Talk:Epistemology/Archive 2

Epistemological Theories/Foundationalism

Wow! I'm so glad to see this as the collaboration of the week! Sifting through the article, one thing gave me pause: Is it really fair to consider all of the epistemological theories mentioned in that section (empiricism, pragmatism, phenomenalism, etc.) as various flavors of foundationalism? Is that the consensus? I was of the understanding that there were viable, say, coherentist theories of knowledge that were also empiricist. Meanwhile, would anybody find it out of line if I added some short summary of, say, coherentism and reliabilism to this list? If there are no objections, I'll get on it. Thanks. Paul Hope 21:48, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

Please, Be bold. Banno 22:06, August 9, 2005 (UTC)

Oldest changes

My apologies in advance to the authors of the article. The article is spoiled by having been edited and added to in an ad hoc fashion. It lacks structure, and so gives a confused account of the topic. Much of it looks like a list of links, rather than an attempt to explain the key issues.

The promotion of subjectivism and objectivism is unusual in an article on Epistemology. These two categories are more commonly used to differentiate two approaches to ethics rather than to knowledge. Also, running through the article is confusion between knowledge, the proper subject of epistemology, and truth, which is only indirectly relevant. There is a desperate need for a discussion of the relationship between knowledge and truth – and why not drop in justification and belief?

It is far more common to start with the rationalist/empiricist distinction, as this article once did. Since this follows more closely the historical development of epistemology, this also makes it far easier to introduce new material into the article.

The second paragraph is strange. It does not seem to have a content that is relevant to the article. Several other paragraphs have similarly lost their apparent relevance – no doubt as a result of editing since they were written. Several paragraphs are about truth, not knowledge – which would be fine, provided the distinction had been spelled out earlier. The taxonomy introduced in the middle of the article is also puzzling. For instance, few constructivists would consider themselves to be subjectivists, as is claimed. Again, the subject appears to be truth rather than knowledge.

A comment on style - much of the article is also written in the first person. Surly this is inappropriate?

The article needs editing and re-writing from top to bottom, with an eye towards consistence and completeness. Banno 13:23, 2 Jan 2004 (UTC)

And leave out the fallacious conflation of knowledge and belief, two entirely different things. --207.200.116.7 22:44, 25 July 2005 (UTC)

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I learnt a little about Epistemology while studying Ethology (which has little to do with ethics btw). Ethologists run into epistemological problems because they sometimes have different senses than the organisms they are observing. This causes 3 problems:

• The observer might influence the behaviour of the organism if the organism manages to observe the observer. The how can the observer know weather or not (s)he is being observed?
• The organism might react to things that it can observe, but the observer cannot observe.
• The organism might fail to react to things that it cannot observe but which the observer *can* observe.

In these cases there is a disparity in knowlege between the observer and the observed. Epistemology warns us that such situations exist, and can sometimes help in solving problems arising from such a situation. I've written a bit about this problem at Animal_echolocation.

When editing the article, it might be interesting to mention some of the practical applications of Epistemology. It gets used by people diving to the deepest depths, and in the middle of steamy jungles ;-). What I'm saying is it's not "just some dusty philosophy", there's actual applications for it, and it might be nice to mention some :-) 80.126.238.189 17:11, 8 Feb 2004 (UTC)

A very confusing article

And its not just because the subject matter is itself difficult, either. After all, other wiki articles dealing with similar subject matter (on "knowledge," for example, or "phenomenalism") do so in an orderly, transparent manner.

In this case, the person who conceived of the central section wanted to create a list of five approaches to epistemology and to explain why they are all inclusive. He came up with: nihilism, subjectivism, objectivism, mysticism, and skepticism. Or did he? It looks as if he intended to include "phenomenalism" but declined to cross-reference that so it wouldn't end up a list of six. But why NOT six then? Or twenty? What principled distinctions are behind this list? I can't tell.

I've tried to clean up this article, introducing a couple of subheads and my own definitions of some of the key terms, and adding a transition at the end of that second paragraph so it won't look so out of place.

But I won't go any further, fearing as some have mentioned that 'too many cooks' may be part of the problem here.

--Anonymous

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Somehow rationalism and empiricism have gotten snowed under. There's so much *ELSE* going on that the 2 main schools in epistemology are snowed under. Eep. -- 80.126.238.189 22:06, 24 Feb 2004 (UTC)

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The section “beliefs about how one acquires true beliefs” bothers me.

Primarily, this section is about belief, not about knowledge. So its relevance is questionable.

The section should be about justification, rather than belief. As it claims, the main question is when someone can know that their beliefs are true – that is, when is a true belief justified.

Nihilism, mysticism and scepticism have a place in this article, but subjectivism and objectivism are usually used to categorise ethical theories rather than epistemologies. Relegating rationalism and empiricism to the end of the article puts it at odds with most other accounts.

I intend to re-write much of this material, returning to a more historical structure. Comments welcome.

Banno 20:10, 29 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Looks much tidier! But now the strong influence of empiricism (specifically this small subschool known as "science" :-P ) is still snowed under. This article seems to follow some kind of yearly cycle. :-) Kim Bruning 14:50, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Thanks; I agree to some extent, but philosophy of science and scientific method are both fairly substantial articles, so I don’t think science is missing out.Banno 19:37, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)

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I changed this: "The [analytic-synthetic] distinction was first formulated By Kant, and later given a more formal shape by Frege."

