Talk:Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus/Archive 2

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Revert related to numbers

Ok, I wonder what Noorani in Dawn was up to. Just one question, can we use a footnote/efn to explain this? Which goes something like this,

1. Higher figures have been stated OR
2. Higher figures have been stated which include... ref1 ref2 ref3
3. edit Higher and lower figures have been stated

I know the footnote is not there to fill with less noteworthy stuff, but I can't wrap my head around Noorani using this figure. The talk page discussion you have linked is very helpful. However, you talk of due weight. Clearly, 700,000 would be beyond what would constitute due weight by Wikipedia policy. How about we look at this from the viewpoint of the higher figures... then... we replace 700,000 your above statement with 100,000— Clearly, 100,000 would be beyond what would constitute due weight by Wikipedia policy. But then when we couple this with your second point, census data, your line of argument acquires due weightage.

In the revert a few more lines were taken out as collateral damage, I assume. I will restore this particular one, In 2021, the Jammu and Kashmir relief office recorded 39,782 Hindu migrant families who had migrated from the valley due to security reasons since 1990. This is out of a total of 44,167 registered Kashmiri migrant families. These figures from the JK Relief Office also contradict Noorani and other high counts more than 500,000. Not only 500,000 and above, even 100,000 and above, even if we assume that 50% of exiled refugees have not registered themselves. This is a quick comment, I do not know how the JK Relief Office functions. DTM (talk) 06:43, 22 December 2021 (UTC)

Yes, we should definitely mention the number of "registered refugees", but these are most likely those that live in refugee camps in Jammu. They wouldn't cover the people who have migrated out of J&K. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:24, 22 December 2021 (UTC)

References

Importance and lack of importance of numbers

If one person was part of the exodus from Kashmir, we wouldn't be bothering about this. 10, no. 10000, maybe but no. 50,000 yes. 60,000 yes. After a certain point, it doesn't matter if it is two million or ten million, both are bad. Then again, the importance of the sub-units of those part of the exodus also matter. DTM (talk) 06:49, 22 December 2021 (UTC)

Please read WP:TERTIARY, which states, "Many introductory undergraduate-level textbooks are regarded as tertiary sources because they sum up multiple secondary sources. Policy: Reliable tertiary sources can help provide broad summaries of topics that involve many primary and secondary sources and may help evaluate due weight, especially when primary or secondary sources contradict each other." When one of the most widely-used books worldwide on modern Indian history, Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf's A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge University Press, 2012, says, "When some 100,000 of a total of 140,000 Kashmiri Pandits left the valley, and their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right." and two monographs, one by Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Harvard University Press, 2003), and the other by Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir, Princeton University Press (2004), mention more or less the same statistics, and a widely used graduate textbook, Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh's The Partition of India, Cambridge University Press, 2009 has an estimate that is only higher by 40,000, our hands are tied.

Noorani's article in the Dawn which begins with a peremptory, "In 1990, on the outbreak of militancy, around 700,000 to 800,000 Pandits fled from Kashmir," i.e. which is 550,000 higher in number, flies in the face of historical statistics. The ratio of Muslims and Hindus in the Kashmir valley remained invariant in all the censuses of the British Indian Empire from 1871 to 1941 (Muslims approx 95%, Hindus approx 4 to 5%).

In the 1941 Census of the British Raj, the population of Muslims in the Kashmir valley was 1,110,127 (See for example: Christopher Sneddon's Independent Kashmir: An Incomplete Aspiration, Manchester University Press, 2021, Appendix II). Back calculating from Noorani, would put the Hindu population in 1941 to be 330,000, which is approximately 23%).

I'm sorry but in the matter of Kashmir, all sources are not equal. It is very important that third-party academic sources be used. I've added some more sources and made the lead more NPOV. No one is saying that what happened to the Kashmiri Pandits was not awful, even if as you rightly say, only 10,000 were driven out. Ethnic cleansing, if that is what caused it, is ethnic cleansing, and should be anathematized. But equally, numbers need to be accurate and the history of the evolution needs to be accurately stated. In what they did to the Muslims for nearly a century and a half, the Hindus were not entirely innocent. The pressure had been building up. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:29, 22 December 2021 (UTC)

Changes /Shuffling in the lead

An editor @Jhy.rjwk: has shuffled the paragraphs in the lead and removed some sentences. I submit that they need to make a case here for their edits per WP:BRD. Best, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:25, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

Case about a Sentence Change: Hi Fowler&fowler Please note that the sentence "The Kashmiri Hindus left in much greater numbers in the early 1990s,[7]" is misleading in it's tone which suggests voluntary leaving, while the the cited BBC source clearly mentions "driven out" and "forced exodus" due to the increased threat of militancy To get the correct tone and perspective, please refer to the cited BBC source,more specifically "In the beginning there was a lot of fear, nights were eerily silent. If a cat jumped on to the roof we thought militants had come to kill us", Mr Tikku tells the BBC.

Therefore, it should be replaced by a more relevant sentence, supported by sources, such as: In the early 1990s, a large scale exodus the Kashmiri Hindus happenned [7], with the increased threat of militancy in the region Jhy.rjwk (talk) 20:15, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

@Jhy.rjwk: You do have a point, but the sources you've added are not reliable ones. In my view, in the matter of Kashmir, third-party sources, i.e. not from South Asia are best, and scholarly ones among those are to be preferred. Please give me a day or two to look for the sources and see how they describe the evolution of the exodus. As you very likely know, the Kashmiri Hindus were not entirely innocent. For decades they had supported Indian government policies even when they fell foul of Kashmiri nationalism (a la Sheikh Abdullah) and when they were brutal. As you also likely know, earlier, before the land reforms of 1950, a majority of the landlords in the princely state were Hindus, and in the valley, a good proportion were Pandits, though there were poor Pandits too. My point is that, this is a complicated history and simply talking about the final event without the history of how it happened introduces its own POV. Obviously both India and Pakistan, even their leading liberal intellectuals, have blind spots when it comes to Kashmir. So, please give me a couple of days as I look for the scholarly sources. Thanks, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:09, 27 December 2021 (UTC)

Thanks Fowler&fowler for being open to discussion and looking at all given facts of the case. I agree that any historical event is complicated with several POV, and we have to present a neutral POV here. There are many other Kashmir related pages on Wiki that provide information on the evolution of Kashmir conflict. In my humble view, this page should focus more on Exodus of K.Hindus. Kashmiri Hindus may not be innocent but they were driven away after brutal threats and murders by the militants in 1990 -1992, and this is not highlighted in the lead introduction yet.

Also, we may avoid making isolated judgements on WP:RS for highly reputed and widely circulated newspapers like The Indian Express and The Times of India, whoose references are widely accepted on Wikipedia pages; and they should not be rejected just for being from South Asia. Instead, we should make efforts on multiple reliable sources, instead of basing important conclusions on any single source, even if it's a book from third party country. Many Scholars from third party countries also have their biases and therefore single sourced citataions are not very reliable for Kashmir. Again, I appreciate your open view, and look forward to a healthy discussion to provide more neutral lead as per WP:Purpose Jhy.rjwk (talk) 01:18, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

Agree with Kautilya3 Restored revision 1061545392 by DiplomatTesterMan (talk): Sorry, Fowler&fowler the lead is not the place for this kind of history.

Kautilya3 Jhy.rjwk (talk) 05:14, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

@Jhy.rjwk: Again, please discuss the issue here as much as you want, but please do not edit war. The Times of India, for example, is not reliable in such matters. See Wikipedia:Reliable_sources/Noticeboard/Archive_287#Times_of_India_RFC. See also 2020 Delhi riots and 2019 Balakot airstrike in the leads of neither of which have South Asian newspapers been used. In fact, I began to edit the Delhi riots article per K3's request on my user talk page, so I do have a reputation of some integrity in these matters. Please allow me to finish. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 10:14, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

Apparently, there is a 1RR restriction on this page, so my hands are tied and I've self-reverted. But edit warring is not the way forward. We can't add a quote from Alexander Evans in the lead to replace a more nuanced statement of the factors that might have caused the exodus. I will edit offline for a while and edit once the 24 hours have elapsed. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 10:28, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

@Jhy.rjwk:Please also note that I said, "You do have a point." That means I am attempting to change the stress in the lead to highlight the bigger exodus. Please note that what state the lead is in (whether in your recent version here or K3's or DTM's) is the result of the earlier changes I made in the article. Before I edited the article on 14 August 2021, this was the state it was in. By my last edit of 14 August, this is what it had become, and it is more or less the stable version of the article. Earlier, both K3 and DTM had been aware of the article even if they had not edited it substantially (see here and here). Best, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:27, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

References

Here is the diff of my version from DTM's version from 22 December, which I will call the base line. The added content is quite minimal and well-sourced.

