User:Rueben lys/India RfC

Please note this is a only a record of the sources influencing my opinion during the RfC in the India talk page brought in turn by myself and Fowler&fowler (talk · contribs). This is not intended to influence opinion of the reader of this page and should only be adjudged when produced in support of a given argument and not in isolation.

I have tried to edit the history section to say that the political movement started in the last decades of the 19th century, that Congress came to be the strongest one of many pollitical organisations, there was non-violent and violent philosophies with considerable following of both, that Gandhi forefronted the movement from 1920s, and that there were three notable events in the last five years of the movement that are held of quite considerable importance with relation to the movement. I have referenced my edits to respectable sources including the Encyclopaedia Britannica, BBC's history section, and a number of published accounts of the Raj and the independence movement. These edits have been repeatedly reverted by user Fowler&Fowler who insists that the bit on independence movement can not and should not be expanded anymore, as well as that what my edits are trying to cede more than deserved importance to non-notable events. Hie has also insisted that nothing outside the Gandhian movement is notable and insists on a version that says that

• The movement started in the first decades of the twentieth century (It didn't and is thus factually wrong, only the first non-cooperation movement started around that time).
• That the Congress started the movement (It did not, the pollitical movement for independence had already started long before the Congress, the party was founded in 1885 and rapidly came to the forefront of the political campaign).
• Millions of people engaged in civil disobedience with a commitment to Gandhi's philosophy of Ahimsa. (This in particular seems to be a PoV statement, since more radical movements with considerable public support already existed before Gandhi arrived in India, Gandhi's philosophy was one of many strong views, as well as that Congress itself became divided in the late 1920s on wether to keep following Gandhi's strategy or to take more radical means. Also Quit India Movement was undertaken with a commitment far from Ahimsa).

Fowler also insists that no mention at all of the Indian National Army, Red Fort trials and the Bombay mutiny as well as the tense pollitcal and public situation after the war is admissible to the article because

• His sources and other encyclopaedias he quotes (which do mention other movements in a considerably larger section on the Indian independence movement) are said to ascribe these as nonnotable and he insists that in the article the the independence section be compressed, and for the sake of comressing, nothing else is seen as "making the cut". The references I have provided are not given considered at all, which seems to me to pass into more of an article ownership issue.
• Fowler mentioned earlier that the India article is modelled on the Australia artice, which has a considerably detailed history section and includes quite details the History of modern Australia, especially of notable events from early 1900s through to 1950s I can't see why Fowler refuses to accept that this can be done for this article as well. And also, why is Fowler deciding???
• I have a feeling Fowler has a PoV issue with certain very notable Indian nationalists, particularly Subhas Bose, which I say because of the general tone of his comments here.

I have tried to address my concerns to Fowler, but I have not seen any efforts to collaborate, and have had not reasons or seen efforts to believe that a constructive process is possible. Also his comments on unoing my revision was

“ Reuben Iys, you can't impose you idiosyncratic version of history and include sizeable text and more sizeable footnotes without discussion on the talk page ”

which seems to me to be an obstruction to constructive editing bourne out of an ownership issue.

At least two other editors have expressed the view that the my edits do hold ground and that the section could be improved and also that the edits should be discussed instead of edit-warring. One other editor has expressed the view that Fowler's views are justified based on entries from other encyclopaedias, which I feel needs to be addressed since other sources which I have referenced hold a different view

I would like these concerns to be addressed since my efforts to make the history section more comprehensive is being frustrated here. I have no intention of edit warring and would like to see a collaboration to improve on the article.Rueben lys 23:38, 24 August 2007 (UTC)

My earleri concerns are compounded by this discussion in Fowler's talk page which might suggest there is issue about ownership and collaboration problems.Rueben lys 23:53, 24 August 2007 (UTC)

Opinions found in different Journals about Fowler's sources

Expand to see reviews of the Books quoted later by Fowler, found in different journals, as specified, obtained from JSTOR.