Most historians of philosophy would tell you that the dichotomy was implicit in "Hume's fork," and my change was intended to acknowledge as much.

fair enough. My intent had been to say the terms were first used in this way by Kant.Banno 05:34, 10 Mar 2004 (UTC)

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Perception & ontology

There appears to be a confusion creeping in to the article. Aren’t realism and naive realism ontological, rather than epistemological, theories? Although they inform empiricism (a theory of knowledge), aren’t they themselves theories about what exists?

For that reason, I think they should be removed, or at least re-worded. Banno 21:26, Apr 22, 2004 (UTC)

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The cycle begins anew

Alright, people are adding all kinds of detail to the article again, snowing under the core of the matter with words words words. I think this page should be replaced by something of an index or list pointing to epistemology topics, else it's going to become fat, bloated and utterly unreadable every couple of months. (and make for lots of annoying work cleaning it up, and every cleanup will loose data around the edges. :-/ ) Kim Bruning 09:14, 9 May 2004 (UTC)

I had to make a few edits today, simply because the way it was written before, the implication was that Justified True Belief was still the standard definition of knowledge. It's not (at least in itself), and hasn't been for a couple of decades now. Perhaps JTB deserves its own article.

Secondly, there is a lot of debate about whether justification is necessary at all in a definition of knowledge, or whether something else should take its place. In its previous form, this article would have been quite misleading to anyone reading it. - AmishThrasher

Sure, I'm not saying it's your fault or anyones fault on their own. It's just that while the sum of the parts should be great, the whole actually turns out to somehow suck each time round. (see also the archived talk pages, and page history). Each time the key subschools of epistemology (each having their own articles already as it is) and the importance of epistemology in the real world (which also has entire articles dedicated to it) gets totally snowed under, so no one can find anything of value on the page anymore. Hmph. I guess it *is* possible to have too much of a good thing. :-( Kim Bruning 11:24, 9 May 2004 (UTC)

It is really good to see folk taking an interest in the article. I’m very interested to see some more content on the Gettier problem. However, I’m concerned not to let the discussion of this particular issue detract from what I think is a useful structure for the overall article. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)

The Theaetetus account is used in the article as a way to link the various epistemological theories in something like historical order. It is used as a rhetorical tool that provides, hopefully, a sequence for the reader to use to understand the issues. Theaetetus forms the core of the article, not because it is the prevailing opinion now, but because it was the prevailing opinion for the two-and- a-bit thousand years before now; and as such it provides a spine on which the article can stand and refer to the various epistemic theories. I agree that if one takes a look at the history and the talk pages, one will see that the article has in the past degenerated into near incomprehsibility. Without such a spine, it will do so again.Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)

None of which is intended to detract from the work of Amish. Placing the Gettier material at the start of the article breaks this historical sequence. So I’ve moved it to the end of the article, placing it with other recent material. Given its importance, I’ve left reference to it in the introduction. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)

information (bit)

I just speed read this, but I didn't see any mention of information as defined by the bit. The bit is a building block of information. Our main fuzzy area of the nature of epistemology then is how exactly brains handle information; whether with some form of bits or something else.

That’s because epistemology is about knowledge, not information. In the olden days, before the invention of the bit, they still knew things. Banno 09:07, Jul 12, 2004 (UTC)

Eh? I thought the building block of information was the base. (Hint: perhaps the bit is not the basic unit of information ;-) )Kim Bruning 13:34, 18 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Illness and observer influence

The article misses a great chance when mentioning illness as an example. The human immune system does not operate independantly of the central nervous system at all. For instance, the CNS-generated hormone cortisol is a great example of an immunosupressant. This means that a persons' state of mind can influence the course of an illness to some degree. This would make a really nice example of observer effect. Kim Bruning 13:28, 18 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Moved from article

I’ve moved this stuff from the main page because it has a few problems. It claims to be offering a definition of knowledge, but instead just cites a few philosophers. In doing so it breaks the flow of the article. That is, there is no reason to give primacy to Descartes and Locke. Perhaps the author would like to place the material in the appropriate place in the article. Also, it misuses the phrase “begs the question”. Banno 03:32, Sep 26, 2004 (UTC)

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Epistemology begs the question: from "where" or "what" does human knowledge derive? The "theory of knowledge" comes to us in the modern age by the arguable father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes (1596-1650). It is Descartes, in his attempt to start upon a firm logical ground, who first employs the concept of methodical doubt: the concept that whatever is not provable must be discarded. It is from Descartes that the famous: "Cogito ergo sum" derives. What is irrefutable to Descartes, is this previous statement, which boldly asserts that the most basic knowledge is (in English this time), "I think, therefore I am."

John Locke (1632-1704) was considerably influenced by Descartes. It was Locke however, who stood forth against the idea that there are "innate" ideas or thoughts, but declared rather, that all are born with naught - a blank slate, (tabula rasa), and that all we truly know is that which we experience. Today John Locke is widely considered the father of empiricism, and is followed by Berkley, Hume, Russell, and others of the current era.

Juxtaposed directly opposite the empiricist, is the rationalist. Typified by philosophers including Plato, Aquinas, and Kant, the rationalist asserts that there exists knowledge without experience. This knowledge is said to be "a priori" - or knowledge existant that is known without experience. A rationalist might state: ". . .nowhere in nature can one find, let's say, a contradiction, an imaginary number, or mathematical concepts in the altogether."

Yet, their usage is commonplace.

Epistemology then, is about knowledge and its origins.

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--172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the following because it has problems.

