Ottoman Tunis refers to the episode of the Turkish presence in Ifriqiya during the course of three centuries from the 16th century until the 18th century, when Tunis was officially integrated into the Ottoman Empire as the Eyalet of Tunis (province). Eventually including all of the Maghrib except Morocco, the Ottoman Empire began with the takeover of Algiers in 1516 by the Ottoman Turkish corsair and beylerbey Oruç Reis. The first Ottoman conquest of Tunis took place in 1534 under the command of Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, the younger brother of Oruç Reis, who was the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman Fleet during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. However, it wasn't until the final Ottoman reconquest of Tunis from Spain in 1574 under Kapudan Pasha Uluç Ali Reis that the Turks permanently acquired the former Hafsid Tunisia, retaining it until the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881.
Eyalet of Tunis
The Eyalet of Tunis in 1609
|Status||Eyalet of the Ottoman Empire|
|Common languages||Tunisian Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Judeo-Tunisian Arabic, Berber|
|Religion||Sunni Islam, Judaism|
|13 September 1574|
|15 July 1705|
|Today part of|| Tunisia |
Initially under Turkish rule from Algiers, soon the Ottoman Porte appointed directly for Tunis a governor called the Pasha supported by janissary forces. Before long, however, Tunisia became in effect an autonomous province, under the local Bey. This evolution of status was from time to time challenged without success by Algiers. During this era the governing councils controlling Tunisia remained largely composed of a foreign elite who continued to conduct state business in the Ottoman Turkish language.
Attacks on European shipping were made by Barbary pirates, primarily from Algiers, but also from Tunis and Tripoli, yet after a long period of declining raids, the growing power of the European states finally forced its termination after the Barbary Wars. Under the Ottoman Empire, the boundaries of Tunisia contracted; it lost territory to the west (Constantine) and to the east (Tripoli). In the 19th century, the rulers of Tunisia became aware of the ongoing efforts at political and social reform in the Ottoman capital. The Bey of Tunis then, by his own lights but informed by the Turkish example, attempted to effect a modernizing reform of institutions and the economy. Tunisian international debt grew unmanageable. This was the reason or pretext for French forces to establish a Protectorate in 1881.
In the 16th century, control of the western Mediterranean was contested between Spaniard and Turk. Both were confident due to recent triumphs and consequent expansion. In 1492, Spain had completed her centuries-long reconquista of the Iberian peninsula, which was followed by the first Spanish settlements in America. Spain then formulated an African policy: a series of presidios in port cities along the African coast. For their part, the Ottoman Turks had fulfilled their long-term ambition of capturing Constantinople in 1453, then successfully invaded further into the Balkans (1459–1482), and later conquered Syria and Egypt (1516–1517). Then Turkish corsairs became active from bases in the Maghrib.
Spain captured and occupied several ports in North Africa, including Mers-el-Kebir (1505), Oran (1509), Tripoli (1510), and Bougie (1510); Spain also established treaty relations with a half dozen others. Among these agreements were ones with Algiers (1510), which included Spanish occupation of the off-shore island Peñón de Argel, with Tlemcen (1511), a city about 40 km. inland, and with Tunis, whose Spanish alliance lasted on-and-off for decades. Near Tunis, the port of Goletta was later occupied by Spanish forces who built there a large and strong presidio; they also constructed an aqueduct to Tunis for use by the kasbah.
The Hafsid dynasty had since 1227 ruled Tunisia, enjoying prestige when it was the leading state of the Maghrib, or barely surviving in ill-favored times. Extensive trade with European merchants continued over some centuries, an activity which led to state treaties. Yet the Hafsids also harbored corsairs who raided merchant shipping. During the 15th century the Hafsids employed as bodyguards a Christian force of hundreds, nearly all Catalans. In the 16th century the Hafsid rule grew weak, limited often to Tunis; the last three Hafsid sultans al-Hasan, his son Ahmad, and his brother Muhammad made inconsistent treaties with Spain.
