Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq(Redirected from Zia ul Haq)
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (Urdu: محمد ضياء الحق; 12 August 1924 – 17 August 1988) was a Pakistani military dictator and four-star general who served as the 6th President of Pakistan after declaring martial law in 1977. He ruled from 1978 until his death in 1988 and remains country’s longest-serving head of state after Ayub Khan.
Pakistan Army’s official portrait
|6th President of Pakistan|
16 September 1978 – 17 August 1988
|Prime Minister||Muhammad Khan Junejo|
|Preceded by||Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry|
|Succeeded by||Ghulam Ishaq Khan|
|Chief of Army Staff|
1 March 1976 – 17 August 1988
|Preceded by||Tikka Khan|
|Succeeded by||Mirza Aslam Beg|
12 August 1924|
Jalandhar, Punjab, British India
(now in Punjab, India)
|Died||17 August 1988
Bahawalpur, Punjab, Pakistan
|Resting place||Faisal Masjid|
|Nationality||British Indian (1924–1947) Pakistani (1947–1988)|
|Spouse(s)||Begum Shafiq Zia (1950–1988; his death)|
|Children||5 (including Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq)|
|Alma mater||St. Stephen's College, Delhi
United States Army Command and General Staff College
|Allegiance|| British India
|Service/branch|| British Indian Army
|Years of service||1943–1988|
|Unit||22 Cavalry, Army Armoured Corps (PA – 1810)|
|Commands||2nd Independent Armoured Brigade
1st Armoured Division
II Strike Corps
Chief of Army Staff
|Battles/wars||World War II
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Black September in Jordan
Soviet war in Afghanistan
Educated at Delhi University, Zia saw action in World War II as a British Indian Army officer, before opting for Pakistan in 1947 and fighting in the war against India in 1965. In 1970, he led the Pakistan military's training mission in Jordan, proving instrumental to putting down the Black September insurgency against King Hussein. In recognition, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto approved Zia's four-star appointment and elevated him as the Chief of Army Staff in 1976. Following civil disorder, Zia deposed Bhutto in a military coup and declared martial law on 5 July 1977. Bhutto was controversially tried by the Supreme Court and executed less than two years later, for authorising the murder of a political opponent.
Assuming the presidency in 1978, Zia played a major role in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Aided by the United States and Saudi Arabia, Zia systematically coordinated the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet occupation throughout the 1980s. This culminated in the Soviet Union's withdrawal in 1989, but also led to the proliferation of millions of refugees, with heroin and weaponry into Pakistan's frontier province. On the foreign front, Zia also bolstered ties with China, the European Economic Community, the United States, and emphasised Pakistan's role in the Islamic world, while relations with India worsened amid the Siachen conflict and accusations that Pakistan was aiding the Khalistan movement. Domestically, Zia passed broad-ranging legislation as part of Pakistan's Islamization, acts criticised for fomenting religious intolerance. He also escalated Pakistan's atomic bomb project, and instituted industrialisation and deregulation, helping Pakistan's economy become the fastest-growing in South Asia. Averaged over Zia's rule, GDP growth was the highest in the country's history.
After lifting martial law and holding non-partisan elections in 1985, Zia appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister but accumulated more presidential powers via the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. After Junejo signed the Geneva Accords in 1988 against Zia's wishes, and called for an inquiry into the Ojhri Camp disaster, Zia dismissed Junejo's government and announced fresh elections in November 1988. He was killed along with several of his top military officials and two American diplomats in a mysterious plane crash near Bahawalpur on 17 August 1988. To this day, Zia remains a polarising figure in Pakistan's history, credited for preventing wider Soviet incursions into the region as well as economic prosperity, but decried for weakening democratic institutions and passing laws encouraging religious intolerance.
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was born in a Punjabi Arain family in Jalandhar, Punjab State of the British India, on 12 August 1924 as the second child of Muhammad Akbar, who worked as a staff clerk in the Army GHQ of India Command of British Armed Forces in Delhi and Shimla, prior to the independence of Pakistan from British colonial rule in 1947. Most accounts confirm that Zia-ul-Haq came from a religious family and religion played an important part in molding his personality. His father was known as ''Maulvi'' Akbar Ali due to his religious devotion.
He completed his initial education in Simla and then attended St. Stephen's College of the University of Delhi for his BA degree in History, which he graduated with highest marks in the college in 1943. Prior to his graduation, Zia joined the British Indian Army in 1943. During his collegiate years, he was noted as an extraordinary talent. Zia-ul-Haq occasionally offended his British superiors with his refusal to give up religious and cultural traditions. Zia-ul-Haq attributed his personal resistance to the lifestyle of the British Indian cavalry to his faith in ''God and his teachings.''
He married Shafiq Jahan in 1950. Begum Shafiq Zia died on 6 January 1996. Zia is survived by his sons, Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq, (born 1953), who went into politics and became a cabinet minister in the government of Nawaz Sharif, and Anwar-ul-Haq (born 1960) and his daughters, Zain (born 1972), a special needs child, Rubina Saleem, who is married to a Pakistani banker and has been living in the United States since 1980, and Quratulain Zia who currently lives in London, and is married to Pakistani doctor, Adnan Majid.
Zia was commissioned in the British Indian Army in the Guides Cavalry on 12 May 1943 after graduating from the Officer Training School Mhow and fought against Japanese forces in Burma in World War II. After Pakistan gained its independence through a partition in 1947, Zia joined the newly formed Pakistan Army as a Captain in the Guides Cavalry Frontier Force Regiment. He also served in 13th Lancers and 6 Lancers. He was trained in the United States during 1962–1964 at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After that, he returned to take over as Directing Staff (DS) at Command and Staff College, Quetta. During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Zia is said to have been the Assistant Quartermaster of the 101st Infantry Brigade.
In 1966 Zia took over command of 22 Cavalry and later was Col Staff of 1st Armoured Division. He was stationed in Jordan from 1969 to 1970 as a Brigadier, helping in the training of Jordanian soldiers, as well as leading them into battle during the Black September operations against the Palestine Liberation Organization as commander of Jordanian 2nd Division, a strategy that proved crucial to King Hussein's remaining in power in Jordan. In 1972 he took over command of 9 Armoured Brigade, 6th Armoured Division By 1973, then Major General Zia was commanding the 1st Armoured Division at Multan.
He was then promoted as Lieutenant General and was appointed commander of the II Strike Corps at Multan in 1975. It was during this time that Zia invited Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the Colonel-in-Chief of the Armoured Corps at Multan, using his tailor to stitch the Blue Patrols of his size. The next day, Bhutto was requested to climb a tank and engage a target, where the target was quite obviously hit. After the function, Zia met Bhutto and expressed his loyalty to him .
This promotion was ahead of a number of more senior officers. This promotion was highly controversial but had political motives for Bhutto, who saw Zia as firmly religious and an apolitical military figure who had distaste of politics.[page needed] This was the same motives and move made by future Prime minister Nawaz Sharif who promoted Pervez Musharraf based on his political ambitious, as Chief of Army Staff, but met the same fate as Bhutto in 1999 (although he was not executed).
At the time of his nominating the successor to the outgoing Chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan, the Lieutenant Generals in order of seniority were: Muhammad Shariff, Akbar Khan, Aftab Ahmed, Azmat Baksh Awan, Ibrahim Akram, Abdul Majeed Malik, Ghulam Jilani Khan, and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. But, Bhutto chose the most junior, superseding seven more senior lieutenant-generals. However, the senior most at that time, Lieutenant-General Mohammad Shariff, though promoted to General, was made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, a constitutional post akin to President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry. Zia never called Bhutto "Mr. Prime Minister", instead he called him sir when speaking to him.
Planning of coupEdit
Prime Minister Bhutto began facing considerable criticism and increasing unpopularity as his term progressed, the democratic socialists alliance who had previously allied with Bhutto began to diminish as time progresses. Initially targeting leader of the opposition Vali Khan and his opposition National Awami Party (NAP), also a socialist party. Despite the ideological similarity of the two parties, the clash of egos both inside and outside the National Assembly became increasingly fierce, starting with the Federal governments decision to oust the NAP provincial government in Balochistan Province for alleged secessionist activities and culminating in the banning of the party and arrest of much of its leadership after the death of a close lieutenant of Bhutto's, Hayat Sherpao, in a bomb blast in the frontier town of Peshawar.
Civil disorders against BhuttoEdit
Dissidence also increased within the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and the murder of leading dissident Ahmed Raza Kasuri's father led to public outrage and intra-party hostility as Bhutto was accused of masterminding the crime. PPP leaders such as Ghulam Mustafa Khar openly condemned Bhutto and called for protests against his regime. The political crisis in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan intensified as civil liberties remained suspended, and an estimated 100,000 troops deployed there were accused of abusing human rights and killing large numbers of civilians.