____ Before considering the definition of knowledge in detail, it is important to distinguish two slightly different meanings of belief. To believe something can mean to be convinced of its truth, despite their being insufficient evidence. In this sense, one might believe in ghosts, UFOs, love or some such phenomena, even though one knows the evidence to be inadequate to reach that conclusion. This sort of belief is a close cousin of faith.

The other meaning is less intense, but just as profound: to believe something can just mean to think that it is true. That is, to believe P is to do no more than to think, for whatever reason, that P is the case. It is this sort of belief that philosophers most often mean when they are discussing knowledge. The reason is that in order to know something, one must think that it is true - one must believe (in the second sense) it to be the case.

To see that this is so, consider someone saying "I know that P, but I don't think P is true". The person making this utterance has, in a profound sense, contradicted themselves. If one knows that P, then, amongst other things, one thinks that P is indeed true. If one thinks that P is true, then one believes (inthe second sense) P.

If someone claims to believe something, they are claiming that they think that it is the truth. But of course, it might turn out that they were mistaken, and that what they thought was true was actually false. This is not the case with knowledge. For example, suppose that Jeff thinks that a particular bridge is safe, and attempts to cross it; unfortunately the bridge collapses under his weight. We might say that Jeff believed that the bridge was safe, but that his belief was mistaken. We would not say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. For something to count as knowledge, it must be true.

Similarly, two people can believe things that are mutually contradictory, but they cannot know things that are mutually contradictory. For example, Jeff can believe the bridge safe, while Jenny believes it unsafe. But Jeff cannot know the bridge is safe and Jenny know that the bridge is unsafe. Two people cannot know contradictory things.

Justified true belief

The most influential writing on knowledge is the Theaetetus account written by Plato, in which he further develops the definition of knowledge. We know that, for something to count as knowledge, it must be true, and be believed to be true. Plato argues that this is insufficient, and that in addition one must have a reason or justification for that belief.

Plato defined knowledge as justified true belief.

One implication of this definition is that one cannot be said to "know" something just because one believes it and that belief subsequently turns out to be true. An ill person with no medical training but a generally optimistic attitude might believe that she will recover from her illness quickly, but even if this belief turned out to be true, on the Theaetetus account the patient did not know that she would get well, because her belief lacked justification.

Knowledge, therefore, is distinguished from true belief by its justification, and much of epistemology is concerned with how true beliefs might be properly justified. This is sometimes referred to as the theory of justification.

The Theaetetus definition agrees with the common sense notion that we can believe things without knowing them. Whilst knowing p entails that p is true, believing in p does not, since we can have false beliefs. It also implies that we believe everything that we know. That is, the things we know form a subset of the things we believe.

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--172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the above because it has problems.

Problems: "The most influential writing on knowledge" is advocacy, and conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, in "Knowledge is belief" is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy --172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Mr. Rhobite maintains that "Conflation of knowledge and belief" is "original research." It is not. Conflation is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy. --172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Wrong. Conflation is not a form of equivocation. To conflate two things is to speak of them as if they were the same thing. (Sometimes they are, so it is not always wrong to conflate. E.g. The Morning Star and The Evening Star should be conflated.) To equivocate is to shift the meaning of a word in an argument as the argument progresses. --63.231.15.66 23:16, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

intro

Ungtss, you are right that the first paragraph needs work, but there are several problems with your edits.

Firstly, it restricts truth to correspondence. This is too restrictive, as s look at truth will reveal.

Second, you have stated that justified belief is a subset of knowledge. This is the wrong way around. Things we know are a subset of our justified beliefs (pretty well that part of them that is true…)

Thirdly, you equate epistemology with theory of justification, which is incorrect.

Fourth, you have removed what I think is an important piece of the definition, which discusses two different senses of belief. This is included as a result of a discussion elsewhere in the Wiki (in truth, I think…), and should be maintained.

And finally, you place a great deal of emphasis on the types of belief that are not knowledge, which might be more appropriate for the article on belief, rather than the present article. Banno 00:32, Oct 30, 2004 (UTC)

Justificationism and Anti-justificationism

Can I second the motion that "Justified True Belief" takes its own article? That's what brought me here on a redirect. I was investigating to see what, if anything, is recorded on Wikipedia concerning the critique of 'justificationism' (the -ism that holds JTB to be the correct definition of knowledge) eg, the school of 'anti-justificationism' associated with Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos. I was going to add something in but note the blizzard problem mentioned here. It would fit better under a new article on JTB, perhaps? Adhib 14:41, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps "Justified True Belief" should be redirected to Gettier Problem.

Gruepig 04:05, 13 Jan 2005 (UTC)

'Infinity': the uncompleted measurement

Most important: Diagram http://www.creightonbrown.co.nz/Creighton%20Brown%20-%20Theories%20-%20Philosophy%20-%20Epistemology%20-%20ForTheFinite_ToKnow_Is_ToAssume.png

Ideas: Philosophy meets maths:

Assumed knowing idea { Assumed Knowing To know with assumption is to think and achieve a computed truth when measured on the complete system, a complete test however is beyond the logic of smaller to know so it assumes it knows

Never Knowing To not know is for it to never be computed to never know, Direct to Assumed Knowing

Wrongly knowing To wrongly know is for the logic of the smaller to not meet that of the larger. Direct to assumed knowing

Always knowing To know without doubt is to have the logic of all, implausable to the logic of the smaller, and the larger is incapable of seeing beyond itself so will never know [Theory, see Assumed knowing]

NOTE THIS: Why do we not know? Because we cannot complete the equation [Of the complete system] ERGO: to know for sure is an equation we could not complete. }

PS if anyone wants to call me any sort of philosophist call it this: The philosophy of logic - Not fixed definable physicality merely the uncomplete measurement [Or uncomplete equation]

Anything else i was to define will be of assumption, the finite logic, and potentially incomplete. I So ask because it is to be finite that it not be seen as the philosophy i wish to bestow on others, but the practical assumptions i have to make

Idea: Philosophical Accountability

How do you make people accountable? by accounting [[cognition] n. a system that provides quantitative information about finances]

In response to the above, I --Christofurio 15:02, Apr 14, 2005 (UTC), have just one question: Huh?

