17 November: Napoleon's bold maneuver edit
Davout in peril edit
At 3:00 a.m., the troops of Davout's I Corps decamped from their bivouac and began their march to Krasny. The reports of Eugène's defeat the previous day were so dismaying that Davout felt it necessary to abandon his original plan of postponing his movement until Ney's III Corps, still at Smolensk, had caught up with him.[2] Davout, finding the road almost clear, approached the town at 9 in the morning. Miloradovich, permitted by Kutuzov to recommence his attack, opened a massive artillery barrage on Davout. The panicked French troops began fleeing from the road, and as Russian infantry and cavalry attacks were likely to follow, the I Corps was threatened with destruction.[3] Davout lost half of his men and had only 4,000 men left.[4]
"When Marshal Michel Ney's III Corps, which formed the rear guard of the army as it retreated west from Smolensk, was cut-off and destroyed, Davout was made the scapegoat. ... After Davout, who had been supported by the remnants of the Corps of Eugene de Beauharnais in his escape, had passed, the enemy strengthened its position and waited for Ney."[5]
Leaving their bivouac, on an excessively cold morning,[6] the rearguard (the 33rd Regiment under Marguerye's command[7]) was attacked by Cossacks, cuirassiers and infantry, became encircled and out of ammunition.
The 33rd regiment tried desperately to connect with the I Army Corps but was forced to carre. Russian guard cuirassiers attacked the regiment and shelled it with scrap fire. In the next attack, the carre of the 33rd succumbed. Dutch and Russian officers, who were Freemasons, made contact with each other, after which the fighting ended. The surviving soldiers and officers (78 men) went into captivity.[8]
Napoleon orders the Guard to advance edit
Davout's peril and the distressing developments of the previous day had alerted Napoleon to the grave danger confronting the Grande Armée. Waiting for Ney in Krasny was no longer feasible, given that any kind of determined attack by Kutuzov would destroy the Grande Armée. The starving French troops also needed to reach their closest supply source 40 km (25 mi) west at Orsha—before the Russians captured the town ahead of him.[9]
At this critical juncture, Napoleon's "sense of initiative" returned to him for the first time in weeks. In Caulaincourt's words: "This turn of events, which upset all the Emperor's calculations... would have overwhelmed any other general. But the Emperor was stronger than adversity, and became the more stubborn as danger seemed more imminent."[9]
Immediately, before daylight, Napoleon prepared his Imperial Guard to make an aggressive feint against Miloradovich and Golitsyn, gambling that this unexpected maneuver would discourage the Russians from attacking Davout and Ney. The Grande Armée's remaining artillery was massed for combat, and the Guardsmen formed themselves into attack columns.[10] Simultaneously, the remnant of Eugène's IV Corps succeeded to breakthrough to Krasny but without weapons unable to secure the Grande Armée's escape route to Orsha.[11]
Napoleon hoped to fend off the Russians just long enough to collect Davout's and Ney's troops and to immediately resume his retreat before Kutuzov attacked or outflanked him by moving on Orsha.[10]
The Imperial Guard attacks edit
At 5:00 a.m., 11,000 Imperial Guards marched out of Krasny intending to secure the terrain immediately east and southeast of the town.[a]
Facing the tattered but resolute Imperial Guardsmen were densely concentrated Russian infantry columns to the south and east, supported by massive, powerful artillery batteries. Lacking sufficient cannon of their own, the Guardsmen were badly outgunned by the enemy. As described by Segur: "Russian battalions and batteries barred the horizon on all three sides—in front, on our right, and behind us"[13]
Kutuzov's reaction to the Imperial Guard's forward movement led to the most decisive and controversial development of the battle: he promptly cancelled his army's planned offensive, even despite of the Russians' overwhelming superiority in strength.[b]
For most of the rest of this day, the Russians remained at a safe distance from the Guard, beyond the reach of French muskets and bayonets, and simply blasted the Young Guard with cannon fire from afar.
Action at the Losvinka edit
The limited close-quarters combat that did occur on this day unfolded throughout the morning and early afternoon around Uvarovo. The Imperial Guard attacked Uvarovo to use the village to cover Davout's retreat into Krasny.
Uvarovo was held by two battalions of Golitsyn's infantry, which formed a weak forward outpost in advance of the rest of the Russian army. The Russians were soon driven from Uvarovo, as Kutuzov forbade Golitsyn from reinforcing his troops. Golitsyn reacted by commencing a devastating artillery barrage on Uvarovo, which took a terrible toll on the Young Guardsmen.[14]
Kutuzov, in order to mass as much strength as possible behind Golitsyn, at this point ordered Miloradovich to shift his position west, so that it linked with Golitsyn's lines.[14] Kutuzov's decision to realign Miloradovich's troops is remarkable, as the bulk of the Russian army—Golitsyn's and Tormasov's commands—were already merged in a powerful defensive position. Miloradovich was thus denied the chance to complete the destruction of Davout.
