User:Yerevantsi/sandbox/Anti-Armenianism in Turkey

History edit

Ottoman era edit

Republican era edit

Public sentiment edit

^[1]

^[2]

^[3]

^[4]

^[5]

^[6]
^[7]
^[8]
^[8]
^[9]
^[9]
^[9]
^[10]
^[11]

Afterwards, Soviet control was established in Armenia on 2 December 1920. Interestingly enough, the last act of the outgoing independent Armenian government in Erivan was to sign the Treaty of Alexandropol (Gu¨mru¨ ) with the Turks on 3 December 1920, which recognised the eastern boundaries of the newly emerging Turkish state.6 It was not a historical coincidence that Turkish nationalists decided to put pressure on the independent Erivan government as the first foreign authority to recognise the sovereignty of the Ankara government. The treaty ranks as the first official agreement undertaken by the Ankara government with a foreign state. Turkish scholars have neglected the role of the treaty in their analyses of Turkish nationalism and nation-state building since it was never ratified. Despite the fact that the treaty did not have any legislative power it still played an important role in Turkish nation-state building for the following reasons:^[12] First, the Armenians were chosen as the first ‘other’ state which had to recognise the authority of the new Ankara government. The Treaty of Alexandropol indicated the willingness of the Turks to recognise the political existence of the Armenians as the ‘other’ as long as they did not have any territorial claims in Anatolia. It was a deliberate act that the Ankara government signed the treaty on behalf of the ‘Turkish’ GNA and defined, for the first time, the political identity of the Ankara government in terms of the territorial delineation of Turkey. Second, the treaty demarcated the Armenian–Turkish border in accordance with the principles of the Turkish National Pact of 1920. The Ankara government regained all the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire which had been lost to Russia after the war of 1877–78. The border was later finalised by the Treaty of Kars between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet republics under the supervision of Moscow in 1921, and this border between the modern Turkish and Armenian states remains today (AMDP Vol. 1 Doc. 97: 571–9; PRO: Archival Research).7 Third, the victory against the Armenians created ardent nationalist feelings among the Turks arising from the impression that the nationalists had the necessary political will and material capabilities to fight against the foreign invaders. In foreign affairs, both the Bolsheviks and the Allies changed their policies towards the Ankara government after its victory over the Armenians.^[12]

The Lausanne settlement was the zenith of Turkish nationalism in international relations since there was no word of a united independent Armenia as designated in the Treaty of Se` vres. The legacy of the Ottoman past and the Allied plans for Anatolia in the 1920s led to the ‘Se`vres syndrome’ which represented the misperception and distrust of the Western intentions towards Turkey, which made the Turks very sensitive about the protection of their territorial integrity and national identity.^[13]

The first official newspaper of the Ottoman Empire, Le Moniteur Ottoman, in 1832 had a section in Armenian language (Go¨ c¸ek 2002: 42). Hayastan (the homeland of the Armenians), the Armenian newspaper in Istanbul, was an influential channel in setting the ideological parameters of Armenian nationalism, which called for the Armenian nation to wake up and follow the examples of other enlightened nations in the 1840s (Libaridian 1983: 76). In addition, the Armenians had another advantage that Anatolian Turkish peasants did not have: many Ottoman Armenians were prosperous enough to send their children to Europe for religious and secular education. Armenian students in St Petersburg and Moscow produced and distributed brochures about the success of the Greek and Bulgarian revolutions to gain political independence from the Ottomans. The spread of these ideas bore fruit and Armenian revolutionary discourse and activity spread between the 1860s^[14] and 1890s (Nalbandian 1963: 140–1). These internal developments were interwoven with the pressures from European powers on the Empire’s modernisation and the liberal policies of the Tanzimat era, as explained earlier.^[15]