Yet the cross-cultural Hafsid alliance with Spain was not as unusual as it might seem, given the many Muslim-Christian treaties—despite recurrent hostilities. Indeed, during the early 16th century, France allied with the Ottomans against the Spanish King Carlos. As an indirect result of Spain's Africa policy, a few Muslim rulers encouraged Turkish forces to enter the region to counter the Spanish presence. Yet the Hafsid rulers of Tunis came to see the Turks and their corsair allies as a greater threat and entered a Spanish alliance, as also did the Sa'dids of Morocco. Nonetheless many Maghriban Muslims strongly preferred Islamic rule, and the Hafsid's decades-long Spanish alliance was not generally popular, indeed anathema to some. On the other hand, the Saadi dynasty sultans of Morocco successfully played off Iberian against Turk, thus managing to remain both Muslim ruled and independent of the Ottoman grasp.
In this naval struggle, the Ottoman Empire supported many corsairs, who raided European commercial shipping in the Mediterranean. The corsairs later would make Algiers their principal base. The "architects of Ottoman rule in the Maghrib" were Aruj [Oruç] (c.1474–1518) and his younger brother Khizr "Khayr al-Din" [Arabic epithet] (c.1483–1546). Both were called Barbarossa ("red beard"). The Muslim brothers hailed from obscure origins in the Greek island of Medelli or Mytilene [ancient Lesbos].
After acquiring fighting experience in the eastern Mediterranean (during which Aruj was captured and spent three years at oars in a galley of the Knights of St. John before being ransomed), the two brothers arrived in Tunis as corsair leaders. By 1504 they had entered into a privateer agreement with the Hafsid sultan Mohammad b. al-Hasan (1493–1526). By it the 'prizes' (ships, cargoes, and captives) were to be shared. The brothers operated from Goletta [Halq al Wadi]; they ran similar operations from Djerba in the south, where Aruj was governor. During these years in Spain, those who remained non-Christian were required to leave, including Muslims; at times Aruj employed his ships to transport a great many Moorish Andalucians to North Africa, especially Tunisia. For these efforts Aruj won praise and many Muslim recruits. Twice Aruj joined the Hafsids in unsuccessful assaults on Bougie, held by Spain. Then the brothers set up an independent base in Djidjelli east of Bougie, which attracted Hafsid hostility.
In 1516 Aruj and his brother Khayr al-Din, accompanied by Turkish soldiers, moved further west to Algiers, where he managed to wrestle control away from the shaykh of the Tha'aliba tribe, who had treatied with Spain. By intra-city political cunning, in which the tribal chief and later 22 notables were killed, control of Algiers passed to the Barbarossa brothers. The Turkish brothers were already Ottoman allies. Yet in 1518 when Aruj led an attack against Tlemcen, then held by a Spanish ally (since 1511), Aruj was killed by Muslim tribal forces and the Spanish.
His younger brother Khayr al-Din inherited control of Algiers, but left that city and for some years was based to its east. After returning to Algiers, in 1529 he captured from Spain the offshore island Peñón de Argel whose guns had controlled the port; by constructing a causeway joining these islands he created an excellent harbor for the city. Khayr al-Din continued to direct large-scale raids on Christian shipping and against the coast lands of Mediterranean Europe, seizing much wealth and taking many captives. He won several naval battles and became a celebrity. In 1533 Khayr al-Din was called to Constantinople where the Ottoman sultan made him Pasha and the admiral [Kapudan-i Derya] over the Turkish navy; he acquired control over many more ships and soldiers. In 1534 Khayr al-Din "taking advantage of a revolt against the Hafsid al-Hasan" invaded by sea and captured the city of Tunis from Spain's allies.
Yet the following year the Emperor Charles V (Carlos, Rey de España) (r.1516–1556) organized a fleet under Andrea Doria of Genoa, composed predominantly of Italians, Germans, and Spaniards, which proceeded to recapture Tunis in 1535, following which the Hafsid sultan Mawlay Hasan was reestablished. Yet Khayr al-Din escaped. Thereafter, as supreme commander of naval forces for the Ottoman Empire, Khayr al-Din was largely preoccupied with affairs outside the Maghrib.
A few decades passed until in 1556 another Turkish corsair Dragut (Turgut), ruling in Tripoli, attacked Tunisia from the east, entering Kairouan in 1558. Then in 1569 Uluj Ali Pasha, a renegade corsair, now the successor to Khayr al-Din as the Beylerbey of Algiers, advanced with Turkish forces from the west, and managed to seize the Spanish presidio Goletta and the Hafsid capital, Tunis. After the key naval victory of the Christian armada at Lepanto in 1571, Don Juan de Austria in 1573 retook Tunis for Spain, restoring Hafsid rule. Yet Uluj Ali returned in 1574 with a large fleet and army, and captured Tunis with finality. To the Turkish sultan he then sent by ship, imprisoned, the last ruler of the Hafsid dynasty.