1977 Parliamentary electionsEdit
On 8 January 1977 a large number of opposition political parties grouped to form the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Bhutto called fresh elections, and PNA participated fully in those elections. They managed to contest the elections jointly even though there were grave splits on opinions and views within the party. The PNA faced defeat but did not accept the results, alleging that the election was rigged. They proceeded to boycott the provincial elections. Despite this, there was a high voter turnout in the national elections; however, as provincial elections were held amidst low voter turnout and an opposition boycott, the PNA declared the newly elected Bhutto government as illegitimate.
Soon, all the opposition leaders called for the overthrow of Bhutto's regime. Political and civil disorder intensified, which led to more unrest. On 21 April 1977, Bhutto imposed martial law in the major cities of Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad. However, a compromise agreement between Bhutto and opposition was ultimately reported. Zia planned the Coup d'état carefully, as he knew Bhutto had integral intelligence in the Pakistan Armed Forces, and many officers, including Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Major-General Tajammul Hussain Malik, GOC of 23rd Mountain Division, Major-General Naseerullah Babar, DG of Directorate-General for the Military Intelligence (DGMI) and Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, were loyal to Bhutto.
The coup, (called "Operation Fair Play") transpired in the small hours of 5 July 1977. Before the announcement of any agreement, Bhutto and members of his cabinet were arrested by troops of Military Police under the order of Zia. Bhutto tried to call Zia but all telephone lines were disconnected. When Zia spoke to him later, he reportedly told Bhutto that he was sorry that he had been forced to perform such an "unpleasant task".
Zia and his military government portrayed the coup as a "spontaneous response to a difficult situation", but his response was a complete contradiction. Soon after the coup, Zia told the British journalist Edward Behr of Newsweek:
I [Zia] am the only man who took this decision [Fair Play] and I did so on 1700 Hrs on 4[th] July after hearing the press statement which indicated that the talks between Mr. Bhutto and the opposition had broken down. Had an agreement been reached between them, I would certainly never had done what I did.— General Zia-ul-Haq, statement given to Newsweek, 
However, Zia's Chief of Army Staff General Khalid Mahmud Arif contradicted Zia's statement when Arif noted that the coup had already been planned, and the senior leadership of Pakistan Armed Forces had solid information. Therefore, Arif met with Bhutto on an emergency basis, stressing and urging Bhutto to "rush negotiations with the opposition". By Arif's and independent expert's accounts, the talks had not broken down even though the coup was very much in the offing. Zia further argued that Fair Play against Bhutto had been necessitated by the prospect of a civil war that Bhutto had been planning, by distributing weapons to his supporters. However, Arif strongly rejected Zia's remarks on Bhutto, and citing no evidence that weapons were found or recovered at any of the party's election offices, the military junta did not prosecute Bhutto on the charge of planning civil war.
Immediately, the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mohammad Shariff announced his and the navy's strong support for Zia and his military government. But, the Chief of Air Staff General Zulfikar Ali Khan remains unsupported while the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Muhammad Shariff remains neutral, while he silently expressed his support to Prime minister Zulfikar Bhutto. In 1978, Zia pressured President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry to appoint General Anwar Shamim as Chief of Air Staff; and Admiral Karamat Rahman Niazi as Chief of Naval Staff in 1979. On Zia's recommendation, President Illahi appointed Admiral Mohammad Shariff as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hence making the Admiral the highest ranking officer and principal military adviser overlooking all of the inter-services, including the Chiefs of Staff of the respected forces. In 1979, the Chiefs of Army, Navy, and the Air Force, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the coup as constitutional and legal under the war-torn circumstances, pledging their support to Zia as well.[page needed]
United States sponsorshipEdit
The United States, notably the Reagan Administration, was an ardent supporter of Zia's military regime and a close ally of Pakistan's conservative-leaning ruling military establishment. The Reagan administration declared Zia's regime as the "front line" ally of the United States in the fight against the threat of Communism. American legislators and senior officials most notable were Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Charlie Wilson, Joanne Herring, and the civilian intelligence officers Michael Pillsbury and Gust Avrakotos, and senior US military officials General John William Vessey, and General Herbert M. Wassom, had been long associated with the Zia military regime where they had made frequent trips to Pakistan advising on expanding the idea of establishment in the political circle of Pakistan. Nominally, the American conservatism of Ronald Reagan's Republican Party influenced Zia to adopt his idea of Islamic Islamic conservatism as the primary line of his military government, forcefully enforcing the Islamic and other religious practices in the country.
The socialist orientation had greatly alarmed the capitalist forces in Pakistan and as well as brought a clinging bell tolls alarm to the United States who feared the loss of Pakistan as an ally in the cold war. Many of Pakistan's political scientists and historians widely suspected that the riots and coup against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was orchestrated with help of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United States Government because United States growing fear of Bhutto's socialist policies which were seen as sympathetic towards the Soviet Union and had built a bridge that allowed Soviet Union to be involved in Pakistan, and had access through Pakistan's warm water port; something that the United States was unable to gain access since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark widely suspected the United States' involvement in bringing down the Bhutto's government, and publicly accused the United States' Government after attending the trial. On the other hand, the United States refused any involvement in Bhutto's fall, and argued that it was Bhutto who had alienated himself over the five years. While witnessing the dramatic fall of Bhutto, one US diplomat in American Embassy in Islamabad wrote that:
During Bhutto's five years in Pakistan's helm, Bhutto had retained an emotional hold on the poor masses who had voted him overwhelmingly in 1970s general elections. At the same time, however, Bhutto had many enemies. The socialist economics and nationalization of major private industries during his first two years on office had badly upsets the Business circles.... An ill-considered decision to take over the wheat-milling, rice-husking, sugar mills, and cotton-gaining, industries in July of 1976 had angered the small business owners and traders. Both leftists—socialists and communists, intellectuals, students, and trade unionists—felt betrayed by Bhutto's shift to centre-right wing conservative economics policies and by his growing collaboration with powerful feudal lords, Pakistan's traditional power brokers. After 1976, Bhutto's aggressive authoritarian personal style and often high-handed way of dealing with political rivals, dissidents, and opponents had also alienated many....
Postponement of elections and call for accountabilityEdit
My sole aim is to organise free and fair elections which would be held in October this year. Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule.
He also stated that the Constitution of Pakistan had not been abrogated, but temporarily suspended. Zia did not trust the civilian institutions and legislators to ensure the country's integrity and sovereignty therefore, in October 1977, he announced the postponement of the electoral plan and decided to start an accountability process for the politicians. On television, Zia strongly defended his decision for postponing the elections and demanded that "scrutiny of political leaders who had engaged in malpractice in the past". Thus, the PNA adopted its policy of "retribution first, elections later". Zia's policy severely tainted his credibility as many saw the broken promise as malicious. Another motive was that Zia widely suspected that once out of power the size of the Pakistan Peoples Party rallies would swell and better performance in elections was possible. This led to request for postponement of elections by the right-wing Islamists as well as left-wing socialists, formerly allied with Bhutto, which displaced Bhutto in the first place. Zia dispatched an intelligence unit, known as ISI's Political Wing, sending Brigadier-General Taffazul Hussain Siddiqiui, to Bhutto's native Province, Sindh, to assess whether people would accept martial law. The Political Wing also contacted the several right-wing Islamists and conservatives, promising an election, with PNA power-sharing the government with Zia. Zia successfully divided and separated the secular forces from right-wing Islamists and conservatives, and later purged each member of the secular front.
A Disqualification Tribunal was formed, and several individuals who had been members of parliament were charged with malpractice and disqualified from participating in politics at any level for the next seven years. A white paper document was issued, incriminating the deposed Bhutto government on several counts.
It is reported by senior officers that when Zia met federal secretaries for the first time as leader of the country after martial law, he said that "He does not possess the charisma of Bhutto, personality of Ayub Khan or the legitimacy of Liaquat Ali Khan" thereby implying how can he be marketed.
Reign as Chief Martial Law AdministratorEdit
After deposing Prime Minister Bhutto on 5 July 1977, Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law, and appointed himself Chief Martial Law Administrator, which he remained until becoming president on 16 September 1978.
The Doctrine of NecessityEdit
Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of the deposed Prime Minister, filed a suit against Zia's military regime, challenging the validity of the July 1977 military coup. The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled, in what would later be known as the Doctrine of Necessity (not to be confused with the 1954 Doctrine of necessity) that, given the dangerously unstable political situation of the time, Zia's overthrowing of the Bhutto government was legal on the grounds of necessity. The judgement tightened the general's hold on the government. When Bhutto appeared personally to argue his appeal in the supreme court, he almost affirmed his concurrence with the judges present for not letting off a judgement without imposing some conditions on ruling military government.[clarification needed]
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto TrialEdit
Former elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was arrested during the coup but released shortly afterwards. Upon his release, Bhutto travelled the country amid adulatory crowds of PPP supporters. On 3 September 1977, he was arrested again by the Army on charges of authorising the murder of a political opponent in March 1974. The trial proceedings began 24 October 1977 and lasted five months. On 18 March 1978, Bhutto was declared guilty of murder and was sentenced to death.