Here's the review of Markovits's book in the Journal of Asian Studies which says it focusses heavily on the French role in India, as well as other criticisms of the book which might raise doubts as to how much it is a text book all over the world. Incidentally it also says as a Text Book it does not compare well with more recent and far more historigraphical work like those of Metcalfe and Metcalfe.Rueben lys 13:07, 1 September 2007 (UTC) Here's a review of Peter Robb's book in the Journal of South Asian studies, which says there will be inevitable discomfort at the ommission of details and then says it is an excellent book on the Development of society, economics and pollitics in Modern India. It is an examination of Modern-Nation-state-style western democracy and Indian-traditional-religious dichotomy of modern India. I am not entirely sure why this would be a study of The Raj and the Indian independence movement. It seems more social history to me.Rueben lys 13:20, 1 September 2007 (UTC) I couldn't find a review of Sugata Bose's book yet (I am looking), but I did come accross this article by him in the Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 38, No. 1. which addresses some of the earlier comments you made regadring Bose's own newphew etc etc.

Excerpts and contents from some Rueben's sources

Expand to View a Sumit Sarkar's opinion of notable and decisive event influensing British policy in India

Modern India, 1885-1947 has to say on the question of what were notable (verbatim): “ In November 1945, a British move to put the INA men on trial immediately sparked off massive demonstrations all over the country. Even more significant was the probable link between the INA experience and the wave of disaffection in the British Indian army during the winter of 1945-46, which culminated in the great Bombay Naval strike on February 1946 and was quite possibly the sinlge most decisive reason behind the British decision to make a quick withdrawal ” (Sarkar, pp 411) and “ The decisive shift in British policy really came about under mass pressure in Autumn and Winter of 1945-46 - the same month Pererel Moon while editing Wavell's journal (Vicerory's journal)(Chapter VIII) has perceptively described as "The edge of a Volcano". Very foolishly, The British initially decided to hold public trials of dismissing from service and detaining without trial no less that 7000:Mansergh, Vol. VI, pp49-51). They compounded the folly by holding the first trial in the Red Fort, Delhi in November 1945, and putting on the dock together a Hindu, a Muslim, and a Sikh (P.K. Sehgal, Shah Nawaz, Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon). Bhulabhai Desai, Tejbahadur Sapru and Nehru apperared for teh defence (the latter putting on his barrister's gown fter 25 years), and the Muslim league also joined the countrywide protest. On 20 November, an intelligence Bureau note admitted that "There has seldom been a matter which has attracted so much public interest and, it is safe to say, sympathy...this particular brand of sympathy cuts across communal barriers." ” (Sarkar, pp-419) and “ The British became extremely nervous about the INA spirit spreading to the Indian army, and in Janurary the Punjab Governor reported that a Loahore reception for released INA prisoners had been attended by Indian soldiers in uniform ” (Sarkar pp420) and “ Asaf Ali in a private conversation in october was reported to have explained that his party "would lose much ground in the country" unless it took up their cause ” (Sarkar, pp420) and “ The British for their part realised the need for some concessions. On 1 December, it was announced that only INA members accused of murder or brutal treatment of fellow-prisoners would henceforward be brought trial (instead of the sweeping charge of "waging war against the King" used in the first case) and imprisonment sentences passed against the first batch were remitted in January ” and “ The turning-point, which "caused at least a temporary detente" (Wavell to George VI,31 December, Mansergh Vol.VI pp713) came with popular explosion in Calcutta on the INA issue 21-23 November 1945, which set a pattern of periodic upheavals in that city which went on for about a decade and are reminescent of the famou journees or "days" in Paris during the French revolution. ” On the some mutiny of the Royal Indian Navy that you say you cant find (a bit surprised I am, because you seem quite well read and with access to info if you cared to look up), Sarkar says “ The greatest threat of all, however, was the naval mutiny in Bombay on 18-23 February 1946 - one of the most truly heroic, if largely forgotten, episodes in our freedom struggle. ”

I believe you would find similar arguments in Pyarelal's Maharma Gandhi: The Last Phase, (Vol. IX).

Expand to see [Michael Edwardes' opinion in his 1964 Book The last years of British IndiaLondon, Cassell, 1963 (and its review in Journal of Asian studies) on the notable and decisive event influencing British policy in India.