Arranging of topics

Shouldn't 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 (two forms of realism) be their own headings instead of subheadings under empiricism?

etymology of epistemology, episteme

episteme is translated as knowledge rather than science by http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/.

where is Paul Feyrabend?

I think Paul Feyrabend should be present in this article. He wrote a lot of epistemology and is well known. May be many people do not like him, but he stated interesting questions.

In any case, he is in the Italian version (stub) of the article and will remain.

Truman Burbank from it.wiki --213.156.54.194 17:09, 15 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Understood: there are differences between English term Epistemology and Italian Epistemologia. In Italian the term is about the same as "philosophy of science". I think the same could be for other languages (e.g. French).

Truman Burbank --213.156.54.194 11:42, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Reasonable Reason

If there was to be a reason for reason, I hope it would be reasonable. Then if it were to be reasonable how would one reason it?

If there was to be reason, there a reasonable reason, an equation, not so much maths

I think of an equation as a reason :-)

Whatever it is, we will model it, whether its maths or otherwise is not so much the case, the system is modelled, whether words, diagrams, a book or so forth.

At some points you have to decide what is the best answer to the problem. When we have enough of the equations to model the mind and the other parts of the string theory it may be possible that we have an answer which shows enough of the workings to highlight that we do seem likely to have assumption.

Is there anyone here who can tell me: 1] They do not assume or 2] How they assume?

A JTB is an assumption of measuring equations too big to be computed.

I could also assume i have a date with alyssa milano this year, would that JTB / assumption be an advantage?

Query

Why the redirect to Epistemology from Gnoseology (in the article 'Noetics') ?

Shouldn't there be an article on Gnoseology?

It could refer to the book entitled 'Gnoseology' by Alejandro Llano, translated by Fr. David Sands “Gnoseology should be considered — along with ontology and natural theology — as one of the principle part of metaphysics. It is the metaphysical theory of knowledge. Gnoseology is the metaphysics of truth. Its study has theoretical importance and vital relevance especially today because it warns us against fundamental errors which are very common at the present time.” ISBN 971 554 133

If you think there is a difference between epistemology and Gnoseology significant enough to justify it, go ahead and write Gnoseology. It is not a common term. I don't see its absence here as a problem for the article. Banno 20:40, May 13, 2005 (UTC)

Suggestion

This page could be renamed Western Epistemology, and another page can be created for Eastern Epistemology, with an introduction page titled Epistemology. deeptrivia July 9, 2005 05:19 (UTC)

Is there substantial enough material on eastern epistemology to justify its own page? (I'm not commenting, I really have no idea). --Kzollman 05:15, July 26, 2005 (UTC)

Writing such a page would be an obvious first step before re-naming this page. Banno 09:10, July 26, 2005 (UTC)

Knowledge as JTB

An anonymous user that has been removing content at Knowledge has come by here. I reverted the removal. I understand that you think that defining knowledge as justified true belief constitutes a conflation between knowledge and belief. However, this is a standard account which receives substantial discussion in the literature. If you have some references for why this is a bad view please feel free to add them to the entry, but please do not delete something that clearly deserves mention. For the sake of simplicity, lets keep all further discussion of this point at Talk: Knowledge. thanks, Kzollman 00:04, July 26, 2005 (UTC)

Yup, happened again... with a reference to the talk page, for some strange reason. Perhaps if this user could make a comment about his actions, we might be able to get somewhere. Until that time, I regard it as vandalism--viewpoints that I think are false are still valid and important as viewpoints. They should be left in the article and argued against in the article rather than deleted. WhiteC 03:56, 26 July 2005 (UTC)

Same user has been causing trouble at truth and true, as well as (oddly) Wikipedia:Neutral point of view. Removes large blocks of text, claiming that they are logical fallacies. Attempts to discuss the issue with this user usually draw accusations of fallacious reasoning and "obscurantism". Rhobite 04:46, July 26, 2005 (UTC)

"The fallacy of conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, has no place in a modern encyclopedia, the attempts of the obscurantists to have it engraved in stone notwithstanding" (from .6's comment to an edit he made, which has since been reverted)

Since we're talking about the opinion of at least one historically important philosopher, Plato, this conflation deserves mention in a modern encycylopedia, even if all current philosophers disagree with it. It is mentioned (I think) in the context of its relation to current philosophy. I think beliefs may be wrong, and may not constitute objective knowledge, but this is more of an everyday approach than a reference to JTB (justified true belief). The mere fact that this was an important viewpoint historically merits its mention in this encyclopedia.