The Pandit exodus is not a well-understood issue, academically. There has been very little attention paid to it. So, I can't accept that tertiary sources are somehow much better at figuring out a good summary. The Talbot-Singh book is especially problematic because its two authors are of vastly different capabilities and standing. Gurharpal Singh is a known POV scholar. So, I would prefer if the lead just stuck to facts. You can add all the theories in the body, and of course the Pandits' own theories would also need to go here. That is what WP:NPOV requires. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:20, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

Please allow me to finish. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:47, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

How about using your sandbox? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:14, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

An interesting comment on Gurharpal Singh:

Further, he sometimes overstates the argument that India is a meta-ethnic state (meaning Hindu-dominated) engaged in processes of ‘ethnic oppression’ (p. 203, referring to Kashmir, for example).

I notice that this very opinion has been used in the contested verison of the lead (in addition to being wildly off-topic). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:00, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

The book I have used is: Partition of India by Talbot and Singh (Cambridge 2009), a major textbook on the partition. It has been cited in 279 other scholarly articles and monographs. Three reviews sum up the book in this fashion:

• Sharma, Jayeeta, "A Review of "The Partition of India" Talbot, Ian, and Gurharpal Singh, New York: Cambridge University Press 224 pp., $29.99, ISBN 978-0521672566 Publication Date: August 2009", History: Review of New Books, 39 (1): 26–27, doi:10.1080/03612759.2011.520189, Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh's book provides an authoritative overview of the partition itself, its complex and contested historiography, its wider implications, and its current ramifications. It is an invaluable resource for scholars of migration, displacement, refugees, decolonization, national politics and memory, and mass violence, as well as area studies in South Asia. The authors introduce their subject with a masterly outline of historiography of partition and show how the contested nature of this historiography both emerges from and has shaped deep-rooted differences in national indentities and political destinies in modern South Asia. ... For historians, this book is a most useful introduction to the rich crop of recent research works on the social and political dimensions of modern South Asia's partition. ... this is a most valuable volume, especially as a tool for classroom teaching.
• Sheikh, Farzana (2011), "Review of THE PARTITION OF INDIA. By Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. xvii, 206 pp. (Tables, maps, B&W photos.) US$85.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-85661-4; US29.99, paper, ISBN 978-0-521-6756-6.", Pacific Affairs, 84 (1), Ian Talbot is widely respected as a historian of Pakistan and is the author of a number of critically acclaimed studies of Punjab under colonial rule. Gurharpal Singh, who shares a common interest in Punjab, has made valuable contributions to the study of ethnic conflict that are key to a better understanding of Partition. Now working as a team they have skilfully synthesized a vast body of complex historiographical debates on the causes of Partition and sought at every turn to rescue its history from the political agendas of its key protagonists, namely the nation-states of India and Pakistan.
• Major, Andrew (December 2010), "Review of Ian Talbot, Gurharpal Singh. The Partition of India. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 206 pp. $29.99, paper, ISBN 978-0-521-67256-6", H-Net Reviews in the Humanities and Social Sciences, In sum, this is a sophisticated work by two eminent scholars that greatly widens and deepens our understanding of India's division in 1947 and of its lasting legacies and significance for the people of India and Pakistan. With its attention to recent advances in Partition historiography, and with the provision of maps, photographs, a glossary, and a chronology of main events from 1937 to 1947, this volume will be appreciated by all teachers and students of modern South Asia.

Per WP policy that is what matters. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 19:02, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

References

User:Jhy.rjwk It isn't a good idea to cite newspapers when the scholars differ on the subject. You should cite scholarly sources to assert your points. Here is relevant comment from a scholar [1]

The reality was much more complex than as portrayed by simplistic understandings of the reason of the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. Neither it was the case of the Kashmiri Muslims operating in a planned manner to throw Kashmiri Pandits out, so that Kashmir could become an Islamic society, nor the Pandits left because their migration was ‘engineered’. The reality is much more layered and different.

Akshaypatill (talk) 20:50, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

User:Fowler&fowler This book [2] has covered in detail, everything about the policies of the Hindu rulers and how the Hindu rulers favoured only their own people and neglected others.

The Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics [3] basically iterates the same thing as mentioned by Talbot and Singh about the election, the killings by Army and the detention without trial. Akshaypatill (talk) 21:31, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

I've used Mridu Rai in Kashmir-related articles starting a few years after it was published by Princeton in 2003 or 4 and it is cited in this article as well. Rekha Chowdhury's book I've seen, as I have the Routledge Handbook, but I'm sticking to text-books for now (and widely cited monographs such as Rai's) for reasons given in WP:TERTIARY, which states: "Many introductory undergraduate-level textbooks are regarded as tertiary sources because they sum up multiple secondary sources. Policy: Reliable tertiary sources can help provide broad summaries of topics that involve many primary and secondary sources and may help evaluate due weight, especially when primary or secondary sources contradict each other." Stick to the widely-used internationally recognized textbooks and only when they disagree are other sources needed. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:09, 28 December 2021 (UTC)

If these passages of Talbot-Singh book are summing up multiple secondary sources, we should be able to find ample secondary sources that state the same views. Where are they? (I am referring in particular to the "decades of ethnic oppression" claim.) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:30, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: If "ethnic" was the problem, you should have simply tagged "ethnic" with an inline {{clarify}}. What was the need for all this drama? As you must know, even the version you have reverted to is hardly DTM's. The wording is all mine. Both you and he were aware of the very poor old version of the article (which I was not), but did not oppose its claims with the energy with which you seem to be opposing mine. This is very uncharacteristic of you. It is not a big deal. When I find time I will integrate more sources. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:19, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

@Fowler&fowler:, My first objection as stated in the edit summary is that "the lead is not the place for this kind of history".

My second objection is that I find Gurharpal Singh a POV scholar and, therefore, his views (or "arguments" as Paul Brass calls them) can be stated only with WP:in-text attribution, never as a fact.

These are the kind of principles that I myself would follow everywhere. So I am not making any new rules here.

The background section can cover more of the background, but again WP:DUE would mean that only those facts and views that are stated in some reliable source as the background to the Exodus can go in there. We can't construct our own narrative. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:21, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

• Agree with Kautilya3 that the Talbot-Singh book's wild claims may not be sufficient as a single source.

If these passages of Talbot-Singh book are summing up multiple secondary sources, we should be able to find ample secondary sources that state the same views. Where are they? ("decades of ethnic oppression" claim.)

Hi Akshaypatill I agree that Scholars and Books differ on this subject, which shows that some Scholars & Books may be biased, so it's best to avoid any Single source citation in this subject ,and find support from multiple secondary sources. Also, there is no WP policy that mentions to avoid Reputed Newspapers, so they can be used along with Scholarly work. I agree that a single Newspaper article should not be used as citation.

Hi User:Fowler&fowler We cannot rely on any single book or author as the Final Truth in this contested subject matter. Any single source can be very biased such as your favorite book [4]

User:Fowler&fowler's lead version does not look appropriate for this page, whoose focus should be on K. Hindu Exodus, instead you focussed more on historical oppression of Muslims In Kashmir to justify militancy.

User:Fowler&fowler Please make a new Wikipedia page if you want to discuss the oppression of "Muslim peasants under the Kashmiri Hindu rulers", which is not a direct subject matter of this page. You wide historical knowledge on that topic should be will be better used for separate page on that topic about the K. Hindu Dogra rule from 1846 to 1947, in which mainly Dogras got land grants and even Kashmiri Pandits did not get land grants.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/44156274 LANDLORDS, PEASANTS AND THE DOGRA RULE IN KASHMIR Showkat Ahmad Naik 2012

We need multiple secondary sources to provide a neutral view on the issue as per WP:PURPOSE

Therefore, the lead version of Kautilya3 should be kept, and not reverted.

Jhy.rjwk (talk) 03:11, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

User:Jhy.rjwk There is nothing wrong with citing a newspaper. But you are giving undue weight to the newspaper articles. You are comparing a scholar's years worth research and work to a journalist's article. If you are to negate a scholar's work, you need cite another scholar. You will get the same feedback, if this is taken to WP:RSN, which will just waste time. And anyway Fowler has already told that he is considering your point.Akshaypatill (talk) 03:48, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

After reading the different lead versions, I find that Fowler's lead version does not have appropriate focus for this page's topic on Exodus.

Agree with Kautilya3 and K3's lead version which is the most neutral view and should should be kept as per WP:PURPOSE, and not reverted.