“ The Government of India had hoped, by prosecuting members of the INA, to reinforce the morale of the Indian army. It succeeded only in creating unease, in making the soldiers feel slightly ashamed that they themselves had supported the British. If Bose and his men had been on the right side — and all India now confirmed that they were — then Indians in the Indian army must have been on the wrong side. It slowly dawned upon the Government of India that the backbone of the British rule, the Indian army, might now no longer be trustworthy. The ghost of Subhas Bose, like Hamlet’s father, walked the battlements of the Red Fort (where the INA soldiers were being tried), and his suddenly amplified figure overawed the conference that was to lead to independence. ”

Expand to see a synopsis of Niradh Chaudhri's opinion in the Journal Pacific affairs in 1953.

The INA trials attracted much attention in India and became a rallying point for the independence movement from Autumn 1945 so much so that the release of INA prisoners and suspension of the trials came to be the dominant pollitical campaign in precedence over the campaign for Freedom. ...If any overpowering emotion distinguished India at the end of the war, it was anger at the victory of the United Nations... ...Public resentment had not abated after six months. So on March 7 1946, the day of formal celebration of victory in India, Delhi town hall was partly gutted, Indians in European dresses were set upon, their hats and neckties snatched... ...Opposition to the trial of the officers for treason became a major public and pollitical campaign, and the very opening of the first trial saw violence and series of riots in a scale later described as sensational. It also saw a campaign that defied communal barriers.

Expand to see how Dr Chandrika Kaul's opinion on her BBC History article.

“ There was also a split within Congress between those who believed that violence was a justifiable weapon in the fight against imperial oppression (whose most iconic figure was Subhas Chandra Bose, who went on to form the Indian National Army), and those who stressed non-violence. The towering figure in this latter group was Mahatma Gandhi, who introduced a seismic new idiom of opposition in the shape of non-violent non-cooperation or 'satyagraha' (meaning 'truth' or 'soul' force'). ”

Expand to see Peter Fay's opinion in his 1993 Book The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945. University of Michigan Press.

“ Auchinleck did not say, and probably did not believe, that the Raj had ceased to be the object of the Indian officer's loyalty simply because Bose and his renegades had come along. Colonel Wren had not supposed so either. Both believed that the shifting of alleigance was bound to happen, and would have happened sooner or later no matter what. Nevertheless it did not happen later. It happened then. In the autumn if 1945 India was swept by a storm of excitement and indignation, a storm that Bose and his renegades ignited. It was a storm the Indian officer, and the Jawan too, could not ignore. They did not ignore it. We have it on the authority of the Commander-in-Chief that they did not ignore it. In 1942, at the time of quit India, there had been no question of reliability. Now their own commander doubted it. Three years of campaigning, three years climaxed by victories in Europe and on the Irrawaddy, do not explain the change. Only that autumn storm can. It was the Indian National Army that forced the British hand. ”

Expand to see Lawrence James's opinion in his 1993 Book Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India.

...The mutiny came to receive widespread militant support, even for the short period that it lasted, not only in Bombay, but also in Karachi and Calcutta on 23 February, in Ahmedabad, Madras and Trichinopoly on the 25th, at Kanpur on the 26th, and at Madurai and several places in Assam on the 26th. The agitations, mass strikes, demonstrations and consequently support for the mutineers, therefore continued several days even after the mutiny had been called off. Along with this, the assessment may be made that it described in crystal clear terms to the government that the British Indian Armed forces could no longer be universally relied upon for support in crisis, and even more it was more likely itself to be the source of the sparks that would ignite trouble in a country fast slipping out of the scenario of political settlement... ...The navy itself was marginal in terms of state power; Indian service personnel were at this time being swept by a wave of nationalist sentiments, as would be proved by the mutinies that occurred in the Royal Indian Air Force. In the after-effect of the mutiny, a Weekly intelligence summary issued on 25 March 1946 admitted that the Indian army, navy and air force units were no longer trust worthy, and, for the army, "only day to day estimates of steadiness could be made". [7]. It came to the situation where, if wide-scale public unrest took shape, the armed forces could not be relied upon to support counter-insurgency operations as they had been during the "Quit India" movement of 1942...