Perhaps if someone could point out some weaknesses of this approach to knowledge and belief, then this would be a valid criticism of Plato's approach to epistemology. Simply saying that the approach is wrong, doesn't tell us WHY IT IS WRONG. Even if it is only wrong from a theological viewpoint, a mention of the name/author of the viewpoint which considers it wrong would go a long way toward legitimizing inclusion in the article of this criticism. WhiteC 03:51, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

6 might not be aware of the importance of discussing his/her changes on the Talk page. I've added a message in <!-- --> tags in the text of the article itself, which I've discovered sometimes helps in these cases. Ravenswood 16:25, August 2, 2005 (UTC)

"Knowledge is ... belief" is the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things. The fallacy of conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, has no place in a modern encyclopedia, the attempts of the obscurantists to have it engraved in stone notwithstanding. --172.193.1.144 20:47, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

No it is not a fallacy. Only arguments can commit fallacies. Doctrines cannot commit fallacies. Doctrines can be true or false, they cannot be fallacious or non-fallacious. --63.231.15.66 23:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

.6, this is a statement of your position, not an argument. It is an excellent demonstration of the problem. In place of this repetition, could you answer the question above from WhiteC? Why is it inappropriate, at the least, to mention Plato in an article on Epistemology? Why have you not answered similar question in talk:truth and talk:knowledge? Banno 21:12, August 2, 2005 (UTC)

1. It's not in any way a "position statement" (a personal point of view) to point out the logical fallacy of conflation of knowledge and belief in the argument you are championing, "Knowledge is belief."
2. "Knowledge is belief" still gets mentioned in Epistemology#Defining_knowledge. What's your problem? You want that antiquated bit of logical fallacy to be given a more central placement than that? Why don't you write a separate article about it? --172.198.112.65 22:11, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

No it is not a fallacy. Only arguments can commit fallacies. Doctrines cannot commit fallacies. Doctrines can be true or false, they cannot be fallacious or non-fallacious. --63.231.15.66 23:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Nameless user, please calm down. You seem to be reacting with bitterness to what to us is, and please bear with us, a simple question. We have repeatedly asked you to clarify your position. Some of us are still confused as to what you are trying to say. More importantly, it is very rude to repeatedly change an article when it is very clear that a large number of people prefer the unchanged version. See Wikipedia:Wikiquette. In these cases it is best to discuss the matter and try to reach a consensus. Perhaps your changes can be applied in another part of the article, or worded differently.

Also, just as a matter of formality, please register and choose a user name for yourself. This will immediately improve other people's opinion of you. Officially, all are welcome, but the unspoken reality is that anonymous users are regarded with a dose of suspicion. Ravenswood 22:30, August 2, 2005 (UTC)

Responding to the above points by .6 ...

1) Regardless of whether the conflation of knowledge and belief is a logical fallacy or not, it remains a historically important argument, even if it is illogical. At the moment the main criticism of it (yours) is the opinion of one anonymous user, and as such (unfortunately for you) does not have very much weight. Plato, as an ancient Greek philosopher whose arguments shaped Western history, carries a lot of weight, even if he is utterly wrong (which is in dispute). IF you were to say WHY you thought this was a logically fallacy, OR mention someone important who agreed with you, THEN this would be much more likely to merit inclusion in an encyclopedia, even if several people disagreed with you.

I would very much like to see your point of view in detail, but if all you can say/do is the same thing over and over again, this won't convince anyone who has ALREADY heard your original argument. In fact, such behavior has convinced a few people that you are most likely just trying to be annoying, regardless of whether your statement is correct or not. And so we hope you will explain your statement, but if you don't, you aren't likely to convince anyone of its correctness (regardless of whether it actually is objectively correct).

2) Yes, I'm sure this statement that "knowledge is belief" is mentioned in many places in Wikipedia. One person acting alone is unlikely to change this for more than a few minutes, unless he/she can PERSUADE others that it is wrong. Even if he/she is correct (which is in dispute). WhiteC 00:26, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

I'm not a philosopher. I'm just trying to keep up. Am I just being annoying, or cute, to suggest that the statement itself, "belief is not knowledge", conflates belief with knowledge? Doesn't a closer look at it show it to be self-contradictory? Does this statement reflect what the editor "knows", or rather something he "believes"? Isn't it something in fact that he believes so firmly that it seems preposterous that anyone could disbelieve it (or not know it). Those infidels, he condemns as "obscurantists" - enemies of knowledge. He complains that this is not a "modern" view. It is "antiquated". On these bases, he argues, it is a "logical fallacy". All of this, I assume can be demonstrated to be a justified true belief - err ... known fact. — Mark (Mkmcconn) ** 00:46, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Conflation

DotSix again removed a large piece of the article. This text was inserted: "Another current objection to the Theaetetus definition of knowledge is that the statement, "Knowledge is ... belief" suffers from the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things." Statements like these need to be cited, per the NPOV policy. Otherwise they are original research. It may be true that Plato's theory is no longer accepted by philosophers but it's still historically notable. Rhobite 17:30, August 3, 2005 (UTC)

Hey DotSix, you told me to come over here and post on the talk page but you haven't posted anything yourself recently. Please respond instead of revert-warring. Rhobite 17:32, August 3, 2005 (UTC)

See above, in the section "Moved from article" started by Mr. Banno. --172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

I don't think that justifies all the paragraphs you removed. Plato's theories are well-known, so they should be discussed in this article. Maybe I should have been more clear. You inserted text into the article which stated this:

Another current objection to the Theaetetus definition of knowledge is that the statement, "Knowledge is ... belief" suffers from the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things.

