Talk:Crossfire Hurricane (FBI investigation)/Archive 3

Source for claim about Papadopoulos

@Valjean:@Starship.paint: Our text currently says The New York Times and Vox said his denials were not honest, as he had previously told Australian FFG officials he knew about the Russian offer of help to the Trump campaign.. I see that the Vox source says this. I do not see where the NYT story says anything like this. Can someone please point me to the relevant quote from the NYT article? If I'm right and the NYT did not say this, we have the Vox source. I then want to raise the question whether a Vox opinion is due or reliable in this context. I think it is not due, since it is a partisan opinion source, and here we are trying to explain the facts first. Moreover, it isn't reliable. The Vox source is just repeating what (they take from) the NYT story on the origin of CH, which does not say (as Vox claims) that Papadopoulos had drunkenly bragged to an Australian diplomat about Russia offering him “dirt”. No, the NYT story said P told Downer that Russia had political dirt on Hillary Clinton and that Exactly how much Mr. Papadopoulos said that night at the Kensington Wine Rooms with the Australian, Alexander Downer, is unclear. It's always possible that I'm missing it, so please feel free to point to other parts of the NYT source. Shinealittlelight (talk) 21:35, 17 May 2020 (UTC)

• @Shinealittlelight: (1) I don't see it in the NYT source of April 9, 2019, so I've removed it. (2) I don't think the Vox article is an opinion piece. This is their opinion section. (3) The Vox source is just repeating what (they take from) the NYT story on the origin of CH - are they? The only link to NYT in the Vox source was to this May 18, 2018 article by NYT. That's not the same as what you claimed? Did I miss another link? starship.paint (talk) 03:17, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint:Well we disagree about whether that's an opinion source, but nevermind. Maybe we can agree that this Vox source is among the lowest quality sources we have for the relevant facts, and I don't see why we are including it in this section when we have better sources (like NYT) that report the known facts with much greater care. I was inferring that Vox was getting their info from NYT from the fact that they link to this story--which just makes an attempt to repeat what the NYT reported. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:46, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - I can see how the Vox article of December 30, 2017 seems to go further than the NYT article of December 30, 2017. But the article we are discussing now is the Vox article of May 25, 2018. The source for Vox in 2018 is not necessarily the NYT article of December 30, 2017. It could be this one: by the Sydney Morning Herald in January 1, 2018: Fairfax Media has confirmed independently that the conversation first reported by The New York Times took place. In May 2016, Trump campaign adviser George Papadopoulos told Mr Downer over drinks at an upscale London wine bar that the Russians had a dirt file on rival candidate Hillary Clinton in the form of hacked Democratic Party emails. starship.paint (talk) 06:45, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: It is at least very plausible that the 5/2018 Vox piece was depending on the 12/2017 Vox piece that it linked, or the 12/2017 NYT piece that the 12/2017 Vox piece linked. It is not very plausible that it was depending on an unlinked SMH report. But even if I am wrong about that, does the SMH piece support what Vox says? No, it does not. The SMH says that Papadopoulos told Mr Downer ... that the Russians had a dirt file on rival candidate Hillary Clinton in the form of hacked Democratic Party emails. But Vox wants to say that Papadopoulos had drunkenly bragged to an Australian diplomat about Russia offering him “dirt” on Hillary Clinton. SMH doesn't support drukenly bragged and also does not support Russia offering him "dirt". In other words, SMH only reports that Pap said Russia had "dirt", not that he said (much less "drunkenly bragged") that they offered that dirt to him. Finally, even if I were wrong about all of that, I think we should have serious questions about what is actually known about what Pap said to Downer. The IG report is impressively cagey in its characterization of this. It repeatedly says that Downer reported that Pap "suggested" to an FFG official that the Trump campaign had received "some kind of suggestion" from Russia that it could assist with the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. I think this is what's known--that Downer reported that Pap gave a "suggestion of some kind of suggestion"--to Downer. That's really hard to interpret, and really cagey, and I think the media "reports" that have talked about this aren't always very careful. We should be careful, since we have the IG report. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:43, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

Just placing these quotes from the IG report so we can easily compare them:

"Papadopoulos ... made statements indicating that he is knowledgeable that the Russians made a suggestion to the Trump team that they could assist the Trump campaign with an anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton campaign." (p. 60)

"...the goal of this meeting was for Source 2 to ask Papadopoulos direct questions about whether the Trump campaign benefitted from, or anyone in the Trump campaign had knowledge of, Russian assistance or the Wikileaks release of information that was damaging to the Clinton campaign." (p. 331, 352)

"For example, when Papadopoulos was asked about the Trump campaign, the questions were focused on obtaining information about other Crossfire Hurricane subjects (Page and Flynn) or determining whether the Trump campaign benefitted from, or anyone in the Trump campaign had knowledge of, Russian assistance or the WikiLeaks release of information that was damaging to the Clinton campaign." (p. 406)

Valjean (talk) 15:23, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

I do not like this quote as it totally misses Source 3 (that was his high school friend and thus...). FBI totally manipulated Source 3 information! Even if Typhoon was lying to Source 2 (as he noted to Source 3 Halper looked like CIA agent), he should have been truthful with Source 3. They hid this exculpatory evidence. 91.76.22.132 (talk) 15:46, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight and Valjean: - can we just use made statements indicating that he is knowledgeable that the Russians made a suggestion to the Trump team that they could assist the Trump campaign with an anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton campaign, which is from the IG report, secondary sourced to Lawfare? starship.paint (talk) 15:49, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint:, that sounds good. -- Valjean (talk) 16:26, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

Alternatively, according to FFG, George Papadopoulos “suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama).” Sourced to FactCheck. starship.paint (talk) 15:52, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

I'm not sure I know what you're proposing exactly, Starship.paint. The repeated and authoritative characterization from the IG report, repeated numerous times, is that Pap "suggested" that the Trump team had received "some kind of suggestion" from Russia, etc. That's how I'd put it, since that's how they put it over and over and over and over again:

"...information from a Friendly Foreign Government (FFG) reporting that, in May 2016, during a meeting with the FFG, then Trump campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos "suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama)." (p. ii)

"According to the information provided by the FFG, in May 2016, a Trump campaign foreign policy advisor, George Papadopoulos, "suggested" to an FFG official that the Trump campaign had received "some kind of suggestion" from Russia that it could assist with the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton {Trump's opponent in the presidential election) and President Barack Obama." (p. 1)

"It was in this context that the FBI received information on July 28, 2016, about a conversation between Papadopoulos and an official of a Friendly Foreign Government (FFG) in May 2016 during which Papadopoulos "suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion" from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to candidate Clinton and President Obama." (p. 50)

"During one of these meetings, Papadopoulos reportedly "suggested" to an FFG official that the Trump campaign "received some kind of a suggestion from Russia" that it could assist the campaign by anonymously releasing derogatory information about presidential candidate Hillary Clinton." (p. 51)

"[Papadopoulos] suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama). It was unclear whether he or the Russians were referring to material acquired publicly of [sic] through other means." (apparently quoting from an FBI document, p. 51-2)

"Papadopoulos suggested that Candidate #l's campaign had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that Russia could assist with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to another candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #2)" (quoting from a FISA application, p. 167)

"According to the FBI Electronic Communication (EC) documenting the decision, the investigation was opened in response to information CD officials received on July 28, 2016, from a Friendly Foreign Government (FFG) indicating that in a May 2016 meeting with the FFG, George Papadopoulos, an advisor to the Trump campaign, "suggested the Trump team had received some kind of a suggestion" from Russia that it could assist in the election process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to candidate Clinton and President Obama." (p. 346)

