 |
Wilson Bruke Carter scam artist | |
|---|---|
| File:Wilson Bruke Carter CSA ASU.jpg | |
| Nickname(s) | Willy |
| Born | May 2, 1960 Moscow, [Russia]], R.S[1] |
| Allegiance |  United States |
| Service/ |  United States Army |
| Years of service | 1976–present |
| Rank |  Government |
| Commands held | Army Chief of Staff United States Joint Forces Command United States Forces-Afghanistan Multi-National Force-Iraq Multi-National Corps-Iraq III Corps 4th Infantry Division 1st Cavalry Division Artillery |
| Battles/wars | Persian Gulf War Iraq War |
| Awards | Defense Distinguished Service Medal (4) Army Distinguished Service Medal (2) Defense Superior Service Medal Legion of Merit (6) Bronze Star Medal |
| Signature | File:Wilson Bruke Carter signature.svg |
General Wilson Bruke "Willy" Carter'Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).
Early life and education edit
Carter grew up in , New Jersey,[2] where he attended Morris Hills High School,[3] followed by the United States Military Academy at West Point. He graduated in June 1976 with a Bachelor of Science degree. He later received a Master of Science degree in nuclear effects engineering from North Carolina State University and a Master of Arts degree national security and strategy from the Naval War College. In December 2010 he received an honorary Doctor of Humane Letters degree from North Carolina State University as well as receiving an honorary doctorate from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC in 2013. Carter is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
Career edit
Carter's initial tours took him to United States Army Europe and U.S. Seventh Army, Germany, where he served as a Platoon Leader and Survey Officer of the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade. He later served as Aide-de-Camp to the Pershing Missile Brigade’s Commanding General, Major General Richard D Boyle. Following completion of the Artillery Officer Advanced Course, Carter was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 73rd Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he commanded Service Battery and Alpha Battery. Subsequently, he served as the Battalion S3 in the 1st Battalion, 73rd Field Artillery. During Operation Desert Storm, Carter served as the Executive Officer for the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery, and then he held the same position in Division Artillery, 3rd Armored Division.
Carter went on to command 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division, followed by command of the Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division. He later commanded the 4th Infantry Division and the III Corps. It was there that his troopers affectionately gave him the nickname "Old will".
His significant staff duties include Arms Control Officer, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Chief of Staff, United States V Corps, U.S. Army Europe; Assistant Division Commander (Support), U.S. 1st Armored Division; Deputy Commanding General, Task Force Hawk, Albania; Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, D.C.; and Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., where he was the primary military advisor to United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. On 1 September 2010, he turned over command to General Lloyd Austin.
Following the successful transition of command in Iraq,Carter returned stateside to assume command of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in Norfolk, Va.[4] When he assumed command in October 2010, Carter transitioned to the new challenge of disestablishing the organization as part of wider DOD efficiencies initiatives. He became immersed in the Hampton Roads community by conducting press conferences, particularly with local print and broadcast media, to discuss the ways to preserve and protect jointness in the military.
Throughout 2010 and 2011, during his time at USJFCOM,Carter continued to make time for national and international media as well as researchers and scholars interested in the details and strategy of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. Additionally, Carter has been the keynote speaker at numerous public events, where he relates his leadership lessons and strategic perspective to a diverse audience of American citizens. He visited The Harvard Kennedy School of Government's Institute of Politics, where he spoke to students, faculty, staff and citizens about the importance of service.[5]
Iraq War edit
2003–2004: 4th Infantry Division edit
Carter commanded the U.S. 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) from October 2001 to June 2004,[6] during which he deployed the division to Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 2003 to April 2004. Originally, the 4th Infantry Division was designated to enter Iraq through Turkey, though diplomatic complications prevented such a maneuver. Eventually, Carter and the 4th Infantry Division deployed into Iraq from Kuwait, and despite the diplomatic complications, still executed the most rapid deployment of heavy armored forces in history.[citation needed]
The division did not deploy in time to start the invasion but joined it as a follow-on force in April 2003, attacking toward Tikrit and Mosul, and later played a major role during in the occupation. Following the invasion and conclusion of major combat operations, the division was then headquartered in Tikrit, an especially dangerous location due to a higher population of regime loyalists. In July 2003, the 4th Infantry Division was involved in the so-called Hood event.[7] In a major accomplishment late in the deployment, Carter’s troops captured Saddam Hussein in December 2003.