The Spanish-Ottoman truce of 1581 quieted the Mediterranean rivalry between these two world powers. Spain kept a few of its Maghriban presidios and ports (e.g., Melilla and Oran). Yet both Spanish and Ottoman Empires had become preoccupied elsewhere. The Ottomans would claim suzerainty over Tunisia for the next three centuries; however, its effective political control in the Maghrib would prove to be of short duration.
Ottomans in the WestEdit
Absent the entry of the Turks into the western Mediterranean, the political situation favored the Christian north. In overall strength, the various European powers led by Spain continued to increase their lead. Among the local Maghriban states in comparison, business was in decline and their governments weak and divided. The long-term future seemed to present the possibility, or probability, of an eventual 'reconquest' of North Africa from the north. Accordingly, the intervention by another rising foreign power, co-religionists from the east, namely the well-armed Ottoman Turks, appeared crucial. It tipped the scales in the Maghrib, allowing for several centuries of continued rule by the older Muslim institutions, as redone per Turkish notions. Furthermore, the successful but questionable tactic of mounting raids on European commercial shipping by the corsairs of Barbary fit well enough into the Mediterranean strategy pursued by the Ottoman Porte at Constantinople.
"Turkey was frequently combated by native North African rulers, and never gained any hold over Morocco. But the Turks were none the less a powerful ally for Barbary, diverting Christian energies into eastern Europe, threatening Mediterranean communications, and absorbing those forces which might otherwise have turned their attention to reconquest in Africa."
So for the first time the Ottomans entered into the Maghrib, eventually establishing their governing authority, at least indirectly, along most of the southern coast of the Mediterranean. During the 16th and subsequent centuries their empire was widely recognized as the leading Muslim state in the world: Islam's primary focus. The Ottoman Empire was "the leader of all Islam for nearly half a millennium." The Turkish sultan became the caliph.
This Ottoman contact enriched Tunisia by its distinctive Islamic culture and institutions, which differed markedly from the familiar Arab world. For more than half a millennium Islamic doctrines had filtered through Turkish experience, whose ethnic origin lay in Central Asia, resulting in unique developments, and new perspectives. For example, Turks wrote their own gazi sagas of frontier warfare, no doubt following Islamic traditions of early Arab conquests, yet informed by legends of their own derived from life on the steppes of Central Asia. Due to the exigencies of rule, and its large geographic jurisdiction, the Ottoman state took the lead in Muslim legal developments for some centuries. Sources of imperial law included not only Islamic fiqh, and inherited Roman-Byzantine codes, but also "the traditions of the great Turkish and Mongol empires of Central Asia". The Turkish jurist Ebu us-Suud Efendi (c.1490–1574) was credited with the harmonization for use in Ottoman courts of the qanun (regulations of the secular state) and the şeriat (sacred law).
Ottoman popular literature and much of the learning of its elites was expressed in the Turkish language. Turkish became the idiom for state business in Tunisia and its unique flavors percolated throughout Tunisian society. After Arabic and Persian, it is the third language of Islam and for centuries has "played a very important role in the intellectual life" of Muslim culture. In addition, the Turks brought their popular customs, such as their music, clothing, and the coffee house (kahvehane or "kiva han").
The new energy of Turkish rule was welcome in Tunis and other cities, and the regime's stability appreciated by the clerical ulama. Although the Ottomans preferred the Hanifi school of law, some Tunisian Maliki jurists were admitted into administrative and judicial positions. Yet the rule remained one of a foreign elite. In the countryside, efficient Turkish troops managed to control the tribes without compromising alliances, but their rule was unpopular. "Ottomans' military prowess enable them to curb the tribes rather than placate them. An image of Turkish domination and Tunisian subordination emerged everywhere." The rural economy was never brought under effective regulation by the central authority. For revenues the government continued to rely primarily on corsair raids against shipping in the Mediterranean, an activity then more 'profitable' than trade. With a Spanish-Ottoman accord in 1581 Spain's attention turned away and corsair activity increased. Yet peaceful trade and commerce suffered.