Please name a notable philosopher who has objected to this definition on the grounds that it is "conflation". If you cannot cite this objection, it is original research. Theaetetus proposes several definitions of knowledge, and (at least according to our article and an informal perusal of the text) does not arrive at a conclusion. I think it is misleading for you to simply remove the section. Perhaps we need to expand on the part which discusses Plato's definitions of knowledge. This appears to be only one definition. Philosophers, please correct me if I'm wrong.

On a completely unrelated note: Holy crap, Edmund Gettier taught my intro logic class! Feels kind of weird that I'm working on an article which cites him as a source. I confess to being completely unaware of his notability in epistemology at the time I was in the class. Rhobite 19:01, August 3, 2005 (UTC)

Copied from above: --172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the above because it has problems.

Problems: "The most influential writing on knowledge" is advocacy,

To say it is influential is not the same as to say that it is correct. All it means is that other people have read it and responded to it. It is very difficult to find an introduction or summary of epistemology that does not include the Justified Truth Belief account; indeed any such account would be inadequate. It'd be like writing and account of NASA that did not mention rocketry. Banno 21:54, August 3, 2005 (UTC)

"Knowledge is belief" is mentioned in the section, "Defining Knowledge" quote

Knowledge' is simply that which is known, to a high level of confidence, to be in accord with the actual state of affairs because it is supported by proof, where proof is the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance, or the process of establishing the validity of a statement by derivation from other statements in accordance with principles of reasoning.

For most of philosophical history, "knowledge" was taken to mean belief that was justified as true to an absolute certainty. Any less justified beliefs were called mere "probable opinion." This viewpoint still prevailed at least as late as Bertrand Russell's early 20th century book The Problems of Philosophy. In the decades that followed, however, the notion that the belief had to be justified to a certainty lost favour.

In the 1960s, Edmund Gettier criticised the Theaetetus definition of knowledge by pointing out situations in which a believer has a true belief justified to a reasonable degree, but not to a certainty, and yet in the situations in question, everyone would agree that the believer does not have knowledge.

Another current objection to the Theaetetus definition of knowledge is that the statement, "Knowledge is ... belief" suffers from the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things.

and conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, in "Knowledge is belief" is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy--172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Wrong. A single clause sentence like "Knowledge is belief" cannot commit a fallacy because it is not an argument. Only arguments can commit fallacies. --63.231.15.66 23:39, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

The new section is very careful to distinguish knowledge and belief. It argues that they are distinct, and furthermore points to another distinction between two different types of belief. It does not say that "Knowledge is belief", it presents an argument (that comes ultimately from Plato) that the things we know form a subset of the things we think are true (our beliefs in the second sense described). I can't make sense of your use of "equivocation", unless perhaps you think it means "equate"? Nor is it clear what fallacy you thin has occurred. Banno 21:54, August 3, 2005 (UTC)

Isn't that just the fallacy of appeal to personal incredulity? "I don't understand the term, 'equivocation' here, therefore there is no fallacy of equivocation in saying, 'Knowledge is a type of belief'."

No. Pointing out that you are misusing the word "equivocation" is not the same as making an argument to the effect that you are wrong because "I can't believe what you say". Making an argument and making a statement are two different things, and finding a remark unbelievable is a different thing from finding it incoherent. --63.231.15.66 23:39, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

You insist, "It does not say 'Knowledge is belief'." You are mistaken, 'Knowledge is justified true belief' definitely says that knowledge is belief, which is equivocation. 'Knowledge is a subset of belief' says that knowledge is belief, which is the fallacy of equivocation.--67.182.157.6 22:33, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Triply wrong: First, 'Knowledge is justified true belief' does not say "Knowledge is belief". The latter EQUATES knowldge and belief. The former does not. Rather it implies that knowledge is a subset of beliefs. Second, asserting that "X is Y" is not a fallacy of equivocation because assertions cannot commit fallacies, only arguments can. Third, "X is Y" would not be a fallacy of equivocation, even if it were an argument. The fallacy of eqivocation is not committed when two things are equated, it is committed when two different meanings are given to THE SAME WORD at different places in the argument.

Mr. Rhobite maintains that "Conflation of knowledge and belief" is "original research." It is not. Conflation is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy. --172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Please don't misrepresent my arguments. I am merely pointing out that you have yet to cite a philosopher who has criticized Plato's theory as conflation. Gettier, for example, did not accuse Plato's reasoning of being fallacious. He provided counter-examples to knowledge as JTB. Rhobite 00:47, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

Please don't accuse others of misrepresenting your arguments. That is just more lame ad hominem personal attack/poisoning the well. Please limit your comments to content, not the contributor, per wikipedia:no personal attacks. Thank you.

There is a well-established principle of valid argument (logic) involved here, that conflation of knowledge and belief by your side continuing to insist against all reason that "Knowledge is belief," when knowledge and belief are really two different things, as even Mr. Banno admits, is a form of the fallacy of equivocation.

No. There's a well-established method of definition, known as genus-differentia definition that involves the establishment of a species by its genus and its differentiating characteristics. For example, homo sapiens -- of the hominid genus, differentiated (it likes to think!) by wisdom, sapience. Homo sapiens are the wise hominids. This method of definition works outside of biology, too. A fork is a sort of eating utensil. What sort? It is differentiated from the other utensils by its tines. So you might conveniently define a fork as "the tine-possessing eating utensil." That wouldn't amount to the conflation of forks and utensils. So there'd be no fallacy of conflation.