References edit

^ Çırakman 2011, p. 1895: "Indeed, promotion of Turkish self-image in the 2000s can be grasped as a political project. During the course of the last decade, there has been an increasing politicization of Turkishness against other collective identities such as Kurds, Armenians, Sabetaists,2 and the West."
^ Çırakman 2011, p. 1897: "On the one hand, one can observe the (re)birth of a self-promoting ethno-nationalist discourse; abundant literature on a glorified Turkish past and disposition has recently emerged and one may observe extraordinary appearances of the Turkish flag in daily life and in TV series, emphasizing Turkish nationalist sentiments. On the other hand, there has been an apparent rise in the expression of xenophobic feeling against Kurdish, Armenian, and Jewish presences in Turkey. This may be exemplified with reference to the rising interest in conspiracy theories that reveal how Turkish pride can be destroyed from within and from without."
^ Çırakman 2011, p. 1899: "The divisive elements in Turkish society are described in various interviews as democratization, Jews, foreigners, Christians, missionaries, Armenians, and the Kurds (Kentel et al. 2007, pp. 206�13)."
^ Çırakman 2011, p. 1900: "These two extreme cases of flagging the nation showcase strong identification with ethno-nationalist symbols. Redefining the Turkish self-image around such symbols could pose questions about the ethnic identity of Turkish citizens, as if the answers would reveal who the enemy is and who the friends are. In the above-mentioned cases the enemy is determined as being either the Armenians or the Kurds."
^ Çırakman 2011, p. 1903: " "Turkish nationalist discourse in the 2000s suffers from Se`vres syndrome: a perception of threat or a fear of the scrambling and disintegration of Turkey. This ‘affliction’ can be traced back to the 1920 Se`vres Treaty, which resulted in the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, awarding parts of Anatolia to Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds (O¨ zkırımlı 2008, p. 51). In this regard, one may observe the emergence of Turkey’s xenophobic attitude toward the other, who is usually identified as the enemy or the traitor."
^ Göl 2005, p. 122: "This article argues that the Turkish nation was imagined as a modern nation with territorial sovereignty after the erosion of traditional Ottoman umma (religious community) identity. During the process of this imagination, the Armenians became the first ‘others’, whose claims over eastern Anatolia were perceived as a real threat to Turkish territoriality and identity. Such an argument challenges one of the historical myths of official Turkish nationalism which argues that the Turkish national consciousness emerged during its struggle against the Greek invasion of western Anatolia, which caused the Greeks to be considered as the ‘other’."
^ Göl 2005, p. 130: "The CUP government’s reaction to the loss of the Balkan territories was a formulation of drastic policies that combined their enlightened authoritarianism with ‘chauvinist nationalism’. The CUP leadership was the first group to implement policies of ‘homogenisation and Turkification’ which were reinforced by the conditions of World War I (Rae 2002: 151–3). The first implementation of the CUP regime’s goal of creating a homogeneous nation was the elimination of the Armenians from Anatolia in 1915. The Armenians were accused of collaborating with the Russians against the Ottomans despite the fact that they were called the millet-i sad{ka (the most loyal subjects) of the Empire. It was a prerequisite for homogenisation in the name of modernisation that both internal and external conditions served to justify their policies under the rhetoric of state security and interests. The question that automatically comes to mind concerns the reason for the change in the perception of the Armenians from being loyal millet to being subjected to the policies of elimination by the Young Turks, as will be dealt with in the second part of this article."
^ ^a ^b Göl 2005, p. 131: "The day on which Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun, 19 May 1919, has come to be understood as the starting date of the national movement. In contrast to this orthodox account of the factors which are related to the rise of Turkish nationalism, I argue that the threat of an extended Armenian state in eastern Anatolia united the Turks to act as a national group. The subsequent part of this article critically explores the reasons that led to the policies of exclusion and, thus, changed the perception of the Armenians from being ‘loyal millets’ to the ‘others’ in Ottoman/Turkish social history." Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEGöl2005131" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
^ ^a ^b ^c Göl 2005, p. 132: "Russian Armenians as a necessary condition for the creation of a united identity, their Turkish counterparts perceived this as an actual threat to their own interests. Consequently, Turkish nationalists prioritised two tasks of creating a homogenous nation-state in order to tackle the ‘Armenian question’: to declare Anatolia as the Turkish homeland, which clashed with Armenian territorial claims, and to gain the international recognition of Turkish sovereignty over this territory." Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEGöl2005132" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
^ Göl 2005, p. 133: "I maintain that the Treaty of Se`vres served as a catalyst for Turkish nationalism by uniting the Muslim peoples of Anatolia to act as a national group under the leadership of the Kemalists. The treaty was also described as the origin of Turkish nationalism in a British Foreign Office report, indicating that foreign observers understood that the European decision over the future of Anatolia at Se`vres escalated the nationalist feelings among Turks (PRO: Archival Research).5 Therefore, the European-backed territorial claims of the Armenians over eastern Anatolia played a more determining role than the Greek invasion of Izmir in the development of a raison d’eˆtre of the new Turkish state."
^ Göl 2005, p. 134: "This is why I maintain that the indirect occupation of eastern Anatolia by the Armenians through the articles of the Treaty of Se`vres was a key factor for Turkish nationalism: the establishment of a united Armenia posed a direct threat to the integrity of Turkish territory and identity. While the Armenian demands were satisfied by the stillborn Treaty of Se` vres, which in principle gave Armenia a large part of north-eastern Anatolia (the boundaries would be drawn by President Wilson), this in return reinforced Turkish nationalist feelings. Turkish policy towards Armenia from that time on would be based on the rejection of ceding any Turkish soil to the Armenians (Akc¸am 1999: 499). It also served to strengthen Turkish national consciousness by allowing Turks to differentiate themselves from the Armenians. There was no place for the Armenians in the new Turkish nation, defined in territorial and religious terms. The crucial stage of invalidating the Armenian claims was to gain international recognition of Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia and, therefore, priority was given to foreign affairs."
^ ^a ^b Göl 2005, p. 135.
^ Göl 2005, p. 136.
^ Göl 2005, p. 128.
^ Göl 2005, p. 129.