In the words of Aftab Kazie and Roedad Khan, Zia hated Bhutto and had used inappropriate language and insults to describe Bhutto and his colleagues.[full citation needed] The Supreme Court ruled four to three in favour of execution. The High Court had given him the death sentence on charges of the murder of the father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, a dissident PPP politician. Despite many clemency appeals from foreign leaders requesting Zia to commute Bhutto's death sentence, Zia dismissed the appeals and upheld the death sentence. On 4 April 1979, Bhutto was hanged, after the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence as passed by the Lahore High Court.
Bhutto's last personal appearance and utterances in the supreme court were not merely a long defence of his conduct; he also made some matters clear. He mentioned the words of "heir" for his son "Mir Murtaza Bhutto". He made some remark which indicated that he has views similar to a Sunni, though he was Shia albeit a non-practicing one. He also effectively cast doubt on the reliability of star witnesses against him i.e. Masood Mahmood who was a UK-trained lawyer and not merely a police officer and FSF chief. He mentioned repeatedly Lahori Ahmedi connection of Masood Mahmood in his testimony. He repeatedly brought the subject of his maltreatment in the death cell. Bhutto made it abundantly clear, even though indirectly that he wanted either freedom or death, not some thing in between, and appreciated Khar and his lawyer Yahya Bakhtiar.
Appointment of Martial Law AdministratorsEdit
Martial law judgesEdit
The Ad hoc appointments of senior justices at the Supreme Court of Pakistan was one of the earliest and major steps were taken out by the military government under General Zia-ul-Haq. Zia had recognised the fact that since, Bhutto had good equations with the governments of the Soviet Union, China, and all the important western countries, excluding the United States. Still, it was a formidable array of sovereigns, presidents and prime ministers and the PPP can be forgiven for making a massive political miscalculations.
After calling for martial law, Zia pressured President Fazal Illahi to appoint Justice Sheikh Anwarul Haq to Chief Justice of Pakistan on 23 September 1977. Immediately, chief justice Yaqub Ali was forcefully removed from the office after the latter agreed to re-hear the petition filed at the supreme court by the peoples party's chairwoman Nusrat Bhutto on 20 September 1977. After Justice Yaqub Ali's removal, Bhutto objected to the inclusion of the new Chief Justice, Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq, as a chief justice of the Bench on the grounds that by accepting the office of acting president during the absence of Zia-ul-Haq from the country, he had compromised his impartial status. Bhutto also stated that the Chief Justice in his public statements had been critical of his government in the recent past.
The objection was over-ruled by the Chief Justice Anwarul Haq, and the case of Bhutto was again heard by the Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq as the bench's lead judge, and presided the whole case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto while forcing the martial law throughout Pakistan. Shortly, after Zia's return, another judge Mushtak Ahmad also gained Zia and Anwar-ul-Haq's support and elevated as the ad hoc Chief Justice of Lahore High Court; he was too part of the bench who retained the death sentence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto even though Bhutto was not declared guilty of the murder of the political opponent. In 1979, when Zia departed for Saudi Arabia, Justice Haq served as interim president of Pakistan.
Martial law governorsEdit
The Zia regime largely made use of installing high-profile military generals to carte blanche provincial administration under martial law. Zia's Guides Cavalry comrade and foul-mouth Lieutenant-General Fazhle Haque was appointed Martial Law Administrator of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province. Lieutenant-General Fazle Haque was considered a strong vocal General and a strong man. General Haque was the commander of the XI Corps, and commanding-general officer of the Army elements responsible for fighting a secret war against Soviet Union.
The second appointment was of Lieutenant-General S.M. Abbasi who was appointed Martial Law Administrator of Sindh Province; his tenure too saw civil disorder amid student riots. By contrast, third martial law administrator appointment of Lieutenant-General Ghulam Jilani Khan to the Punjab Province made much headway in beautifying Lahore extending infrastructure, and muting political opposition. The ascent of Navaz Sharif to Chief Minister of Punjab was largely due to General Jilani's sponsorship. Perhaps most crucially, final and fourth martial law administrator appointment was then-Lieutenant-General Rahimuddin Khan. Lieutenant-General Rahimuddin Khan was appointed to the post of Martial Law Administrator of Balochistan Province saw the disbanding of the Baloch insurgency, the containment of Afghan Mujahideen, as well as the construction of nuclear test sites in the Chagai District.
Zia's tenure saw the influx of heroin, sophisticated weaponry, and countless refugees in from neighbouring Afghanistan. Law and order deterioration was worse after he appointed Mr. Junejo as Prime minister in 1985. The government did not locate evidence of Zia having a relationship in the heroin trade, but has been considered.
Zia benefited from the extremely capable martial law administrators who previously had worked with the military governments of former president Yahya Khan and Ayub Khan in the 1960s. One of the notable officers that had worked with him were General Khalid Arief, Chief of Army Staff, and Admiral Mohammad Shariff, Chairman Joint Chiefs. Both were noted by Western governments as highly capable and had wide experience from the military government of the East-Pakistan and remained General Zia' confidential members.
Both Admiral Sharif and General Arif handled the matters efficiently if the matters were out of control by Zia. In 1979, Zia influenced the Navy's Promotion Board several times after he succeeded first in the appointment of Admiral Caramatt Nazi as Chief of Naval Staff in 1979, and Admiral Tarik Kamal Khan, also chief of naval staff, in 1983. On his request, then-President Fazal Illahi approved the appointment of General Anwar Shamim as Chief of Air Staff and following President's resignation, Zia appointed Shamim as the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator. In the matters of serious national security, General Zia had taken the chief of air staff and chief of naval staff in confidence after he discussed the matters with the respected chiefs of Staff. Zia's appointment in inter-services were highly crucial for his military government and pre-emptive measure to ensure the continuous loyalty of Navy and Air Force to himself and his new military government.
Reign as President of PakistanEdit
Assumption of the post of President of PakistanEdit
Despite the dismissal of most of the Bhutto government, President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry was persuaded to continue in office as a figurehead. After completing his term, and despite Zia's insistence to accept an extension as President, Chaudhry resigned, and Zia took the office of President of Pakistan on 16 September 1978. Thus his position was cemented as the undisputed ruler of the country. Over the next six years, Zia issued several decrees which amended the constitution and greatly expanded his power. Most significantly, the Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order granted Zia the power to dissolve the National Assembly virtually at will.
|The Military Government of General Zia-ul-Haq|
|Presidential cabinet||Officer holder||Term|
|President||General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq||1978–1988|
|Prime Minister||Mohammad Khan Junejo||1985–1988
|Foreign Affairs||Agha Shahi
Lt.General Yaqub Khan
|Treasury||Ghulam Ishaq Khan
|Law, Justice||Sharifuddin Pirzada||1977–1988|
|Interior||Air Mshl Inamul Haq Khan
Lt.General Farooq Lodhi
|Defence||Lt.General Ghulam Jilani Khan
Maj.General Rahim Khan
|Science advisor||Lt.General Zahid Ali Akbar
Munir Ahmad Khan
|Health||Lt.General Vajid Ali Khan||1977–1988|
|Media broadcasting||Brig.General Siddique Salik||1977–1988|
|Internal Security||Roedad Khan||1977–1988|
|Public Service||Adm Mohammad Sharif||1980–1988|
|Communications||Adm Tariq Kamal Khan||1986–1988|
|Economic||Adm Karamat Rahman Niazi||1983–1988|
|Intelligence||Maj.General Rao Farman Ali||1983–1988|
Political structural changesEdit
Formation of Majlis-e-ShooraEdit
Although ostensibly only holding office until free elections could be held, General Zia, like the previous military governments, disproved of the lack of discipline and orderliness that often accompanies multiparty "parliamentary democracy." He preferred a "presidential" form of government and a system of decision making by technical experts, or "technocracy". His first replacement for the parliament or National Assembly was a Majlis-e-Shoora, or "consultative council." After banning all political parties in 1979 he disbanded Parliament and at the end of 1981 set up the majlis, which was to act as a sort of board of advisors to the President and assist with the process of Islamization. The 350 members of the Shoora were to be nominated by the President and possessed only the power to consult with him, and in reality served only to endorse decisions already taken by the government. Most members of the Shoora were intellectuals, scholars, ulema, journalists, economists, and professionals in different fields.
Zia's parliament and his military government reflect the idea of "military-bureaucratic technocracy" (MBT) where professionals, engineers, and high-profile military officers were initially part of his military government. His antipathy for the politicians led the promotion of bureaucratic-technocracy which was seen a strong weapon of countering the politicians and their political strongholds. Senior statesman and technocrats were included physicist-turned diplomat Agha Shahi, jurist Sharifuddin Perzada, corporate leader Nawaz Sharif, economist Mahbub ul Haq, and senior statesman Aftab Kazie, Roedad Khan, and chemist-turned diplomat Ghulam Ishaq Khan were a few of the leading technocratic figures in his military government.
