The Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure is a joint Task Force by the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Its establishment was announced on January 11, 2023 by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen and the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg.[1] It is embedded in the existing NATO-EU Structured Dialogue on Resilience and further reinforces it,[2] it is composed out of staff from the European Commission, the European External Action Service and NATO International Staff. The Task Force strengthens the cooperation between the EU and NATO on critical infrastructure protection.[2][1] It started its work in March 2023.[3]

The Task Force focused on mapping out current security challenges and the importance of resilience in energy, transport, digital infrastructure, and space and made recommendations as to how NATO-EU cooperation can be deepened further.[2] The Final Assessment Report was published on June 29, 2023.[4]

The establishment of the joint Task Force is a response to the growing security threats to critical infrastructure in Europe, which have been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the attached attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine and Europe.[5]

Structure of the Report edit

The final assessment report is divided into six sections and identifies four sectors of critical infrastructure with "cross cutting importance"[4] for EU Member States and NATO allies, for those infrastructures a sectoral analysis was conducted, detailing their importance as well as the threats and vulnerabilities they face.

The six sections are:

  • The Importance of Critical Infrastructure
  • Security Context
  • Sectoral Analysis
    • Energy
    • Transport
    • Digital Infrastructure
    • Space
  • Cross-Sectoral Challenges
  • Conclusions and Recommendations

Sectoral Analysis edit

Energy           edit

The long distances energy infrastructure spans, as well as its networked structure makes it difficult to monitor and creates the possibility that the attack in one location has a big impact beyond the local area. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines illustrates this vulnerability very well. The increased use of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and the transformation to renewable energy sources is projected to lessen the dependence on Russian energy.[2] However, this diversification also brings new challenges in monitoring as well as supply chain vulnerabilities in the production of renewable energy. The report sees three aspects as the main vulnerabilities to consider: real-time requirements when reacting to threats, cascading effects when one power grid fails and maintaining a technology mix.

Transport edit

While transport infrastructure in Europe is marked by a great deal of redundancy and alternative routing options, there are highly important key nodes, which are not easily replaceable. Especially major airports, seaports, railway hubs and mass transit infrastructure is vulnerable to terrorist and cyber-attacks. The highest vulnerability lies with larger seaports and airports, since there are not many alternatives for military and civilian purposes alike. In the future, the increasing electrification will increase the reliance on the electricity grid, additional to hydrocarbon products.

Digital Infrastructure edit

Digital Infrastructure, and increasingly 5G networks, are the backbone of a wide range of essential public services and economic functions. 95% of the world's internet traffic is carried by undersea communication cables. So, while redundancy is built into the communication networks, there is still a need to plan for contingencies. As governments and armed forces rely largely on digital infrastructure, which is operated by private companies, there is a need to focus on law enforcement for digital infrastructure and ensuring its resilience. Additionally, the global supply chains needed for digital infrastructures are vulnerable to accidental and intentional disruptions, which introduces security risks.

Space edit

Space infrastructure includes space-based assets and ground-based systems which are vulnerable to human-induced as well as natural risks. Next to the EU, the number of private operators has increased. Since many essential services, including energy transport, finance and digital infrastructure rely on space data, there is a need to strengthen resilience and redundance, to protect EU's and NATO's access to and freedom to operate in the space domain due to the threat posed by strategic competitors and potential adversaries.

Challenges and Recommendations edit

Due to the high interdependence between different types of infrastructure, disruption in one sector can cascade into another very quickly. The report thus argues that these interlinkages need to be better understood to anticipate cascading effects and identify mitigation measures and facilitate an effective civilian and military response. Since critical infrastructure is increasingly digitalized, new vulnerabilities arise, with malign actors already having shown the willingness and ability to conduct malicious cyber activities. Additionally, ownership structures of critical infrastructure also pose a challenge, due to potential adversaries already playing a part in Member States and Allies.

The report details 14 recommendations for EU-NATO cooperation on critical infrastructure. A European Union Press Release condensed them into three key recommendations:[6]

  1. Increased engagement, while making full use of synergies, for instance through the EU-NATO Foresight Seminar and with the support of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
  2. Strengthening the Structured Dialogue on Resilience and the Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility, and expanding talks between both organizations Military Staff
  3. Promoting best practices, assessments, and enhancing monitoring for security implication and cooperation

Future EU-NATO Cooperation edit

The EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Resilience will coordinate the implementation of these recommendations. The eight progress report of the Structured Dialogue was published on June 23, 2023, it did not focus on the implementation of the recommendations of the Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure. The ninth progress report can be expected in June 2024.

Further Reading edit

-      Full Final Assessment Report

-      8th Progress Report of Structured Dialogue

References edit

  1. ^ a b "Press corner". European Commission - European Commission. Retrieved 2024-05-17.
  2. ^ a b c d European Commission (2023-06-29). "EU-NATO TASK FORCE ON THE RESILIENCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FINAL ASSESSMENT REPORT" (PDF). Retrieved 2024-05-17.
  3. ^ European, Newsletter (2023-04-26). "EU-NATO Task Force on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure". Newsletter European. Retrieved 2024-05-17.
  4. ^ a b NATO. "NATO and European Union release final assessment report on resilience of critical infrastructure". NATO. Retrieved 2024-05-17.
  5. ^ "Comparing Critical Infrastructure Policy Updates". css.ethz.ch. 2024-05-08. Retrieved 2024-05-17.
  6. ^ European Commission (2023-06-29). "European Commission Press Relsease - EU-NATO Task Force: Final assessment report on strengthening our resilience and protection of critical infrastructure" (PDF). Retrieved 2024-05-17.