Rwandan Genocide
startApril 6, 1994
endMay 1994
death tollabout 800,000
HIV rates70% of survivors contracted HIV from rape
"The option of destroying yourself is both real and attractive" -- General Romeo Dallaire, on surviving Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide also sparked devastating conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Anthropology of the Rwandan Genocide explores a critical anthropological view of the atrocities that took place before, after and during the 100 day mass murder of Tutsi citizens and Hutu moderates who sympathized with the Tutsi. With a deeper understanding of the inner workings and culture of genocidal campaigns, there is a greater chance of recognizing signs to stop genocide.

History edit

The Paul Kagame, who led the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and Jean-Damascene Gasanabo, a consultant for UNESCO who researched the history leading up to the genocide, agree that these groups existed before European occupation, but were based primarily on wealth (measured in number of cows). [1]

Colonialism edit

Belgian colonialism played what is probably the largest role in the divide between the Tutsi and Hutu. While ethnic groups loosely existed before the genocide, the effects were extremely exacerbated by Belgians, especially in their exodus. When Belgians left Rwanda, the majority of the land and power was left to the Tutsi while Hutu were used as forced laborers or Akazi. The colonialist period created these ethnicities that came to hate each other over time through a great power struggle. Where there may not have been an ethnic divide before, colonialists created these cultures to perpetuate their control over the colonies.

Genocide edit

Hate Media edit

In addition to mass manipulation of familial and ethnic ties, the FAR and other perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide broadcasted radio stations and created newspapers aimed at generating a culture of hate against the Tutsi.

Radio edit

Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines was a creation of the Rwandan government that sent out constant messages of violence and encouragement for widespread murder during the Rwandan genocide. This measure may have been the most effective tool of genocide that made it the most devastating in history in terms of numbers and time period. [2] The radio sent messages of anti-Tutsi sentiment before the genocide, but reached a peak after the rebel forces killed the political leader. After this event, the radio was fervently asking for the swift elimination of all Tutsi [3]

The Rwandan government used the CNN effect to incite violence and hatred among individuals that may not have normally participated. Because of the illusion that media is fact-based, people tend to believe that everything broadcast is an unbiased representation of reality. Quickly, citizens not prone to murder are convinced to kill and mob mentality ensues-- neighbors, friends and relatives may begin to participate.

Print edit

The Kangura was a newspaper that was published in Rwanda that helped spread the genocide though to a lesser extent than the RTLM. The Kangura also asked its readers to commit genocide and murder the Tutsi "cockroaches", much like the hate radio. The executive Hassan Ngeze, who owned the Kangura, was sentenced to life in prison for ordering Hutu Interhamwe living in and around Kigali to murder their neighbors [4] While the hate newspapers did not send out direct locations and targets like the RTLM did, it still caused the genocide by creating a culture in which murder was accepted and even warranted [5]. Under normal circumstances, many of these killing groups would never have formed. However, when cultural contexts were created in which killing was ideal, normal people were inspired to commit heinous crimes.

Relationships edit

Family ties and relationships were manipulated by the Rwandan government as well as the Rwandan Armed Forces to create killing groups, or Interahamwe, throughout Kigali and more rural areas. Without these killing groups, the genocide would not have been nearly as effective and gruesome. [6] In her article on citizen participation in the genocide, Lee Ann Fujii argues that the Interhamwe formed not from hatred for Tutsi or the Rwandan Patriotic Front, but from "social dynamics that sometimes took precedence over ethnic considerations" [7]

International Intervention edit

There was a quick, swift response by the United Nations to remove all foreign citizens from Rwanda at the beginning of the violence in early April. However, outside of UN peace keepers of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, there were no attempts to stop the violence by individual countries until it was far too late.

United Nations edit

The United Nations received a fax from a Hutu official with a guilty conscience just before the genocide began in April of 1994. The fax detailed where, against whom and with exact what materials the genocide would be carried out. The information was never dealt with and United Nations peacekeepers were only sent in after the genocide was fully underway. In addition, the peacekeepers were sent with specific instructions not to interfere unless a fellow peacekeeper or self was in danger. In the United Nation's Capstone Doctrine, it states that peace keepers are to exercise their own judgement in stopping the violence; however, it is the job of the United Nations Security Council to use force.[8] Peace keepers from the United Nations did amazing things even with their limitations. One peace keeper from Senegal personally saved 1,000 people by simply driving them through check points to safety, a feat that no nation even attempted. [9] Others stood outside of churches where hundreds of Tutsi refugees hid; by simply guarding a door, the Interhamwe and other Hutu extremists simply did not try to trespass. [10]

A fax was sent from a Hutu man high in the ranks of the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain de Parmehutu to the United Nations and to the United States detailing the plans of genocide against the Tutsis that would take place shortly. The fax was ignored. For whatever reason, perhaps bureaucracy, the word of the genocide never spread far enough to enlist help from the Security Council. Many leaders today still say that they simply did not know the extent of the violence [11]

Rusesabagina, the man that the movie Hotel Rwanda was modeled after, was quoted saying:

“In a sense things got better after the peacekeepers left,' Rusesabagina told me. “People realized no one was going to help them.” [12]

Cultural patterns of nonintervention must change, especially within the United Nations. The Security Council failed to take action, as did the rest of the nations in the UN. Sending in peace keepers that are not given the appropriate tools to affect change is not a viable option.