"...the FFG information received from an FBI Legal Attache stating that Papadopoulos had suggested during a meeting in May 2016 with officials from a "trusted foreign partner" that the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist by releasing information damaging to candidate Clinton and President Obama." (p. 351)

"...George Papadopoulos "suggested the Trump team had received some kind of a suggestion" from Russia that it could assist in the election process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to candidate Clinton and President Obama. " (p. 410)

Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:05, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

"Some kind" is vague, but we know exactly what kind (using WikiLeaks for "an anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton campaign."). We don't favor vague content when we have specific information.-- Valjean (talk) 16:16, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

This begs the question. I am contending that we don't have specific information, and that the vague characterization is what we have to go on. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:45, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

I must be totally misunderstanding you. "Some kind" is vague, whereas we are told exactly what "kind", and that is not vague. "an anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton campaign." is quite specific information about the type of "kind". We also know that the released information included those stolen emails released by WikiLeaks. We don't have to go into detail here. As suggested above by @Starship.paint:, we can just write: "made statements indicating that he is knowledgeable that the Russians made a suggestion to the Trump team that they could assist the Trump campaign with an anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton campaign". The "suggestion" was about "an anonymous release of information". -- Valjean (talk) 19:55, 18 May 2020 (UTC)

• @Valjean and Shinealittlelight: - I am now of the opinion that we should provide both characterizations from page ii and page 60. The characterization from page ii refers to the information from the FFG, we should state it as so. The characterization from page 60 refers to the information stated by the FBI Electronic Communication in opening the investigation, we should state it as so too. The one from page ii should come first, it's from the executive summary. Our readers can make their own conclusions. starship.paint (talk) 04:51, 19 May 2020 (UTC)
  • @Starship.paint:, that sounds reasonable. What would that look like? -- Valjean (talk) 05:02, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

A review of Crossfire Hurricane done by Justice Department Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz resulted in a report released in December 2019. The report stated that the following information from a Friendly Foreign Government triggered the investigation: George Papadopoulos "suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama)."

Horowitz's review also found that the FBI Electronic Communication opening the investigation into Papadopoulos said that Papadopoulos "made statements indicating that he is knowledgeable that the Russians made a suggestion to the Trump team that they could assist the Trump campaign with an anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to the Clinton campaign."

starship.paint (talk) 05:12, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

Looks good. -- Valjean (talk) 05:21, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

I like this language, Starship.paint. Thank you. However, I've lost the thread here. What becomes of the sentence about Vox that exercised me above? Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:16, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint and Shinealittlelight: - eh, upon reflecting on the differences between the IG report, Vox, and SMH, I conclude that the Vox one seems to have gone the furthest. Unlike the SMH, they don't seem to be breaking a story (e.g. Fairfax Media confirmed...), so it's unclear where they got their info from. I'd say that we remove the Vox sentence then. It would be preferable to use the source Vox got their story from. starship.paint (talk) 13:42, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

Sounds right. Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:50, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint and Valjean: I'm not familiar with this source, but it's a story from October 2019 containing an interesting quote from Downer about his report on Pap: "...He didn’t say dirt (on Clinton). He said material that could be damaging to her. No, he said it would be damaging. He didn’t say what it was.” Thoughts? Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:29, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

It would be interesting to hear Erika Thompson's recollection, as she was there. Usually, the recollections closest to the event are the most reliable. Is that recollection mentioned in any other RS? I can only find it used in books by unreliable sources (Bongino, Strassel, and Corsi). It seems the difference is the word "dirt".

In that meeting, Papa­dopoulos told Downer Russia had many emails that could damage Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton. Papadopoulos has since accused Downer of being a spy working against the Trump campaign....

“During that conversation he (Papadopoulos) mentioned the Russians might use material that they have on Hillary Clinton in the lead-up to the election, which may be damaging.

“It was worth reporting,” he said. “It wasn’t the only thing we reported. We reported (back to Australia) the following day or a day or two after … it seemed quite interesting. He didn’t say dirt (on Clinton). He said material that could be damaging to her. No, he said it would be damaging. He didn’t say what it was.”...

Australia reported Papadopoulos’s claims about the Clinton emails to the US government in July 2016 shortly after a flood of Russian-hacked Democrat emails was released on WikiLeaks.

BTW, it's a RS, and not a controversial BLP matter, so I see no reason not to use the quote as a later clarification/modification from Downer. -- Valjean (talk) 16:19, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

Do we know whether Downer recorded the conversation? I haven't been able to tell. Sure would be helpful to see a transcript! I don't know of this quote in any other RS; I found it in this paper I haven't heard of only because Papadopoulos himself pointed to it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:30, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - sure, you can use that source for Downer. Papa "mentioned the Russians might use material that they have on Hillary Clinton in the lead-up to the election, which may be damaging" to her. Papa "didn’t say dirt". starship.paint (talk) 01:24, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint:, I can't get your link to work. -- Valjean (talk) 02:57, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Valjean: - it's just an archived version of the Australian source. starship.paint (talk) 03:01, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight:, I don't know that Downer recorded the meeting. He had no reason to do it. That is one of Papadopoulos's claims, which have evolved over time. I don't trust him. Neither did the FBI. Once the stories about Russian interference and Page's travels to Russia broke in the media, the Trump campaign (including the three subjects of these operations) went into damage control, and their statements became very guarded and untrustworthy. They also became aware that someone (later revealed to be Steele) was performing opposition research related to Russia. The Russians may have alerted them, and Steele's sources in Russia dried up. It became too dangerous for them. -- Valjean (talk) 02:57, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Do you want to update the language on Pap that you came up with above? It seems that it needs go to in three places in the article; not sure exactly what you had in mind in that regard. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:52, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - I was only thinking about [1] one place, actually. starship.paint (talk) 05:05, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

Source 3

@Starship.paint and Valjean: I want to add the recent information reported by CBS about this contact. Specifically: CBS1 reports Pap's very lawyerly and rehearsed (/sarcasm) remarks to source 3 here:

Earlier in the profanity-laced conversation, which covered a wide range of topics, the confidential source asked about Moscow's election meddling.

CHS: You think Russia's playing a big game in this election?

Papadopoulos: No.

CHS: Why not?

Papadopoulos: Why would they?

CHS: Don't you think they have special interests?

Papadopoulos: Something like that (Banging sound) I don't think so. That's all bull****. No one know's who's hacking— them.

CHS: You don't think that they, that they hacked the, the DNC? Who hacked the f***ing DNC then?

Papadopoulos: Could be the Chinese, could be the Iranians, it could be some Bernie, uh, supporters. Could be— Anonymous.

The conversation continued, with the FBI source zeroing in on Russia and then-candidate Trump.

CHS: Do you think they have interest in Trump?

Papadopoulos: They, dude, no one knows how a president's going to govern anyway, You don't just say, oh I like —

CHS: He is very limited in what he can do anyways so like (laughs)…

Papadopoulos: I mean, the r-the Congress is very hostile with Russia anyways, so…I don't know, I don't know. And even Putin said it himself (unintelligible) (rustling) It's all, it's like conspiracy theories.

CBS also has another report here: CBS2. I also think that, in line with these sources, it should specifically be noted that the IG report includes the FBI's omission of these specific denials to source 3 as among the 17 "errors and omissions" that have been widely reported. Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:14, 19 May 2020 (UTC)

• @Shinealittlelight: - propose a text. starship.paint (talk) 01:20, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Here's my proposal for the Source 3 section:

Another FBI CHS named "Source 3", "an individual with a connection to Papadopoulos", was used to interact with Papadopoulos "multiple times between October 2016 and June 2017". In a meeting with Source 3 in late October 2016, Papadopoulos called the allegations that Russia was "playing a big game" in the election "bullshit". He added that he knew "for a fact" that the Trump campaign was not involved in the hack, adding that such involvement would have been illegal. He further stated that he did not think Russia wanted Trump to win the election. The FBI failed to include these statements in their subsequent FISA warrant applications. In his report, Horowitz included this failure as among the seventeen "inaccuracies or omissions" in the FBI's handling of the FISA warrant application.