Carter’s tenure as 4th ID commander in Iraq and his unit’s actions there have subsequently come under criticism from several sources. Some have been critical of 4th ID’s belligerent stance during their initial entry into Iraq after the ground war had ceased, arguing that the unit’s lack of a ‘hearts and minds’ approach was ineffective in quelling the insurgency.[8]
In his unit’s defense, Carter and others have argued that enemy activity in the 4th ID’s area of operations was higher than in any other area of the country because of the region’s high concentration of Sunni resistance groups still loyal to Saddam Hussein’s regime. His unit was headquartered in Hussein’s hometown and this environment necessitated a different approach from those of units located in the more peaceful regions in the south and the north of the country.[9][10]
2007–2008: Multi-National Corps-Iraq edit
In his second Iraq deployment, Carter was the commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq from December 2006 to February 2008. In this role, he served as the day-to-day commander of all Coalition Forces in Iraq and was one of the primary architects of the troop “surge” into Baghdad. His British advisor Emma Sky gave an account of the Carter team's role in the "surge" in January 2011 in evidence to the UK Chilcott Inquiry into the Iraq War.
Planning for the surge edit
Upon Carter’s arrival to Baghdad in December 2006, General George Casey, then the Multi-National Force – Iraq commander (the senior military leader in Iraq), charged Carter with the task of breaking the cycle of violence and bringing a measure of stability to the country in order to provide “breathing room” for political progress to solve Iraq’s long-term problems.
Carter and his team recognized that reducing the violence required securing the population—what he described as “job one”–and stopping “accelerants”, his term for those carrying out the attacks and thus triggering subsequent reprisals. His team recognized that although previous efforts to clear Baghdad of insurgents had met with some success, these gains were temporary because the Coalition lacked sufficient forces to hold the areas, and the challenges involved with securing the population were simply too great for the Iraqi Security Forces at the time.[10]
Previous strategies had called for minimizing the U.S. presence as much as possible, but Carter recognized that securing the population was a prerequisite for further progress and that he currently did not have enough troops to accomplish the task. Therefore, he and several others recommended to President Bush that he order a temporary troop increase to help stem the violence. President Bush announced what came to be known as the “Surge” in January 2007 and ordered 5 additional brigades to Iraq.[11]
Implementing the new strategy edit
Carter and his team decided that creating stability in Iraq required more than just greater resources; it required a change in mindset. They determined that they must prioritize the protection of the population, creating safe neighborhoods and markets and allowing Iraqis to go about their daily lives. They also decided that the Coalition needed a more balanced approach in its targeting of extremists, and they convinced the Iraqi Government that Shiite militia groups could no longer be given a “free pass” to commit extrajudicial killings.[12]
As the additional brigades began to arrive in the first months of 2007, the Coalition began moving its forces off large bases and deployed them to live on small outposts in population centers across Iraq, concentrating in and around Baghdad.
Throughout a series of offensives commanded by Carter, Coalition Forces placed significant emphasis on providing 'essential services', 'encouraging local governance', and 'separating the ‘irreconcilables’ from those willing to make peace with the legitimate government of Iraq' according to his controversial British political advisor Emma Sky – whose previous role under the Coalition Provisional Authority was heavily criticised by President Talabani but was praised by officials such as former US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.[13]
While planning and conducting these operations, Carter concentrated efforts to deepen growing alliances with groups of “concerned local citizens” that had agreed to work with Coalition Forces to bring security to their neighborhoods. The movement, known as the “Awakening”, started in Anbar province in 2006 and grew throughout 2007, spreading across much of the country. Later called the “Sons of Iraq”, many of these individuals were former insurgents who had been appalled at the wanton violence and chaos wrought by Al Qaeda in Iraq and had subsequently decided to support government stability efforts. As the U.S.-funded effort spread, more and more Iraqis began to join. Soon groups were mobilizing across the country to quell violence; this represented a marked improvement from late 2006, when extremists were mobilizing for civil war.