Introduction into Tunisia of a Turkish-speaking ruling caste, whose institutions dominated governance for centuries, indirectly affected the lingering divide between Berber and Arabic in the settled areas. This bipolarity of linguistic culture had been reactivated by the 11th-century invasion of the rebellious Arabic-speaking Banu Hilal. Subsequently, Arabic had gained the ascendancy, and use of Berber had been thereafter gradually eroding. Then this assertive presence of a Turkish-speaking elite seemed to hasten the submergence of Berber speech in Tunisia.
Pasha role in TunisEdit
After Tunisia's fall to the Ottoman Empire, a Pasha was eventually appointed by the Porte. "Pasha" (Trk: paşa: "head, chief") is Ottoman imperial nomenclature indicating a high office, a holder of civil and/or military authority, e.g., the governor over a province. During its first few years under the Ottomans, however, Tunisia was ruled from the city of Algiers by a corsair leader who held the Ottoman title beylerbey (Trk: "bey of beys" from Turkish beğ: "gazi commander"].
When armed forces loyal to the Ottomans began arriving in the Maghrib, its coastal regions particularly the Algerian were in political disarray and fragmented. One of its quasi-independent sea ports Algiers [ancient Ikosim] became among the first to fall under permanent Turkish control (in 1516). Its early capture gave Algiers some claim to primacy within the expanding Turkish Empire. It was only under the Ottomans that Algiers became a favored city. Before, Algiers was not particularly significant; the middle Maghriban coast (present-day Algeria) for the most part had long lain in the shadows of Tunis to its east and of Morocco or Tlemcen to its west.
During early Ottoman rule, Tunisia lost control (in the 1520s) over Constantine. The area was historically within Hafsid domains, but fell to attacks led by the beylerbey Khayr al-Din of Algiers. Later Tunisia also lost Tripoli (Tarabulus, in present-day Libya), ruled by another Turkish corsair, the renegade Dragut or Turgut Reis (1551).
In 1518 the younger Barbarossa Khayr al-Din became the first Ottoman beylerbey in Algiers. His rule was autocratic, without the moderating advice of a council (diwan). As Beylerbay he captured Tunis in 1534, holding it only a year. In 1536 Khayr al-Din left the Maghrib, promoted to command the Ottoman fleets. Four beylerbeys in succession (1536–1568) then ruled in Algiers and over areas of North Africa fallen to Ottoman control. The renegade corsair Uluj Ali (1519–1587) was appointed Pasha of Algiers and its last Beylerbey in 1568; the Porte instructed him to capture Tunis. He was perhaps "with Khayr al-Din the greatest figure in Turkish rule" of the Maghrib. In 1569 Uluj Ali took Tunis, holding it four years, yet in 1574 he again took possession of the city. Tunis thereafter remained under the Beylerbey in Algiers, Uluj Ali, until his death in 1587. The office was then abolished.
Perhaps due in part to these few brief periods of Algerian rule over Tunis in the early Ottoman era, later Turkish rulers in Algiers more than once tried to exercise control over Tunisian affairs by force, e.g., during intra-dynasty conflicts. Yet eventually such interference by Algiers was each time checked.
The beylerbey had "exercised the authority of suzerain in the name of the Ottoman sultan over [Tunis]. [The beylerbey] was the supreme Ottoman authority in the western Mediterranean, and responsible for conducting the war against the Christian enemies of the empire... ." When Uluj Ali died, the Turkish sultan discontinued the office, in effect normalizing the administration of the Maghriban provinces in acknowledgement of an end to the long struggle with Spain. In its place, for each province (present day Algeria, Libya, Tunisia), the office of pasha was established to oversee provincial government.
Thus in 1587 a Pasha became Ottoman governor of Tunisia. Under the Pasha served a Bey, among whose duties was the collection of state revenue. From 1574 to 1591 a council (the Diwan), composed of senior Turkish military (Trk: buluk-bashis) and local notables, advised the pasha. The language used remained Turkish. With permanent Ottoman rule (imposed in 1574) the government of Tunis acquired some stability. The prior period had been made insecure and uncertain by the fortunes of war.