Jhy.rjwk (talk) 03:59, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

User:Jhy.rjwk Please indent your reply with an appropriate number of colons. You are making the replies hard to read. See WP:INDENT. Akshaypatill (talk) 04:38, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

Fowler should refrain from Reverts to the contested version without discussing on Talk page

K3's lead version is the well cited neutral view and clearly focussed on Exodus, the main topic of this page should be kept. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 05:27, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

If I had the sense that you had made any productive, articulate, or coherent contribution in the discussion above @Jhy.rjwk: I would attempt to reply. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:25, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

• Can you all please INDENT your posts for the sake of my eyes? I cannot follow much of anything in this maze of a discussion but I cannot understand why Kautilya3 believes Jugdeem Chima's (decent) review to be some kind of damning indictment of Singh as a "POV-scholar". Brass' remark is more to-the-point. In any case, the argument that India has been a meta-ethnic democracy long before the Modi-regime is not some kind of pioneer thesis (see recent pubs. of Brass, where he concedes more ground) and is increasingly gaining force in scholarship. TrangaBellam (talk) 19:41, 29 December 2021 (UTC)
  • Dropping a quote from Mridu Rai's excellent chapter: "Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past",

    The reluctance to acknowledge a longer history of drifting relations between Kashmir’s Muslims and Pandits exculpates Pandits from any responsibility for the divisions that have riven the Kashmiri society. They become the hapless victims of an irrationally enraged majority besetting them without provocation [...]

    Members of the Pandit community had relied on the wider Hindu nation to protect their interests well before the exodus. Ironically, when Kashmiri Muslims expressed affinity with the wider world of Islam, the same Pradeep Kaul had labelled them anti-national [...]

    As for the rhetoric, history has demonstrated the pragmatic shifts Pandits have frequently made in their allegiances. After all many had turned into Kashmiri regionalists in the early twentieth century to fend competition from outsiders and then into Indian nationalists from the 1930s to ward off threats to their regional dominance by their more numerous Muslim compatriots. It is, therefore, not anomalous for large numbers among them to have turned into Hindu nationalists more recently. Their shaping of their past has certainly primed many into claiming high status in India as the purest Hindus of all. And with a little help from the saffron brotherhood of India, the clock might yet be turned back and Kashmir made Hindu again.

    TrangaBellam (talk) 19:59, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

    Hi TB, It is not clear to me whether you are proposing any edit to the page, especially the lead. We can't keep arguing for argument's sake. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:27, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

    I wonder if what TB means is that while "ethnic" itself may or may not be the best descriptor, the bulk of Talbot and Singh's summary is not far off the mark if the supporting evidence in Rai is to be believed. There was suppression of Muslim aspirations in Kashmir not just before 1947, but also after. In it, the Pandits were not innocent bystanders. Whereas what happened to them is not to be condoned in the least, the briefest medium-term history of how it happened is important to describe in the lead. In some ways from the mid-1940s, they were more wedded to India than to Kashmir. The Muslims had nowhere else to go, even during the height of Indian brutalization at the end of the century, as well as the violence caused by Pakistan and the insurgents. Manyfold more Muslims were killed in the turmoil of the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s, but very few left Kashmir, in relative numbers. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:41, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

    From TB's proposed addition using Mridu Rai's contested narrative, the only part that is neutral and supported by tertiary sources is:

    Members of the Pandit community had relied on the wider Hindu nation to protect their interests well before the exodus...Kashmiri Muslims expressed affinity with the wider world of Islam.

    Jhy.rjwk (talk) 00:25, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

    Agree with Kautilya3 that the background section can cover more of such background, rather than adding contested historical narratives in the lead version. Jhy.rjwk (talk) 00:43, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

    @Jhy.rjwk: Which tertiary source? In the Kashmir article in the primary encyclopedia in the English language, Britannica, the Pandits are conspicuous by their complete absence. And another tertiary source says:

    The year 1989 marked the beginning of a continuing insurgency, fuelled by covert support from Pakistan. The uprising had its origins in Kashmiri frustration at the state's treatment by Delhi. The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Upwards of 100,000 of them left the state during the early 1990s; their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right. As the government sought to locate ‘suspects’ and weed out Pakistani ‘infiltrators’, the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris.

    I'm happy to go with that in the lead. Or are we going to say that Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf's widely used undergraduate textbook A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge University Press, 2012, cited in 839 scholarly works, is also biased? Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:40, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

    I wonder if what TB means is that while "ethnic" itself may or may not be the best descriptor, the bulk of Talbot and Singh's summary is not far off the mark if the supporting evidence in Rai is to be believed. - Precisely.

    What happened with the Pandits is absolutely condemnable but as Mridu Rai and many other scholars (I can think of about a dozen) show, that did not foment independently of them oppressing Muslims for decades—actively or passively—, and bonhomie-ing with the Hindu Right as well as an Indian State, hell-bent on Hinduising Kashmir and stripping off their rights.

    If you want more focus on the episode of 90s, which I believe is a valid argument, you need to cover these backgrounds too. Even if not as acutely as Talbot et al put it. TrangaBellam (talk) 15:21, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

Arbitrary break

Again, I agree with K3 that such historical narrative should be added in the Background and not in the lead version.

Given the increasing content for Background, we may rename Background to "Historical background", and add several relevant subsections such as Reign of Sikandar Shah (1389-1413), Mughal Kashmir, Durrani Empire (1752–1819), Dogra rule (1846-1947), 1947 Accession to India, 1950 Land reforms, etc..

Many scholars have noted the Kashmiri Hindu migration in the reign of Sikandar Shah Miri (also known as Sikandar Butshikan), as the first exodus of Kashmiri Hindus.

A related quote from Bill K. Koul, 2020 The Exiled Pandits of Kashmir: Will They Ever Return Home? Page 208 ::: https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Exiled_Pandits_of_Kashmir/CW78DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=first+exodus+of+kashmiri+Pandits+Sikandar&pg=PA208&printsec=frontcover

Sultan Sikandar Butshikan initiated the first wave of exodus of many Pandits from the valley.

Please note extensive Citations below mentioning persecution in Kashmir under Sikandar Butshikan.

Extended content

Aggarwal, Neil (2008-07-01), "Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier", Interventions, 10 (2): 222–235, doi:10.1080/13698010802145150, ISSN 1369-801X, S2CID 143912163 AHMAD, AZIZ (1979), "Conversions to Islam in the Valley of Kashmir", Central Asiatic Journal, 23 (1/2): 3–18, ISSN 0008-9192, JSTOR 41927246 Hasan, Mohibbul (2005), Kashmīr Under the Sultāns, Aakar Books, pp. 59–95, ISBN 978-81-87879-49-7 Slaje, Walter (2019), "A Glimpse into the Happy Valley's Unhappy Past: Violence and Brahmin Warfare in Pre-Mughal Kashmir", Brahma's Curse : Facets of Political and Social Violence in Premodern Kashmir, Studia Indologica Universitatis Halensis - 13, p. 5, ISBN 978-3-86977-199-1 Witzel, Michael (September 1991), The Brahmins of Kashmir (PDF) Accardi, Dean (2017), "Embedded Mystics: Writing Lal Ded and Nund Rishi into the Kashmiri Landscape", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 247–264, ISBN 978-1-107-18197-7, retrieved 2021-02-03 Jhy.rjwk (talk) 02:10, 30 December 2021 (UTC) Even Mridu Rai accepts the persecution memories of Sikandar Shah on Page 286 In the course of this mass migration, Kashmiri Pandits have recalled memories of the persecutions of Sultan Sikandar Another quote from D. N. Dhar · 2005 Kashmir, a Kaleidoscopic View - Page 76 https://www.google.com/books/edition/Kashmir_a_Kaleidoscopic_View/p0NuAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=first+exodus+of+kashmiri+Pandits+Sikandar&dq=first+exodus+of+kashmiri+Pandits+Sikandar&printsec=frontcover Kashmiri Pandits... When the first exodus took place during the time of Sikander Butshiken Jhy.rjwk (talk) 06:12, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

I think the widely cited oppression of the Kashmiri Hindus in the reign of Sikandar Shah Miri deserves atleast a brief mention in the lead, but Kautilya3 may be in a better position to decide whether to include it in the lead version or just have it in the Background. Jhy.rjwk

User:Jhy.rjwk Apparently, Chitralekha Zutshi's book has called the migration an involuntary migration in the introduction chapter. Here - [5]

Displacement has defined the experience of another group in Jammu and Kashmir, the Kashmiri Pandits, whose responses to their involuntary migration in the wake of the insurgency form the subject of Haley Duschinski’s essay.

Akshaypatill (talk) 08:38, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

User:Fowler&fowler I didn't notice it earlier but, you had wholly neglected the immediate cause of the exodus, which was the insurgence and accompanied militancy, violence, fear etc. I hope you were going to add it. This too has to be weighed accordingly. Akshaypatill (talk) 11:15, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

User:Akshaypatill, Well, I was going to but am not being given a chance by the drama here which has now become unproductive. The version in place right now is also mine, except for four sentences K3 has added, "Alexander Evans states that 'a mere handful' of them remain in the Valley. A number of those that left, live in refugee camps in Jammu, where the conditions are grim. The reasons for their exodus continue to be debated. They range from targeted killings of Pandits by the separatist militants and threats issued in local newspapers, to local government's encouragement." The last paragraph of my version before my attempted expansion already speaks to your description As you will have seen above, the tertiary sources (see WP:TERTIARY) (as Metcalf and Metcalf, Talbot and Singh, Britannica), don't say much about the Pandits, and when they do the description is not one of "being forced to." In other words, it is not clear that they were forced, though they did perceive the conditions to be threatening. The four sentences K3 has added suggest the same in some more detail. Its not a big deal. I'm happy to hold my horses until what I perceive as drama on this page dies down. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:44, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

Allright. I didn't know that you had added it. Akshaypatill (talk) 11:58, 30 December 2021 (UTC)

UNDUE long quotation

I am removing the UNDUE long quotation from this passage:

In the Kashmir valley, the Pandits, at less than 5% of the population owned 30% of the arable land.