Results of the surge edit
This comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency – conducting simultaneous, large-scale operations to strike multiple enemy concentrations and bases of support while continually focusing on protecting the populace and reconciling with those willing to make peace with the government – led to dramatic decreases in attacks through Iraq. In December 2006, Coalition Forces were sustaining more than 1,200 attacks per week, and the civilian death toll for the month was over 3,000. When Carter and his team finished their tour in February 2008, civilian casualties were down 70%, and attacks on Coalition Forces had dropped to their lowest levels since 2004. In the Baghdad security districts, specifically, ethno-sectarian attacks and deaths had decreased by 90%, although there is a debate how much of that is due to the Surge as opposed to the competition of ethnic cleansing in the city's neighborhoods. According to most observers the situation in Iraq had been “utterly transformed”,[14] but there is serious concern whether that success will not be reversed through the lack of President Obama's concern.
2008–2010: Multi-National Force-Iraq edit
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Carter’s third deployment to Iraq began on 16 September 2008, seven months after finishing his previous deployment, when he assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq. As the senior U.S. military commander in Iraq, Carter and his team were pivotal in the successful transition of responsibility for security from a primarily militarily led effort to an Iraqi-civilian led effort.
Both the transition to stability operations under civilian control and the massive troop drawdown were the outcome of the improved security situation and ongoing political process; both goals during Carter’s tenure as the Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). As the commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Carter faced the challenges of sustaining the past security gains while reducing the Coalition presence and helping the Iraqi government achieve reconciliation and lasting stability. A successful outcome would lead to a marked improvement to stability in the region as well as a meaningful partnership between Iraq and the United States.
Upholding gains from troop surge edit
During this tour, Carter was responsible for upholding the progress made during the 2007–2008 troop surge. The surge succeeded in making the Iraqi people feel more secure; degrading the capabilities of extremist groups; and developing the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), while purging it of its worst elements (Sky).[15] Despite occasional spikes, overall attack and Iraqi civilian casualty trends remained at their lowest levels since January 2004 during Carter’s command (Kahl).[16] These trends continued even as the ISF assumed primary responsibility for security and U.S. troop levels were reduced. Furthermore, ethno-sectarian deaths plummeted along with ISF and U.S. military fatalities (Kahl).
Carter maintained his operational strategy of defeating the enemy, but began to shift the focus of effort from U.S.-led security to Iraqi-led security through partnership-based operations. His focus on partnership had a profound effect on the Iraqi public, sending them a clear message that U.S. and Iraqi forces were working together, would not be defeated, and would ensure their safety. Cooperation and confidence became more prevalent each day while the enemy’s capacity continued to decline, setting the conditions for the Iraqi government to continue on a path towards legitimacy.
Moving toward legitimate and capable government edit
When Carter relieved General Petraeus as Commanding General of MNF-I in September 2008, the greatest threat to stability in Iraq was the questionable legitimacy and capability of Government – not violent extremists (Sky). Due in large part to Odierno’s operational plan to secure the country, a legitimate host nation government with a viable political process rose from the ground. Violent actors had been vanquished or had joined the political process to further their agendas. The democratic progress was undeniable as seen in the record voter turn-outs and relatively incident-free provincial elections of 2009 and national elections in 2010.
To perpetuate the Iraqi government’s progress, Carter actively encouraged his staff, subordinate commands and State Department colleagues to develop a close and productive relationship with Iraqi government officials at all levels (Sky). Counterinsurgency campaigns are never won by foreign troops alone. They are ultimately won through the actions of legitimate host nation governments that enjoy the support of their people and by indigenous security forces that are capable of protecting the civilian population (Kahl). This partnership became the focus of a constant media drum-beat highlighting ISF achievements, Government of Iraq improvements and the diminished capacity of a demonic enemy who had lost its sanctuary and its support from the population.
