Sino-Japanese War outline edit

The Second Sino-Japanese War article is a mess, especially its structure. The article is not based on timeline, jumps all over the place, lacks significant information about military aspect of the war and resulting territorial changes, places too much emphasis on stalemate and foreign aid, and such. The article needs much more information on the ROC, its conflict with warlords, communists, and resurgent warlords, political and economic developments, and guerilla warfare (including the KMT's military zones). The Sino-Japanese war should eventually become a part of the History of the Republic of China series. They're inseparable, as the war happened during the growing stages of the republic.

I therefore propose the following order:

Introduction edit

  • General idea of what the war was about. Some background, timeframe, costs, and result.

Background (1895-late 1930s): edit

  • Information on the First Sino-Japanese War, conflict between China and Japan.
  • The weak central KMT government, various forces (Northern factions, social-liberals, communists, right/left wings of the Kuomintang).
  • Japan's "Mainland Policy," economic and military
  • Japan's conflicting strategy over China, 126 Incident, military junta. Choice between Manchuria and all of China, total war and puppets.
  • Manchuria (Zhang Xueliang), integration back into the ROC, unification of China -> hastened mukden incident.

The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the late 19th century in which China, then under the Qing Dynasty, was moribund with internal strifes and foreign imperialism, while Japan had emerged as a great power due to its successful modernization efforts and attempted to become the dominant foreign power in China. In 1912, the Republic of China overthrew the Qing Dynasty, ending thousands of years of imperial rule. However, the new Republic was even weaker due to the fragmenting nature ushered in by the warlord era. The prospect of unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a very remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe out another. For example, warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. It was during the early period of the Republic that Japan became the greatest foreign threat to China. A war between the two was inevitable as one of the ultimate goals of the Three People's Principles was to rid China of foreign imperialism.

In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to further its political and commercial interests in China. Following World War I, Japan acquired German sphere of influence in Shandong. China under the Beiyang government was unable to resist foreign incursions until the Northern Expedition of 1926-28, launched by the Kuomintang (Nationalists) rival government based in Guangzhou. The Northern Expedition swept through China until it was checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the Kuomintang's National Revolutionary Army from unifying China. This situation culminated in the Jinan Incident of 1928 in which the Kuomintang army and the Japanese were engaged in a small battle. In the same year, Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin was assassinated in the Huanggutun Incident when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan. Following these incidents, the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek finally succeeded in unifying China in 1928 with its capital established in Nanjing.

However, the Northern Expedition had only nominally unified China, and civil wars broke out between former warlords and rival Kuomintang factions. In addition, the Chinese Communists revolted against the central government following a purge of its members after the dissolution of the First United Front (China). The 1930 Central Plains War against former warlords almost bankrupted the central government. Because of these situations, the central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of first internal pacification before external resistance. This situation provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its aggression.

In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria immediately following the Mukden Incident. After five months of fighting, in 1932, the puppet state Manchukuo was established with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as its head of state. Unable to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton Report, which condemned Japan for its incursion of Manchuria, and led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. From the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, appeasement was the policy of the international community and no country was willing to take an active stance other than a weak censure. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials and also as a buffer state against the Soviet Union.

More "incidents" followed the invasion of Manchuria. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese soldiers fought a short war in the January 28 Incident in Shanghai. The war resulted in the demilitarization of the city, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to defeat the volunteer armies that arose from the popular frustration at the policy of nonresistance to the Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region, and in its wake the Tanggu Truce was signed, which gave Japan the control of Rehe province and a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. The Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government whose capital was Nanjing.

In addition, Japan increasingly utilized the internal conflicts among the Chinese factions to reduce their strength one by one. This was precipitated by the fact that even some years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist central government only extended around the Yangtze River Delta region, and other regions of China were essentially held in the hands of regional powers. Thus, Japan often bought off or created special links with these regional powers to undermine the efforts of the central government in bringing solid unity to China. To do this, Japan sought various Chinese traitors for cooperation and helped these men lead "autonomous" governments friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (Chinese: 華北特殊化; pinyin: húaběitèshūhùa), or more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong.

In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting political operations in Hebei and effectively ended Chinese control of North China. In the same year, the Chin-Doihara Agreement was signed and removed the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935, the Chinese central government had virtually vacated from North China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established.

Meanwhile, in Japan, a policy of assassination by secret societies and the effects of the Great Depression had caused the civilian government to lose control of the military. In addition, the military high command had limited control over the field armies who acted in their own interest, often in contradiction to the overall national interest. Pan-Asianism was also used as a justification for expansion. This is perhaps best summarized by the "Amo Doctrine" of 1934, issued by Eiji Amo, head of the information department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Known as the "Monroe Doctrine of Asia," it announced Japan's intention for European countries to adopt a "hands off" policy in China, thereby negating the Open Door Policy. It stated that Japan was to be the sole leader in security in East Asia, including the task of defeating communism. Economic reason was also a very important factor leading to the invasion of China. During the Great Depression, Japanese exports to American and European markets were severely curtailed, and Japan turned to completely dominating China politically and economically to provide a stable market for Japanese products. In the period leading up to full-scale war in 1937, Japan's use of force in localized conflicts to threaten China unless the latter reduced its protective tariff and suppressed anti-Japanese activities and boycotts were evidence to this.