Shinealittlelight (talk) 02:06, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

• @Shinealittlelight: He further stated that he did not think Russia wanted Trump to win the election is questionable. Also, "bullshit" refers to the "special interests" question, not the "playing a big game". starship.paint (talk) 02:54, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Points taken. How 'bout this:

Another FBI CHS named "Source 3", "an individual with a connection to Papadopoulos", was used to interact with Papadopoulos "multiple times between October 2016 and June 2017". In a meeting with Source 3 in late October 2016, Papadopoulos called the allegations that Russia was "playing a big game" and that they had "special interests" in the election "all bullshit". He added that he knew "for a fact" that the Trump campaign was not involved in the hack, adding that such involvement would have been illegal. He further argued that there was no reason to think that Russia wanted Trump to win the election. The FBI failed to include these statements in their subsequent FISA warrant applications. In his report, Horowitz included this failure as among the seventeen "inaccuracies or omissions" in the FBI's handling of the FISA warrant application.

Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:00, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

Another FBI CHS named "Source 3", "an individual with a connection to Papadopoulos", was used to interact with Papadopoulos "multiple times between October 2016 and June 2017". In a meeting with Source 3 in late October 2016, Papadopoulos denied that Russia was "playing a big game" in the American presidential election. When he was next asked whether Russia had "special interests", Papadopoulos declared: "that's all bullshit". He added that he knew "for a fact" that the Trump campaign was not involved in the DNC hack, adding that such involvement would have been illegal. When asked if Russia had "interest in Trump", Papadopoulos replied: "no one knows how a president's going to govern anyway". The FBI failed to include these statements in their subsequent FISA warrant applications. In his report, Horowitz included this failure as among the seventeen "inaccuracies or omissions" in the FBI's handling of the FISA warrant application.

@Shinealittlelight: - see above. starship.paint (talk) 03:10, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Sounds good. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:12, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: yes, that looks good. -- Valjean (talk) 03:15, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

@Valjean and Shinealittlelight: - just a heads-up, I expect that I will be off-wiki until May 26. Starting from now. starship.paint (talk) 10:47, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

Okay. Thanks for all your help and input. -- Valjean (talk) 17:58, 20 May 2020 (UTC)

Add info that Hurricane is one of 4 umbrellas, other 2 names are now known: DRAGON FISA and CROSSFIRE FURY

Also add information that Igor Yurievich Danchenko is Primary subsource (PSS) that used some of his russian friends like Olga Galkina, she created most of Steele dossier. He was working for Orbis in UK. 2A00:1370:812C:DE1A:E888:DD99:E1:5BB7 (talk) 02:39, 24 July 2020 (UTC)

Surveillance of Trump associates

I have not followed the discussion above very closely, so I'm not sure if this is helpful or not.

Background

There were a number of reasons why the investigations into the Russian's "sweeping and systematic" election interference led to suspicion, investigations, and surveillance of the Trump campaign in efforts to determine the nature of the election interference and the relationships between Russians and Trump campaign members. It started with routine surveillance of Russian assets by foreign agencies, not as part of any surveillance of the Trump campaign. That surveillance was started in late July 2016, by U.S. intelligence agencies.

Foreign surveillance

de Volkskrant reported that Dutch intelligence agency AIVD had penetrated the Russian hacking group Cozy Bear in 2014, and observed them in 2015 hack the State Department in real time, while capturing pictures of the hackers via a security camera in their workspace. American, British, and Dutch intelligence services had also observed stolen DNC emails on Russian military intelligence networks.

Over a period of several months, starting in August 2015, and before U.S. intelligence agencies started any investigations, they began to receive alarming reports from eight foreign intelligence agencies (United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, Poland, Australia, France, a Baltic state, and Holland) describing overheard conversations between known Russian agents and officials and Trump campaign members. The conversations "formed a suspicious pattern", and while their nature is known by intelligence agencies, it has not been revealed to the public.

In September 2015, the FBI discovered that a Russian cyber group had hacked the DNC's servers. The FBI then attempted, without success, to warn the DNC. Seven months later the DNC hired private cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, which also found that the Russians were behind the hacks.

Then, in April 2016, the FBI received a tape-recorded conversation from a Baltic state "about money from the Kremlin going into the US presidential campaign". The Dutch also reported how they literally watched in real time a group of Russians hacking the DNC.

The New York Times also reported that British and Dutch agencies had evidence of more secret meetings between Trump campaign members and Russian officials in the Netherlands, Britain and other countries, and that U.S. intelligence had overheard Russian officials, some of them within the Kremlin, talking about contacts with Trump associates. Some Russian officials were arguing about how much to interfere in the election. Then cyber attacks on state electoral systems led the Obama administration to directly accuse the Russians of interfering.

Because the CIA is not allowed to surveil the private communications of American citizens without a warrant, the CIA and FBI were slow to react to these revelations.

• Jan 26, 2019 - Donald J. Trump and 18 of his associates had at least 140 contacts with Russian...
• Apr 30, 2019 - A total of 272 contacts between Trump's team and Russia-linked...

The significance of this for the discussion above is that Russian agents and Russian officials were (and are) surveilled by our intelligence allies, and thus Trump associates and campaigners were inadvertently caught up in that surveillance. The findings were alarming enough that our allies warned the FBI. Never has an American candidate or president been involved in such cozy collusion with the enemy. Never. No wonder that the heads of our major intelligence agencies have publicly stated that Trump is acting as a Russian asset. Trump then got rid of them.

Note that Dutch intelligence penetrated the Russians in 2014, which was right after some Russians (in early 2014) publicly stated they would support Trump's candidacy (which had not been announced). This happened right after Trump's Miss Universe trip to Moscow in the fall of 2013. His plans existed already then, and Russians, not Americans, were privy to those plans.

I hope this is informative. -- Valjean (talk) 17:36, 3 August 2020 (UTC)

Sources

Strzok comments on NYT piece

@Soibangla: I do not see in the NYT article you cite where you are getting "subsequently reporting that the released notes did not provide a fully accurate representation of Strzok's knowledge." Can you please provide the quote you're depending on there? Thank you. Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:17, 28 July 2020 (UTC)

Still, [Strzok]] also added, the bureau had identified contacts between Mr. Page and Russian intelligence officials before the campaign; contacts between an associate of Paul Manafort, the onetime campaign chairman, and Russian intelligence; and contacts between two campaign advisers, Jeff Sessions and Michael T. Flynn, and Russia’s ambassador to the United States.[[2]]

soibangla (talk) 00:24, 28 July 2020 (UTC)

Ok. I tried to rewrite that part to be, in my judgment, a little closer to the source. Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:40, 28 July 2020 (UTC)

@Soibangla:@Starship.paint: I prefer SSP's version, even though I think all the versions after my initial one tend to obscure the main point of interest in an article on Crossfire Hurricane--namely, that the lead investigator at the FBI though they had no evidence of connection between the Trump campaign and Russian intelligence as of approximately February 2017--with lots of irrelevant smoke. But SSP's version at least doesn't get into the weeds quite as much. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:02, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

We need to get into the weeds, as this was a significant article that created a significant dispute, as exemplified by your inaccurate assertion that the lead investigator at the FBI though they had no evidence of connection, as the last NYT ref clarified as inaccurate and you provided in your edit. If we’re gonna add this, it needs to be laid out in a clear, chronological and comprehensive fashion, and the rework is significantly deficient in all three ways. It doesn’t mention Page, it irrelevantly mentions Stone, it doesn’t say when the notes were taken, it doesn’t mention that the NYT stood by the account, only that Strzok/Comey disputed it. soibangla (talk) 18:23, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

Strzok wrote "We have not seen evidence of any individuals affiliated with the Trump team in contact with [intelligence officers]." So no, my statement was not inaccurate. That is what he thought at that time, and it's why he wrote that then. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:34, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

But as we’ve already acknowledged and you included in your edit:

Still, [Strzok]] also added, the bureau had identified contacts between Mr. Page and Russian intelligence officials before the campaign; contacts between an associate of Paul Manafort, the onetime campaign chairman, and Russian intelligence; and contacts between two campaign advisers, Jeff Sessions and Michael T. Flynn, and Russia’s ambassador to the United States.