References

Obviously, one sentence from this long quotation is required for support and citing a page number would be quite sufficient. The rest of it is really WP:COATRACKing.

I would also like to highlight what Mridu Rai says about it:

Although not all Kashmiri Pandits were by any means wealthy landowners, nor the only members of the landed elite, large landholdings were certainly common among them.[189] It is said that over 30 per cent of the land in the valley belonged to them prior to the reforms, much of which had been obtained at the time of the first settlement of the 1880s. An equally large proportion was obtained through purchase after 1934, when proprietary rights were granted to Kashmiri cultivators following the agitation of 1931-2.[190] Considering that the Pandits comprised approximately 5 per cent of the Kashmiri population, their control of over 30 per cent of the land speaks for significantly large holdings. However, Pandits did not resist the abolition of big landed estates quite as shrilly as did their Dogra counterparts.[191]

I might also add that the reforms of the 1880s and the introduction of land-ownership in 1930's were done at the behest of British instigation. Lest anybody think 5% of the population owning 30% of the land as being abnormal, let me quote the stats for British-ruled Bihar province:

A sample survey of 1951 showed that in Bihar Brahmins and Rajputs together, although comprising only 9.6% of the families surveyed, still made up 78.6% of landowners.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 02:34, 1 January 2022 (UTC)

References

Kautilya3 (talk) 02:34, 1 January 2022 (UTC)

It has nothing to do with being abnormal. Bihar never got the land reforms that Kashmir did in 1950. And the reason is that the Constitution of India, newly promulgated but already rendered ineffectual in the realm of land redistribution by conservatives in the constituent assembly, had no power to implement the kind of land reforms that Kashmir, being independent of it, fell subject to.

As for the earlier British land reforms, the British Raj page speaks to that in the context of post-1857 dispensation: "At the same time, it was felt that the peasants, for whose benefit the large land-reforms of the United Provinces had been undertaken, had shown disloyalty, by, in many cases, fighting for their former landlords against the British. Consequently, no more land reforms were implemented for the next 90 years: Bengal and Bihar were to remain the realms of large landholdings (unlike the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh)."

Kashmir, therefore, had the most radical land reforms in South Asia in one hundred years. The Pandits at 5% of the population owned 30% of the land, which means they owned relatively large amounts per capita. Sheikh Abdullah's land reforms of 1950 put the ceiling at 22 acres; the rest was given away to landless peasants and tenant farmers, all of whom were Muslim and low-caste Hindus and had been exploited (in a medieval manner) for 150 years by Sikhs and upper-caste Hindus. In other words, the Pandits stood to lose their wealth in a way that no big landlord in Bihar did. 20% left in the period 1947 to 1950 because they were cutting their losses. They may have been the bigger landholders among the Pandits, but it is unimportant for the purposes of an exodus.

I add long quotes in citations so that articles can be expanded and others can see the paraphrasing in context. Quoting only the very relevant bit promotes cherry-picking of sources and paragraphs that lack cohesion. I do it everywhere. Nothing more to it. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:35, 1 January 2022 (UTC)

To give an example of my point. If Alexander Evans had been quoted at greater length is the following manner: Evans, Alexander (2002). "A departure from history: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990-2001". Contemporary South Asia. 11 (1): 19–37, 20. doi:10.1080/0958493022000000341. ISSN 0958-4935. In early 1990, large numbers of KPs began leaving the Kashmir Valley. Over 100,000 left in a few months; some 160,000 in total have left the Kashmir Valley since. Not all KPs have left; but a mere handful remain today. Most of the original 1990 migrants left for Jammu, where they lived in squalid refugee camps, to begin with, but, by 1997, most had moved on, either to proper homes in Jammu or to cities elsewhere in India. Conditions in the refugee camps were, and still are, grim. We could expand your excellent paraphrasing:

Alexander Evans states that "a mere handful" of them remain in the Valley. A number of those that left, live in refugee camps in Jammu, where the conditions are grim.

to something along the lines of:

Kashmiri Pandits initially moved to Jammu, where they lived in refugee camps among squalor; but by 1997, they had mostly moved to proper housing in Jammu or to urban areas in other parts of India. Writing in 2001, Alexander Evans observed that a small fraction had remained in grim refugee camps and a mere handful were in the Valley."

So, there's an advantage in longer quotes; others can vet, correct, expand on, contextualize, your initial edits.

Al safa

On 14 April 1990, another Srinagar based newspaper named Al-safa republished the same warning - Quite not; it was an obscure military commander giving bytes. HM noted him to be a "false militant" (whether he was a part of he organization remains doubtful; it was either a false flag or HM disowning rogue cadres) and the newspaper issued a clarification.

For some background on why the inflammatory piece was carried: Al-Safa's founder M.S. Vakil was a leading figure in the human rights scene (but no saint) and was far from being friends with the establishment. C. late March, CRPF raided the newspaper office and (lit.) lynched their staff - it was the second time in postcolonial Kashmir since '48. Al-Safa provided some of the most detailed coverage of the late 80s and early 90s chronicling exploits of militants and security forces in equal depth with some decent investigative journalism and ignored the (unwritten) convention of mainstream Kashmiri Media to ignore excesses of both sides. To aid in the process, Vakil eased editorial safeguards; news were to be carried by-default rather than the other way round even if the result was a gossip-vine than a respectable newspaper.

Anyways, Jagmohan had the newspaper banned for a few weeks in response to the piece. HM did some kind of "public conference" at Tashgao where it reiterated how this was a Jehad against the state than any community. Ironically, Vakil will fell to militants exactly a year later.

Regrettably, no scholar has bothered to mine Al safa archives till date. A glance at their news-feed shows that KMs fell almost at the same rate as KPs - all it took was for some militant honcho to doubt you as a state apparatchik. I remember that Muslims were often murdered for "pretending" to be militants and oppressing Kashmiris [theft etc.], thus bringing a "dispute" to real militants (or so went the official militant version!)

Long story short, there are many details that are integral to our understanding of KP exodus but are yet to surface out in non-vernacular press. I don't think this is an article worth devoting much time to or losing sleep over; we need scholars who are willing to do their job—rather than recycle the same old narratives and parrot others in a circular fashion—at the first place. TrangaBellam (talk) 06:51, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

Evans writes:

Two Srinagar-based newspapers carried threats against the Pandits. These threats, carried in Alsafa and Srinagar Times on 16 April 1990, were allegedly supported by both Hizbul Mujahideen, a leading militant group, and the JKLF.[18: Prof. Foteh Dhar interview, 16 March 1997] M.K. Teng and C.L. Gadoo publish a translation of an ultimatum from Hizbul Mujahideen published in Alsafa on 14 April 1990 that says 'all Pandits from Jammu & Kashmir should leave from here in two days'.[19: Teng & Gadoo, White Paper on Kashmir, p.116]

Jagmohan banning the newspaper hardly makes any difference. It was Hizbul Mujahideen that issued the threats, and it wasn't under his control. It was under ISI's control, if there was anybody controlling it at all. The constitution of HM was only made in June 1990, by which time the Pandit exodus was a done deal.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:23, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

The "White Paper" also claimed of temples being desecrated left and right in Kashmir, which turned out to be false upon inspection by a human rights retinue. Or that Hindus were living in Kashmir since stone age. Or that the economic condition of an average Pandit was worse than the poorest of Muslims.