Meanwhile, to the north, Davout's troops began streaming into Krasny, harassed by swarms of Cossacks who made no serious attempt to stop them. The Russian artillery continued to pound Davout's corps with grapeshot, inflicting ruinous casualties on the I Corps. Most of Davout's baggage train was lost, but a significant number of his infantrymen had been saved, and they were rallied by their officers in Krasny.[15]
Next, General Bennigsen, second in seniority only to Kutuzov among Russian generals, ordered Golitsyn to recapture Uvarovo. Golitsyn's attack was met by a simultaneous counterattack by a column of the Guard's voltigeurs.[14]
Golitsyn attacked the voltigeurs with two regiments of cuirassiers; the Dutch 33rd regiment formed squares and repelled the attack. During the third Russian attack, they became trapped and without ammunition, and soon the entire regiment was killed by sword or captured; 75 men survived.[16] A second line of (Dutch) Grenadiers, which had been advancing to support the voltigeurs, then fell back under heavy Russian cannon fire. The Grenadiers were driven from a critical defensive position with massive casualties.[14] Roguet attempted to support the Dutch by attacking the Russian artillery batteries, but this offensive was broken up by Russian grapeshot and cavalry charges. Only 25 soldiers and eleven officers of the Grenadiers survived this encounter.[17][18] The loss of this regiment ended the battle of Krasnoi.[19]
Around 11:00 a.m., as the Imperial Guard was holding firm near Uvarovo despite its withering losses, Napoleon received intelligence reports that Tormasov's troops were readying to march west of Krasny.[c] This news, coupled with the Young Guard's mounting casualties, forced Napoleon to abandon his ultimate object of standing down Kutuzov long enough for Ney's III Corps to arrive in Krasny. If Kutuzov opted to attack, the Grande Armée would be encircled and destroyed. Napoleon immediately ordered the Old Guard to fall back on Krasny, and then join Eugène's IV Corps in marching west towards Liady. The Young Guard, nearing its breaking point, would remain at the Losvinka, to be relieved shortly thereafter by Davout's reorganized troops from Krasny.
Napoleon's decision was not an easy one to make. Segur describes the beleaguered Emperor's predicament as follows:
So the 1st Corps was saved; but at the same time, we learned that our rear guard was at the end of its resistance at Krasny, that Ney had probably not left Smolensk yet, and that we ought to give up all idea of waiting for him. Still, Napoleon hesitated, unable to bring himself to make this great sacrifice. But finally, as everything seemed lost, he decided what to do. He called Mortier to him, took his hand kindly, and told him, 'There is not a minute to lose! The enemy is breaking through on every side. Kutuzov may reach Liady, even Orsha and the last bend of the Dnieper before me. I must move rapidly with the Old Guard to occupy that passage. Davout will relieve you. Together you must try to hold out at Krasny until nightfall. Then you will rejoin me.' His heart heavy with despair at having to abandon the unfortunate Ney, he withdrew slowly from the field of battle, entered Krasny where he made a brief halt, then cut his way through as far as Liady[21]
Meanwhile, the Young Guard's capacity to resist the Russians was deteriorating rapidly, and Mortier ordered a retreat before his remaining troops were surrounded and destroyed.[22] As if on parade ground drill, the perfectly disciplined Guardsmen then turned about face and marched back to Krasny, absorbing a final, terrible barrage of Russian cannon shot as they retired.[23] [d]
Only 3,000 of the Young Guard's original 6,000 troops had survived the Russian shelling at the Losvinka. 17 November may have been the bloodiest day in the Young Guard's entire history.
The Young Guard's retreat did not end once it returned to Krasny. Mortier and Davout were so wary of the possibility that the inert Kutuzov might attack that they immediately joined the throng of troops, mobs and wagons rushing that moment to Liady. Only a weak rearguard under General Friederichs was left to hold Krasny. Ney's III Corps, having departed Smolensk only that morning, would not find Davout's I Corps in Krasny awaiting him.
Kutuzov delays the pursuit edit
Miloradovich and Golitsyn were not permitted by Kutuzov to persue the French and attack Krasny for several more hours.[e]
At 2:00 p.m., satisfied that the French were in full retreat and not intending to resist his troops' advance, Kutuzov finally allowed Tormasov to begin his enveloping movement west through Kutkovo and north to Dobraya. It would take Tormasov two hours to reach his destination, however, by which time the opportunity to encircle and destroy the Grande Armée would be past.[25]
Sometime around 3:00 p.m., Golitsyn's troops rushed into Krasny like a torrent, and Friederichs' rearguard quickly crumbled.