Let’s not go in circles here, please. soibangla (talk) 18:40, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

Not going in circles, just correcting your claim that my statement was inaccurate. The point I added about Manfort (etc.) does not claim any connection between "individuals affiliated with the Trump team" and Russian intelligence. What I said before was accurate, then, and perfectly consistent with the latter claim about Manafort (etc.). Let's not insult each other gratuitously please. FOC. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:06, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

You agreed with the contents of the green box in your edit, acknowledging that your original edit was not fully accurate. Now, here, you write that his statement "We have not seen evidence of any individuals affiliated with the Trump team in contact with [intelligence officers]." is what he thought at that time, and it's why he wrote that then. So you're circling back to your original edit after ackhowledging it was not fully accurate in your subsequent edit. soibangla (talk) 21:11, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

The contents of the green box are consistent with my statement. Strzok clearly thought that the contacts mentioned in the green box did not amount to connections between "individuals affiliated with the Trump team" and Russian intelligence. I myself think he's being consistent here. But even if that wasn't true and Strzok was incorrect to think that these were not connections between "individuals affiliated with the Trump team" and Russian intelligence, that would be Strzok being inconsistent, not me, and it would still be true that he believed there was no evidence of such connections. I mean, if I'm wrong, you're basically saying that Strzok is contradicting himself and his remarks make no sense. I don't think that's the right way to read him. Shinealittlelight (talk) 21:28, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

I'm not arguing Strzok is contradicting himself. NYT reported it was not fully accurate and explained why, which you did not originally mention, nor does the reworking. soibangla (talk) 21:32, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

I do not agree that NYT showed that his remarks were not accurate, and I never said that they did. That's part of why I revised what you originally wrote. What S said was that there was no evidence of a connection of a certain sort, but that there were other connections they knew about--connections that were not connections between individuals associated with the Trump team and Russian Intelligence. There has been no demonstration from you or the NYT that S was inaccurate in his statement about their story. Shinealittlelight (talk) 21:54, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

You added this:

Strzok also stated that there were contacts between Carter Page and Russian officials prior to the campaign, as well as such contacts with an associate of Paul Manafort, and contacts between the Russian Ambassador and Trump campaign advisers

after I pointed out the contents of the green box at the top of this thread. In doing so, you acknowledged that your original edit was not fully accurate. soibangla (talk) 22:02, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

"Russian intelligence" does not equal "Russian officials" or "Russians". -- Valjean (talk) 22:41, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

Yes, Page was speaking directly with SVR agents, so that should change. soibangla (talk) 22:55, 1 August 2020 (UTC) Also, Kislyak was officially a diplomat. soibangla (talk) 18:33, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

What V said. And also, "associate of an ex-campaign chair" does not equal "individuals associated with the Trump team", and so on. My original edit was fully accurate per the source, though it did not include all the information subsequently added. Shinealittlelight (talk) 22:57, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

As I stated from the start, if we're going to include this, we should be thorough, because the article was significant and the dispute was significant, but your original edit did not capture the full complexity, it left readers with the impression the NYT was flatly wrong, which your subsequent edit did a better job of clarifying, after I brought the details to your attention. soibangla (talk) 23:01, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

I think the original edit gave the correct impression that Strzok, the lead investigator involved in our subject (the CH investigation), and no fan of Trump, thought the NYT was wrong. And he did think they were wrong, as he said in the annotation. But, that said, as a compromise, I am ok with including the additional information about the fact that Strzok also thought that there are connections of other sorts that they were aware of. But I think that we can do that with a much shorter passage than what we currently have, which in my judgment goes into the weeds on whether the NYT has egg on its face--an interesting question, but not one that seems to me particularly important for understanding our topic, the CH investigation. I think SSP's edit is preferable to the current state of the article on this score. Even better would be a more focused version, which I'd be happy to propose, but no point if you and SSP disagree. Valjean, which version do you prefer? Shinealittlelight (talk) 23:16, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

There are two key issues here: a) what the Times reported, and b) its veracity based on what both Comey and Strzok said about it and what the NYT said in response, twice over three years. Some are asserting that the NYT was flatly wrong, in some cases to score political points, but it's not that simple, as the NYT points out Comey said it was "in the main" untrue, without specifying how, and what Stzok also said about Page, Kilimnik/Manafort, Sessions and Flynn. we can do that with a much shorter passage but the proposed change is not materially shorter, and the proposed change goes into the weeds by talking about Stone and Trump Tower. Really, the existing paragraph is simple: NYT reported a major story; months later Comey said nope; years later it's reported Strzok said nope; both times NYT stood by it. That's just enough, not too much and not too little, to allow readers to understand what happened. I'm not saying the NYT is right, I'm just showing they've stood by their reporting for three years, and explained why. soibangla (talk) 23:34, 1 August 2020 (UTC)

Good summary. I don't see that the NYT explained why. I do agree that Stone doesn't need a mention here. But I don't see why we need to go into such detail about whether the NYT has egg on its face. What's relevant to our subject (CH) is that the FBI did not think they had established any evidence for the connection they were investigating as of approximately Feb 14, 2017, and that's where the spotlight should be. NYT disagrees, fine, so do lots of others I'm sure. Why is that due here? We're talking about the FBI's investigation, so it's important to say what the investigators thought they had found, not what the NYT reported independently. (One other question: you've said that S's notes were "contemporaneous"; do you have a source on that? I couldn't find it in sources, but I may have just missed it.) Shinealittlelight (talk) 00:38, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

In February 2017, The New York Times, citing current and former American officials, reported that communications intercepts and logs showed that Trump campaign members and Trump associates, including Paul Manafort, had "repeated contacts" with senior Russian intelligence officials "in the year before the election". In June 2017, former FBI director James Comey stated that the February 2017 Times report was "in the main" not true, but did not specify what the inaccuracies were. In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that senior FBI agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately disputed the February 2017 report by The New York Times in undated annotations, commenting that the FBI at the time was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials". According to Strzok, the FBI at the time was only aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison. In response, The New York Times stood by its reporting.