Yet the new Ottoman Pasha's grip on power in Tunisia was if anything of short duration. Four years later, in 1591 a revolt within the ranks of the occupying Turkish forces (the janissaires) thrust forward a new military commander, the Dey, who effectively took the Pasha's place and became the ruling authority in Tunis. The Pasha remained as a lesser figure, who nonetheless continued to be appointed from time to time by the Ottoman Porte. Within a few decades, however, the Bey of Tunis added to his office the title of Pasha; soon thereafter, the Bey's growing power began to eclipse that of the Dey. Eventually the Bey of Tunis became the sole ruling authority. The Beys of Tunis always kept well apart from any Ottoman attempts to compromise their political grip on power. Yet the Beys as Muslim rulers were also dignified by the honor and prestige associated with the title of Pasha, with its direct connection to the Ottoman Caliph, whose religious significance included being the 'Commander of the Faithful' (Arb: Amīr al-Mu'minīn).
The Ottomans first garrisoned Tunis with 4,000 janissaries taken from their occupying forces in Algiers; the troops were primarily Turkish, recruited from Anatolia. Janissary corps were under the immediate command of their Agha (Trk: "master"). The junior officers were called deys (Trk: "maternal uncle"); each dey commanded about 100 soldiers. The Ottoman Porte did not thereafter maintain the ranks of the janissaries in Tunis, but its appointed Pasha for Tunisia himself began to recruit them from different regions.
The janissaries (yeni-cheri or "new troops") were an elite institution peculiar to the Ottoman state, though deriving from an earlier practice. Christian youth were recruited through a practice called devshirme [Trk: "to collect"], often from Greece and the Balkans, were impressed into military training and compelled to convert to Islam; when mature they provided an elite corps of soldiery. Kept apart in their barracks and forbidden marriage, they were under a strict code of toilet and dress, and regimented by rules of the Hurufi sect (later the Bektashi Sufi). Begun in the 15th century as a type of slavery, the janissaries later came to enjoy privileges and might rise to high positions. A well-known symbol of their collective force was the huge kazan [Trk: "kettle"], beside which they ate and talked business. Eventually Muslims became members; the janissaries gained the right to marry and evolved into a powerful caste. They were then liable to riot and loot if not appeased, and "not less than six Sultans were either dethroned or murdered through their agency." At first a small elite of 10,000 by the 19th century before the institution was terminated "the number on the [Ottoman] payroll had reached... over 130,000."
In the Maghrib under Ottoman control, however, the janissaries were originally Turkish or Turkish-speaking. There existed some rivalry between the janissaires and the corsairs, who were composed in large part of Christian renegades, and as against other Turks. Also the janissaries viewed with suspicion, as potential enemy combatants, the local tribal forces and the militias of the Maghrib. Called collectively the ojaq [Trk: "hearth"], the janissary corps maintained a high degree of unity and élan.
"They possessed a high sense of group solidarity and egalitarian spirit in the ranks, and elected their commander-in-chief, the agha, and a diwan [council] which protected their group interests. Being Turkish, they enjoyed a privileged position in the state: they were not subject to the regular system of justice in the regency, and were entitled to rations of bread, meat, and oil, to a regular salary, and to a proportion of the yields of piracy."
In Tunisia until 1591, the corps of janissaries was considered to be under the control of the local Ottoman Pasha. In 1591 janissary junior officers (deys) overthrew their senior officers; they then forced the Pasha to acknowledge the authority of one of their own men. This new leader was called the Dey, elected by his fellow deys. The Dey took charge of law and order in the capital and of military affairs, thus becoming "the virtual ruler of the country". The change defied the Ottoman Empire, although from the Tunisian perspective political power still remained under the control of foreigners. The existing state diwan (council) was dismissed, but to placate local opinion some Tunisian Maliki jurists were appointed to some key positions (yet the Ottoman Hanafi jurists still predominated). The janissary Dey enjoyed wide discretion, being quite free in the exercise his authority, yet his reach was at first limited to Tunis and other cities.
Two very effective Deys were 'Uthman Dey (1598–1610) and his son-in-law Yusuf Dey (1610–1637). Able administrators, they displayed tact, enhancing the dignity of the office. Neither being fond of luxury, treasury funds were made available for public projects and new construction (e.g., a mosque, fortress, barracks, and repair of aqueducts). Rebellious tribes were subdued. A long period of chronic social turbulence in Tunisia was brought to a close. The resulting peace and order allowed for some measure of prosperity. The Dey's ruling authority was both supported by, and relied upon, the Qaptan of the corsair fleet and the Bey who collected taxes.