Referendum of 1984Edit
After Bhutto's execution, momentum to hold elections began to mount both internationally and within Pakistan. But before handing over power to elected representatives, Zia-ul-Haq attempted to secure his position as the head of state. A referendum was held on 19 December 1984 with the option being to elect or reject the General as the future President, the wording of the referendum making a vote against Zia appear to be a vote against Islam. According to official figures 95% of votes were cast in favour of Zia, however only 10% of the electorate participated in the referendum.
1985 elections and constitutional amendmentsEdit
After holding the 1984 referendum, Zia succumbed to international pressure and gave permission to election commission to hold national wide general elections but without political parties in February 1985. Most of the major opposing political parties decided to boycott the elections but election results showed that many victors belonged to one party or the other. Critics complained that ethnic and sectarian mobilisation filled the void left by banning political parties (or making elections "non-partisan"), to the detriment of national integration.
The General worked to give himself the power to dismiss the Prime Minister dissolve the National Assembly, appoint provincial governors and the chief of the armed forces. His prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo was known as unassuming and soft-spoken but was a Sindhi.
Before handing over the power to the new government and lifting the martial law, Zia got the new legislature to retroactively accept all of Zia's actions of the past eight years, including his coup of 1977. He also managed to get several amendments passed, most notably the Eighth Amendment, which granted "reserve powers" to the president to dissolve the Parliament. However, this amendment considerably reduced the power he'd previously granted himself to dissolve the legislature, at least on paper. The text of the amendment permitted Zia to dissolve the Parliament only if the government had been toppled by a vote of no confidence and it was obvious that no one could form a government or the government could not function in a constitutional manner.
In general Zia gave economic development and policy a fairly low priority (aside from Islamization) and delegating its management to technocrats such as Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Aftab Qazi and Vaseem Jaffrey.  However, between 1977 and 1986, the country experienced an average annual growth in the GNP of 6.8%—the highest in the world at that time—thanks in large part to remittances from the overseas workers, rather than government policy. The first year of Zia's government coincided with a dramatic rise in remittances, which totalled $3.2 billion/year for most of the 1980s, accounted for 10 percent of Pakistans's GDP; 45 percent of its current account receipts, and 40 percent of total foreign exchange earnings.
By the time General Zia had initiated the coup against Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, the economic cycle process of nationalisation program was completed. The socialist orientation and nationalisation program was slowly reversed; the idea of corporatisation was heavily favoured by President Zia-ul-Haq to direct the authoritarianism in the nationalised industries. One of his well-known and earliest initiatives were aimed to Islamized the national economy which featured the Interest-free economic cycle. No actions towards privatising the industries were ordered by President Zia; only three steel mill industries were returned to its previous owners.
By the end of 1987, the Finance ministry had begun studying the process of engaging the gradual privatisation and economic liberalisation.
Soviet-Afghan War and Strategic initiativesEdit
Soviet invasion and Soviet-Afghan WarEdit
On 25 December 1979, the Soviet Union (USSR) intervened in Afghanistan. Following this invasion, Zia chaired a meeting and was asked by several cabinet members to refrain from interfering in the war, owing to the vastly superior military power of the USSR Zia, however, was ideologically opposed to the idea of communism taking over a neighbouring country, supported by the fear of Soviet advancement into Pakistan, particularly Balochistan, in search of warm waters, and made no secret about his intentions of monetarily and militarily aiding the Afghan resistance (the Mujahideen) with major assistance from the United States.
During this meeting, the Director-General of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) then-Lieutenant-General Akhtar Abdur Rahman advocated for a covert operation in Afghanistan by arming Islamic extremists. During this meeting, General Rahman was heard saying: "Kabul must burn! Kabul must burn!", and mastered the idea of a proxy war in Afghanistan. After this meeting, Zia authorised this operation under General Rahman, and it was later merged with Operation Cyclone, a programme funded by the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
In November 1982, Zia travelled to Moscow to attend the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, the late General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and new Secretary General Yuri Andropov met with Zia there. Andropov expressed indignation over Pakistan's support of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union and her satellite state, Soviet Afghanistan. Zia took his hand and assured him, "General Secretary, believe me, Pakistan wants nothing but very good relations with the Soviet Union". According to Gromyko, Zia's sincerity convinced them, but Zia's actions didn't live up to his words.
Zia reversed many of Bhutto's foreign policy initiatives by first establishing stronger links with the United States, Japan, and the Western world. Zia broken off relations with the Socialist state and State capitalism became his major economic policy. US politician Charlie Wilson claims that Zia directly dealt with the Israelis, working to build covert relations with them, allowing the country to actively participate in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Helped by ISI, the Mossad channelled Soviet reversed engineered weapons to Afghanistan. In Wilson's own word, Zia is reported to have remarked to the Israeli intelligence service: "Just don't put any stars of David on the boxes".
Consolidation of atomic bomb programmeEdit
One of the earliest initiatives taken by Zia in 1977, was to militarise the integrated atomic energy programme which was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972. During the first stages, the programme was under the control of Bhutto and the Directorate for Science, under Science Advisor Dr. Mubashir Hassan, who was heading the civilian committee that supervised the construction of the facilities and laboratories. This atomic bomb project had no boundaries with Munir Ahmad Khan and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan leading their efforts separately and reported to Bhutto and his science adviser Dr. Hassan who had little interest in the atomic bomb project. Major-General Zahid Ali Akbar, an engineering officer, had little role in the atomic project; Zia responded by taking over the programme under military control and disbanded the civilian directorate when he ordered the arrest of Hassan. This whole giant nuclear energy project was transferred into the administrative hands of Major-General Akbar who was soon made the Lieutenant-General and Engineer-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers to deal with the authorities whose co-operation was required. Akbar consolidated the entire project by placing the scientific research under military control, setting boundaries and goals. Akbar proved to be an extremely capable officer in the matters of science and technology when he aggressively led the development of nuclear weapons under Munir Ahmad Khan and Abdul Qadeer Khan in a matter of five years.
By the time, Zia assumed control, the research facilities became fully functional and 90% of the work on atom bomb project was completed. Both the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) had built the extensive research infrastructure started by Bhutto. Akbar's office was shifted to Army Combatant General Headquarters (GHQ) and Akbar guided Zia on key matters of nuclear science and atomic bomb production. He became the first engineering officer to have acknowledge Zia about the success of this energy project into a fully matured programme. On the recommendation of Akbar, Zia approved the appointment of Munir Ahmad Khan as the scientific director of the atomic bomb project, as Zia was convinced by Akbar that civilian scientists under Munir Khan's directorship were at their best to counter international pressure.
This was proved when the PAEC conducted the cold-fission test of a fission device, codename Kirana-I on 11 March 1983 at the Weapon-Testing Laboratories-I, under the leadership of weapon-testing laboratory's director Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad. Lieutenant-General Zahid Akbar went to GHQ and notified Zia about the success of this test. The PAEC responded by conducting several cold-tests throughout the 1980s, a policy also continued by Benazir Bhutto in the 1990s. According to the reference in the book, "Eating Grass", Zia was so deeply convinced of the infiltration of Western and American moles and spies into the project, that he extended his role in the atomic bomb, which reflected extreme "paranoia", in both his personal and professional life. He virtually had PAEC and KRL separated from each other and made critical administrative decisions rather than putting scientists in charge of the aspects of the atomic programmes. His actions spurred innovation in the atomic bomb project and an intense secrecy and security culture permeated PAEC and KRL.
Unlike Bhutto, who faced rogue criticism and a heated diplomatic war with the United States throughout the 1970s, Zia took different diplomatic approaches to counter the international pressure. From 1979 to 1983, the country was made a subject of attack by international organisation for not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Zia deftly neutralised international pressure by tagging Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme to the nuclear designs of the neighbouring Indian nuclear programme. Zia, with the help of Munir Ahmad Khan and Agha Shahi, Foreign Minister, drew a five-point proposal as a practical rejoinder to world pressure on Pakistan to sign the NPT; the points including the renouncing of the use of nuclear weapons.
|“||(sic)...Either General Zia did not know the facts about country's atomic bomb project... Or General Zia was the "most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met...."||”|
|— Vernon Walters, 1981, |
Following the success of Operation Opera— in which an Israeli Air Force strike took place to destroy the Iraqi nuclear programme in 1981— suspicion grew in Pakistan that the Indian Air Force had similar plans for Pakistan. In a private meeting with General Anwar Shamim, then-Chief of Air Staff, Zia had notified General Shamim that the Indian Air Force had plans to infiltrate Pakistan's nuclear energy project, citing solid evidence. Shamim felt that the Air Force was unable to divert such attacks, therefore, he advised Zia to use diplomacy through Munir Ahmad Khan to divert the attacks. At Vienna, Munir Ahmad Khan met with Indian physicist Raja Ramanna and notified him that such an attack would provoke a nuclear war between the two countries. In the meantime, Shamim decided to start the programme to acquire the F-16 Falcons and A-5 Fanton jets for the Pakistan Air Force. Shamim launched Operation Sentinel- a counter operation that thwarted the Israeli Air Force attempt to sabotage Pakistan's nuclear energy project— forced Indian Premier Indira Gandhi to held talks with Pakistan on nuclear issues and directed a high delegation to Pakistan where both countries pledged not to assist or attack each other's facilities. In 1985, following the induction of the F-16 Falcons and A-5 Fantons, Shamim commissioned the Air Force Strategic Command to protect and battle the weapons of mass destruction.