Proposing a new addition with respect to the comments above. Note that in June 2017, The original sources could not immediately be reached after Mr. Comey’s remarks, but in the months since the article was published, they have indicated that they believed the account was solid. starship.paint (talk) 08:26, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

I would still prefer a pared back version. I mean, should we also add the context that it is not unusual for American businessmen to come in contact with foreign intelligence officials, sometimes unwittingly, in countries like Russia and Ukraine, where the spy services are deeply embedded in society. Law enforcement officials did not say to what extent the contacts might have been about business or that It is also unclear whether the conversations had anything to do with Mr. Trump himself? Should we also add that the original sources were anonymous because they were illegally leaking classified information? Or is this "context" not important? If I'm overruled and we keep this version, it occurs to me that it might be a little clearer to reshuffle it so that the account is in chronological order rather than the order that the information was revealed to us. Comey's remark about "in the main" was after Strzok's annotation chronologically, for example. Also, if we're going to add it, though, I would at least like it to also say "the original anonymous sources could not immediately be reached...". Shinealittlelight (talk) 12:15, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

Shinealittlelight - are those words with green sourced or WP:OR? starship.paint (talk) 14:22, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: I pulled them directly from the sources you listed below. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:29, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

Also, I want to emphasize that I'm not advocating that we include all that, but that we pare back to the essential point. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:30, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

Ah yes, here [3]. Carry on. starship.paint (talk) 14:39, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

”In the year before the election” is a good add, because it encompasses a period before Page and Manafort joined the campaign, and we know both were under FISA taps before joining the campaign, and after leaving it. The fact that Page’s FISA tap resumed one month after he left the campaign, and that Manafort’s tap was “before and after the election”[[4]] suggests to me that the taps were suspended once they joined the campaign, so FBI would avoid surveillance of a campaign, a great big no-no. So Stzok was commenting about what was known during the campaign, whereas the NYT was talking about during the campaign and before Page/Manafort joined the campaign. Maybe at a future date we will learn for sure if FBI did suspend the taps upon learning Page and Manafort joined the campaign, but current reporting suggests it (to me). I suggest keeping the fact that Comey was testifying to Congress, and that the NYT at that time stood by its reporting, as well as Stzok being counterintel chief. soibangla (talk) 18:15, 2 August 2020 (UTC)

@Soibangla: - (1) can you point to the exact quote that the NYT at that time stood by its reporting with direct response to Comey? I only see that their sources thought it was solid before Comey talked. (2) I believe the sources currently provided only refer to Strzok as a senior F.B.I. counterintelligence official, not a "counterintelligence chief". starship.paint (talk) 14:01, 5 August 2020 (UTC)

I believe the NYT saying its sources maintained it was solid is tantamount to standing by the reporting, just not in so many direct words, and they wouldn’t have written that if that wasn’t their intent. Although the specific reporting doesn’t call Strzok the counterintel chief, that’s in fact what he was. soibangla (talk) 17:32, 5 August 2020 (UTC)

In February 2017, The New York Times, citing current and former American officials, reported that communications intercepts and logs showed that Trump campaign members and Trump associates, including Paul Manafort, had "repeated contacts" with senior Russian intelligence officials "in the year before the election". In June 2017, former FBI director James Comey testified to Congress that the February 2017 Times report was "in the main" not true, but did not specify what the inaccuracies were. In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately disputed the February 2017 report by The New York Times in undated annotations, commenting that the FBI at the time was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials". According to Strzok, the FBI at the time was only aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison. In response, The New York Times stood by its reporting.

starship.paint (talk) 14:05, August 5, 2020‎ (UTC)

I would prefer the following version:

In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately disputed a February 2017 New York Times report of contacts between Trump campaign members and associates with senior Russian intelligence officials in undated annotations, commenting that the FBI at the time was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials". According to Strzok, the FBI at the time was only aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison.

Here's why: this version focuses on what's relevant to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, and cuts the undue information. In other words, I think Comey's vague statement is undue, in part because nobody knows what he meant, and I think that the NYT's independent journalistic investigation that, they say, turned up such connections is just a different topic--one that would be due in our other articles on alleged Trump-Russia connections. Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:00, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

If you want us to take you seriously, you should drop that "alleged" from "Trump-Russia connections". Just sayin'. The connections were and are myriad. -- Valjean (talk) 15:24, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

FOC please. Shinealittlelight (talk) 15:53, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

Except the NYT's independent journalistic investigation that, they say, turned up such connections was correct. Page did have contacts with SVR agents, Manafort’s close associate Kilimnik was connected to Russian intel, and Sessions/Flynn did have contact with Kislyak, who reports to the Kremlin. And Strzok noted those connections in his notes. soibangla (talk) 17:50, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

I didn't say that their investigation was not correct. Rather, I think it is just undue in this article, which is about a different investigation, the CH investigation. What's relevant to CH is that these declassified annotations reveal the mindset of the lead investigator as of around Feb 2017. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:04, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

But as the NYT showed, the loudly hollered parts of Strzok’s notes did not reflect his full mindset. soibangla (talk) 18:12, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

Can you tell me what about Strzok's view is missing from the text I proposed? Because I thought that this pretty much covered it, but maybe I'm missing something. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:17, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

You cite the NYT article, then show Stzrok’s remarks in a way that suggests NYT got it wrong, then cite a, b and c without noting it was the NYT that clarified that, which tends to feed a narrative that the NYT was still wrong. soibangla (talk) 18:35, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

OK, thanks. Maybe this would fix that up:

In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately disputed a February 2017 New York Times report of contacts between Trump campaign members and associates with senior Russian intelligence officials in undated annotations, commenting that the FBI at the time was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials". The Times subsequently clarified that, according to Strzok, the FBI at the time was only aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison.

Here's another thought. In a way, it's weird that Strzok seemed to be disputing the story from the NYT, and I'm inclined to think that his opinion about the NYTs reporting is itself undue. What we want here is just the facts about the CH investigation, not about the NYT's independent journalistic investigations, and not about Strzok's opinions of those independent investigations. If that's right, then maybe the version we want would look something like this:

In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately made annotations on a news report in which he stated that the FBI was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials," but that they were aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison.

This version strips any question of dispute with the NYT, which seems to me undue anyway. What deserves mention, it seems to me, is that this is what Strzok thought they had at around Feb 2017. Let's leave the NYT's investigation out of it. @Starship.paint: What do you think? Shinealittlelight (talk) 21:49, 13 August 2020 (UTC)

Yesterday...

The [Senate Intellligence Committee] report’s findings about Mr. Kilimnik and other Russians in touch with Trump campaign advisers confirmed an article in The New York Times from 2017 that said there had been numerous interactions between the Trump campaign and Russian intelligence in the year before the election. F.B.I. officials had disputed the report.

soibangla (talk) 22:46, 19 August 2020 (UTC)

So I take it that your view is that we should include all the results of every investigation into Trump-Russia in this article on CH, and so you don't like my pared back version? Shinealittlelight (talk) 01:12, 20 August 2020 (UTC)

In February 2017, The New York Times, citing current and former American officials commenting anonymously on classified matters, reported that communications intercepts and logs showed that Trump campaign members and Trump associates, including Paul Manafort, had "repeated contacts" with senior Russian intelligence officials "in the year before the election". In June 2017, former FBI director James Comey stated that the February 2017 Times report was "in the main" not true, but did not specify what the inaccuracies were. In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately made annotations on the February 2017 Times report in which he stated that the FBI was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials," but that they were aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison. Ultimately, in August 2020, the Senate Intelligence Committee went further than previous investigations by the American government by presenting a new conclusion that Manafort's associate Konstantin Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence official who had contacts with the Trump campaign.