Bibliography edit

Göl, Ayla (2005). "Imagining the Turkish nation through 'othering' Armenians". Nations and Nationalism. 11 (1). Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism: 121–139. doi:10.1111/j.1354-5078.2005.00195.x.
Çırakman, Aslı (2011). "Flags and traitors: The advance of ethno-nationalism in the Turkish self-image". Ethnic and Racial Studies. 34 (11): 1894–1912. doi:10.1080/01419870.2011.556746. ISSN 0141-9870.

[FOOTNOTEÇırakman20111895-1] Çırakman 2011, p. 1895: "Indeed, promotion of Turkish self-image in the 2000s can be grasped as a political project. During the course of the last decade, there has been an increasing politicization of Turkishness against other collective identities such as Kurds, Armenians, Sabetaists,2 and the West."

[FOOTNOTEÇırakman20111897-2] Çırakman 2011, p. 1897: "On the one hand, one can observe the (re)birth of a self-promoting ethno-nationalist discourse; abundant literature on a glorified Turkish past and disposition has recently emerged and one may observe extraordinary appearances of the Turkish flag in daily life and in TV series, emphasizing Turkish nationalist sentiments. On the other hand, there has been an apparent rise in the expression of xenophobic feeling against Kurdish, Armenian, and Jewish presences in Turkey. This may be exemplified with reference to the rising interest in conspiracy theories that reveal how Turkish pride can be destroyed from within and from without."

[FOOTNOTEÇırakman20111899-3] Çırakman 2011, p. 1899: "The divisive elements in Turkish society are described in various interviews as democratization, Jews, foreigners, Christians, missionaries, Armenians, and the Kurds (Kentel et al. 2007, pp. 206�13)."

[FOOTNOTEÇırakman20111900-4] Çırakman 2011, p. 1900: "These two extreme cases of flagging the nation showcase strong identification with ethno-nationalist symbols. Redefining the Turkish self-image around such symbols could pose questions about the ethnic identity of Turkish citizens, as if the answers would reveal who the enemy is and who the friends are. In the above-mentioned cases the enemy is determined as being either the Armenians or the Kurds."

[FOOTNOTEÇırakman20111903-5] Çırakman 2011, p. 1903: " "Turkish nationalist discourse in the 2000s suffers from Se`vres syndrome: a perception of threat or a fear of the scrambling and disintegration of Turkey. This ‘affliction’ can be traced back to the 1920 Se`vres Treaty, which resulted in the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, awarding parts of Anatolia to Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds (O¨ zkırımlı 2008, p. 51). In this regard, one may observe the emergence of Turkey’s xenophobic attitude toward the other, who is usually identified as the enemy or the traitor."