In 1977, Zia ultimately adopted the policy of "Nuclear opacity" to deliberately deny the atomic bomb programmes. This policy of nuclear ambiguity was adopted after witnessing the success of Israel's nuclear programme and on multiple occasions Zia broke his words and promises concerning the nature of the country's atomic bomb project. On nuclear policy issues, Zia deliberately misguided the United States and concealed classified information from the outside world. The United States trusted Zia's sincerity and his promises made to the United States; Zia gave assurances to the United States not to produce weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) above a 5% level. However, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Vernon Walter, confronted Zia on his secret trip to Pakistan in October 1981. Confronted with the evidence, Zia acknowledged that the information "must be true," but then denied everything, leading Walters to conclude that: "either Zia "did not know the facts" or was the "most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met...".
Soon after the coup, the clandestine nuclear energy project was no longer a secret to the outside world. Part of his strategy was the promotion of nuclear proliferation in anti-western states (such as North Korea, Iran, and communist China) to aid their own nuclear ambitions, to divert international attention which was difficult. In 1981, Zia contracted with China when he sent weapon-grade uranium to China and also built the centrifuge laboratory which increasingly enhanced the Chinese nuclear programme. This act encouraged Abdul Qadeer Khan, who allegedly tried to aid the Libyan nuclear programme but because Libya–Pakistan relations were strained, Khan was warned of serious consequences. This policy envisaged that this would deflect international pressure onto these countries, and Pakistan would be spared the international community's wrath.
After Zia's death, his successor General Mirza Aslam Beg, as Chief of Army Staff, encouraged Abdul Qadeer Khan and gave him a free hand to work with some like-minded nations such as North Korea, Iran and Libya which also wanted to pursue their nuclear ambitions for a variety of reasons. In 2004, Abdul Khan's dismissal from the nuclear weapons programme was considered a face saving exercise by the Pakistan Armed Forces and political establishment under the then Chief of Army Staff and President General Pervez Musharraf. Zia's nuclear proliferation policy had a deep impact on the world, especially anti-western states, most nominally North Korea and Iran. In the 2000s (decade), North Korea would soon follow the same suit after it was targeted by the international community for its on-going nuclear programme. In the 2000s (decade), North Korea attempted to aid the Syrian and Iranian nuclear programmes in the 1990s. The North Korean connection to the Syrian nuclear programme was exposed in 2007 by Israel in its successful strategic operation, Orchard, which resulted in them sabotaging the Syrian nuclear programme as well as the deaths of 10 senior North-Korean scientists who were aiding the nuclear program.
Even though Zia had removed the Bhutto sentiment in the nuclear energy project, Zia did not completely disband Bhutto's policy on nuclear weapons. After the retirement of Zahid Ali Akbar, Zia transferred control of the nuclear weapons programme to Bhutto's close aide Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Soon, Zia promoted Khan as the technical director of the entire programme as well as appointing Khan as his Science Adviser. With the support of handpicked civilian Prime Minister Muhammad Juneijo, Zia sanctioned the launch of the 50 Megawatt (MW) heavy water plutonium production reactor, known as Khushab-I, at Khushab in 1985. Zia also took initiatives to launched the space projects as spin-off to nuclear project. Zia appointed nuclear engineer Salim Mehmud as the Administrator of the Space Research Commission. Zia also launched the work on the country's first satellite, Badr-1, a military satellite. In 1987, Zia launched the clandestine aerospace project, the Integrated Missile Research Programme under General Anwar Shamim in 1985, and later under Lieutenant-General Talat Masood in 1987.
International standing enhancement and resumption of aidEdit
Zia's international standing greatly rose after his declaration to fight the Soviet invaders. Pakistan–United States relations took a much more positive turn. US President Jimmy Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, cut off US aid to Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan had not made sufficient progress on the nuclear issue. Then, on 25 December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and Carter offered Pakistan $325 million in aid over three years. Zia rejected this as "peanuts." Carter also signed the finding in 1980 that allowed less than $50 million a year to go to the Mujahideen. After Ronald Reagan came to office, defeating Carter for the US Presidency in 1980, all this changed, due to President Reagan's new priorities and the unlikely and remarkably effective effort by Congressman Charles Wilson aided by Joanne Herring, and CIA Afghan Desk Chief Gust Avrakotos to increase the funding for Operation Cyclone. Aid to the Afghan resistance, and to Pakistan, increased substantially, finally reaching $1 billion. The United States, faced with a rival superpower looking as if it were to create another Communist bloc, now engaged Zia to fight a US-aided war by proxy in Afghanistan against the Soviets.
Fighting the war by proxyEdit
Zia now found himself in a position to demand billions of dollars in aid for the mujahideen from the Western states, famously dismissing a United States proposed $325 million aid package as "peanuts". Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Special Service Group now became actively involved in the conflict, and in co-operation with the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Army Special Forces supported the armed struggle against the Soviets.
In 1981, Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter as President of the United States. Reagan was completely against the Soviet Union and its communist satellites, dubbing it "the evil empire". Reagan now increased financial aid heading for Pakistan. In 1981, the Reagan Administration sent the first of 40 F-16 jet fighters to the Pakistanis. But the Soviets kept control of the Afghan skies until the mujahideen received Stinger missiles in 1986. From that moment on, the mujahideen's strategic position steadily improved.
The Soviets declared a policy of national reconciliation. In January they announced that a Soviet withdrawal was no longer linked to the makeup of the Afghan government remaining behind. Pakistan, with the massive extra-governmental and covert backing from the largest operation ever mounted by the CIA and financial support of Saudi Arabia, therefore, played a large part in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988.
The war legacyEdit
The rise of the illicit drug trade and its spread through Pakistan to the rest of the world increased tremendously during the Soviet-Afghan war. Afghanistan's drug industry began to take off after the Soviet invasion in 1979. Desperate for cash with which to buy weapons, various elements in the anti-Communist resistance turned to the drug trade. This was tolerated if not condoned by their American sponsors such as the CIA.
'Sharization' of PakistanEdit
In 1977, prior to the coup, the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims, along with nightclubs, and horse racing was banned by Prime Minister Bhutto in an effort to stem the tide of street Islamization. Zia went much further, committing himself to enforce Nizam-e-Mustafa ("Rule of the prophet" or Islamic System, i.e. establishing an Islamic state and sharia law), a significant turn from Pakistan's predominantly secular law, inherited from the British.
In his first televised speech to the country as head of state Zia declared that
Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of [an] Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.
Zia established "Sharia Benches" in each High Court (later the Federal Sharia Court) to judge legal cases using the teachings of the Quran and the Sunna, and to bring Pakistan's legal statutes into alignment with Islamic doctrine. Zia bolstered the influence of the ulama (Islamic clergy) and the Islamic parties. 10,000s of activists from the Jamaat-e-Islami party were appointed to government posts to ensure the continuation of his agenda after his passing. Conservative ulama (Islamic scholars) were added to the Council of Islamic Ideology.
Islamisation was a sharp change from Bhutto's original philosophical rationale captured in the slogan, "Food, clothing, and shelter". In Zia's view, socialist economics and a secular-socialist orientation served only to upset Pakistan's natural order and weaken its moral fibre. General Zia defended his policies in an interview in 1979 given to British journalist Ian Stephens:
The basis of Pakistan was Islam. ... Muslims of the subcontinent are a separate culture. It was on the Two-Nation Theory that this part was carved out of the Subcontinent as Pakistan.... Mr. Bhutto's way of flourishing in this Society was by eroding its moral fiber. ... by pitching students against teachers, children against their parents, landlord against tenants, workers against mill owners. [Pakistan has economic difficulties] because Pakistanis have been made to believe that one can earn without working. ... We are going back to Islam not by choice but by the force of circumstances. It is not I or my government that is imposing Islam. It was what 99 percent of people wanted; the street violence against Bhutto reflected the people's desire ...