@Shinealittlelight, Soibangla, and Valjean: - proposed as above. Apologies for my weeks-long absence. The emergence of new information has slightly changed my thinking of what should be presented. Although it is pertinent that ultimately Kilimnik was recognized as Russian intelligence, we should also note that this was a new conclusion, and therefore not of Crossfire Hurricane. starship.paint (talk) 09:21, 23 August 2020 (UTC)

Glad you're back, Starship.paint. Can you explain to me why you think that the details of an independent investigation by NYT and the details of an independent investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee are due in this article on CH? Or, to put it anther way, what information relevant to CH is missing from my above pared-back version? Shinealittlelight (talk) 16:42, 23 August 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - you can’t ping after your signature is already applied. The independent investigation of the NYT was reporting on what was supposedly being found during CH. Whereas the independent Senate investigation declaring something that the U.S. government had never found before, just proves that CH/Mueller had not concluded that KK was Russian intelligence. Which would be relevant to what investigators knew at the time. starship.paint (talk) 02:49, 24 August 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: The NYT report does not say it was a report on what was supposedly being found during CH. Where are you getting that? I guess you're inferring it from the NYT statement that "The call logs and intercepted communications are part of a larger trove of information that the F.B.I. is sifting through as it investigates the links between Mr. Trump’s associates and the Russian government, as well as the hacking of the D.N.C., according to federal law enforcement officials." That is shaky in my view. It would be good to include as much in the proposal: in other words, say something to the effect that their report was a report on what CH was finding. Feels shaky, but you have to say it to connect the content to the subject of the article. I'd still prefer paring back. Shinealittlelight (talk) 03:05, 24 August 2020 (UTC)

In February 2017, The New York Times published a report about what intelligence agencies had found in their investigation of links between Trump associates and Russian officials. Citing current and former American officials commenting anonymously on the classified investigation, The New York Times reported that communications intercepts and logs showed that Trump campaign members and Trump associates, including Paul Manafort, had "repeated contacts" with senior Russian intelligence officials "in the year before the election". In June 2017, former FBI director James Comey stated that the February 2017 Times report was "in the main" not true, but did not specify what the inaccuracies were. In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately made annotations on the February 2017 Times report in which he stated that the FBI was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials," but that they were aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison. Ultimately, in August 2020, the Senate Intelligence Committee went further than previous investigations by the American government by presenting a new conclusion that Manafort's associate Konstantin Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence official who had contacts with the Trump campaign.

• @Shinealittlelight: - see above. starship.paint (talk) 12:57, 25 August 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Oh I didn't realize that this was an article on what intelligence agencies had found; I thought we already had an article about that, and that this article was about CH. What you need to do to allay my concern is say that the NYT was reporting on what CH found, and of course that goes out too far on a limb. So its better to pare back. See my point? Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:12, 25 August 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - no, pings don't work without ~~~~ within a comment on a new line of text (as in, after a line break). Now, the content is on what intelligence agencies had found in their investigation of links between Trump associates and Russian officials. The bolded part is CH. That's what CH was about. The CH name was first reported in May 2018, if I remember correctly, so there's no way this article in February 2017 could have referred to CH as CH. Note that the June 2017 article headline calls it "the Russia investigation", which again, is CH. starship.paint (talk) 14:27, 25 August 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: So your position is that, in February 2017, CH was the one and only investigation of links between Trump associates and Russian officials among ingelligence agencies. I don't know how you know that. I don't think I know it. Shinealittlelight (talk) 18:42, 25 August 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: NYT Feb 2017 said: The call logs and intercepted communications are part of a larger trove of information that the F.B.I. is sifting through as it investigates the links between Mr. Trump’s associates and the Russian government, as well as the hacking of the D.N.C., according to federal law enforcement officials. As part of its inquiry, the F.B.I. has obtained banking and travel records and conducted interviews, the officials said. starship.paint (talk) 13:10, 26 August 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Ok, if you're going to assume that the investigation in question was CH, I think we should make that explicit. Something like "...a report on the FBI's CH investigation, whose name had not been made public at the time, ..." Still feels out on a limb to me. Finally, what's your reason for including the much later senate intel conclusion in this article on CH? Why is that due? Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:38, 26 August 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - it reaffirms that previous investigations by the American government had not yet concluded that KK was an Russian intelligence agent. starship.paint (talk) 13:56, 26 August 2020 (UTC)

In February 2017, The New York Times published a report on the FBI's investigation, whose name had not been made public at the time. Citing current and former American officials commenting anonymously on the classified investigation, The New York Times reported that communications intercepts and logs showed that Trump campaign members and Trump associates, including Paul Manafort, had "repeated contacts" with senior Russian intelligence officials "in the year before the election". In June 2017, former FBI director James Comey stated that the February 2017 Times report was "in the main" not true, but did not specify what the inaccuracies were. In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately made annotations on the February 2017 Times report in which he stated that the FBI was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials," but that they were aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison. Ultimately, in August 2020, the Senate Intelligence Committee went further than previous investigations by the American government by presenting a new conclusion that Manafort's associate Konstantin Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence official who had contacts with the Trump campaign.

@Starship.paint: How about "a report on Crossfire Hurricane, whose name ..."? That's what we're saying, so why don't we say it? My basic issue with all of this is that it is unreadably wordy, and not written in a way that the average reader will understand what we are saying as it relates to CH. I still don't agree that the results of a much later investigation are due here. But, if we are going to include that, I would prefer that instead of the very unclear "went further" we say explicitly how this is supposed to relate to CH, something like "...the Senate Intelligence Committee ultimately uncovered that Manafort's associate Konstantin Kilimnik was in fact a Russian intelligence official who had contacts with the Trump Campaign, though the FBI was evidently unaware of this when Strzok made his remarks in February of 2017." Again, I don't see why this is due, but if we're going to include it, let's at least not bury the relationship to the topic of the article. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:46, 26 August 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - I'm logging off and will address when I return. Cheers. starship.paint (talk) 14:50, 26 August 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Unacceptable, please return to your post immediately. Shinealittlelight (talk) 14:52, 26 August 2020 (UTC)

@Shinealittlelight: - I am Bach! Taking your suggestions into account... starship.paint (talk) 13:32, 29 August 2020 (UTC)

In February 2017, The New York Times published a report on Crossfire Hurricane, whose name had not been made public at the time. Citing current and former American officials commenting anonymously on the classified investigation, The New York Times reported that communications intercepts and logs showed that Trump campaign members and Trump associates, including Paul Manafort, had "repeated contacts" with senior Russian intelligence officials "in the year before the election". In June 2017, former FBI director James Comey stated that the February 2017 Times report was "in the main" not true, but did not specify what the inaccuracies were. In July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that FBI counterintelligence agent Peter Strzok, one of the leaders of the investigation, had earlier privately made annotations on the February 2017 Times report in which he stated that the FBI was "unaware of ANY Trump advisors engaging in conversations with Russian intelligence officials," but that they were aware that (a) Carter Page had contacts with Russian intelligence before he joined the Trump campaign, (b) an associate of Manafort had contacts with Russian intelligence, and (c) Trump campaign officials had contacts with the Russian ambassador and the Russian embassy's congressional liaison. The Senate Intelligence Committee ultimately uncovered that Manafort's associate Konstantin Kilimnik was in fact a Russian intelligence official who had contacts with the Trump campaign, though the FBI was apparently unaware of this in the earlier months of 2017 given Strzok's annotations.

starship.paint (talk) 13:32, 29 August 2020 (UTC)

@Starship.paint: Better. Still wordy, but I will live. Fire away! Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:36, 29 August 2020 (UTC)

I edited all known Crossfires code names as of now, all from report volume 5

• Donald J. TRUMP -- Unknown
• Igor Danchenko -- Unknown, yes investigation from 2009
• Jeffry Sessions -- Unknown
• Papadopoulos -- Crossfire Typhoon
• M. T. FLYNN -- Crossfire Razor
• Walid Phares -- CROSS WIND //this was in New York Times
• Paul Manafort -- Crossfire Fury
• Unknown -- Dragon Fisa
• Carter Page -- Crossfire Dragon 91.78.221.238 (talk) 18:40, 20 September 2020 (UTC)

Information Declassified on 29 September 2020

The following is a letter from John Ratcliffe to Lindsey Graham:

UNCLASSIFIED
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC

The Honorable Lindsey Graham
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
290 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Chairman Graham,

In response to your request for Intelligence Community (IC) information related to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, I have declassified the following:

• In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S Presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee. The IC does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.