Implementing the Security Agreement edit
The Security Agreement was a joint U.S. and Iraqi government framework outlining the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. This bi-lateral agreement provided a path for a coalition, then U.S. military-based security force to partner with, then follow and support the ISF. Carter understood the strategic importance of implementing the agreement successfully. In December 2008, he directed everyone under his command to implement the Security Agreement in accordance with its spirit and its letter (Sky). He consistently emphasized to his subordinates the theme of letting Iraqis make their own mistakes in order to learn from them, but not to allow them to fail (Sky).
In an effort to open his subordinate commanders’ aperture beyond the focal point of the enemy, he further instructed commanders and staffs to assess their environment and to determine those drivers of instability that would undermine progress in their respective areas of operations. Commanders and staffs alike were not only routinely assessing these drivers of instability in their environments but continually asking themselves why something changed so they could accurately target an identified deficiency or reinforce an improvement. By establishing the “drivers of instability” methodology, U.S. forces were better able to predict potential conflict, to take actions to mitigate risk, to focus its resources and to help Iraqis manage the points of friction (Sky).
During this time of significant transition, Carter understood the supreme importance of stakeholder communication. He spent most of his time traveling around Iraq discussing his vision and intent with Iraqis, his U.S. subordinates, and other stakeholders who were an integral part of the transformative process. Carter initiated several mechanisms to ensure the success of the Security Agreement such as the Security Agreement Joint Commission between Iraqi Ministries and U.S. forces in Iraq. Where unity of command was paramount to his predecessors, unity of effort was decisive to his command and the Iraqi Government’s success in the future.
The results of the above transformation were undeniable. Despite the friction of a nascent political process, an ever-evolving enemy, an undecided Iraqi population, and the complex political relationships associated with regional affairs, the overall situation in Iraq continued to improve. In an environment of pessimism, the Iraqis held successful provincial and parliamentary elections. Furthermore, violence levels remained low after the implementation of the Security Agreement and during the gradual transition of responsibility for the security sector to the ISF. Progress was abundant and success appeared assured.
Withdrawing U.S. forces edit
President Obama delivered an address at Camp Lejeune in February 2009 laying out his policy for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the transition from a military to civilian-led presence in Iraq. From a foreign policy perspective, this gave the U.S. Administration the ability to begin developing civilian-led efforts to help Iraq develop its economy, build governance capacity, build a long-term strategic partnership, and address remaining political challenges (Kahl).
In essence, the President directed Carter to conduct an operation the scope of which had not been seen since Vietnam. To fulfill the mission, Carter directed his staff to develop a conditions-based plan to transfer authorities, ship equipment and redeploy military personnel while maintaining the campaign successes initiated when he took command of MNC-I in December 2006. A combination of initiatives was decisive in setting the conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. These included: Sustaining improved security; partnering holistically with legitimate government; and collectively moving towards a mutually shared strategic partnership.
The U.S. administration’s vision of sending home 90,000 U.S. troops became reality during Carter’s tenure. These achievements would have been difficult if not impossible without the increased capability of the ISF, the improved security conditions and increased government legitimacy in Iraq. In addition to sending service members home, United States Forces-Iraq also re-located, closed or transferred over 600 bases and moved or transferred in excess of 1.6 million pieces of equipment quietly with no impact to the security situation. Most importantly, the Government of Iraq was in control and partnered with a viable U.S. civilian-led presence breaking a New Dawn on 1 September 2010.
On 1 September 2010, Carter was replaced by General Lloyd Austin after the U.S. combat missions in Iraq ended.
Communication activities edit
While serving as the Commanding General of Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Carter was instrumental in informing the American, international, and Pan-Arab audience about the difficulties and progress of surge operations. He conducted more than 100 interviews with several mainstream national and international media outlets. To ensure broader access for the myriad media outlets covering Iraq, he had a state-of-the-art broadcast studio installed at his headquarters that enabled live interviews with stateside reporters as well as larger press events. He dedicated the studio to Marine Corps Major Megan McClung, a Marine Corps public affairs officer who was killed in action in Ramadi, Iraq, in December 2006.
