Anekāntavāda also known as the principle of relative pluralism, is one of the basic principles of Jainism. According to this, the truth or the reality is perceived differently from different points of view, and that no single point of view is the complete truth.[1] [2] Jain doctrine states that, an object has infinite modes of existence and qualities and, as such, they cannot be completely perceived in all its aspects and manifestations, due to inherent limitations of the humans. Anekāntavāda is literally the doctrine of non-onesidedness or manifoldness; it is often translated as "non-absolutism". Syādvāda is the theory of conditioned predication which provides an expression to anekānta by recommending that epithet “Syād” be attached to every expression. [3] Syādvāda is not only an extension of Anekānta ontology, but a separate system of logic capable of standing on its own force. As reality is complex, no single proposition can express the nature of reality fully. Thus the term “syāt” should be prefixed before each proposition giving it a conditional point of view and thus removing any dogmatism in the statement. .[4] The seven propositions also known as saptabhangi are[5]:
- Syād-asti – “in some ways it is”,
- syād-nāsti - “in some ways it is not”,
- syād-asti-nāsti - “in some ways it is and it is not”,
- syād-asti-avaktavyaḥ - “in some ways it is and it is indescribable”,
- syād-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ - “in some ways it is not and it is indescribable”,
- syād-asti-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ - “in some ways it is, it is not and it is indescribable”,
- syād-avaktavyaḥ- “in some ways it is indescribable”
Each of these seven propositions examines the complex and multifaceted reality from a relative point of view of time, space, substance and mode. To ignore the complexity of the objects is to commit the fallacy of dogmatism.
Syadvada edit
Sutrakritanga
FOURTEENTH LECTURE, CALLED THE NIRGRANTHA.
A monk living single should not ridicule heretical doctrines, and should avoid hard words though they be true; he should not be vain, nor brag, but he should without embarrassment and passion (preach the Law). (21) A monk should be modest 2 though he be of a fearless mind; he should expound the Syâdvâda 3; he should use the two (permitted) kinds of speech 4, living among virtuous men, impartial and wise. (22) Note : Vibhagyavâda. The saptabhaṅgînaya or seven modes of assertion are intended by the expression in the text.
JACOBI in Intro Thus, I think, that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañgaya, Mahâvîra has established the Syâdvâda. For as the Agñânavâda declares that of a thing beyond our experience the existence, or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence, can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a similar way, but one leading to contrary results, the Syâdvâda declares that 'you can affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view (syâd asti), deny it from another (syâd nâsti); and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times (syâd asti nâsti). If you should think of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (syâd avaktavyah). Similarly, under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible p. xxviii [paragraph continues] (syâd asti avaktavyah); of non-existence (syân nâsti avaktavyah); and also of both (syâd asti nâsti avaktavyah) 1.' This is the famous Saptabhaṅgînaya of the Gainas. Would any philosopher have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence some dangerous opponents? The subtle discussions of the Agnostics had probably bewildered and misled many of their contemporaries. Consequently the Syâdvâda must have appeared to them as a happy way leading out of the maze of the Agñânavâda. It was the weapon with which the Agnostics assailed the enemy, turned against themselves. Who knows how many of their followers went over to Mahâvîra's creed convinced by the truth of the Saptabhaṅgînaya!
Example edit
Syadvada can be explained by the analogy of a man “A” his relationship with others, say his son “B” and his father “C”
- From a perspective, A is a father. (from the perspective of B)
- From a perspective, A is not a father. (from the perspective of C)
- From a perspective, A is and is not a father. (from the different perspectives of B and C)
- From a perspective, A is indescribable. (from the combined perspective of B,C and numerous other relationships like – husband, grandfather, grandson, uncle, nephew, son-in-law, father-in-law, friend, employee, boss, subordinate etc.)
- From a perspective, A is a father and indescribable (from the perspective of B and other relations)
- From a perspective, A is not a father and is indescribable (from the perspective of C and other relations)
- From a perspective, A is and is not a father and is indescribable (from the combined perspective of B, C and other relations)
test edit
Gautama: Lord! Is the soul permanent or impermanent?
Māhavīra: The soul is permanent as well is impermanent. From the point of view of the substance it is eternal. From the point of view of its modes it undergoes birth, decay and destruction and hence impermanent.[6]
—Bhagvatisūtra, 7:58–59
Jayanti: Lord! Of the states of slumber or awakening, which one is better?
Māhavīra: For some souls the state of slumber is better, for some souls the states of awakening. Slumber is better for those who are engaged in sinful activities and awakening for those who are engaged in meritorious deeds.[7]
— Bhagvatisūtra, 12:53–54
- ^ Dundas, Paul (2002). The Jains. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-26606-8.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) (help) - ^ Koller, John M. (July 2000). "Syadvada as the Epistemological Key to the Jaina Middle Way Metaphysics of Anekantavada". Philosophy East and West. 50 (3). Honululu: 400–7. ISSN 0031-8221. Retrieved 2007-10-01.
- ^ Chatterjea, Tara (2001). Knowledge and Freedom in Indian Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. ISBN 739106929.
{{cite book}}: Check|isbn=value: length (help) p. 77-87 - ^ Koller, John M. (July 2000). "Syādvāda as the [[epistemological]] key to the Jaina middle way metaphysics of Anekāntavāda". Philosophy East and West. 50 (3). Honululu: Pp. 400-8. ISSN 0031-8221. ProQuest 216882163. Retrieved 2007-10-01.
{{cite journal}}:|pages=has extra text (help); URL–wikilink conflict (help) - ^ Grimes, John (1996). A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English. New York: SUNY Press. ISBN 0791430677. p. 312
- ^ Charitrapragya, Samani (2004) p. 75
- ^ Charitrapragya, Samani (2004) p. 76