How much of Zia's motivation came from piety and how much from political calculation is disputed. One author points out that Zia was conspicuously silent on the dispute between the heterodox Zikri and the 'Ulama in Balochistan where he needed stability. Secular and leftist forces accused Zia of manipulating Islam for political ends. According to Nusrat Bhutto, former First Lady of Pakistan:
The ... horrors of 1971 war ... are (still) alive and vivid in the hearts and the minds of people of [Pakistan]...Therefore, General Zia insanely ... used Islam ... to ensure the survival of his own regime....— Nusrat Bhutto, 
How much success Zia had using state-sponsored Islamisation to strengthen national cohesion is also disputed. Religious riots broke out in 1983 and 1984. Sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shia worsened over the issue of the 1979 Zakat ordinance, but differences in fiqh jurisprudence also arose in marriage and divorce, inheritance and wills and imposition of hadd punishments.
Among Sunni Muslims, Deobandis and Barelvis also had disputes. Zia favoured Deobandi doctrine and the Sufi pirs of Sindh (who were Barelvi) joined the anti-Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.
In one of his first and most controversial measures to Islamize Pakistani society was the replacement of parts of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) with the 1979 "Hudood Ordinance." (Hudood meaning limits or restrictions, as in limits of acceptable behaviour in Islamic law.) The Ordinance added new criminal offences of adultery and fornication to Pakistani law, and new punishments of whipping, amputation, and stoning to death.
For theft or robbery, the PPC punishments of imprisonment or fine, or both, were replaced by amputation of the right hand of the offender for theft, and amputation of the right hand and left foot for robbery. For Zina (extramarital sex) the provisions relating to adultery were replaced by the Ordinance with punishments of flogged 100 lashes for those unmarried offenders, and stoning to death for married offenders.
All these punishments were dependent on proof required for hadd being met. In practice the Hudd requirement—four Muslim men of good repute testifying as witness to the crime—was seldom met. As of 2014, no one offenders have been stoned or had limbs amputated by the Pakistani judicial system. To be found guilty of theft, zina, or drinking alcohol by less strict tazir standards—where the punishment was flogging and/or imprisonment—was common, and there have been many floggings.
More worrisome for human rights and women's rights advocates, lawyers and politicians was the incarceration of thousands of rape victims on charges of zina. The onus of providing proof in a rape case rests with the woman herself. Uncorroborated testimony by women was inadmissible in hudood crimes. If the victim/accuser was unable to prove her allegation, bringing the case to court was considered equivalent to a confession of sexual intercourse outside of lawful marriage. Despite this the ordinance remained in force until the Women's Protection Bill was passed in 2006.
The hybridisation of Pakistan penal code with Islamic laws was difficult because of the difference in the underlying logic of the two legal systems. PPC was kingly law, Haddood is a religious and community-based law.
Other sharia lawsEdit
Under Zia, the order for women to cover their heads while in public was implemented in public schools, colleges and state television. Women's participation in sports and the performing arts was severely restricted. Following Sharia law, women's legal testimony was given half the weight of a man's, according to critics. Unlike men, women entering into legal contracts were required to have their signature witness by another person.
In 1980 the "Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980" was implemented. The measure called for a 2.5% annual deduction from personal bank accounts on the first day of Ramadan, with Zia stating that the revenues would be used for poverty relief. Zakat committees were established to oversee distribution of the funds.
In 1981 interest payments were replaced by "profit and loss" accounts (though profit was thought to be simply interest by another name). Textbooks were overhauled to remove un-Islamic material, and un-Islamic books were removed from libraries. Eating and drinking during Ramadan was outlawed, attempts were made to enforce praying of salat five times a day.
To outlaw blasphemy, the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) were amended through ordinances in 1980, 1982 and 1986. The 1980 law prohibited derogatory remarks against Islamic personages, and carried a three-year prison sentence. In 1982 the small Ahmadiyya religious minority were prohibited from saying or implying they were Muslims. In 1986 declaring anything implying disrespect to the Islamic prophet Muhammad, Ahl al-Bayt (family members of Muhammad), Sahabah (companions of Muhammad) or Sha'ar-i-Islam (Islamic symbols) was made a cognisable offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine, or both.
Traditional religious madrassass in Pakistan received state sponsorship for the first time, under the General Zia-ul-Haq's administration, Their number grew from 893 to 2,801. Most were Deobandi in doctrinal orientation, while one quarter of them were Barelvi. They received funding from Zakat councils and provided free religious training, room and board to impoverished Pakistanis. The schools, which banned televisions and radios, have been criticised by authors for stoking sectarian hatred both between Muslim sects and against non-Muslims.
In a 1979 address to the nation, Zia decried the Western culture and music in the country. Soon afterwards, PTV, the national television network ceased playing music videos and only patriotic songs were broadcast. New taxes were levied on the film industry and most of the cinemas in Lahore were shut down. New tax rates were introduced, further decreasing cinema attendances.
This was despite strong support from the largest Western country, the United States, and warm meetings between Zia and President Ronald Reagan. It was under Zia and the economic prosperity of his era that the country's urban middle and lower-middle-classes expanded and Western 1980s fashion wear and hairstyle spread in popularity, and rock music bands gained momentum, according to leftist cultural critic Nadeem F. Paracha.
Welfare of the people with disabilitiesEdit
During his tenure, he oversaw passing of an ordinance for the welfare of people with disabilities. The ordinance is called "The Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981" and it was passed into law on 29 December 1981. It provides the measures for the employment, rehabilitation and welfare of the people with disabilities.
Dismissal of the Junejo government and call for new electionsEdit
As time passed, the legislature wanted to have more freedom and power and by the beginning of 1988, rumours about the differences between Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and Zia were rife.
It is said by some that Zia-Junejo rift was encouraged by late Mahboob-ul-Haq and Junejo's insistence on signing Geneva pact without deciding the composition of next government of Afghanistan before Soviet withdrawal. Junejo also gave Benazir a seat next to him in parleys before that. Junejo did not strengthen the Islamization drive and rather weakened it. His era led to serious disturbances in Karachi and ultimately Karachi went into the secular control of MQM from the clutches of Sunnis Jamaat-e-Islami.
Ojhri Camp blast had irreversibly weakened Zia.
On 29 May 1988, Zia dissolved the National Assembly and removed the Prime Minister under article 58(2)b of the amended Constitution. Apart from many other reasons, Prime Minister Junejo's decision to sign the Geneva Accord against the wishes of Zia, and his open declarations of removing any military personnel found responsible for an explosion at a munitions dump at Ojhri Camp, on the outskirts of army headquarters in Rawalpindi, earlier in the year, proved to be some of the major factors responsible for his removal.
Zia promised to hold elections in 1988 after the dismissal of Junejo government. He said that he would hold elections within the next 90 days. The late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter Benazir Bhutto had returned from exile earlier in 1986, and had announced that she would be contesting the elections. With Bhutto's popularity somewhat growing, and a decrease in international aid following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Zia was in an increasingly difficult political situation.
Zia died in a plane crash on 17 August 1988. After witnessing a US M1 Abrams tank demonstration in Bahawalpur, Zia had left the small town in the Punjab province by C-130B Hercules aircraft. The aircraft departed from Bahawalpur Airport and was expected to reach Islamabad International Airport. Shortly after a smooth takeoff, the control tower lost contact with the aircraft. Witnesses who saw the plane in the air afterward claim it was flying erratically, then nosedived and exploded on impact. In addition to Zia, 31 others died in the plane crash, including chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, close associate of Zia, Brigadier Siddique Salik, the American Ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Lewis Raphel and General Herbert M. Wassom, the head of the US Military aid mission to Pakistan. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Senate chairman announced Zia's death on radio and TV. Conditions surrounding his death have given rise to many conspiracy theories. There is speculation that the United States, India, the Soviet Union (in retaliation for Pakistani support of the mujahideen in Afghanistan) or an alliance of them and internal groups within Zia's military were behind the incident.
A board of inquiry was set up to investigate the crash. It concluded 'the most probable cause of the crash was a criminal act of sabotage perpetrated in the aircraft'. It also suggested that poisonous gases were released which incapacitated the passengers and crew, which would explain why no Mayday signal was given. There was also speculation into other facts involving the details of the investigation. A flight recorder (black box) was not located after the crash and previous C-130 aircraft did have them installed.
Maj. Gen. (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, who was suspected by many circles within Pakistan and also by the then United States Ambassador to India, John Gunther Dean, for being extraordinarily insistent with President Zia to visit the demonstration, is considered to be the prime suspect in the incident. He claimed later that reports of Israeli and Indian involvement in Zia's plane-crash were only speculations and he rejected the statement that was given by former president Ghulam Ishaq Khan that the presidential plane was blown up in the air. Durrani stated that Zia's plane was destroyed while landing.
Lt. General Hameed Gul, the head of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence agency at the time, suggested that the United States might be responsible, even though the U.S. Ambassador and military attaché were also killed. He told The Times that the Pakistani President was killed in a conspiracy involving a "foreign power".