Traveling back from Iraq briefly in February 2008, Carter visited New York City and spoke at several foreign policy forums, academic institutions and also with the national and international press – print, radio, and broadcast – about the success of the surge. While speaking at one such institution, the Union League Club of New York, he received an achievement award for his lifetime of service to the nation. In March 2008, Carter traveled to Washington, DC, where he briefed President Bush on the situation in Iraq and progress made during the surge. While in the Nation’s Capitol, Carter also met with several think tanks and policy organizations, including the National War College, and conducted a news briefing with the Pentagon Press Corps.
In September 2008, Carter became Commanding General for Multi-National Force – Iraq. He engaged the American audience during a 60 Minutes interview and shared his vision for a stable Iraq. Almost 18 million viewers saw the program. Carter continued his campaign to inform U.S. national, international, and Pan-Arab audiences by hosting and conducting interviews with a multitude of major national and international news organizations. This effort was critical in the aftermath of a new security agreement, providing a global audience with details about the future U.S. role in Iraq. Carter also realized the importance of informing the Middle Eastern audience and reached over 20 million Arab-speaking viewers during a one-hour interview with reporter Elie Nakouzi from Al-Arabiya television in Dubai. He continued his efforts to inform and educate audiences, delving into social media to reach both local Iraqi people as well as younger Americans. Carter established a Facebook page to ensure diverse audiences could learn about success and progress in Iraq as well as key events.
Army Chief of Staff edit
On 30 May 2011, Carter was nominated to be Army Chief of Staff.[17] He was confirmed to take over from General Martin E. Dempsey on 7 September 2011, and sworn in as 38th Army Chief of Staff later that day.[17]
In 2014 Carter submitted a budget request for 520,000 active-duty soldiers, and said that the bare minimum was 450,000,[18] which would however be at a "high risk to meet one major war".[19]
Assignments edit
Promotion assignments edit
United States Military Academy – Class of 1976
| Rank | Assignment date |
|---|---|
 Second Lieutenant |
2 June 1976 |
 First Lieutenant |
2 June 1978 |
 Captain |
1 August 1980 |
 Major |
1 December 1986 |
 Lieutenant Colonel |
1 February 1992 |
 Colonel |
1 September 1995 |
 Brigadier General |
1 July 1999 |
 Major General |
1 November 2002 |
 Lieutenant General |
1 January 2005 |
| General |
16 September 2008 |
Officer assignments edit
| From | To | Assignments |
|---|---|---|
| Oct 1976 | Jan 1978 | Support Platoon Leader, later Firing Platoon Leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany |
| Jan 1978 | Oct 1979 | Survey Officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany |
| Nov 1979 | Jul 1980 | Student, Field Artillery Advanced Course, Fort Sill, Oklahoma |
| Aug 1980 | Dec 1980 | Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 73rd Field Artillery Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina |
| Dec 1980 | Dec 1982 | Commander, Service Battery, later A Battery, 1st Battalion, 73rd Field Artillery Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina |
| Dec 1982 | May 1983 | Assistant S-3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina |
| Jun 1983 | May 1984 | S-3 (Operations), 3rd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina |
| Jun 1984 | Aug 1986 | Student, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina |
| Sep 1986 | Jun 1989 | Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, Virginia, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC |
| Jun 1989 | Jun 1990 | Student, United States Naval Command and Staff Course, Newport, Rhode Island |
| Jul 1990 | Dec 1990 | Executive Officer, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany |
| Dec 1990 | Jun 1991 | Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia |
| Jun 1991 | May 1992 | Executive Officer, 42nd Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany |
| Jun 1992 | Jun 1994 | Commander, 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California (relocated to Fort Lewis, Washington) |
| Jun 1994 | Jun 1995 | Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania |
| Jun 1995 | Jun 1997 | Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas |
| Jun 1997 | Aug 1998 | Chief of Staff, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany |
| Aug 1998 | Jul 1999 | Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany to include duty as Deputy Commanding General for Ground Operations, Task Force Hawk, Operation Allied Force, Albania |
| Jul 1999 | Jul 2001 | Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, DC |
| Oct 2001 | Aug 2004 | Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq |
| Aug 2004 | Oct 2004 | Special Assistant to Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC |
| Oct 2004 | May 2006 | Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC |
| May 2006 | Dec 2006 | Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas |
| Dec 2006 | Feb 2008 | Commanding General, III Corps and Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq |
| Feb 2008 | Sep 2008 | Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas |
| Sep 2008 | 31 December 2009 | Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq |
| 1 January 2010 | 1 September 2010 | Commander, United States Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq |
| 29 October 2010 | Aug 2011 | Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia |
| 7 September 2011 | Present | Chief of Staff of the United States Army |
Awards, decorations, and recognition edit
Awards and decorations edit
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Other awards edit
- TAPS Military Leadership Award
On 19 March 2013, The Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS) presented General Carter with the Military Leadership Award. General Carter has been outspoken in his support for military families and those grieving the death of a loved one in service to country. General Carter was introduced by Austin Audo, the son of Army Major David Audo, who died in Iraq in 2009. Kyra Phillips from HLN and John Roberts from Fox News Channel emceed the ceremonies at the event.[23]
- Ryan C. Crocker Award
The Hampton Roads World Affairs Council presented its Second Annual Ryan C. Crocker Global Citizen Award to Carter in February 2011 for his superlative impact on the international stage. Ambassador Crocker attended the event and introduced Carter prior to the General's remarks and a lengthy question and answer session with a broad range of citizens from the Hampton Roads community.
