Aeroflot Flight E-15

The Yak-40 crash near Batumi was an aviation accident that occurred on July 15, 1975 in the mountains near Batumi involving a Yak-40 aircraft operated by Aeroflot, resulting in the deaths of 40 people.

Aeroflot Flight E-15

Yak-40 of Aeroflot
Accident
Date	15 July 1975 (1975-07-15)
Summary	Controlled flight into terrain
Site	Soviet Union near Batumi, Adjara ASSR, Georgian SSR, Soviet Union
Total fatalities	40
Aircraft
Aircraft type	Yak-40
Operator	Armenian SSR Aeroflot (Armenian UGA, Yerevan AO)
Registration	CCCP-87475
Flight origin	Armenian SSR Zvartnots, Yerevan (Armenian SSR)
Destination	Georgian SSR Batumi, Adjara ASSR
Occupants	40
Passengers	35
Crew	5
Fatalities	40

Aircraft

The Yak-40 with tail number 87475 (factory number 9442037, serial number 37-20) was manufactured by the Saratov Aviation Plant on December 10, 1974 and was delivered to the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, which assigned it to the 1st Yerevan Aviation Unit of the Armenian Civil Aviation Administration. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had logged 1244 flight hours and 1151 landings.

Accident

The aircraft was operating Flight E-15 from Yerevan to Batumi, piloted by a crew from the 113th flight squadron, consisting of Captain (PIC) Suren Avetisovich Nersesyan, co-pilot Eduard Artashesovich Ovsepyan, and flight engineer Gennady Vladimirovich Azizyan. Also in the cockpit was a checker, senior pilot-instructor of the MGA Nikolai Alexandrovich Loginov. The cabin crew included stewardess Rimma Misakovna Mikaelyan. There were a total of 35 passengers on board, including 23 adults and 12 children.

At 12:18 MSK, Flight E-15 entered the airspace of Batumi Airport and the crew established communication with the dispatcher. The dispatcher gave permission to descend to 300 meters for the fourth turn and provided landing conditions with a magnetic course of 127°. At 12:25, the dispatcher reported weather conditions: overcast with a lower boundary at 420 meters, scattered clouds at 300 meters, visibility of 5 kilometers, and an easterly wind (195°) at 5–8 m/s. Although these conditions were above the minimum, the actual weather had deteriorated significantly, with visibility at 3 kilometers and a lower cloud boundary at 200 meters.

When the aircraft was 11 kilometers from the airport, the dispatcher cleared the fourth turn and reported a reciprocal course of 139° as the aircraft was 2 kilometers to the left of the approach course. At 12:29:35, the dispatcher informed the crew that the distance from the airport was 5 kilometers. The Yak-40 was between the coastline and the runway threshold, 1300 meters from the runway threshold, when the checker on board informed the dispatcher about a go-around. According to eyewitnesses, the aircraft flew over a point 2700 meters northwest (azimuth 307°) of the runway threshold, almost on the landing course with a left turn. At this moment, the last communication from the dispatcher to the crew occurred: "Can you make a visual approach?". "Yes, visual approach.". After this, the aircraft, still in the clouds, flew over the mountain Anaria. When the dispatcher attempted to contact the crew again 170 seconds later, there was no response.

Eyewitnesses reported that the Yak-40 made a right turn over the tea factory (9 kilometers from the airport reference point) along the valley of the Korolisckali River, then turned left to a magnetic course of 60°, and continued in this direction. Approximately 1000–1500 meters later, the Yak-40 began a right turn with altitude gain when at 12:34, at an altitude of 550 meters above sea level, with a course of 84°, right bank of 20°, and angle of attack of 14°, it collided with a mountain 594.6 meters high, 15 kilometers from the airport. The aircraft exploded and burned upon impact, killing all 40 people on board.

Causes

According to the investigation, the weather information provided by the dispatcher to the crew did not match the actual conditions. The flight operations supervisor knew that the weather reported by AMSG at 12:15 was below the minimum but did not take action to direct the aircraft to an alternate airport. The crew, in turn, initiated a go-around from an altitude of 150 meters and 1300 meters from the runway threshold, likely due to deteriorating visibility on the final approach. The crew then entered clouds in mountainous terrain and decided to attempt a second approach without sufficient conditions for visual flight. The decision to gain altitude and transition to instrument flight was too late, leading to the collision with the mountain. The aircraft itself was fully operational and had no failures before the collision.

The main cause of the accident was the significant deviation of the aircraft's flight path from the established procedure during the go-around.

Contributing factors:

1. Incorrect visibility information given to the crew (5 kilometers instead of 3 kilometers), with the airport's minimum visibility set at 5 kilometers, and the lack of continuous radar control during the go-around.
2. Inadequate meteorological support for the flight at the airfield, including infrequent 15-minute weather observations.
3. The absence of terrain features higher than 200 meters in the procedure chart and flight production instructions at a distance of 5 kilometers from the scheme, while the actual altitude was 410 meters.