Funeral and aftermathEdit
|“||Well, he was a great loss...He is a martyr, and was a great man.||”|
|— George P. Shultz, 1988, |
His funeral was held on 19 August 1988 in Islamabad. As a 21-gun salute of light artillery resounded off the lush Margalla Hills, nearly 1 million mourners joined in chants of "Zia ul-Haq, you will live as long as the sun and moon remain above." His remains were laid to rest in a 4-by-10-foot dirt grave in front of the huge, modern Faisal Mosque that Zia had built as a symbol of Pakistani-Saudi friendship. Also in attendance was his successor President Ghulam Ishaq Khan chiefs of staff of armed forces, chairman joint chiefs, and other high military and civil officials. Former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz also laid a floral wreath at Zia's grave.
Even after his death, Zia-ul-Haq remained a highly polarizing and widely discussed figure in the country's intellectual and political circles. Out of the country's short history, Zia-ul-Haq's legacy remains a most toxic, enduring, and tamper-proof legacy, according to the editorial written in Dawn. Historians and political scientists widely discussed and studied his policy making skills, some authors noting him as "The Ringmaster", "Master of Illusion" and "Master Tactician". However, his most remembered and enduring legacy was his indirect involvement and military strategies, by proxy supporting the Mujahideen, against the USSR's war in Afghanistan. His reign also helped the conservatives to rise at the national politics against Benazir Bhutto. He is also noted as being one of Pakistan's most successful generals, placing the armed forces in charge of the country's affairs. During his regime, western styles in hair, clothing, and music flooded the country. The 1980s gave birth to Pakistani rock music, which expressed Pakistani nationalism in the country.
Removal of name from the Constitution of PakistanEdit
With the passing of Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, General Zia's name was permanently deleted from the Constitution of Pakistan.
Portrayals in popular cultureEdit
Zia has been portrayed in English language popular culture a number of times including:
- In the comic Shattered Visage, it is implied that Zia's death was orchestrated by the same intelligence agency that ran The Village from the show The Prisoner.
- Zia was portrayed by Indian actor Om Puri in the 2007 film Charlie Wilson's War.
- Zia is caricatured as one of the main protagonists in Mohammed Hanif's 2008 satirical novel A Case of Exploding Mangoes which is loosely based around the events of his death.
- Zia is the basis for the character General Hyder in Salman Rushdie's novel Shame (1983), which describes Zia's long-lasting relationship with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (here known as Iskander Harrapa), the president whom he would later overthrow and "put to death".
- Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's takeover of Pakistan and circumstances of his death were referenced in the Star Trek novel The Rise and Fall of Khan Noonien Singh, Volume One. In a prelude to the fictional Eugenics Wars, it is implied that genetically engineered "superman" Khan Noonien Singh arranged the crash.
- http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\story_16-3-2008_pg3_3 https://web.archive.org/web/20170215124259/http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page%3D2008%5C%5C05%5C%5C30%5C%5Cstory_30-5-2008_pg7_56&date=2009-09-04. Archived from the original on 15 February 2017. Retrieved 12 February 2017. Missing or empty
- Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan:Between Mosque and Military; §From Islamic Republic to Islamic State. United States: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 2005). pp. 395 pages. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1.
- Amin, Abdul Hafiz. "Remembering Our Warriors: Babar The Great". Interview with Major-General baber. Defence Journal of Pakistan. Archived from the original on 28 April 2016.
- Rafiq Dossani (2005). Prospects for Peace in South Asia. Stanford University Press. pp. 46–50. ISBN 978-0-8047-5085-1.
- Story of Pakistan. "Ouster of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto" (PHP). Retrieved 7 November 2006.
- Wynbrandt, James (2009). A Brief History of Pakistan. Facts on File. p. 216.
In his first speech to the nation, Zia pledged the government would work to create a true Islamic society.
- Haqqani 2010, p. 131: "Zia ul-Haq is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. Undoubtedly, Zia went farthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state, and he nurtured the jihadist ideology."
- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. p. 245.
Pakistan during the period 1977–1988 ... aspired to be an ideological state... the goal of an Islamic state was deemed to be its main basis.
- Khanna, Sushil Khanna. "The Crisis in the Pakistan Economy". Sushil Khanna. Retrieved 16 November 2011.
- "Setting the record straight: Not all dictators equal, nor all democrats incompetent". The Express Tribune. 20 May 2012. Retrieved 24 March 2016.
- GoPak, Government of Pakistan. "The Eight Amendment". Constitution of Pakistan. Retrieved 16 November 2011.
- "Pakistan's abused Ahmadis". The Economist. London. 13 January 2010. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "To Fulfill Its Potential Pakistan Must Return to The Original Intent of The Lahore Resolution".
- Haqqani 2010, p. 112
- /K Natwar Singh (1997). "Master of Game: Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan". The Rediff Special. Retrieved 28 September 2013.
- Haqqani, Hussain (2010). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Carnegie Endowment. p. 132. ISBN 9780870032851.
- Khalid Hasan (16 March 2008). "POSTCARD USA: The Pakistani flying carpet". Daily Times. Lahore. Archived from the original on 20 October 2012. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "Gone but not forgotten". The News. Archived from the original on 19 November 2011. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq". Nndb.com. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- Zaeef 2011, p. 275
- Book: President of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq: January–December 1985
- "Funeral of Zia ul Haq". Storyofpakistan.com. 1 June 2003. Archived from the original on 18 December 2011. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "Zia's daughter is here". The Tribune. Chandigarh. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "Shatrughan reminisces ties with Zia". The Tribune. Chandigarh. 21 March 2006. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "Umeed-e-Noor's efforts for special children lauded". Paktribune.com. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "In Mumbai, she sends out a prayer for peace". Cities.expressindia.com. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "Zia through a daughter's eyes". Khalidhasan.net. 28 March 2004. Archived from the original on 28 September 2011. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- "General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq". Ijazulhaq.com. Archived from the original on 13 July 2011. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
- A.H. Amin. "Interview with Brig (retd) Shamim Yasin Manto" Defence Journal, February 2002
- "Encyclopedia of the Developing World". google.com. Retrieved 24 March 2016.
- In the summer of 1976, General Zia, who had superseded seven senior senior lieutenant-generals, told Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: "Sir, I am so grateful to you for appointing me Chief of Army Staff. Not only myself, but may future generations will be eternally grateful to you for singling me out for such a great honor, and this is a favour which I can never forget." The Herald, July 1992
- Haqqani 2010, p. 111
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- Haqqani 2010, p. 126
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"I [Ramsey Clark] do not believe in conspiracy theories in general, but the similarities in the staging of riots in Chile (where the CIA allegedly helped overthrow President Salvador Allende) and in Pakistan are just too close, Bhutto was removed from power in Pakistan by force on 5 July, after the usual party on the 4th at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, with U.S. approval, if not more, by Zia. Bhutto was falsely accused and subjected to brutality for months during proceedings that corrupted the Judiciary of Pakistan before being murdered, then hanged. As Americans, we must ask ourselves this: Is it possible that a rational military leader under the circumstances in Pakistan could have overthrown a constitutional government, without at least the tacit approval of the United States?".
- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. p. 256.
- PML. "Pakistan Muslim League". PML Public Press. Pakistan Muslim League. Archived from the original on 9 February 2012. Retrieved 29 December 2011.
- Hyman, Ghayur & Kaushik 1989, pp. 38, 40: "In the first week of October 1977, the General abruptly postponed the election ... Perhaps now some political leaders sensed that the General's game was different ... Many people now  believe that the General had his plan ready when he took over the reins of government, and had been astutely following the plan when he announced the postponement of the elections."
- Khan, Roedad. "Pakistan- A Dream Gone Sour". Colonel Athar Hussain Ansari, PAF. Roedad Khan. Retrieved 16 November 2011.
"What is a constitution? It is a booklet with twelve or ten pages. I can tear them away and say that tomorrow we shall live under a different system. Today, the people will follow wherever I lead. All the politicians including the once mighty Mr. Bhutto and his [Scumbag] friends will follow me with tails wagging...." General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977
- "Zia describing Bhutto". Saudi Press Agency. Saudi Press Agency. Retrieved 16 November 2011.
"I hate anybody projecting as a leader ... if you want to serve the Islamic Ummah and Humanity, do it as a humble person. Amongst Muslims we are all Muslim brothers ... not leaders...
- Khan, Roedad. "Zia's attitude towards Bhutto and his friends".
"It is either his neck or mine! ... I have not convicted him or his friend [Mubashir Hassan], and if they hold him guilty, my God, I am not going to let him off!
- Lyon, Peter Lyon (2008). Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopedia. California: Library of Congress, United States. p. 276. ISBN 978-1-57607-713-9.