America edit

Though it is still unknown the extent of the United States' awareness, it is certain that the country did not intervene in the Rwandan genocide. President Clinton claimed to have not fully understood the severity of the situation. Scholars have suggested that the President Clinton could not have known about the genocide until around April 20th 1994 when it became popularized in American media. The fighting was reported by newspapers around the world as being a civil war with both parties fighting rather than a genocidal campaign. However, the very few peoples who remained in Rwanda for parts of the genocide before fleeing report that almost every country knew something about the violence. For example, Carl Wilkens, the only American who stayed behind to lead the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International, reports thinking:

"If the people in Rwanda ever needed help, it now was the time. And everyone was leaving." [13]

It is likely that having had a political disaster in Somalia where eleven United States Marines were killed, President Clinton and his administration believed that they could not afford the further turn in political favor. It would seem that the combined effects of the media, who misrepresented the genocide, and a lack of popular support for humanitarian intervention for genocide resulted in the failure to intervene. From an anthropological standpoint, the effect of the media on Western societies is clear; the media often shapes the thoughts and opinions of the populous. Perhaps to prevent future genocides, a focus must be put on responsibility of the media to report these atrocities, and education of citizens so that they may understand genocide and hopefully support intervention. The United States and many other countries have never outright apologized for their lack of help with the genocide. President Clinton said while visiting:

"And so I say to you, though the road is hard and uncertain, and there are many difficulties ahead, and like every other person who wishes to help, I doubtless will not be able to do everything I would like to do, there are things we can do."

While he instilled a deep sense that measures would be taken in the future, no apology was never explicitly expressed.

War Rape/Sexual Assault edit

70% of all sexual assault victims in the Rwandan genocide are infected with HIV/AIDS. Of households in poverty, 60% are headed by women. 70% of the remaining population is women because more were kept alive to be raped during the genocide. Gacaca are courts set up locally to deal with all crimes committed during the genocide, except class one crimes which are dealt with nationally. One survivor told the story of the man who raped her and helped kill 295 of 300 people seeking refuge in these courts. He was released a decade later into the same community where she lives now [14] During the genocide, it was culturally acceptable/mandatory to stand by while women were raped. Maria Louise Niyobuhungiro recalls seeing local peoples, other generals and Hutu men watching her get raped about 5 times per day. Even when she was kept under watch of a woman, she would give no sympathy or help and furthermore, forced her to farm land in between rapes. "Rape was the rule, its absence the exception" [15].

Post-Genocide edit

Political Systems edit

Rwanda now has a democracy that is extremely progressive considering the extreme disorder that occurred after the genocide. There is an equal representation of Hutus and Tutsis as well as an equal representation between males and females (CITE). Post-genocide democracy in Rwanda can be dangerous. The first try at democracy was under Habyarimana just before his plane was shot down and the genocide began. Democratization had been prompted by French influences (international donors practically forcing the administration's hand) [16] Thus, the history with democracy is a shaky one. Because the idea had been presented as both a Tutsi imposition and a colonialist one, it remained a disdainful concept in the cultural mindset of the Hutu majority [17] In addition, there has always been a large "non-governmental sector" in Rwandan society that has hindered peace for decades. For instance, the existance of hate media, such as the Kangura (anti Tutsi newspaper), perpetuated a divide between ethnic groups [18]

Notes edit

  1. ^ Gasanabo, Jean-Damascene. "The Rwandan Akazi System, History and Humiliation". Social Alternatives Vol. 25.1. 2006. p.50
  2. ^ Silverman, Jon. "We Wish to Inform you That..."
  3. ^ "International Law- Genocide- The UN Finds Harvard Law Review: Vol 177 p. 2770
  4. ^ "Fanning Rwanda's Genocide" New York Times 5 Dec. 2003. p38.
  5. ^ "Fanning Rwanda's Genocide" New York Times 5 Dec. 2003. p38.
  6. ^ Fujii, Lee Ann. "The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide". Security Studies Issue 17. 2008: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. p1.
  7. ^ Fujii, Lee Ann. "The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide". Security Studies Issue 17. 2008: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. p3.
  8. ^ http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf
  9. ^ Barker, Greg. "Ghosts of Rwanda"
  10. ^ Barker, Greg. "Ghosts of Rwanda"
  11. ^ Barren, Greg "Ghosts of Rwanda". PBS Frontline Documentary.
  12. ^ Zakaria, Fareed. "When the UN Fails, We All Do". Newsweek: 13 Dec 2004. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/40908.html
  13. ^ Barren, Greg. Ghosts of Rwanda. PBS Frontline Documentary.
  14. ^ Ka Hon Chu, Sandra, and Anne-Marie de Brouwer. "the MEN who KILLED me." Herizons 22, no. 4 (Spring2009 2009): 16. EBSCOhost, MasterFILE Premier p18.
  15. ^ Ka Hon Chu, Sandra, and Anne-Marie de Brouwer. "the MEN who KILLED me." Herizons 22, no. 4 (Spring2009 2009): 16. EBSCOhost, MasterFILE Premier p16
  16. ^ Silva-Leander, Sebastian. "On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation: trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term peace in post-genocide Rwanda." Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (December 2008): 1601-1620. EBSCOhost, Military & Government Collection p2.
  17. ^ Silva-Leander, Sebastian. "On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation: trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term peace in post-genocide Rwanda." Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (December 2008): 1601-1620. Military & Government Collection p3.
  18. ^ Silva-Leander, Sebastian. "On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation: trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term peace in post-genocide Rwanda." Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (December 2008): 1601-1620. EBSCOhost, Military & Government Collection. p5.
[[Category:Anthropology]]
[[Category:Ethnography]]
[[Category:Genocides]]
[[Category:Rwandan Genocide]]
[[Category:1994 in Africa]]
[[Category:1990s in Africa]]
[[Category:Peacekeeping operations]]
[[Category:Peacekeeping missions and operations involving the United States]]
[[Category:United Nations operations in Rwanda]]
[[Category:Responsibility to protect]]