• According to his handwritten notes, former Central Intelligence Agency Director Brennan subsequently briefed President Obama and other senior national security officials on the intelligence, including the "alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on July 26, 2016 of a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services."

• On 07 September 2016, U.S. intelligence officials forwarded an investigative referral to FBI Director James Comey and Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Peter Strzok regarding "U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's approval of a plan concerning U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering U.S elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private mail server."

As referenced in his 24 September 2020 letter to your Committee, Attorney General Barr has advised that the disclosure of this information will not interfere with ongoing Department of Justice investigations. Additional declassification and public disclosure of related intelligence remains under consideration; however, the IC welcomes the opportunity to provide a classified briefing with further detail at your convenience.

Respectfully,
John Ratcliffe

The Honorable Lindsey Graham
Cc:
The Honorable Diane Feinstein
The Honorable Marco Rubio
The Honorable Mark R. Warner
The Honorable Adam Schiff
The Honorable Devin Nunes

What information should be incorporated into the main article, and how?

Seraphim3 (talk) 06:48, 30 September 2020 (UTC)

I don't yet see a connection here to the CH investigation. If the letter is to be believed, US intelligence at one point was concerned enough about the allegation to brief President Obama and refer the matter to the FBI for investigation. If it comes out that the FBI did investigate the allegations as part of CH, this would belong in the article. But we don't know that. Shinealittlelight (talk) 13:01, 30 September 2020 (UTC)

We should all be proud about the release of Russian disinformation. soibangla (talk) 18:24, 30 September 2020 (UTC)

Politico article was already debunked by Ratcliffe, that it was not our disinformation, instead Clinton used known to her disinformation not only from my country but from UK. This was asked to Comey today, BTW, nice, one guy who said that Comey will testify on 30th of September was right. 109.252.55.72 (talk) 02:33, 1 October 2020 (UTC)

References

Source 3 in Igor Danchenko's interview is Olga Galkina

We finally have a WP:RSPS. https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-in-cyprus-was-behind-key-parts-of-discredited-dossier-on-trump-11603901989 And pee pee tape in Ritz-Carlton was created by Ivan Vorontsov! No source YET. We have known all sources for months now, crazy we have no RSes. 2A00:1FA0:8F9:9773:C887:2D43:D2C0:F441 (talk) 07:15, 29 October 2020 (UTC)

We finally have all names of Igor's sources and in a WP:RSPS! They interviewed all of them! https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/11/03/raw-intelligence 109.252.94.30 (talk) 19:13, 10 November 2020 (UTC)

Edit warring

Neptune1969, this edit restored disputed text, and is thus edit warring as it does not follow BRD and ignores that the text is disputed. If you immediately self-revert, I won't report you to a drama board.

My edit summary was clear, so your question is puzzling, as it's easy to read: "POV opinion content based on unreliable sources." We don't include disinformation from Russian intelligence as fact, especially when sourced to unreliable sources. Fox News and Andrew C. McCarthy are unreliable sources for political content. McCarthy is a pusher of conspiracy theories. They both report the "news" as if the Russians were right, rather than reporting it as Russian disinformation designed to denigrate Clinton and aid Trump. Instead of doing that, we use RS and, if it has enough weight, report it as the Russian disinformation that it is.

That you spammed this content to three different articles is also problematic. Pinging Muboshgu and GorillaWarfare for their input. If I'm wrong, I will happily apologize.

I believe this article should have the same DS restrictions as the other articles. -- Valjean (talk) 02:06, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

Perhaps it should have the same restrictions, but at the moment it does not. An uninvolved admin could impose them if they saw fit, since this article is covered by both the American politics 2 and Eastern Europe discretionary sanction authorizations.

I agree with your concerns about the edit, and I have reverted it. The changes ought to be discussed here before the content is reintroduced. GorillaWarfare (talk) 02:19, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree an uninvolved admin should denote this as part of discretionary sanctions. – Muboshgu (talk) 17:20, 29 November 2020 (UTC)

July 2016 briefing

CONTEXT:

In late July 2016, John Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time, briefed President Barack Obama that U.S. intelligence had indications that Russian intelligence was alleging that U.S. presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had invented a plan for a scandal to link candidate Trump to Vladimir Putin, the DNC email hack, and Wikileaks’ release of the emails. U.S. intelligence passed this to James Comey, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Peter Strzok, Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence, on September 7, 2016.

I have posted a revision that updates the sourcing material on the July 26, 2016 briefing by Brennan of Obama, and have sourced it to the NYT, Politico, and the Wall Street Journal. The emphasis is on the fact that the briefing occurred, that this information is reported in RS to have been sent to the FBI, and by extension that there was a letter from DNI Ratcliffe to the United States Senate confirming that this briefing occurred.Neptune1969 (talk) 16:16, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

From looking at that content, I'd guess that it fits better at both the Russian interference in the 2020 United States elections and Russia investigation origins counter-narrative articles. Try the talk pages there and start an identical section with this suggested content. Then work with the editors there to make sure it's not already included and how to include it with the proper due weight, IOW so it doesn't give prominence to disinformation, but just documents that this is one of the ways that the Russians sought to interfere. The mainstream POV always gets more weight than the conspiratorial fringe due to their sourcing, which in turn is due to their widely-differing degrees of accuracy.

That unreliable sources swallowed this raw, especially since Ratcliffe & Co.® put it out there as if there might be some truth to it, is notable, as this action by Ratcliffe was part of the false Russia investigation origins counter-narrative. It's Russian disinfo conspiracy theory, fed to Trump and Co.® to push onto the American people, and they did it. There may well be quotes from Trump actually pushing this one. If so, then use them.

Documenting that angle must come from the RS which comment on how the right-wing media swallowed the bait whole and without questioning its dubious origins. -- Valjean (talk) 22:08, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

• Neptune, maybe you can explain what this story has to do with Crossfire Hurricane? Suppose Brennan briefed Obama and that there was a referral for investigation to the FBI. What does that have to do with Crossfire Hurricane? Not every fact about the FBI and the 2016 election is related to CH, right? Shinealittlelight (talk) 23:49, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
  • Bingo. Although I didn't state that clearly, that was the basis for my comment above. Pretty much everything, other than clear trivia, mentioned in several RS, may well have a place at Wikipedia, so it's just a matter of finding out where. I too think it might not fit here, but it clearly does fit at the other articles. -- Valjean (talk) 01:14, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
    • It's part of the July 2016 origination story of Crossfire Hurricane because these briefings were all in the same week; Brennen briefed Obama multiple times, and the investigation originated in July 2016, and part of the decision making process to launch Crossfire Hurricane included whether or not to incorporate the breadth of the Russian information the intelligence community was acquiring about all of the links between Russia and the campaigns, including disinformation. Indeed, absence additional information, its presence may well have tipped the balance for the FBI into launching the investigation. We don't know how Brennan briefed it. We might believe it to be a separate matter (and subcategorize it as Russian disinformation) but that's our imposition of categories that are not properly sourced to what those who were there at the time made as separate categories. The intelligence process involves taking all information into account and making decisions based on that intelligence. Very little information actually reaches the president through briefing, so the inclusions of this signifies that it was important to those who were there at the time, even if we may not think so. This story is important to the Crossfire Hurricane story because without it we are not accurately explaining what would have been in front of the decision-makers at the time. Neptune1969 (talk) 01:41, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
      • This was the CIA, not FBI, and they don't always talk to each other. This information finally made it to the FBI, and we can presume the CH team (because Strzok led it), on September 7, 2016, so it wasn't part of the origins, but it did become part of the info they used in the investigation. They also gradually incorporated information from Christopher Steele as they got it, and that information, like this, was not part of the origination. Conclusion, IMHO, this may well have some place here, as well as the other articles. -- Valjean (talk) 01:54, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