I am not sure how the quote from Evans disproves any of my points: it was not my claim that Jagmohan's (justified) ban had any mitigating effect. Just an observation. TrangaBellam (talk) 17:50, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

References

Criminal gangs and Islamic radicals

I am removing this bit:

infiltration by criminal gangs and Islamic radicals;

References

I don't see a causal connection indicated between the numerous developments of the insurgency over a period of many decades and the exodus that happened within the first year or so. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:14, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

That's fine. I added it as a second thought. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:52, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

Officials who happened to be Hindu

Here are some of the people killed by militants in early 1990:

• Satish Tikoo, social activist, 2 February 1990.
• Ashok Qazi, field officer of the agriculture dapartment, 23 February 1990.
• Navin Saproo, telecommunications engineer, c. 30 February 1990.
• Tej Kishan, twenty-year old in Budgam, 27 February 1990.
• B. K. Ganju, telecomm. engineer, Srinagar, 18 March 1990.
• P. N. Handoo, assistant director of state information department, March 1990.
• A. K. Raina, department of civil supplies, March 1990.
• Radha Krishen, 85-year old man from Karan Nagar, April 1990.
• Motilal Pandit, Tankipora. (prob.) April 1990.
• Sarwanand Koul, retired head-master and well-known poet, and his 27-year old son, 30 April 1990.
• Satinder Kumar and Swarup Nath, young men from Baramulla, May 1990.
• Bhushan Lal Kaul, engineer in public works department, Kulgam, May 1990.
• Bansi Lal Zutshi, 23 May 1990. (Body was hacked and dumped in a gunny bag)
• Makhan Lal Raina, medical assistant in a government college, Badgam, May 1990.
• Prof. K. L. Ganju, popular teacher at Sophur agricultural college, May 1990 (and wife raped and killed, while the son fled by jumping into the Jhelum).

Which of these are "officials who happened to be Hindu"? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:56, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

"[O]fficials who happened to be Hindu" is not as good as it should be (maybe, save the nuances for body - ?) but the key idea is that Pandits were not murdered only because they were Hindu. As Mridu Rai shows, most of these people were extensively involved with the state-apparatus and this involvement played a significant role.

For an example, Rai points out the paradox of KP refugees who seeks to return to J&K: when they approach media, they claim to be men of no means who were displaced overnight by a bunch of zealots. However, in court petitions, they declare long histories of collaborating with the state-apparatus in times of militancy and seek to elicit compassion in the judge as patriots par excellence.

According to Evans (2002), and Mishra and Datta (2004), two sets of causes are commonly understood to have precipitated the exodus of the Pandits from Kashmir. One of the reasons for mass migration pertains to the breakdown of law and order following attacks by a number of armed militant groups who targeted individuals and places associated with the Indian state and the actions of the Indian security forces. These attacks included the assassination of several Kashmiri Pandits who held prominent positions in everyday life in the valley. The Indian state’s response caused violence to spiral through the brutal suppression of protests and counter-insurgency operations against militant groups. Large-scale demonstrations demanding independence for Kashmir from India and attacks by militant groups on individual Pandits led the community to feel specifically targeted. For many Pandits the demonstrations did not merely express demands for independence from India, the slogans uttered at the protests specifically demanded that Kashmiri Pandits leave Kashmir. Another cause for the exodus is attributed to the Indian state and especially Jagmohan, the appointed governor of the time who is said to have engineered and encouraged the Pandits to leave the valley to prevent casualties among supporters of the Indian state (p.54) and to discredit the movement for independence (Evans 2002: 212–22; Mishra and Datta 2004: 379–81).
— Accounting for Displacement: The Exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits, On Uncertain Ground: Displaced Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir, Ankur Datta, Oxford University Press, 2016

TrangaBellam (talk) 17:42, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

I do not think that "calls from mosques that mixed independence and religion" belongs at lead. Rai (p. 102) is skeptical about these claims. Further,

The slogans the Pandits refer to have never been reported or recorded officially at the time and suggest a gap between what was recorded and what the Pandits describe. Rather, news reports of 19 and 20 January 1990 instead focus on ‘mob violence’, casualties due to police action, and large numbers of arrests [..] Kashmiri Muslims denied hearing the slogans, even those threatening women, from the demonstrations which the Pandits draw attention to.
— Accounting for Displacement: The Exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits, On Uncertain Ground: Displaced Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir, Ankur Datta, Oxford University Press, 2016

I apologize for appearing to be insensitive to KP memories but as Schofield puts it, their night-of-exodus remains shrouded in mystery. The narrative purveyed by KPs vary significantly from what can be objectively verified. There is nothing in newspapers, there is nothing in the form of FIRs etc. about these slogans; maybe, we have to wait for the eventual declassification of IB records etc. TrangaBellam (talk) 19:22, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

Rekha Choudhary quotes Wajahat Habullah, an IAS officer that worked in Kashmir for decades and wrote a book on his experiences [6]:

That the Pandits were apprehensive was hardly surprising.... Places of worship, like the one in Anantnag, where the majority went, were being used to issue threats to them over loudspeakers. I learnt later that these inflammatory sermons, and their reverberating public applause, were audio recordings circulated to mosques to be played over loudspeakers at prayer time. (Habibullah 2015)

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:06, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

Hmm. It looks like she quoted the edited extract from The Hindu. Here is the full narration in Habibullah's book. The omitted parts are also important for our purposes:

I asked the delegation if they knew me—one of my earliest postings was in Anantnag in 1971—and, if so, did they believe that I, a Muslim like them, would actually be the instrument of such a plan? Their response was that I had been kept in the dark and that they were privy to "secret" information. I told them quite clearly that it was hardly surprising that Pandits were apprehensive. Any minority would be if places of worship of the majority were continually used to blare strident threats to them over loudspeakers—as every mosque was at the time—and if prominent members of their community had been murdered. (I learned later that these inflammatory sermons and their reverberating public applause were audio recordings circulated to mosques to be played over loudspeakers at prayer time.) I also told them that such use of a sacred place was no less than desecration and contempt for the faith. Local Muslims needed to reassure the Pandits of their safety. The administration would readily provide security whenever a threat to the Pandits was anticipated, but its effectiveness would be doubtful without public support. I assured the group that I would bring this issue to the governor's attention. After some younger members raised objections to my accusation of desecration, the gathering concurred with my approach and dispersed quietly.

I am not impressed with the governor's response by the way. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:13, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

References

• User:Kautilya3 If it is of any worth - [7] -

  The violence that overtook the Valley had created an environment of uncertainty. However, what affected the Kashmiri Pandits the most was the high-profile killings of Kashmiri Pandits. Among these high profile killings included that of Justice Nelkanth Ganjoo (a judge of the High Court of J&tK, who was targeted by the militants for having awarded thedeath sentence to Maqbool Bhat), Tika Lal Taploo (a lawyer by profession and also a member ofthe BJP's national executive body), Lassa Koul (Director, Srinagar Doordarshan), Sarvanand Premi (a noted poet) and Prem Nath Bhat (an advocate by profession and also an RSS activist). Apart from these killings, there were other kinds of targeted killings of Kashmiri Pandits." Manywere killed because they were seen as 'informers' and 'agents of Indian intelligence agenciesBose 2003. 120-121).

  Akshaypatill (talk) 21:37, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

  Thanks every one for your valuable inputs, especially @Kautilya3:. Yes, as TB notes, it was a bad choice of words. I believe I have incorporated the objections. I have also included some other points of view, all from recent publications. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 21:47, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

Dogras

User:TrangaBellamUser:Fowler&fowler Why there is nothing about Dogras and their discriminatory policies? They deserve a mention. Akshaypatill (talk) 22:04, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

The Dogras were mainly in Jammu. The Pandits were the main Hindu minority group in the Valley. Gulab Singh, who through not inconsiderable deceit of the Sikhs, was able to buy the Valley from the East India Company, was until then the Raja of Jammu. I have incorporated your suggestion cited to a later book by Bose, but he seems to be recycling his material. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:21, 3 January 2022 (UTC)

That is not correct. Dogra officials and Dogra landlords were all over the state. If the Pandits owned 30% of the land, who owned the rest?

It is also worth noting that land-ownership was only 20 years old by 1950. At least half of the Pandit land was purchased after land-ownership was introduced in the 1930s. It is common for middle-class families in India to buy land as investment for retirement, children's education etc. It would have been even more so for Pandits who worked as revenue officials for centuries and knew about land. When the government took away their excess landholding without compensation, they would have been hit hard. Prem Nath Bazaz, whose description Mridu Rai summarised, says this:

With doors of government services virtually slammed against them; with government contracts almost totally denied to them; with trade and commerce in a chaotic condition in the State; with land taken away from them; and, above all, with the insecurity and uncertainty all-round in their homeland, if Kashmiri Pandits found the demons of starvation and destitution staring them in their face there is no wonder in it. Realising that there could be no end to the abnormal conditions so long as the dispute over the accession issue between India and Pakistan continued many Kashmiri Pandits decided to leave their motherland for good.