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005122-6] Göl 2005, p. 122: "This article argues that the Turkish nation was imagined as a modern nation with territorial sovereignty after the erosion of traditional Ottoman umma (religious community) identity. During the process of this imagination, the Armenians became the first ‘others’, whose claims over eastern Anatolia were perceived as a real threat to Turkish territoriality and identity. Such an argument challenges one of the historical myths of official Turkish nationalism which argues that the Turkish national consciousness emerged during its struggle against the Greek invasion of western Anatolia, which caused the Greeks to be considered as the ‘other’."

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005130-7] Göl 2005, p. 130: "The CUP government’s reaction to the loss of the Balkan territories was a formulation of drastic policies that combined their enlightened authoritarianism with ‘chauvinist nationalism’. The CUP leadership was the first group to implement policies of ‘homogenisation and Turkification’ which were reinforced by the conditions of World War I (Rae 2002: 151–3). The first implementation of the CUP regime’s goal of creating a homogeneous nation was the elimination of the Armenians from Anatolia in 1915. The Armenians were accused of collaborating with the Russians against the Ottomans despite the fact that they were called the millet-i sad{ka (the most loyal subjects) of the Empire. It was a prerequisite for homogenisation in the name of modernisation that both internal and external conditions served to justify their policies under the rhetoric of state security and interests. The question that automatically comes to mind concerns the reason for the change in the perception of the Armenians from being loyal millet to being subjected to the policies of elimination by the Young Turks, as will be dealt with in the second part of this article."

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005131-8] Göl 2005, p. 131: "The day on which Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun, 19 May 1919, has come to be understood as the starting date of the national movement. In contrast to this orthodox account of the factors which are related to the rise of Turkish nationalism, I argue that the threat of an extended Armenian state in eastern Anatolia united the Turks to act as a national group. The subsequent part of this article critically explores the reasons that led to the policies of exclusion and, thus, changed the perception of the Armenians from being ‘loyal millets’ to the ‘others’ in Ottoman/Turkish social history." Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEGöl2005131" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005132-9] Göl 2005, p. 132: "Russian Armenians as a necessary condition for the creation of a united identity, their Turkish counterparts perceived this as an actual threat to their own interests. Consequently, Turkish nationalists prioritised two tasks of creating a homogenous nation-state in order to tackle the ‘Armenian question’: to declare Anatolia as the Turkish homeland, which clashed with Armenian territorial claims, and to gain the international recognition of Turkish sovereignty over this territory." Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEGöl2005132" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005133-10] Göl 2005, p. 133: "I maintain that the Treaty of Se`vres served as a catalyst for Turkish nationalism by uniting the Muslim peoples of Anatolia to act as a national group under the leadership of the Kemalists. The treaty was also described as the origin of Turkish nationalism in a British Foreign Office report, indicating that foreign observers understood that the European decision over the future of Anatolia at Se`vres escalated the nationalist feelings among Turks (PRO: Archival Research).5 Therefore, the European-backed territorial claims of the Armenians over eastern Anatolia played a more determining role than the Greek invasion of Izmir in the development of a raison d’eˆtre of the new Turkish state."

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005134-11] Göl 2005, p. 134: "This is why I maintain that the indirect occupation of eastern Anatolia by the Armenians through the articles of the Treaty of Se`vres was a key factor for Turkish nationalism: the establishment of a united Armenia posed a direct threat to the integrity of Turkish territory and identity. While the Armenian demands were satisfied by the stillborn Treaty of Se` vres, which in principle gave Armenia a large part of north-eastern Anatolia (the boundaries would be drawn by President Wilson), this in return reinforced Turkish nationalist feelings. Turkish policy towards Armenia from that time on would be based on the rejection of ceding any Turkish soil to the Armenians (Akc¸am 1999: 499). It also served to strengthen Turkish national consciousness by allowing Turks to differentiate themselves from the Armenians. There was no place for the Armenians in the new Turkish nation, defined in territorial and religious terms. The crucial stage of invalidating the Armenian claims was to gain international recognition of Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia and, therefore, priority was given to foreign affairs."

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005135-12] Göl 2005, p. 135.

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005136-13] Göl 2005, p. 136.

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005128-14] Göl 2005, p. 128.

[FOOTNOTEGöl2005129-15] Göl 2005, p. 129.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]