Napoleon retreats edit
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In short order, the Old Guard was following the IV Corps moving west out of Krasny, and the road to Orsha was clogged with soldiers and their wagonry. Huge mobs of civilians, fugitives, and stragglers preceded the retreating French troops.[26]
Just outside Krasny, on the western road to Liady, the French encountered an ambush by the small detachments of Ozharovsky and Rosen. A bedlam of exploding grapeshot, overturned wagons, careening carriages, and mobs of fugitives rushing in panic ensued. But the Red Lancers under Colbert and Latour-Maubourg forced the Russians aside, and Napoleon was finally marching on Orsha.[27]
The Krasnoy defile was an excellent place to stop a retreating army. In a deep, steep-sided ravine, a steep road, made even more difficult by the icy conditions, led to a narrow bridge. A large number of carriages and baggage piled up on the bridge. The infantry marched on, hampered by the other disorganized arms. The Emperor stepped back from the road, called together the officers and non-commissioned officers of the old guard, and told them he would not see the bonnets of his Grenadiers amid of such disorder: I am counting on you as you can count on me to accomplish great deeds.[28]
Another noteworthy but poorly documented event occurred in the next village Dobraya, when the hind end of the I Corps baggage train, including Davout's carriages, fell to the Cossacks. Among the booty captured by the Russians were Davout's war chest, a plethora of maps of the Middle East, Central Asia and India, his Marshal baton as one of the articles of peace with Tsar Alexander,[29] Perhaps kitchen utensils and a considerable amount of money.[30] Other sources state that Davout's baggage was captured earlier that day east of Krasny, or the previous day during the fighting with Eugène near Lyskovo or the ravine of the Losvinka. Georges Blond assumed it happened at Korytnya.[31] The staff did not receive any reports, and their orders either failed to arrive or else travelled so slowly that they arrived too late.[32] [f] Although in Russian service Wilson's narrative seems most credible as a contemporary.[33]
This feint of the Guard was lent additional melodrama by the personal presence of Napoleon, who lost his chancery. After a march of about three miles, he assembled the Old Guard, formed them into a square, and dismounting, thus harangued them: "Grenadiers of my Guard, you are witnesses of the disorganization of my army."[34] With his birch walking stick in hand, Napoleon placed himself at the helm of his Old Guard grenadiers, declaring "I have played the Emperor long enough! It is time to play general!"[35]
By nightfall on 17 November, Kutuzov had occupied Krasny and its surroundings with his 70,000 troops.
- ^ "Siméon Jean Antoine Fort | La Division Ricard au combat de Krasnoe le 18 novembre 1812, 9 h. du matin | Images d'Art".
- ^ Wilson, p. 269.
- ^ Beskrovny, L.G., Zhilin, P.A. and Y. Tarle.
- ^ Segur, p. 421.
- ^ John G. Gallaher (1997) Davout and Napoleon: A Study of Their Personal Relationship
- ^ Human voices from the Russian campaign of 1812 by Arthur Chuquet (1912)
- ^ Marguerye, Henri de
- ^ Rieksen, E.J. (2020) Voetstappen zonder echo, p. 99-100
- ^ a b Caulaincourt, p. 219.
- ^ a b Caulaincourt, p. 220.
- ^ Cate, p. 360
- ^ Alison's map in higher resolution
- ^ Segur, p. 202.
- ^ a b c d Wilson, p. 270.
- ^ Cate, p. 361.
- ^ Carnets et journal sur la campagne de Russie : extraits du Carnet de La Sabretache, années 1901-1902-1906-1912. Baron Jean Jacques Germain Pelet; M.E. Jordens; Guillaume Bonnet; Henri-Pierre Everts. Paris : Librairie Historique F. Teissèdre, 1997.
- ^ De veldtocht naar Rusland in 1812 onder keizer Napoleon by G. A. Geerts
- ^ Segur, p. 205.
- ^ THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812 IN RUSSIA by CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, p. 79
- ^ Wilson, p. 273
- ^ Segur, p. 204.
- ^ Naffziger, G.F. (1988) Napoleon's invasion of Russia, p. 311
- ^ Segur, p. 205.
- ^ Riehn, p. 355
- ^ Wilson, p. 273.
- ^ Zamoyski, pp. 422–423.
- ^ Wilson, pp. 273–274.
- ^ Mémoires militaires du lieutenant général comte Roguet, p. 514
- ^ Wilson, p. 274.
- ^ 1812 : Eyewitness accounts of Napoleon's defeat in Russia, p. 208
- ^ Blond, G. (1979) La Grande Armée, p. 381
- ^ 1812 : Eyewitness accounts of Napoleon's defeat in Russia, p. 233-234
- ^ History of Europe (from 1789 to 1815). Volume 10, p. 79-80 by sir Archibald Alison
- ^ Wilson, p. 283
- ^ Cate, p. 360; Segur, p. 202.
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