You can read through the polemic, but it is quite clear that insecurity is what made them leave. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:59, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

A large number were absentee landlords from Jammu. The Dogra officials had permanent ancestral homes in Jammu. They were harder hit by the land reforms as they did not get the option to switch to apple orchards which the Pandits did. As for whether the insecurity was economic or social, I can only go by scholarly summaries of Bazaz, and the source which I have cited (not sure if it was Rai or Zutshi) notes both. I can't summarize him myself. You can see references for the absentee landlords here. It was much worse than East Bengal in 1943, where too absentee Hindu landlords from West Bengal by their exploitation added to the Muslim mortality in the famine. Chris Bayly has some poignant passages in his (and Taylor(?)'s) two books on the wars of the 1940s in Asia. It is unimportant that some of the Pandits were recent landowners in 1950; they still had the same motivations for leaving. The mention of 30% by 5% is not the pointing finger of shame. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:05, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

References

Costliest price

Muslims are said to have paid the "costliest price" in killings by the militants. The statistics don't bear this out. From Manoj Joshi's Lost Rebellion ("Pattern of changing militant attacks shown by the people they killed between January and August 1990"), the numbers killed by the militants between January-June 1990 were as follows:

Hindus: 132 (2 7 14 15 35 27 19 13)

Muslims: 168 (6 5 14 20 44 30 21 28)

Security forces: 90 (20 6 12 6 9 11 13 13)

Unidentified: 48 (2 4 1 1 1 17 17 5)

Given that Hindus made up only 5% of the population, their per-capita loss is much higher. The high number of "unidentified" in June and July also points to the fact that there weren't enough Hindus left in the Valley to identify the dead. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:38, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

I don't know about the source, but I did misread my own sources. I have corrected the sentence. Thanks. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:49, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

And yes, the revised sentence is off-topic. No wonder I was having a hard time making it coherent. Good catch, @Kautilya3:! Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:24, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

Done

I've finished revising the lead, using the best of the more recent scholarly sources. I think the lead is fairly comprehensive now. Comments and suggestions are always welcome. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:23, 4 January 2022 (UTC)

We need to have a line on what spurred the chain of events leading to the exodus. '87 rigged elections and associated violence perpetrated by state. Scholars note this unanimously. TrangaBellam (talk) 05:38, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

Thanks. There was some mention earlier, which might not have been adequate, and was removed. I will add a well-sourced sentence or two setting up the context. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:12, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

Jihad

Sushant Sareen quotes a Pakistani newspaper called Wifaq (2 April 1990), which says among other things,

Since last year [1989], when the resistance movement was converted into a Jihad some new parties have been formed, prominent among them being: Hizbe Islami, Hizbullah, Hizbul Mujahedin, Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Allah Tigers, Zia Tigers, Operation Balakot and Liberation Front. Most of them are the military wings of some parties and their vanguard consists of students who have completed their studies at the Islamic institutions.

All these organisations hold Islam and liberation of Kashmir as their objective. Only one party, the Liberation Front talks of independent Kashmir but even that holds Islam as its ultimate objective, that is why the Indian and international media describe this liberation movement as a fundamentalist and pro-Pakistan movement....

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 04:21, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

References

Kautilya3 (talk) 04:21, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

The reliable third-party scholarly sources (which this source is not), are emphatic that during January to March 1990, JKLF was ascendant, and that it was not a religious organization, only one seeking independence (which predictably neither India nor Pakistan found palatable). Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:13, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

The problem generally (and perhaps this is not the place for that discussion) is that India has a legal (or semi-legal) case for Kashmir, but no moral case. Pakistan had the moral case, which they squandered. Indian governments have known that; otherwise, they would have had a plebiscite in their region of administration long ago (as Gandhi, and later Jayprakash Narayan, and no doubt others had suggested, the population of Gilgit being negligible, and its issue a red herring). It is the blind spot in Indian thinking, which has prevailed even in the liberal "intelligentsia." Pakistan squandered its moral ascendance with regards Kashmir ineptly and disastrously from the get-go. That is the nub of it. JKLF was threatening both ideologies. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:30, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

I don't understand the fascination of IR scholars (is he one?) with using Jihad as some kind of buzzword. It is blindingly obvious that if a state and its blessed lackeys oppress a Muslim-majority state for decades with ingrained Islamophobia, the subjects will borrow from religious grammar to mount resistance. And some of that will indeed be fanatic in nature, as much as it is condemnable.

Sareen is not a RS but how many pages does he spend on Indian Govt's myriad means of disenchanting the Kashmiri population, that allowed Pakistan's "Jihad Factories" to play a role at the first place? He rejects that the '87 elections had any role - "conventional wisdom", ah. Our expert on Jihad knows his Urdu but not the tools of scholarship which includes a critical reading of sources. He cites an interview by Ayub Thakur to bolster his claims about longstanding Jehad in the region; however, he is oblivious of the fact that many of these militant leaders engaged in a competition of rhetoric to make the most of himself in a tense political atmosphere. To reproduce Schofields's quip, if all these people were taken at face-value, the militants would come across as the next Asian superpower in making. TrangaBellam (talk) 15:21, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

The text above is from a Pakistani newspaper published in April 1990. (Sareen's contribution is the English translation, and the parenthetical date "[1989]"). The term "Jihad" is from the newspaper. The article claims that all these organisations existed in 1989. Maybe not, but certainly by April 1990, they did.

Ayub Thakur didn't claim that there was long-standing jihad. His statement was, "The Jamaat organised a network of schools and libraries in Kashmir whose students never acknowledged Indian suzerainty over Kashmir. It is this generation which provides the cream of leadership to the Kashmir jihad." The Wifaq article also said the same thing: "In particular, Jamaat Islami has been very active in conducting the resistance movement on all those fronts continuously for the past 36 years.".

Jamaat's programme has always been Nizam-e-Mustafa, as is well-known. That combined with armed militancy quickly turns into a Jihad. I don't see what else it would be. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:14, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

Sareen claims in p. 112 that the conventional wisdom about '87 elections leading to all the mayhem is wrong and that Pakistan-backed promotion of Jehadi militancy had been going on since long. In the very next paragraph (p. 113), Sareen quotes Thakur's interview where he says that IJT was formed in '77 and that IJT had persuaded Kashmiris to undertake Jihad. Obviously, Sareen is using Thakur's interview to back-up his assertions in a back-handed manner.

Your excuse of Sareen being a translator does not hold: Elliot's translation of certain pre-modern Muslim chronicles while ignoring others was dubious political scholarship, in itself. And neither does that answer my query about Sareen's uncritical reading of sources.

There exists excellent scholarship on Jihad in Kashmir: I can start adding quotes (at some relevant talk-page) but all of them run contra Sareen. Because they do not translate a couple of articles from Urdu newspapers that fits to their bias and go on to write a book. TrangaBellam (talk) 17:05, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

Ok, go ahead. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:20, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

Will start a subpage in my user-space; Robinson provides for an excellent reading on how deviant (if not oppositional) Kashmiri jihad is from the stereotypical notions of Jihad. (A review by Ather Zia.) And why the "conventional wisdom" is indeed accurate to a large degree. TrangaBellam (talk) 17:44, 6 January 2022 (UTC)

HM [Hizbul Mujahideen] sometimes rejected Pakistani orders to kill Kashmiri Hindus or punish Muslims collaborating with the Indians.

Sometimes. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:46, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

Jamaat's programme has always been Nizam-e-Mustafa, as is well-known. - Nah, from where did you get that? Though, it should have got the boots from postcolonial India alongside RSS, saving India from a lot of contemporary headaches. TrangaBellam (talk) 14:26, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

References

Jagmohan

Since Jagmohan’s role came up in almost all our conversations with Pandits and Muslims, it would be useful here to consider what he had to say regarding the situation just prior to the migration of Pandits and its implications for the Muslims:

[T]he Kashmiri Pandits are safe targets for militants. There should be strong-arm methods against militants to the extent of frightening the Muslim population through demonstration of the might of the Indian state. Ruthless operations in different localities of Srinagar could be fruitful counter-insurgency operations. But in some areas, there is mixed population and Pandits may become targets of security forces. [Source: Bhasin, Anuradha. 2004. ‘Auditing The Mainstream Media: The Case of Jammu & Kashmir’ in Samir Kumar Das (Ed.) Three Case Studies: Media Coverage on Forced Displacement in Contemporary India. Kolkata: Calcutta Research Group.]

When we interviewed Balraj Puri in Jammu (2006), he told us that Jagmohan had personally told him that the "Kashmiri Pandits had become soft targets of the militants and hence they must leave as this would create a conducive environment to eliminate militancy in Kashmir", adding that "Jagmohan started facilitating Kashmiri Pandits to leave the Valley."
— Fear, Displacement, Departure: The Experience of the Kashmiri Pandits - Love, Loss and Longing in Kashmir. Sahba Husain. 2019. Zubaan Books.

TrangaBellam (talk) 15:21, 7 January 2022 (UTC) added link. Kautilya3 (talk) 00:00, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

A review of literature at the beginning of the study (2005), though not exhaustive, revealed that, barring a few scholarly works, most studies thus far had focused mainly on he communal rather than the political dimensions of the displacement, and on the victimization of the Pandits as a religious minority at the hands of the majority community. Moreover, many of the studies originated and ended at the camps in Jammu, focusing only on the living conditions there, and did not address the rich and complex social relations between Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims, choosing instead to stay within the rhetoric of Islamic fundamentalism, Muslim terrorism, genocide, ethnic cleansing and the exodus. The voices and the subjective experiences of Pandit families who had decided to remain in the Valley were almost totally absent in the literature.