Does anyone know what they did with this information, IOW how the CH team used it? -- Valjean (talk) 02:01, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

I don't think we do yet. I'll put it under September, so out of Origins and in a different portion.Neptune1969 (talk) 02:08, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

Nowhere did he say that Brennan is FBI, that was not nice, Valjean. Also, (Redacted) 109.252.91.17 (talk) 07:49, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

Nowhere did I infer that Neptune1969 said that Brennan was FBI. I just stated a clarifying fact. AGF. -- Valjean (talk) 16:32, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

I have removed unsupported or poorly-supported defamatory claims about living people. I remind participants here that BLP applies to all spaces on Wikipedia. NorthBySouthBaranof (talk) 08:01, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

NBSB, thanks for deleting that conspiratorial BLP-violating mess. It's scary that so many people have swallowed all this Russian disinformation raw, often after they got it relayed directly from the WH, other times after Fox News/Breitbart/Daily Caller reported it and then the WH repeated that, sometimes in real-time (which is how we often know when and what Trump is watching on TV). Would that be called "disinformation laundering"?

IP109, this type of stuff is lies, and in the many cases where it's happened, just because the WH and GOP have washed/recycled/repurposed Russian disinformation and passed it off as plausible or true doesn't make it true. It just makes Trump and the GOP complicit in aiding and abetting Russian attacks on American elections and democracy. As RS have noted, Trump often carries water for Putin, so it's really wise to follow this good advice: "Let's just assume Trump's always lying and fact check him backward." (David Zurawik) -- Valjean (talk) 16:32, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

The only one who used desinformation was Clinton, also Durham looking into Alpha Bank story is here https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/oct/9/john-durham-looking-discredited-alfa-bank-trump-cl/ "Durham looking at discredited Alfa Bank-Trump claim promoted by Hillary Clinton: report", I will also ask you to remove the redaction, because it is arguably not a BLP violation, or I will remove it myself. Ah, and yes, you were already warned many times to stop spreading russian/uk desinformation about russian collusion of Trump in Steele dossier article and others. 109.252.91.17 (talk) 10:59, 3 December 2020 (UTC)

You shouldn't use unreliable sources like the Washington Times and https://weaponizedautism.wordpress.com/2017/04/09/trump-dns-logs-fabricated/. The server existed and communicated with Alfa Bank. That is a fact. (The Trump campaign later claimed it was part of their own hotel marketing, yet the communication immediately stopped when this came to light, and the Russians nearly immediately resumed the communications with a different secret/new(?) IP related to Trump. How did the Russians know about this IP?) It was the nature of the communications that was questioned. (Here is another unreliable source pushing conspiracy theories about the communications.)

Keep in mind that Manafort was also sharing campaign strategy information and polling data with Russia-friendly Ukrainians. Was this how he was doing it? We don't know. Since the Trump campaign (Kushner) was seeking to establish dangerous back-channel communications with the Russians (which even Kislyak saw as a naive and alarming breach of American security), there was lots of speculation by everyone, not just Clinton, that this might be one way they were doing it, and the timing of the sudden stoppage of the communications also seemed to confirm the suspicions. The myriad suspicious contacts between Trump campaigners and Russians is still worth studying. There was no legitimate reason for all this activity, and eight allied European intelligence agencies actually recorded some of it, and it was alarming enough that they relayed the information to American intelligence.

I did not redact that content (see my comment above), but I understand why it was done. These attacks on Hillary were part of the Russian disinformation campaign against her to help Trump win. That has not changed, so I advise you to not use unreliable sources which still traffic in such disinformation. The Russians did interfere in the 2016 elections, and conspiracy theories against that fact are unwelcome here as they are against what RS say. -- Valjean (talk) 17:26, 3 December 2020 (UTC)

Durham's investigation has been a big disappointment to Trump, as the only wrongdoing he could find was carelessness by the FBI in seeking the 3rd and 4th FISA warrants (and they are revising their procedures to prevent such mistakes in the future), and Clinesmith's actions, which were actually good faith, but stupid, actions. Durham has not found any evidence of some anti-Trump plot by US intelligence. None. -- Valjean (talk) 17:49, 3 December 2020 (UTC)

Correction: Clinesmith pled guilty to intentional, material fraud. I don't know what the RS is on "good faith". But let's be sure we're sticking to what we can source here. Shinealittlelight (talk) 19:39, 3 December 2020 (UTC)

I think we've been over this before. What he did was dumb and illegal. Full stop. He also thought what he wrote was accurate. He really didn't believe that Carter Page had been a source for the CIA. He thought what was written was inaccurate, so he "corrected" it by adding a word. It was just too incredible a thought, that someone who acted against all the rules for a CIA source, could be considered a source, but Page did answer their questions when interviewed, thus technically making him a source. The CIA warned him that Russian agents were trying to develop him as a source, but he seemed to ignore their warnings. He continued his pro-Russian activities and is described as an admirer of Putin. Much later, at the time the FBI sought the first of those four FISA warrants, Page's actions convinced the judge that there was probable cause to believe that Page was a foreign agent knowingly engaging in clandestine intelligence for the Russian government.

What many seem to make of this is the false belief that Carter Page was an actual willing CIA asset who approached and provided information to the CIA, acting as some sort of American agent helping to spy on Russians. No, he didn't do that. The FBI (or CIA?) specifically noted that he should not be activated/developed as an asset, likely because he could not be trusted. So the truth in all this is a bit muddled. Page has never been a patriot, as he falsely paints himself, and his anti-American proclamations and actions tell the real story. I don't think he was an active Russian agent either, as many believe. What has been asserted, and seems to be accurate, is that, like Millian, he's a boaster and self-promoter who tried to monetize his connections to Trump. He got caught up in a whole mess. Now he's trying to sue, and this will be interesting. -- Valjean (talk) 22:39, 3 December 2020 (UTC)

"previously rejected by Democrats and Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee as having no factual basis." My guess is that they didn't reach this conclusion in a vacuum, but talked with the FBI about it, and maybe others in the IC, but nobody wants to talk about it because of sources and methods and stuff. soibangla (talk) 01:28, 4 December 2020 (UTC)

I will remind you that Washington post is WP:RSPS without any conditions and moreover specifically mentioned in WP:CRYBLP. And to Soibangla, I will again remind you that SSCI did not reject the information, which is kind of obvious from Comey, McCabe hearings, and Politico is lying here or just wrongly predicted the future. Even McCabe did not say it was cooked up by Trump, even though he did not see it at the time. I suppose we will see from Peter testimony, when he will lose in courts. 109.252.91.17 (talk) 22:44, 5 December 2020 (UTC)

NYT:

Other officials — including Robert S. Mueller III, the special counsel appointed by the Justice Department, and the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee — had evaluated and rejected the information in the years since, according to three current and former officials familiar with those inquiries.

Peter? Peter who? soibangla (talk) 01:21, 6 December 2020 (UTC)

Sources

Chris Steele meat Igor Danchenko through Eric from CIA!

This is aggravating. 109.252.94.59 (talk) 04:36, 15 January 2021 (UTC)