Talk:Liberal international order

potential resource for term usage

Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers by Stewart Patrick Foreign Affairs November/December 2010; excerpt ...

A major strategic challenge for the United States in the coming decades will be integrating emerging powers into international institutions. The dramatic growth of Brazil, China, and India -- and the emergence of middle-tier economies such as Indonesia and Turkey -- is transforming the geopolitical landscape and testing the institutional foundations of the post-World War II liberal order.

99.19.44.155 (talk) 17:02, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

I only want to address point A) of this Talk comment, at least since it was posted. Response to A) here is a United Nations in Australia publication legitimising the topic name: https://www.unaa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/UNAA_RulesBasedOrder_ARTweb3.pdf 220.244.108.39 (talk) 01:14, 10 April 2024 (UTC)

Bad topic / political disinformation

I'm not sure who to discuss this with. This topic title, is, I believe, a "disinformation" artifact. The topic name is A) undocumented, and B) politically inflammatory, and C) it seems to me to be politically motivated. It seems less like an "article" than a plant to support usage of this undocumented title. It is reminiscent, to me, of the John Birch society international conspiracy theory junk.

A) Undocumented: there is no reference that indicates actual usage of this title. There is no reference to indicate the FREQUENCY of usage. It is simply put out there as a de facto name for something. B) This name, given to a real set of international trends, uses two very politically inflammatory techniques. First, use of the word "liberal" tied together with the phrase. This would seem to indicate a direction for a set of international economic trends. It also implies that there is a subset of politicians and people who are somehow involved in setting the agenda of the "international economic order". Secondly, use of the word "order" implies the same thing - there is a subset of people who are involved in setting or controlling the agenda of international economic policies. C) The combination of A and B indicates to me that the term is intimately biased, and not worthy of inclusion as a Wikipedia entry at all - at least, not without a great deal of research into where it entered the lexicon, IF it has actually entered the lexicon of English usage. And, into the political backgrounds and motivations of those people who are using it.

I really think that this entry violates the principles of an encyclopedia.

I wish I had time to research it further, but I don't. In the meantime, I think the article should be deleted entirely. I am going to flag it for my attention, and depending on the feedback I receive, I will give it some time before I simply delete the whole entry. Mbuell72 (talk) 00:13, 24 March 2017 (UTC)

My problem with this entry is that it's incomprehensible. There are a few principles that define the debate over the rules-based order, and this entry loses them in a cloud of verbiage. As I understand it, the rules-based order is used by the United States as an alternative to international law, while the U.S. violates international law. There are several sources in the article that make this point, but they're reduced to footnotes.

I came to this page while I was reading, "The choice before us: International law or a ‘rules-based international order’? by John Dugard, Cambridge University Press (2023) https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/choice-before-us-international-law-or-a-rulesbased-international-order/7BEDE2312FDF9D6225E16988FD18BAF0

Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , June 2023 , pp. 223 - 232 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156523000043

Here's Dugard's central argument:

There are several reasons that may explain why the United States prefers to invoke a ‘rules-based international order’ and not international law.

First, the United States is not a party to a number of important multilateral treaties that constitute an essential feature of international law. It is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention which means that it is compelled to reprimand China for threatening the ‘rules-based international order’ in the South China Sea rather than international law.Footnote²² It is not party to a number of fundamental treaties governing international humanitarian law, including the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Nor is it a party to the Rights of the Child Convention or the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Inevitably this makes it difficult for the United States to hold states accountable for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law to the extent that these rules are not considered by the United States to be part of customary international law.

Second, the United States has placed interpretations on international law justifying the use of forceFootnote²³ and the violation of international humanitarian law that are controversial and contested. Its interpretation of the right of self-defence to allow pre-emptive strikesFootnote²⁴ and the use of force against insurgents/militants characterized as terrorists are widely disputed.Footnote²⁵ The resort to the use of force as a species of humanitarian intervention in the 1999 bombing of Belgrade, conducted under the auspices of NATO,Footnote²⁶ is likewise disputed. The interpretations placed on Security Council resolutions by the United States and the United Kingdom, to authorize the use of force in Iraq in 2003Footnote²⁷ and Libya in 2011Footnote²⁸ have been much criticized as unlawful pretexts for regime change. The denial of prisoner-of-war status to Taliban soldiers detained at Guantanamo Bay following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2002 has been questioned on the ground that it violates Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.Footnote²⁹ The use of drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen to kill hostile militants/terrorists, which the United States has justified as permissible self-defence, has been criticized as a violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.Footnote³⁰ It seems that the United States finds it more convenient – and possible – to uphold contested interpretations of international law of this kind under the broad ‘rules’ of the RBO than to justify them under the stricter rules of international law.Footnote³¹

Third, the United States is unwilling to hold some states, such as Israel, accountable for violations of international law. They are treated as sui generiscases in which the national interest precludes accountability. This exceptionalism in respect of Israel was spelled out by the United States in its joint declaration with Israel on the occasion of President Biden’s visit to Israel in July 2022,Footnote³² which reaffirms ‘the unbreakable bonds between our two countries and the enduring commitment of the United States to Israel’s security’ and the determination of the two states ‘to combat all efforts to boycott or de-legitimize Israel, to deny its right to self-defence, or to single it out in any forum, including at the United Nations or the International Criminal Court’. This commitment explains the consistent refusal of the United States to hold Israel accountable for its repeated violations of humanitarian law, support the prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes before the International Criminal Court, condemn its assaults on Gaza (best portrayed as excessive enforcement of the occupation of Gaza and not self-defence as the United States arguesFootnote³³), insist that Israel prosecute killers of a US national (Shireen Abu Akleh), criticize its violation of human rights as established by both the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, accept that Israel applies a policy of apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,Footnote³⁴ and oppose its annexation of East Jerusalem.Footnote³⁵And, of course, there is the refusal of the United States to acknowledge the existence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal or allow any discussion of it in the context of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.Footnote³⁶ Such measures on the part of Israel are possibly seen as consistent with the ‘rules-based international order’ even if they violate basic rules of international law.

--Nbauman (talk) 01:11, 17 August 2023 (UTC)

Do we just wipe the page and start over? Oneequalsequalsone (talk) 19:56, 22 November 2023 (UTC)

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"Our democracy" listed at Redirects for discussion

An editor has identified a potential problem with the redirect Our democracy and has thus listed it for discussion. This discussion will occur at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2022 July 27#Our democracy until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion. _signed, Rosguill ^talk 15:34, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

Requested move 11 February 2023

The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: not moved. (closed by non-admin page mover) – robertsky (talk) 14:46, 26 February 2023 (UTC)

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Liberal international order → Rules-Based International Order – is the more common name. 210.210.162.226 (talk) 10:32, 11 February 2023 (UTC) — Relisting. BilledMammal (talk) 08:12, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

Disagree with this proposal. It seems to me that Liberal International Order is more commonly used than Rules-Based International Order.--C.J. Griffin (talk) 14:20, 11 February 2023 (UTC)

• Oppose Not a proper noun, so the capital letters are not appropriate, and no evidence was provided for the common name assertion. —⁠ ⁠BarrelProof (talk) 02:57, 21 February 2023 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.