Ahem. TrangaBellam (talk) 15:24, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

All in all, a fascinating (and original) chapter providing layered narratives of the exodus, those who stayed, and their relationship with the Muslim population. Ought be used in this article. TrangaBellam (talk) 15:35, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

The land is important to the Indian state not the people. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:36, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

The KP numbers

user:Van00220 and user:DiplomatTesterMan Please note that my argument Talk:Kashmir#Minor_change_to_one_part_of_the_"Demographics"_section (b) against the figure of 700,000 KPs which I had made off the top of my head is pretty much repeated in Alexander Evans article Evans, Alexander (2002). "A departure from history: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990-2001". Contemporary South Asia. 11 (1): 19–37. doi:10.1080/0958493022000000341. ISSN 0958-4935., which has been cited in the lead of this page.

On page 26, Alexander Evans says:

The last census to record KPs, as distinct from Kashmiri Hindus, was the 1941 census, which reported that there were 78,800 KPs living in the Kashmir Valley. For there to have been 350,000 KPs by 1990, the growth rate for KPsmust have run at roughly an extraordinary 35% per decade. And if, as some KPs claim, they numbered 700,000 by 1991, their growth rate must have been about a phenomenal 45% per decade. KPs would then have displayed a growth rate unheard of in South Asia. For Panun Kashmir (a KP political party; see below) figures to be accurate, the 1931 and 1941 census operations, managed by Hindus and KPs on behalf of a Hindu Maharaja, must have been biased against Hindus. Also, successive post-1947 Indian census operations must have deliberately undercounted the KP population by as much as several hundred thousand each time. Given that a disproportionate number of KPs were census enumerators, this theory seems dubious. The combination of exceptional conspiracies and extreme demography might carry some weight if the figures of 700,000 KPs today, widely bandied about, were based on any reasonable sources.

Best, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 09:00, 31 December 2021 (UTC)

Also Bose (2003, pp. 119–120):

According to the government of India's 1981 census, Hindus made up only 4 percent—124,078 of 3,135,000 people—of the Valley's population. The vast majority of these were Kashmiri Pandits, so the Valley's Pandit population was probably 130,000–140,000 in 1989–1990

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:43, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

POV template

Fowler&fowler, thank you for summarising your POV (or in your view, the scholars' POV). Unfortunately, I don't have any such linearised narrative to offer. All I see are uncertainties and partial truths.

But the POV template is there because I see the treatment skewed. The improper use of "emigration" is only the tip of the iceberg. The lead is now an mini-article in itself. And it will take time for me and other editors to check all the details and make sure that they are NPOV. I have given other examples of POV, how the phrase "fled the Valley" has been incrementally modified, how "voluntary" has been inserted despite the scholar's misgivings etc. Saying a book has hundreds of citations doesn't mean that a particular view has hundreds of citations. And NPOV means representing all notable views in reliable sources in proporotion to their preponderance. A view that the author herself disowns (see Narratives from Exile) hardly fits the bill. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:03, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

A lead that is a mini article in itself is not POV.

You have not clarified anywhere why the exodus of the Pandits which took place in two decades (the late 1940s and 1990) cannot be described as "emigration." The Cuban exodus page begins with, "The Cuban exodus is the mass emigration of Cubans from the island of Cuba after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Throughout the exodus millions of Cubans from diverse social positions within Cuban society became disillusioned with life in Cuba and decided to emigrate in various emigration waves." Alexander Evans uses the expression "en masse migration" (to which I have offered to change "emigration"). Websters' Unabridged (subscription reqd) defines "exodus" to be "a mass departure: emigration". The OED (subscription reqd) defines it to be: "The departure or going out, usually of a body of persons from a country for the purpose of settling elsewhere. Also figurative. Cf. emigration n. 2." and it defines "emigration n. 2" to: "The departure of persons from one country, usually their native land, to settle permanently in another." Jammu and Kashmir is not a country, nor does India have undisputed sovereignty over it, so we can't use "internal displacement.". Even Bill Koul, whose sympathies are decidedly Panditian, acknowledges the usage:

"The reason being none of the Indian governments, since 1990, have practically made any visible difference to their status; they continue to suffer indignation and are abhorrently known as Kashmiri Pandit migrants—and not even as an internally displaced community.

The UNOHCHR, as far as I'm aware, does not include the Pandits in the people who have suffered "forced displacement," as the Kurdish or Syrians have. Ultimately, we can only summarize the sources and their major consensus. We can't slap on a POV tag because we suspect POV (especially in a longstanding competent editor) and propose to let it remain as we examine the lead more closely. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 22:16, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

I am sorry, that doesn't wash. You have added the dictionary meaning of "emigration" saying "to settle permanently". You have changed "fled the Valley" to "moved away". You have added the bit about them leaving "voluntarily" despite the scholar's misgivings. I see all of them together as a deliberate effort to misrepresent the facts. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:27, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

The scholar, Mridu Rai, does not have misgivings; otherwise, she would not have used the expression, and put her "misgiving" in a footnote. It is a qualification. She is qualifying the term, that when people are feeling vulnerable it is easy for them to perceive a threat or potential threat and it is difficult to objectively assess their assessment. But she is obviously summarizing some widely held opinion, otherwise, she would not have made such a blanket judgment that 80% were voluntary migrants. I did make an error in "emigration." And that happened long ago, not recently. At the back of my mind, I was likely counterposing "emigration" (migration out) and "immigration" (migration in), a distinction that is not exactly even made much any more, and chose emigration. But I forgot that they both refer to well-defined other countries. I was certainly not trying to imply that the Jammu Division is a well-defined other country, let alone. That is an error. But "migration," "en masse migration" is used by many authors, and its dictionary meaning: "the act, process, or an instance of migrating: such as a(1): the act or an instance of moving from one country, region, or place to settle in another." All you needed to say was an actual objection," applies in this instance. I am happy to change it. It is not a biggie for me in the least. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:03, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

I don't state anything unless there is a source stating the same. Here is Chitralekh Zutshi talking about the first migration: "Since a majority of the landlords were Hindu, the (land) reforms (of 1950) led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. ... The unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among the Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950." That was the real reason why I had chosen "emigration." It had nothing to do with the POV of your insinuation. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 23:20, 7 January 2022 (UTC)

The number 20% seems arbitary to me, without any demographics or statistical backing. Because 20% is quite a large porportion of the then total number of Kps, Zutsi should have cited some demographical source rather than citing another book. We need to reassign the weightage assigned to it. 80% too seems pretty arbitory. How did she arrived at the number? Akshaypatill (talk) 06:09, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

• I agree with the removal of POV tag on this version of lead as long as the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) internal displacement (or, simply displacement) is mentioned in the first line and wikilinked,

(b) GOI's machinations in late 80s finds a mention [F&F plans to add it]

(c) A line is added about those who stayed, their almost-unanimous positive notion of KMs, and their fractured relationships with those who were displaced. [Consult Husain (2019)]

All in all, I think F&F has drafted an excellent version of lead to build the article upon. TrangaBellam (talk) 07:47, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

Thank you for your generous compliment, @TrangaBellam:. I agree with almost everything you have said, except "displaced." In my assessment, it remains POV-terminology that is favored by a few Pandits, but unevidenced as yet in the tertiary sources that determine due weight. "migration," "exodus," remain the terminology of due weight. In fact, it seems to be preferred by Kashmiris themselves, Mona Bhan et al write in (Bhan, Mona, Deepti Misri, and Ather Zia. "Relating Otherwise: Forging Critical Solidarities Across the Kashmiri Pandit-Muslim Divide." Biography 43, no. 2 (2020): 285-305. doi:10.1353/bio.2020.0030.)

This story came to us from a close friend, long before the inception of our current project, where we consider the everyday modes of relating that existed between Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims in the period leading up to the "Migration," as the Pandit departures have come to be called among Kashmiris, both Pandit and Muslim. Widely framed in Kashmiri popular history and memory as the moment when communitarian relationships in the Kashmir Valley underwent a radical shift, the year 1989 and after saw the rise of Tehreek (the movement for self-determination), largely supported by the Muslim majority in the Valley, and the departure of most Kashmiri Pandits, the minority Hindu community largely allied with the Indian state.

I'm not too worried about the POV tag, but will keep looking for the best available sources, and of course implementing what you have proposed and I have promised. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:06, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

I think something needs to be mentioned about mosques having a target list for KPs - more soon. Btw, Kautilya3: why do you oppose this edit? TrangaBellam (talk) 16:18, 8 January 2022 (UTC)'

User:Fowler&fowler I am trying to find a better source for the 'Migration of 20% KPs between 1947 and 1950' and I couldn't find any. The number '20%' seems arbitrary to me. Zutsi has cited Bajaj for it. Are there any other scholars or demographics that backs this number? Akshaypatill (talk) 17:25, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

See the quote from Bose 2003 in the #KP numbers section. If they were 4% in 1981 but 5% before independence, it follows that 20% had moved out (assuming population growth was uniform across the society). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:47, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

Regarding the KP number of 20%, I agree with F&F, that we need better sources Jhy.rjwk and K3's explanation about decline from 5% to 4% is from 1947 to 1981, but the current lead mentions 20% migration around 1950 land reforms.