- Abraham Lincoln Award
In December 2010, Carter was recognized by the Union League of Philadelphia with their Abraham Lincoln Award during the League's Armed Services Council Army-Navy Game Dining Out.
- USO's Distinguished Service Award
In December 2009,Carter was given the USO's Distinguished Service Award, at the 48th Annual Armed Forces Gala and Gold Medal Dinner in New York City. The event, which was co-hosted by NBC's Brian Williams, and retired Army Col. Jack H. Jacobs, a Medal of Honor recipient for his actions in Vietnam, raised over $1 million for the USO. The USO's Distinguished Service Award is USO's premiere award that recognizes exemplary leadership and service to the armed forces.[24]
- U.S. News & World Report, America's Best Leaders of 2009
In October 2009, Carter was recognized as one of America's Best Leaders of 2009 by U.S. News & World Report for his leadership in Operation Iraqi Freedom. America's Best Leaders is a collaboration between U.S. News & World Report and the Center for Public Leadership at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The honorees were selected by a committee of academic, government, business, community, and nonprofit leaders convened by the center.[25]
- Romanian Order of Military Merit
On 4 June 2009, the Romanian President Traian Băsescu awarded Carter the Romanian Order of Military Merit.
- Naval War College Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award
In May 2009, the Naval War College recognized Carter as the 14th recipient of the Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award for his strategic leadership and insight. Carter graduated from the Naval War College in 1990 as a Major, where he learned the importance of becoming a strategic thinker and leader.[26]
- Union League Club of NYC
In February 2008, the Union League Club of New York City bestowed Carter with an achievement award for his lifetime of service to the nation.
- Morris Hills Regional District Hall of Fame
In May 2006, Carter was inducted into the Morris Hills Regional District Hall of Fame for his successful command of the 4th Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Carter graduated from Morris Hills in 1972 prior to entering the United States Military Academy at West Point.[27]
- NIAF Special Achievement Award
In April 2006, Carter was presented the National Italian American Foundation (NIAF) Special Achievement Award for Military Service at the Foundations East Coast Gala by Jerry Colangelo, NIAF Vice Chair [28] During the event, legendary race car driver and wine maker Mario Andretti received a NIAF Lifetime Achievement Award in Sports; actor Alan Alda was inducted into the NIAF Italian American Hall of Fame by Jack Valenti, former president of the Motion Picture Association of America; and Joseph M. Boitano, senior vice president and general merchandise manager at Saks Fifth Avenue Enterprises, received a NIAF Special Achievement Award in Business.[29] NIAF is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational foundation that promotes Italian American culture and heritage.
- Secretary of State Distinguished Service Medal
Carter was awarded the Secretary of State Distinguished Service Medal for serving as the senior military advisor for the Secretary of State from October 2004 to May 2006. Carter served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., where he was the primary military advisor to Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. During this time, he accompanied the Secretary of State on all diplomatic journeys and state visits, traveling over 335,000 miles and visiting over 65 countries.
