Blackwell's informativeness theorem

In the mathematical subjects of information theory and decision theory, Blackwell's informativeness theorem is an important result related to the ranking of information structures, or experiments. It states that there is an equivalence between three possible rankings of information structures: one based in expected utility, one based in informativeness, and one based in feasibility. This ranking defines a partial order over information structures known as the Blackwell order, or Blackwell's criterion.[1][2]

The theorem states equivalent conditions under which any expected utility maximizing decision maker prefers information structure over , for any decision problem. The result was first proven by David Blackwell in 1951, and generalized in 1953.[3][4]

Setting edit

Decision making under uncertainty edit

A decision maker faces a set of possible states of the world   and a set of possible actions   to take. For every   and  , her utility is  . She does not know the state of the world  , but has a prior probability   for every possible state. For every action she takes, her expected utility is

 

Given such prior  , she chooses an action   to maximize her expected utility. We denote such maximum attainable utility (the expected value of taking the optimal action) by

 

We refer to the data   as a decision making problem.

Information structures edit

An information structure (or an experiment) can be seen as way to improve on the utility given by the prior, in the sense of providing more information to the decision maker. Formally, an information structure is a tuple  , where   is a signal space and   is a function which gives the conditional probability   of observing signal   when the state of the world is  . An information structure can also be thought of as the setting of an experiment.

By observing the signal  , the decision maker can update her beliefs about the state of the world   via Bayes' rule, giving the posterior probability

 

where  . By observing the signal   and updating her beliefs with the information structure  , the decision maker's new expected utility value from taking the optimal action is

 

and the "expected value of  " for the decision maker (i.e., the expected value of taking the optimal action under the information structure) is defined as

 

Garbling edit

If two information structures   and   have the same underlying signal space, we abuse some notation and refer to   and   as information structures themselves. We say that   is a garbling of   if there exists a stochastic map[1] (for finite signal spaces  , a Markov matrix)   such that

 

Intuitively, garbling is a way of adding "noise" to an information structure, such that the garbled information structure is considered to be less informative.

Feasibility edit

A mixed strategy in the context of a decision making problem is a function   which gives, for every signal  , a probability distribution   over possible actions in  . With the information structure  , a strategy   induces a distribution over actions   conditional on the state of the world  , given by the mapping

 

That is,   gives the probability of taking action   given that the state of the world is   under information structure   – notice that this is nothing but a convex combination of the   with weights  . We say that   is a feasible strategy (or conditional probability over actions) under  .

Given an information structure  , let

  

be the set of all conditional probability over actions (i.e., strategies) that are feasible under  .

Given two information structures   and  , we say that   yields a larger set of feasible strategies than   if

 

Statement edit

Blackwell's theorem states that, given any decision making problem   and two information structures   and  , the following are equivalent:[1][5]

  1.  : that is, the decision maker attains a higher expected utility under   than under  .
  2. There exists a stochastic map   such that  : that is,   is a garbling of  .
  3.  :, that is   yields a larger set of feasible strategies than  .

Blackwell order edit

Definition edit

Blackwell's theorem allows us to construct a partial order over information structures. We say that   is more informative in the sense of Blackwell (or simply Blackwell more informative) than   if any (and therefore all) of the conditions of Blackwell's theorem holds, and write  .

The order   is not a complete one, and most experiments cannot be ranked by it. More specifically, it is a chain of the partially-ordered set of information structures.[2]

Applications edit

The Blackwell order has many applications in decision theory and economics, in particular in contract theory. For example, if two information structures in a principal-agent model can be ranked in the Blackwell sense, then the more informative one is more efficient in the sense of inducing a smaller cost for second-best implementation.[6][7]

References edit

  1. ^ a b c de Oliveira, Henrique (2018). "Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams". Games and Economic Behavior. 109: 126–131. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.008.
  2. ^ a b Kosenko, Andre (2021). "Algebraic Properties of Blackwell's Order and A Cardinal Measure of Informativeness". arXiv:2110.11399. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  3. ^ Blackwell, David (1951). "Comparison of Experiments". Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability: 2.
  4. ^ Blackwell, David (1953). "Equivalent comparison of experiments". The Annals of Mathematical Statistics. 24 (2): 265–272. doi:10.1214/aoms/1177729032.
  5. ^ Karni, Edi; Safra, Zvi (2022). "Hybrid decision model and the ranking of experimentsng of Experiments". Journal of Mathematical Economics. 101. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102700. S2CID 237370357.
  6. ^ Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D. (1983). "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem". Econometrica. 51 (1): 7–45. doi:10.2307/1912246. JSTOR 1912246.
  7. ^ Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691091846. JSTOR j.ctv7h0rwr.