Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), is a conscientious objection case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Elliott Ashton Welsh II, was convicted by a United States District Judge of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a), and was, on June 1, 1966, sentenced to imprisonment for three years. One of petitioner's defenses to the prosecution was that § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act exempted him from combat and noncombat service because he was "by reason of religious training and belief . . . conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form". After finding that there was no religious basis for petitioner's conscientious objector claim, the Court of Appeals, Judge Hamley dissenting, affirmed the conviction. 404 F.2d 1078 (1968).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari chiefly to review the contention that Welsh's conviction should be set aside on the basis of its decision in United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163 (1965). 396 U.S. 816 (1969). The court declined to pass upon the constitutional arguments that were raised, but voted to reverse this conviction because of its fundamental inconsistency with Seeger.
Petitioner was convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces despite his claim for conscientious objector status under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That provision exempts from military service persons who by reason of "religious training and belief" are conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that term being defined in the Act as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation" but not including "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code." In his exemption application, petitioner stated that he could not affirm or deny belief in a "Supreme Being," and struck the words "my religious training and" from the form. He affirmed that he held deep conscientious scruples against participating in wars where people were killed. The Court of Appeals, while noting that petitioner's "beliefs are held with the strength of more traditional religious convictions," concluded that those beliefs were not sufficiently "religious" to meet the terms of § 6(j), and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner contends that the Act violates the First Amendment prohibition of establishment of religion, and that his conviction should be set aside on the basis of United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, which held that the test of religious belief under § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption.
Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 398 U. S. 335-367. 404 F.2d 1078, reversed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concluded that: This case is controlled by United States v. Seeger, supra, to which it is factually similar. Under Seeger, § 6(j) is not limited to those whose opposition to war is prompted by orthodox or parochial religious beliefs. A registrant's conscientious objection to all war is "religious" within the meaning of § 6(j) if this Page 398 U. S. 334 opposition stems from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and these beliefs are held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. In view of the broad scope of the word "religious," a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as "nonreligious" is not a reliable guide to those administering the exemption. Pp. 398 U. S. 335-344.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/398/333/