Mardan, only to find it hastily abandoned, with scattered documents and identity papers left behind. However, the success proved short-lived. Sergei Morozov, a sergeant in the 56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade, later recounted how his battalion was ambushed, resulting in thirteen fatalities. Khabarov himself sustained an injury, taking a bullet to the forearm. The Mujahideen had deliberately allowed the Soviet and Afghan forces to penetrate the valley, intending to ambush them during their withdrawal. Six Soviet helicopters had to evacuate the dead and wounded. The expedition returned to the main road, abandoning six tanks and eight trucks, heavy and light weapons, and their ammunition in the Valley.[7] Over the course of the offensive, the Mujahideen reported that the Soviet and Afghan forces suffered around 100 fatalities, while losing only four of their own.[8] Conversely, the Soviets claimed to have inflicted substantial losses on the rebels, however Michael A. Barry reported that the Mujahideen sustained only 4 casualties, while the civilian population suffered 25 deaths.[9] Additionally, the Mujahideen claimed to have captured ten artillery pieces, damaged eight tanks and other vehicles, and shot down ten helicopters.[8][10]

    Results

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    While the Soviets declared victory, it was the Mujahideen who ultimately prevailed. Although the Soviets may have succeeded in their objective of capturing Massoud's headquarters, his forces inflicted significant casualties on the invaders. The Mujahideen had strategically allowed the Soviet forces to penetrate the valley, intending to ambush them during their withdrawal. Massoud's fighters withdrew in an organized manner, regrouping for future engagements. The Soviet retreat, following their losses, significantly bolstered the morale of the local population in Panjshir, strengthening their resolve against the communist forces.[11][12]

    References

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    1. ^ Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. p. 217. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    2. ^ a b Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 [Three Soviet battalions participated, including the 4th Battalion of the 56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade under the command of Captain Leonid Khabarov. About a thousand Afghan soldiers and security police went with them.]. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. pp. 217–218. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    3. ^ a b Grover, Verinder (2000). Afghanistan: Government and Politics [The first Panjshir offensive mobilised two columns of tanks and 7.000 men. Resisting the attack were scattered groups of poorly armed Panjshiris, a motley force of farmers, herdsmen and villagers few of whom had any real combat training.]. Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Limited. p. 101. ISBN 978-81-7100-927-5.
    4. ^ Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 [An Afghan historian has claimed that there were only two hundred armed rebels in the valley at the time, and their only anti-tank weapons were three rocket launchers.]. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. p. 219. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    5. ^ "ArtOfWar. Ляховский Александр Антонович. Ахмад-Шах". artofwar.ru. Retrieved 2024-08-14.
    6. ^ Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 [To oppose this force Masud had little more than a thousand men. They were armed mainly with old-fashioned rifles and they had not yet constructed much in the way of defensive works. They mined the only road in the valley, destroyed the bridges, and planned to ambush the invaders.]. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. p. 218. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    7. ^ Barry, Michael (2002). Massoud: de l'islamisme à la liberté ["Six hélicoptères soviétiques durent évacuer les morts et les blessés; l'expédition repartit vers la grand-route en abandonnant dans le Val six chars et huit camions, des armes lourdes et légères, leurs munitions. / Six Soviet helicopters had to evacuate the dead and wounded; the expedition returned to the main road, abandoning six tanks and eight trucks, heavy and light weapons, and their ammunition in the Valley.".] (in French). L. Audibert. p. 181. ISBN 978-2-84749-002-2.
    8. ^ a b Rodric Braithwaite (2013). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89. Internet Archive. Oxford University Press. pp. 218–219. ISBN 978-0-19-932248-0.
    9. ^ Barry, Michael (2002). Massoud: de l'islamisme à la liberté (in French). L. Audibert. p. 181. ISBN 978-2-84749-002-2.
    10. ^ Urban, Mark (2016-07-27). War in Afghanistan. Springer. p. 70. ISBN 978-1-349-20761-9.
    11. ^ Galeotti, Mark (2021-10-28). The Panjshir Valley 1980–86: The Lion Tames the Bear in Afghanistan [Both sides claimed victory. The Soviets pointed to the fulfilment of their operational goals, and claimed that Massoud had been wounded in the attack, his force dispersed. The rebels likewise claimed to have inflicted severe casualties on the attackers, downing no fewer than ten helicopters, and losing just four men. These last claims are highly dubious, but the point is that the rebels did not seek to confront the attackers on their own terms, rather to withdraw in good order and then regroup afterwards.]. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 40. ISBN 978-1-4728-4467-5.
    12. ^ Barry, Michael (2002). Massoud: de l'islamisme à la liberté [Cependant, cette retraite des Russes gonfla le moral de la population du Pandjshêr. Le choc de l'invasion multiplia les recrues. Massoud bénéficia vite d'une véritable armée. Avant la fin de l'année 1980, les guerriers de Massoud dans le Val étaient déjà passés à 3000 combattants per- manents et, en quelque sorte, professionnels, sans comp- ter des dizaines de milliers d'hommes valides assignés à des tâches de soutien, depuis la logistique jusqu'à la défense locale armée. L'âmer-saheb, victorieux des Russes, avait mobilisé le Pandjshêr entier. / However, this retreat of the Russians boosted the morale of the population of Pandjshêr. The shock of the invasion increased the number of recruits. Massoud quickly benefited from a real army. Before the end of 1980, Massoud's warriors in the Valley had already increased to 3,000 permanent and, in a way, professional fighters, not counting tens of thousands of able-bodied men assigned to combat tasks. support, from logistics to armed local defense. The souler-saheb, victorious over the Russians, had mobilized the entire Panjshêr.] (in French). L. Audibert. p. 182. ISBN 978-2-84749-002-2.