Now, it is possible you're trying to make the point that belief is the wrong genus. This point is already expressed in the article, though, as a discussion of the variety of different possible truth bearers. Truth might not be a species of belief, at all; it might be a species of the genus "sentence" or "proposition" or "teddy bear" or something else. But, certainly, belief is one of the traditional candidates, was invoked in an important discussion by the best known philosopher in the history of the human species. That isn't the sort of material a serious encyclopedia editor will just delete. --Christofurio 17:14, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

Solipsism

I also want to open the discussion on solipsism. In one edit, DotSix made the unqualified assertion that phenomenalism is the same thing as solipsism, and that both are fallacious. There are many counterarguments to Berkeley (and solipsism), but I'd prefer if we made our articles a little more nuanced than simply saying this:

Nowadays this point of view is rejected as solipsism, the fallacious argument that maybe all that really exists is perception, because there is no proof this hypothesis is false, which is the logical fallacy of argment _ad ignorantiam_).

Berkeley never made such an argument. Berkeley's doctring is not rejected "nowadays". Idealism is alive and well in philosophy. It has been getting more popular in recent decades among professional philosophers. Note. e.g., Michael Dummett and the later works of Hilary Putnam and their many accolytes. --63.231.15.66 23:45, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Argument from ignorance (argument _ad ignorantiam_) like that IS summarily rejected as logical fallacy, isn't it?--67.182.157.6 21:35, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

It's not true that all people reject solipsism, just as it's not true that all people reject the existence of God, or UFOs, etc. You may believe that solipsism is a fallacy but many people hold irrational beliefs. Plus, it's inaccurate to say that the only argument for solipsism is argument ad ignorantiam. Berkeley did not argue that "solipsism is true because it cannot be disproved". As with many philosophers of his time, he assumed the existence of God as a premise. Rhobite 19:28, August 3, 2005 (UTC)

Can Berkeley reasonably "assume the existence of God as a premise" consistent with phenomenalism? Let's see.

the section you refer to is:

Phenomenalism is a development from George Berkeley's claim that to be is to be perceived. According to phenomenalism, when you see "a tree" you see a certain perception of a brown shape. On this view, one shouldn't think of objects as distinct substances, which interact with our senses so that we may perceive them; rather we should conclude that all that really exists is the perception itself.

Nowadays this point of view is rejected as solipsism, the fallacious argument that maybe all that really exists is perception, because there is no proof this hypothesis is false, which is the logical fallacy of argment _ad ignorantiam_).

Okay, now let's look at this situation from the phenomenalist point of view, and just take it for granted (just for the sake of discussion) that George Burkeley thinks he sees God,

in the same way that I think I see a tree outside my window. Now, to be logically consistent with Burkeley's point of view, (phenomenalism), when Berkeley thinks he sees (meaning he thinks he understands that there might be) an invisible God, he actually sees only a certain PERCEPTION of a God-like shape. On this view, Berkeley shouldn't think of objects as distinct substances, which interact with our senses so that we may perceive them; rather we should conclude that all that really exists is the perception itself, so there really is no God, all that really exists is the perception (as Phenomenalism says). So Burkeley cannot "presume the existence of God as a premise," as you put it, he has just said that just as there really is no tree, there is just the perception, there really is no God, there is just the perception, right?--67.182.157.6 21:35, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Wrong. Because Berkeley does not think he sees God. He does not believe that knowledge of God is perceptual. --63.231.15.66 23:45, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

Who ever said that Berkeley was talking about seeing God? He argued that our senses are all that we can know, and these senses are caused by God. He did not argue that phenomenalism is true simply because it can't be proven to be false. DotSix, that is what you are accusing him of when you use the phrase "argument ad ignorantiam". Rhobite 01:06, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

Zacharyas Boufoy-Bastick reference deleted

I deleted the paragraph about Zacharyas Boufoy-Bastick because he is just a kid who's only philosophical paper was published a few weeks ago in a very minor journal. His views are not important enough to include in this article. (It also didn't make a lot of sense.)

The policy here is comment on CONTENT, not on the CONTRIBUTOR.

"I know P, but I don't think P is true."

Somebody wrote: Consider someone saying "I know P, but I don't think P is true."

That amounts to a straw man, since nobody in his right mind would EVER utter such an aninity. That would be like someone saying, "I know it is raining, but I don't think it is raining." Absurd!

The obscurantists are just trying to conflate knowledge and belief again, which is the logical fallacy of equivocation.

Amazingly, you are correct. The article is describing a nonsensical statement and then explaining how it makes no sense. It is intended to illustrate that if you know P, then it is necessary that you think P is true. So why are you removing it? We can illustrate invalid statements, can't we? Also, have you just given up responding to our points about Berkeley and the Theaetetus above? We have explained how you are misrepresenting Plato and Berkeley, yet you continue to remove this text. Rhobite 17:34, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

Should we lock this page?

DotSix has been making a concentrated attack on this page (and others). Even when we try to work with him, he yanks out our edits and tries to force in his version. The opening paragraphs, as they stand now, are an effort to appease DotSix by woking in his issues without removing any existing text. These paragraphs are a bit clumsy, but they're being worked on. However, efforts to work on them are hampered by DotSix repeatedly reverting everything back to his version.

I, personally, believe that it is time to lock out all changes to this page, after first reverting it all the way back to whatever state it was in before DotSix began his agressive editing, even if that means a version from several months ago.