Even though Japan had annexed Manchuria and gained unmatched influence in North China and elsewhere, Chiang Kai-shek's central government was unwilling to mount a full-scale war to reclaim Chinese sovereignty in these areas. His goal was to eradicate the communists and former warlords and to build up a viable military-industrial base first, before tackling on Japan. China was a underdeveloped country with little industrial strength while Japan had been designing and manufacturing its own armaments. The Chinese army in general was also under-trained and under-equipped, with only a cursory understanding of fighting a modern war. China was simply not prepared to challenge Japan militarily. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek focused on training and nationalizing the Chinese army, building up the necessary industry, and expanding the central government into an effective, unified modern state. At the same time Chiang and other regional forces also fought Japan in small, localized "incidents", whose outcomes were mostly unfavorable to China. Many in the Chinese populace had doubted the wisdom of Chiang's strategy. People who opposed government policy was composed of a myriad of groups, including students, patriots of the National Salvation, communists, and anti-Chiang opportunists. Public opinion was especially hostile to his suppression of anti-Japanese protests to pacify Japan in order to lessen its demands. It was against this backdrop of the distrust between government policy and public opinion that the famous Xian Incident came into being.

Formation of the United Front (1936-1937) edit

  • Xian Incident, conditions for Chiang's release, end of anti-communist suppressions.
  • CCP forces integrated into the NRA. Chiang's reservations and conflict with KMT leftists.
  • Hastened the war.

The War Begins and Early Stages (1937-1940) edit

  • Comparison of the Chinese military, economy, industry, with that of Japan. China obviously ten times worse.
  • Strategy: Space for time.
  • Marco Polo Bridge War: small flare-up that wasn't supported by Manchukuo strategists. Strategic error by Japan.
  • Battle of Shanghai: Chiang's strategy was to show off to foreign interests. The plan backfired as his a third of his best men got wasted and US/UK didn't do squat to help China. The battle took over three months, Japan's goal of a quick war shattered.
  • Battle of Nanjing: Tang Shenzhi's inept defense of Nanjing, Nanjing massacre.
  • Xuzhou, taierzuang..etc.
  • Japan conquered most coastal areas, but ran into trouble as they moved inland, end with battle of wuhan. Essentially the Japanese lost momentum.

Collaborationists and occupied territories (1937-1945) edit

  • Wang Jinwei and various puppets of northern China.
  • KMT and CCP behind enemy lines. Expansion of CCP base of operations.
  • war crimes by Japan.
  • guerilla warfare.

Homefront (1937-1945) edit

  • Chongqing, industries, bombing.
  • War culture (movies, radio etc).
  • Overseas Chinese contributions.

The War Continues and the China Warzone (1941-1944) edit

  • Changsha battles, Changde, chinese gains.
  • more major engagements here.
  • western embargo, oil in indochina. Japan attacks the USA to get out of the china quagmire.
  • pearl harbor, formation of the ABCD defense line and the China Warzone (including southeast asia).

KMT/CCP (1937-1945) edit

  • new fourth army incident,
  • fighting together to fighting separately.

ROC and foreign relations (early 1930s-1945) edit

  • with the soviet union, military aid, soviet union reining in CCP, soviet union's non-aggression pact with Japan, operation zet
  • with germany, military advisers forced to leave china by japan, recognition of wang's government.
  • with the USA, soong meiling, monetary aid, flying tigers, conflict with stilwell,
  • with the UK, churchill is a fatty, closure of the burmese road by the brits, british loss to japan, , indian/vietnamese independence movement, new 1st army deployed in indochina, saved brits, wasting time in the jungle away from china.

Later stages of the war (1944) edit

  • operation ichigo to link up southeast asian theater with the china theater. Explainations of china's previous success against japan and near loss toward the end of 1944.
  • chinese counteroffensive to retake occupied territories.
  • last major engagements.

End of war (1945) edit

  • cairo, potsdam conferences.
  • yalta conference sold China out. Soviet union agreed to fight japan for interests in manchuria, ccp strengthens.
  • china retakes guangxi and other areas.
  • atomic bombing, soviet entry into the war, atomic bombing. Japan surrenders.

Aftermath edit

  • Death toll and economic devastation.
  • ROC and Japan appraisals.
  • Cancellation of all unequal treaties, the ROC became the founding member of the UN
  • ROC's dubious economic policy, and general weird stuff that allowed the CCP to come to power.
  • tokyo trial, chiang's favorable treatment of japanese pows.
  • pyrrhic ROC victory essentially wasted the KMT and made the CCP stronger.

Legacy edit

  • pretty much what the current article features.
  • current politics. ROC desinicization, PRC liers, japanese deniers.

Who fought the war edit

  • the current article has a good assessment on it.

ists edit

  • incidents before 7-7-1937
  • battles
  • individuals, generals, politicians,
  • war crimes, more organized into types

References edit

  • more books needed. Almost all the books I've read are chinese sources published in taiwan, and most are neutral (i.e. the criticisms of Chiang is a sure sign of neutrality).