Expand to see Stephen P. Cohen's opinion in the Journal Pacific Affairs in Summer issue,1973.
“ ...Its political impact in India-after defeat-oddly proved to be of greater and more lasting importance, for the trials of several INA officers became a rallying point of the nationalist movement ”

Expand to see how Stanley Wolpert describes the Indian National Army and the effects of INA trials in his 2005 book India.(pp68)

“ Bose's Force was stopped by Monsson just outside Imphal in Manipur State in 1944, then driven back by Allied reinforcements flown in after the rain. Whe brought to trial in Delhi's Red Fort after war's end for "treason",Hindu, Sikh, and Muslims officers of the India National Army (INA)were defended by Nehru himself and emerged national heroes. Britain's Field Marshal Lord Wavell, and his Commander in Chief understood at that moment in 1945 that the Raj was doomed, for all ranks in the army that held fast was "turning soft." Britain's final two post-war years were a holding action designed to maintain some "illusion of permanence," while the newly elected labour Government desperately searched for a formula to make the imminent transfer of Power as peaceful as possible. ”

Expand to see how Reinhard Schulze describes the effect of the Indian National Army in his book A Modern History of the Islamic world.(p 130)

“ In India itself the atmosphere was tense. There was mass protests against the arrests of leaders of the small Indian National Army recruited by Japan in 1942, which had been udner the command of Subhas Chandra Bose in 1943 and had earned itself a reputation through military actions in north-eastern India.These protests led to the British governments growing willingness to grant India independence its Independence as soon as possible. ”

Expand to see Ronald Hyam's analysis of decisive factors that guided British policies with regards to India in 1944-46, as described in his Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968.(pp106)

“ By the end of 1945, he and the Commander-in-chief, General Auckinleck were advising that there was a real threat in 1946 of large scale anti-British Disorder amounting to even a well-organised rising aiming to expel the British by paralysing the administration ” {Cquote|...it was clear to Atlee that everything depended on the spirit and reliabillity of the Indian Army:"Provided that they do their duty, armed insurrection in India would not be an insolube problem. If, however, the Indian Army was to go the other way, the picture would be very different...}} “ ...Thus, Wavell concluded,if the army and the police "failed" Britain would be forced to go. In theory, it might be possible to revive and reinvigorate the services, and rule for another fifteent to trwenty years, but:It is a fallacy to suppose that the solution lies in trying to maintain status quo. We have no longer the resources, nor the neccessary prestige or confidence in ourselves. ”

Expand to see how Kulke Dortmund's "A history of India" has one chapter on Indian independence movement, broken up as shown below.

1 para on te ealriest stuff preceding the mutiny of 1857 followed by the followng sections: Neo Hinduism and Muslim resentment (1 page in total) A new Generation of liberal nationalists (Mostly the period before the congress)- nearly two pages. Vedanta Karmayoga and National revolutionaries (Vivekanada etc)- one page. Partition of Bengal and rise of extremism. Nearly two pages. 1st world war and the Home rule league one page. Gandhi and Non-cooperation. Nearly 3 pages. Swaraj in One year (part of the Congress story). Nearly two pages. Return to the constitutional arena. two pages. Includes the rise of extremeist views within the Congress, and describes Bose and Nehru as the leaders in this new trend. Gives equal coverage (give or take a sentence) to Nehru and Bose. Civil-disobedience and Gandhi-Irwin pact. two pages. Frustration at the round table and the communal award two pages. The pros and cons of office acceptance. Includes the policies of the Congress as well as the princes in 1936 and also describes the effect of Bose standing for re-election as Congress President at Tripuri. (I am going by what it says and not how many times it mentions Bose or Gandhi.)Same space given to Nehru, the left wing of the Congress and the plans for election and office. Second world war, the Cripp's mission and 'Quit India' Three and a half page in total, again with the mentions of Bose at the end.