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- Nawaz Sharif Profile on WikiMir source of original citation
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- Many Islamists have pointed out that while the Quran makes no mention of elections, parliaments, etc., the Quran did urge Muhammad – the first ruler of Muslims, and the one who Muslim should emulate – to consult his companions. (see The Need for Consultation (mushāwara)|by Muhammad Haq Archived 9 December 2014 at the Wayback Machine. | 3 January 2013)
- Al-Mushir 24, n.2 (1982), p.85
- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. pp. 284–5.
Partyless elections encouraged sectarian and ethnic mobilisation to the detriment of national integration. C. Rakisits points out that '.... Ethnic identification has increasingly replaced the Pakistan 'nation' as a symbol of emotional loyalty.'
- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. pp. 246, 7.
... the period of rapid economic growth during the 1980s also dampened threats to Zia's power, although it was based more on the bounty of remittances from overseas' workers than on economic policies. ... per capita income [increased] by 34% but the economy also benefited in this period from overseas remittances of $25 billion.
- Mohiuddin, Yasmeen Niaz (2007). Pakistan: A Global Studies Handbook. ABC-CLIO. p. 110. Retrieved 4 December 2014.
The dramatic rise in remittances coincided with the first year of the Zia government and is considered the most significant economic development during his era. These remittances totaling $3.2 billion per year for most of the 1980s, were substantial, particular in relation to the size of the economy. They accounted for 10 percent of GDP; 45 percent of current account receipts, and 40 percent of total foreign exchange earnings
- Hussain, Ishrat (1999). Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Yousaf, PA, Brigadier General (retired) Mohammad (1991). Silent soldier: the man behind the Afghan jehad General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. Karachi, Sindh: Jang Publishers, 1991. pp. 106 pages.
- Hyman, Ghayur & Kaushik 1989, pp. 35–36
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- Wikileaks. "Reagan admin swallowed Gen Zia's lies on nuclear weapons". 27 April 2012-- declassified information archive, 1981. First post. Retrieved 28 April 2012.
- Shamim, Anwar (2010). Cutting Edge PAF: A Former Air Chief's Reminiscences of a Developing Air Force§ Critical Years: Intelligence and Deception. Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Vanguard Books. pp. 320–351. ISBN 978-969-402-540-7.
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- The Man Who Sold the Bomb, Time.com Sunday, 6 February 2005
- Mehmud, Salim PhD (Nuclear Engineering). "Pakistan and Earth Observational System (EOS)". [full citation needed]
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- The Bear Trap, Brig. Muhammad Yousuf[full citation needed]
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- Jones, Owen Bennett (2002). Pakistan : eye of the storm. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. pp. 16–7.
... Zia rewarded the only political party to offer him consistent support, Jamaat-e-Islami. Tens of thousands of Jamaat activists and sympathisers were given jobs in the judiciary, the civil service and other state institutions. These appointments meant Zia's Islamic agenda lived on long after he died.
- Michael Heng Siam-Heng; Ten Chin Liew (2010). State and Secularism: Perspectives from Asia§General Zia-ul-Haq and Patronage of Islamism. Singapore: World Scientific. p. 360. ISBN 9789814282383.
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- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. p. 251.
- speech given on 2 December 1978, on the occasion of the first day of the Hijra
- Haqqani, His Excellency and State Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States of America, dr. Hussain (2005). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Washington D.C.: United Book Press. p. 400. ISBN 9780870032851.
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- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. p. 252.
The need for stability in the strategic region of Balochistan during the Afghan war led Zia to distance himself from the sectarian conflict between the heterodox Zikri community and the ulama. ... Significantly standing aside from the issue, Zia lent credence to critics' claim that his call for Islamisation was just a cover for his undemocratic regime rather than a genuine desire.
- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. p. 251.
The state sponsored process of Islamisation dramatically increased sectarian divisions not only between Sunnis and Shia over the issue of the 1979 Zakat Ordinance, but also between Deobandis and Barelvis.
- Talbot, Ian (1998). Pakistan, a Modern History. NY: St.Martin's Press. p. 271.
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- Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia, By Dilip Hiro, Yale University Press, 2012, p.162
- Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, edited by Zahid Hussain, Columbia University Press, 2006, p.78
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This was a time when the wily General Ziaul-Haq was reigning supreme ... Even though the country, at the time was covered by a ... façade of strict conservatism and ... moralistic pretence,... Ironically, it ... also propelled the gradual expansion of the country's urban middle and lower-middle-classes. And it is the youth cultures that emerged from these classes that launched the first shots of the kind of pop culture, scene and music we now call modern Pakistani pop.
- "THE DISABLED PERSONS (EMPLOYMENT AND REHABILITATION) ORDINANCE, 1981" (PDF). The Government of Punjab. 29 December 1981. Retrieved 24 March 2016.
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- Ghosh, Palash. "Politics Who Killed General Zia Of Pakistan? Perhaps The Israelis, The US, Moscow; He Implemented Sharia Law And His Murder Remains Unsolved 25 Years Later". International Business Times. IBT Media Inc. Retrieved 22 November 2014.
- Fineman, Mark (21 August 1988). "Million Mourn at Funeral for Pakistan's Zia". The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2 December 2012.
- There is also still a lot of controversy on who or what actually lies buried in Zia's supposed grave. Some people claim only his jawbone was found and identified, and is buried there; whilst others claim that bits and pieces of a number of the aircrash victims were put in together. See SAH Rizvi in his article in 'The Pakistan Observer' Islamabad, 27 August 1988
- The Faisal Mosque is named after the late Saudi Arabian king Faisal, and was partially constructed with Saudi funds
- Nasir, Abbas (7 July 2012). "Zia's Long Shadow". Dawn Newspapers. Dawn Newspapers. Retrieved 2 December 2012.
- Hyman, Ghayur & Kaushik 1989, p. 35
- Rehman, I A (September 1988). "Ziaul Haq: Master of illusion". Islamabad: Dawn Newspapers, Rehman. Dawn Newspapers. Retrieved 18 August 2016.
- Shah, Mehtab Ali (1997). The foreign policy of Pakistan: ethnic impacts on diplomacy, 1971–1994. London [u.a.]: Tauris. ISBN 1-86064-169-5.
- "Election Commission of Pakistan on Zia-ul-Haq". Election Commission of Pakistan on Zia-ul-Haq. Archived from the original on 16 March 2013. Retrieved 2 December 2012.
- Kapur, Ashok (1991). "Zia ul Haq's legacy". Pakistan in crisis (1. ed.). London: Routledge. pp. 146–190. ISBN 0-415-00062-9. Retrieved 2 December 2012.
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- Mohammed Hanif (May 2008). A Case of Exploding Mangoes. Knopf. ISBN 0-307-26807-1.
- Greg Cox (July 2001). The Rise and Fall of Khan Noonien Singh, Volume One. Pocket Books. ISBN 0-671-02127-3.
- Haqqani, Husain (2010), Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Carnegie Endowment, ISBN 978-0-87003-285-1
- Hyman, Anthony; Ghayur, Muhammed; Kaushik, Naresh (1989), Pakistan, Zia and After--, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, ISBN 81-7017-253-5
- Zaeef, Abdul Salam (2011), My Life with the Taliban, Hurst, ISBN 978-1-84-904152-2
- Books about Haq's time period
- The Leopard and the Fox by Tariq Ali (2007)
- Breaking the Curfew by Emma Duncan (1989) ISBN 0-7181-2989-X
- Working with Zia by General Khalid Mahmud Arif
- Khaki Shadows by General Khalid Mahmud Arif
- Desperately Seeking Paradise by Ziauddin Sardar
- Waiting for Allah by Christina Lamb
- Ayub, Bhutto, and Zia by Hassan Iftikhar
- Journey to Disillusionment by Sherbaz Khan Mazari
- Ghost Wars by Steven Coll
- General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq Shaheed: A Compilation by various authors
- Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History by George Crile III
- The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story by Mohammed Yousaf, Mark Adkin (1992) ISBN 0-85052-267-6
- A Case of Exploding Mangoes by Mohammed Hanif
- Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years by Mushahid Hussain Syed
- Pakistan Under Martial Law 1977–1985 by Muhammad Waseem
- Songs of Blood and Sword by Fatima Bhutto
- Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, Its Role and Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil, 1947–1999. RoseDog Books. ISBN 9780805995947.
|Wikiquote has quotations related to: Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq|
- Biography video 'Shaheed e Islam
- Annotated Bibliography for Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues
- "Who Killed Zia?" by Edward Jay Epstein for Vanity Fair, September 1989
- Official profile at Pakistan Army website
- The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
- General Zia-ul-Haq's plane crash due to mechanical problem (Times of London)
- Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq President of Pakistan on Encyclopedia Britannica
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
|Colonel Commandant of Army Armoured Corps
Ali Jan Mehsud
|Chief of Army Staff
Mirza Aslam Beg
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
|Minister of Defence
Ali Ahmed Khan Talpur
Ali Ahmed Khan Talpur
|Minister of Defence
Muhammad Khan Junejo
Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry
|President of Pakistan
Ghulam Ishaq Khan