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The 13 amendments proposed by Makarios III (also known as 13 points) was a proposal by president of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios in 1963 for constitutional changes that scrapted privileges from turkish Cypriot community. The crisis created got out of hand and led to Bloody Chistmass.

The Thirteen AmendmentsEdit

The most serious constitutional problem the newly established Cyprus Republic faced in daily-life politics was the municipal issue. Turk Cypriots strived for the creation of separate municipals for Greeks and Turks while Greek Cypriots were aiming for mixed ones.[1] Makarios took into consideration the probability of changing the constitution unilaterally, and despite warnings for constitutional collapse from the Turkish Republic, Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff and his cabinet minister Glafkos Clerides, he decided to go forward changing the constitution.[2] Makarios calculated the political instability at Turkey and Greece, also he thought that his proposal would be backed by the United Nations.[3] On the 30th of November 1963, Makarios handed a memo of 13 points to the Turkish-Cypriot side[4]

Kucuk, Denktash, and the Turkish Government rejected the 13 amendments with furor.[5] Turkish Cypriots filed a lawsuit against the 13 amendments in Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus (SCCC). Makarios clarified not to comply with whatever the decision of SCCC will be,[6] and defended his amendments as being necessary "to resolve constitutional deadlocks" as opposite to the stance of SCCC.[7] On 25 April 1963, SCCC decided that Makarios' 13 amendments are illegal. On 21 May, president of SCCC resigned due to the Makarios' disobedience to the laws of SCCC, thereby disobedience to the laws of Cyprus. On 15 July, Makarios ignored the decision of SCCC.[8] On 30 November, Makarios legalized the 13 proposals.

Some key points of the plan were aiming to scarp privileges from the Turkish Cypriot community, while others where neutral- Greek Cypriots were benefiting from the thirteen amendments.[9]

See alsoEdit


  1. ^ Ker-Lindsay 2011, Chapter 2 Constitutional Collapse 1960-1964; Mirbagheri 2014, p. 18.
  2. ^ Richter 2010, p. 113; Ker-Lindsay 2011, Chapter 2 Constitutional Collapse 1960-1964.
  3. ^ Göktepe 2003, p. 130.
  4. ^ Richter 2010, p. 115; Mirbagheri 2014, p. 19.
  5. ^ Richter 2010, p. 115.
  6. ^ Pre-Rejection of SCCC decision by Makarios Archived 2012-03-11 at the Wayback Machine The fact that the decision of SCCC was not to be implemented by Makarios was made quite clear, and it was not implemented. Non-implementation of the decision of a Constitutional Court is sufficient reason to compel the resignation of its President, me"
  7. ^ Deutsche Zeitung (Nr. 15, 18-19.01.1964) Archived 2011-07-19 at the Wayback Machine SCCC: "...deny the allegation that an implementation of the constitution was impossible. It is a matter of good will to make it work."
  8. ^ Republic of Cyprus, SCCC Official Website "... in order to face this situation which paralysed the judiciary..."
  9. ^ Richter 2010, p. 115; James 2001, p. 34.


  • James, Alan (28 November 2001). Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963–64. Palgrave Macmillan UK. ISBN 978-1-4039-0089-0.
  • Göktepe, Ci̇hat (2003). British Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, 1959-1965. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-0-7146-5396-9.
  • Ker-Lindsay, James (21 April 2011). The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know®. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-983135-7.
  • Mirbagheri, Farid (1 May 2014). Cyprus and International Peacemaking 1964-1986. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-67745-8.
  • Richter, Heinz (2010). A Concise History of Modern Cyprus, 1878-2009. Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen. ISBN 978-3-938646-53-3.