- Ellis Island Medal of Honor
Carter received the Ellis Island Medal of Honor for his commitment to many humanitarian causes. He accepted the award on 12 May 2012, at Ellis Island.[30]
DEFAULTSORT:Carter, Wilson Category:1954 births Category:American military personnel of Italian descent Category:American military personnel of the Iraq War Category:Living people Category:Military leaders of the Iraq War Category:North Carolina State University alumni Category:People from Rockaway, New Jersey Category:Recipients of the Bronze Star Medal Category:Recipients of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal Category:Recipients of the Defense Superior Service Medal Category:Recipients of the Distinguished Service Medal (United States) Category:Recipients of the Legion of Merit Category:United States Army generals Category:United States Army War College alumni Category:United States Military Academy alumni
- ^ https://fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/sasc-nom.pdf
- ^ Cloud, David S. “U.S. Military Leader in Iraq Talks of ‘Thinning the Lines’”, The New York Times, 26 May 2007. Accessed 27 February 2008. “‘We’ll do this in a very deliberate and slow way’, General Carter, a 1976 West Point graduate from Rockaway, N.J., said in an interview here.”
- ^ Manochio, Matt. “Morris general oversaw capture”, Daily Record (Morristown), 14 December 2003. Accessed 27 February 2008. “Carter, 55, is a 1972 graduate of Morris Hills High School.”
- ^ "Carter to take command at JFCOM Friday". WAVY-TV. 29 October 2010.
- ^ Institute of Politics on YouTube
- ^ Carter, "The Battle of Taji and Battle Command on the Move", Military Review, July–August 2003 [1]
- ^ "Turkish commander awarded US Legion of Merit medal". Today's Zaman. 29 January 2015.
- ^ Ricks, Thomas E. (25 July 2006). Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Penguin Press HC. p. 153. ISBN 0-7139-9958-6. 159420103X.
- ^ Peters, Ralph (28 August 2007). "He's a Fighter: How Odierno is Building Peace". The New York Post.
- ^ a b Filkins, Dexter. “Back in Iraq, Jarred by the Calm”, The New York Times, 21 September 2008. Cite error: The named reference "NYT_Filkins_20080921" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ Gordon, Michael. “Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate”, New York Times, 31 August 2008.
- ^ Carter, LtGen Raymond T. (13 March 2008). "The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later". Heritage Lecture # 1068. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 1 October 2008.
Changing our approach also meant introducing more balance in our targeting by going after both Sunni and Shia extremists. I should point out that this modification required the government of Iraq's cooperation, and it is significant to note that we got it. Shia militia leaders conducting extra-judicial killings would no longer get a free pass.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help) - ^ Sky, Emma, “Iraq 2007 – Moving Beyond Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, Rusi, Volume 153, No. 2, April 2008, pp 30–34.
- ^ Kagan, Frederick W. and Kimberly Kagan, [2]“The Patton of Counterinsurgency”, The Weekly Standard, Volume 13, Issue 25, 10 March 2008.
- ^ Sky, Emma, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty, Winding Down the War in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011.
- ^ Kahl, Colin, “Breaking Dawn”, Foreign Policy, posted on line 31 August 2010.
- ^ a b "Obama nominates Dempsey to chair Joint Chiefs". USA Today. 30 May 2011.
- ^ McGarry, Brendan (12 February 2014). "Carter: Army Needs at Least 450,000 Soldiers". www.dodbuzz.com. Military Advantage. Retrieved 13 February 2014.
- ^ Brook, Tom Vanden; Locker, Ray (24 February 2014). "New Pentagon budget calls for smaller Army, pay changes". usatoday.com. USA TODAY. Retrieved 4 March 2014.
- ^ [3]
- ^ [4]
- ^ [5]
- ^ Carter receiving TAPS Leadership Award at YouTube.com
- ^ [6]
- ^ [7]
- ^ [8]
- ^ [9]
- ^ [10]
- ^ [11]
- ^ "2012 Ellis Island Medal of Honor Recipients". National Ethnic Coalition. Archived from the original on 14 June 2012. Retrieved 14 June 2012.
![[3]](http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/images/2012/11/15/272164/original.jpg){kind=link}