Regarding the POV template, agree with the points raised by K3 and conditions mentioned by Akshaypatil. Jhy.rjwk

When highlighting the 1950 land-reforms, an important point missed is KP's land was acquired without any compensation, forcing some dispossessed KP landowners to leave Kashmir. Here are some relevant quotes below from multiple scholarly sources:

Extended content

A quote from Chitralekha Zutshi · 2017, Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation - Page 100 https://www.google.com/books/edition/Kashmir/g09bDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PA100&printsec=frontcover In the early 1950s... As these reforms affected landowners, the majority of whom belonged to the Hindu community, they considered the compulsory acquisition of land without compensation a deliberate ploy to alter their socio-economic status and ensure the domination of the Muslim majority. A quote from Pramoda Kumāra Agravāla · 2010, Land Reforms in States and Union Territories in India - Page 182 https://www.google.com/books/edition/Land_Reforms_in_States_and_Union_Territo/eP_rQWpQZuoC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PA182&printsec=frontcover Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 1950… no compensation was paid to the landlords. Under this law, the tiller was made owner of the land. A quote from Christopher Snedden · 2021 Page 127, Independent Kashmir: An incomplete aspiration https://www.google.com/books/edition/Independent_Kashmir/ZfEuEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PT127&printsec=frontcover This lack of compensation seriously disenchanted dispossessed landowners, both Dogras and Pandits.

Jhy.rjwk

That is not correct. We have talked about the land reforms of 1950. The Pandits were allowed some compensation in the form of apple and other orchards. Also, as in other parts of India, many got around the 22 2/3 acre limit by redistributing the land among the male members of the family. The Dogras in Jammu were not so lucky. But the Kashmiri Muslims who had lived in conditions of slavery for 150 years, had nothing. So no one was shedding tears for either the Pandits or the Dogras. The is a reason that Sheikh Abdullah was considered a god by the Muslims of Kashmir. No administrator in 100 years, British or Indian, had been able to push through such radical land reforms anywhere in South Asia. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:54, 9 January 2022 (UTC)

Strange, that all these Scholars can be considered incorrect: Zutshi, 2017; Agravāla, 2010; Snedden · 2021 and many more Scholars. (This Article has previosly quoted same authors such as Zutshi many times) Kautilya3 has also noted lack of compensation to KPs. This can be discussed after the emmigration issue.

A quote from Chitralekha Zutshi · 2017, Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation - Page 100

https://www.google.com/books/edition/Kashmir/g09bDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PA100&printsec=frontcover

In the early 1950s... As these reforms affected landowners, the majority of whom belonged to the Hindu community, they considered the compulsory acquisition of land without compensation a deliberate ploy to alter their socio-economic status and ensure the domination of the Muslim majority.

A quote from Pramoda Kumāra Agravāla · 2010, Land Reforms in States and Union Territories in India - Page 182

https://www.google.com/books/edition/Land_Reforms_in_States_and_Union_Territo/eP_rQWpQZuoC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PA182&printsec=frontcover

Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 1950… no compensation was paid to the landlords. Under this law, the tiller was made owner of the land.

A quote from Christopher Snedden · 2021 Page 127, Independent Kashmir: An incomplete aspiration

https://www.google.com/books/edition/Independent_Kashmir/ZfEuEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kashmir+land+reforms+1950&pg=PT127&printsec=frontcover

This lack of compensation seriously disenchanted dispossessed landowners, both Dogras and Pandits.

Jhy.rjwk

TrangaBellam, We say "alleged" when we don't have any secondary sources that state the information. Here we do. I don't see anything in Ankur Datta that raises any doubts. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:49, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

I do not follow your argument at all. Multiple KPs produce a ritualized account of the slogans (to the extent that it seems entire Kashmir Valley was reverberating with those chants at those nights) but there's nil evidence in any police archives, daily newspapers etc. All KMs collectively deny it. That is sufficient in itself to introduce "alleged." TrangaBellam (talk) 18:54, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

See WP:OR. We go by what sources are saying, and not by editors personal opinion. LearnIndology (talk) 19:07, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

I am not Datta, quite obviously. TrangaBellam (talk) 19:28, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

I have added a quotation to substantiate "alleged". Please check. I have access to only TOI archives among Indian newspapers, which is hopeless. Foreign journalists weren't allowed into Kashmir in 1990. I did find news story in Toronto Star, which went into some depth about the refugee experience. It doesn't quite say what we are looking for, but it is close.

• Hindus flee reign of fear in Kashmir, Toronto Star, 14 May 1990. ProQuest 436199360

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:13, 8 January 2022 (UTC)

Can you email a pdf? See this report from India Today (31 March 1990) from when it used to be a credible news magazine and the remarkable change in tonality when they reported the same events 26 years hence. TrangaBellam (talk) 05:28, 9 January 2022 (UTC)

• And here is part of Roma Chatterjee's review of Ankur Datta's recent published Ph.D. thesis:

  Presented in the form of a traditional ethnography that describes the life of Kashmiri Pandit migrants in Porkhu Camp in Jammu, this monograph fills a gap in the anthropological literature on migrant communities. Often categorised as an elite group, a form of categorisation that they identify with, Kashmiri Pandits defy easy classification. Unusual in the sense that as Hindus they all belong to a single caste, Brahmin, with radically heterodox customs that may sit uneasily with those of Brahmins elsewhere in India, especially when it comes to diet, that ambivalent status within the Indian mainstream is further exacerbated by the recent controversies around their political status. Labels such as ‘internally displaced persons’ or ‘refugee’ suggest a failure on the part of the state to protect its own citizens apart from the fact that they are generally associated with impoverished and marginalised populations. The designation ‘migrant’, failing as it does to distinguish between those who have voluntarily left their home states in search of a better future and those who have been forced out, also does not adequately describe the compulsions under which people may be forced to relocate. But once adopted, even bureaucratic categories can produce unexpected consequences allowing the Pandits to claim a different kind of voice and position themselves as ‘victims’ and that they are innocent of complicity in the present political turmoil in Kashmir.

  which talks about some of the ambiguities of labels. (See: Society and Culture in South Asia 4(1) 163–178© 2018 South Asian University, New Delhi, DOI: 10.1177/2393861717730622. Review of Ankur Datta, On Uncertain Ground. Displaced Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2017, xvii., 268 pp., ` 895, ISBN: 0-19-946677-7. by Roma Chatterjee, Professor and Head of Department of Sociology, Delhi University.) Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:33, 8 January 2022 (UTC)
• And Duschinski, Haley (2018), "'Survial Is Now Our Politics': Kashmiri Pandit Community Identiy and the Politics of Homeland", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172–198, 178–179,  The Kashmiri Pandit migration: (p. 178) The onset of the armed phase of the freedom struggle in 1989 was a chaotic and turbulent time in Kashmir (Bose, 2003). Kashmiri Pandits felt an increasing sense of vulnerability and insecurity in response to what they perceived as a threatening atmosphere in the region (Evans, 2002). These feelings were exacerbated by a series of actions directed against their community, including attacks on prominent Kashmiri Pandit politicians and advocates, displays of hit lists with the names of specific Kashmiri Pandit individuals, and acts of violence in Hindu localities in Srinagar and elsewhere in the region. Community members were particularly affected by the selective killings of prominent community members, such as (p. 179) high profile politicians, bureaucrats, lawyers and judges. Many Kashmiri Pandits, uncertain of their role in relation to the freedom struggle at this stage, decided to leave the Valley. Although various political stakeholders dispute the number of Kashmiri Pandits who left the Valley at that time, Alexander Evans estimates on the basis of census data and demographic figures that over 1,00,000 left in a few months in early 1990, while 1,60,000 in total left the Valley during the 1990s (2002, 23-26); T. N. Madan uses similar figures (1989, xviii-xix). Most Kashmiri Pandits initially settled in temporary arrangements in Jammu, the major city in the predominantly Hindu southern region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir." They arrived in Jammu to find that the state had made no preparations for their accommodation, relief, or rehabilitation and that problems of overcrowding severely limited their options for housing or employment. Many followed family networks or job opportunities to New Delhi, making the capital city the second largest relocation site. There were generational differences in these relocation patterns, as individuals described Delhi to meas 'the city of youths and jobs' and Jammu as 'the city of parents and depression.' Please note that the estimate of migrants, i.e. 100,000 to 150,000, which the Wikipedia Kashmir page has held on to for 15 years, despite much POV-denial, is now de rigueur in academics. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 21:15, 8 January 2022 (UTC)