I realize this is drastic, but considering how tenacious DotSix is being, I feel there is no other way to save this article. Ravenswood 18:34, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

I think the page should be left unlocked. The next step is not to block or lock, but to go to arbitration. Banno 19:59, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

Yes, of course. Just... got a bit frustrated there.

DotSix, if you are truly sincere in wanting to work with us, then please work with us. Thank-you. Ravenswood 20:10, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

New tag needed

We need a new tag that says something like,

There is a well-organized obscurantist faction here in Wikipedia that is trying to control the content of this and related articles through ganging up on and bullying anyone who disagrees with them, and tyranny of the majority, which does not comport with policy.

Who else but your good self would make use of such a template? You might take this to Wikipedia:Template messages rather than discussing it here. Banno 20:12, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

Two senses

user:Christofurio removed the following, describing it as "incoherent":

Before considering the definition of knowledge in detail, it is important to distinguish two slightly different meanings of belief. To believe something can mean to be convinced of its truth, despite their being insufficient evidence. In this sense, one might believe in ghosts, UFOs, love or some such phenomena, even though one knows the evidence to be inadequate to reach that conclusion. This sort of belief is a close cousin of faith.

The other meaning is less intense, but just as profound: to believe something can just mean to think that it is true. That is, to believe P is to do no more than to think, for whatever reason, that P is the case. It is this sort of belief that philosophers most often mean when they are discussing knowledge. The reason is that in order to know something, one must think that it is true - one must believe (in the second sense) it to be the case.

I'd like to re-instate it, although I guess that the prose could be improved. Here are my reasons:

1. the distinction is real. My Shorter Oxford, in its inimitable way, lists as its first sense of belief "The mental action of trusting to or confiding in a person or thing; trust, confidence"; and as its second: "acceptance of a proposition... as true". The Macquarie, in its much more direct style, lists "That which is believed; an accepted opinion" as its first sense, and "conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge". So, on the one hand we have "belief used to express simple assent to a statement, and on the other we have "belief" used to indicate a strong commitment, trust or confidence.

(Incidentally, wiktionary:Belief lists as its first sense, "Mental acceptance of a claim as truth without evidence". There is a lot of work to be done over there.) Banno 20:55, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

2. It is relevant. I guess that .6 provides the best example of how misunderstanding this distinction leads to problems. The only way I can see to make sense of his position is to see him as taking "conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge" as the entirety of belief; so when he claims that I am conflating knowledge and belief, he thinks I am asserting that knowledge is conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge - which indeed would be wrong. See also the discussion at talk:Knowledge#mis-use.

So, Chris, please help me to write a better explanation rather than just removing the paragraphs. thanks. Banno 20:46, August 4, 2005 (UTC)

Belief as "the mental action of trusting" simply has no place in a discussion of truth. That mental action can be well or poorly grounded, and the grounds, in turn can be true or false, but all of that is just unnecessary complication here. I might well, "believe in Saint Paul" in roughly the sense in which I "believe in my cousin Joe." I would happily lend Joe money at his request. I might likewise pray for the intervention of Saint Paul. But all that is non-cognitive. When we discuss belief in the cognitive sense, i.e. my belief that my cousin Joe is honest and that Saint Paul in some sense still excists despite his (earthly) death, we're back to epistemology. But bringing up the irrelevant non-cognitive sense of the word is just confusing here. --Christofurio 14:16, August 5, 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for your answer. Well, I wish that you were right. It would be simpler to leave the discussion of the two senses of belief out. But .6 seems to miss the point, or at least misunderstand what is going on, and MickWest pointed to a similar problem (although Mick can see the issue) in knowledge. The point of the section is precisely to say that the sense of belief as "the mental action of trusting" is not important in this account, that belief means simply "assenting to the truth of..." or somesuch. So I still say leave it in. Is there any improvement you can suggest to he wording? Banno 21:12, August 5, 2005 (UTC)

For what it's worth, I also find the "two senses of belief" stuff unnecessary. (And hard to follow, too.) I don't think DotSix is confused about different senses of "belief". I think that, in his typical impulsive and muddled way, he just (1) read the article shortly after reading a defintion of "conflate," (2) failed to see that the article says that knowldge is a subset of belief instead of equating the two of them, and (3) impulsively declared that the article conflates belief and knowledge. It was explained to him immediately what was wrong in his thinking and I think he has known perfectly well since then that he was wrong. He persists because he cannot admit error, not because he is confusing different senses of a word. --

Nate Ladd 22:51, August 5, 2005 (UTC)

True, .6 might be simply obtuse. But I've seen the problem elsewhere (on forums) with novices, so I think it still important to make it. If it is unclear, then I'd like to make it clearer. The main purpose is not to counter .6 so much as to explain the way in which belief is being used in the remainder of the article before it becomes a problem for any other readers. Banno 07:59, August 7, 2005 (UTC)

I believe I've improved that passage considerably just now. I stuck to the "Shorter Oxford" definition you provided, and worked through its implications in the "safe to fly" example -- cutting the stuff about ghosts, which seems headed in other directions. For what it's worth, I agree with Nate that this doesn't have much to do with DotSix's problem. --Christofurio 19:52, August 6, 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for having a go. Perhaps your example does do a better job of explaining the difference. But I must say I'm not keen on using Repose in the sentence. The usage is a bit obscure, and I think makes the paragraph more difficult. I also think that the lack of evidence is pivotal, since it contrasts with the idea of knowledge being justified. Banno 08:19, August 7, 2005 (UTC)