Yet under Yusuf Dey, various interest groups emerged which maneuvered to outflank his ruling strategies. Many such were Tunisian, e.g., the local military, the urban notables including the disbanded diwan, and most rural tribes; also included at least to some extent was the distant sultan in Constantinople. During the 1620s and 1630s the local Turkish Bey managed to enlist these social forces, thus augmenting his authority and coming to rival the Dey, then overtaking him. That the political reign of the Dey and his janissaries had slowly evaporated was clearly demonstrated when in an attempt to regain power their uprising of 1673 failed.
Piracy may be called "an ancient if not always honorable activity" which has been practiced at different times and locations by a wide variety of peoples. A wikt:corsair (or privateer) may be distinguished from a pirate in that the former operates under explicit government authority, while the later carries no papers. The Mediterranean region during the late Middle Ages and renaissance became the scene of wide-scale piracy (and privateering) practiced both by Christians (aimed more at Muslim shipping in the east) and by Muslims (more active out of the Barbary Coast in the west, with its many targets of Christian merchant ships).
The first "great age of the Barbary corsairs" occurred in the 16th century, between 1538 and 1571. Ottoman sea power in the Mediterranean was supreme during these decades, following their naval victory at the Preveza. Ottoman supremacy, however, was effectively broken at Lepanto, although Ottoman sea power remained formidable. In the early 17th century corsair activity again peaked. Thereafter Algiers began to rely more on 'tribute' from European nations in exchange for safe passage, rather than attacking merchant ships one by one. Ottoman Empire treaties with European states added a layer of conflicting diplomacy. Lastly, during the wars following the French Revolution (1789–1815), Barbary corsairs activity briefly spiked, before ending abruptly.
In 16th-century Algiers under the new Ottoman regime, the customs and practices of the pre-existing Barbary corsairs were transformed and made into impressive institutions. The activity became highly developed, with modes of recruitment, corps hierarchies, peer review, private and public financing, trades and materials support, coordinated operations, and resale and ransom markets. The policies developed in Algiers provided an exemplary model of corsair business (often called the taife reisi, or "board of captains"), a model latter followed by Tunis and by Tripoli, and independently by Morocco.
Crews came from three sources: Christian renegades (including many famous or notorious captains), foreign Moslems (many Turkish), and a few native maghribans. Seldom did a native attain high rank, the exception being Reis Hamida a Kabyle Berber during the last years of the corsair age. Captains were selected by the ship's owners, but from a list made by a Diwan of the Riesi, an authoritative council composed of all active corsair captains. Also regulated was location of residence. "Captains, crews, and suppliers all lived in the western quarter of Algiers, along the harbor and docks."
Private capital generally supplied the funds for corsair activity. Investors essentially bought shares in a particular corsair business enterprise. Such investors came from all levels of society, e.g., merchants, officials, janissaries, shopkeepers, and artisans. The financing made money available for the capital and expenses of ship and crew, i.e., naval stores and supplies, timbers and canvas, munitions.
"Because of the potential profits to be made from corsair prizes, the underwriting of expeditions was an attractive proposition. Shareholding was organized in the same manner as that of a modern stock company, with the return to individuals dependent on their investment. This type of private investment reached its peak in the seventeenth century, the 'golden age'."
After the corsair "golden age", the state of Algiers, mainly under the control of its Turkish janissaries, came to own many of the corsair vessels and to finance many of their expeditions. Strict rules governed the division of the prizes captured at sea. First came Algiers as the state representative of Allah; next came the port authorities, the custom brokers, and those who kept the sanctuaries; then came that portion due the ship owners, and the captain and crew. The merchant cargo seized was sold "at auction or more commonly to European commercial representatives resident in Algiers, through whom it might even reach the port of its original destination."
Ransom or sale of captured prisoners (and auction of cargo) was the main source of private wealth in Algiers. Payment for captives was financed and negotiated by religious societies. The conditions of the captivity varied, most being worked as slave labor. Yet often the Muslim masters granted these Christians some religious privileges. During the early 17th century in Algiers more than 20,000 Christian prisoners were being held, coming from more than a dozen countries. "To the people of Barbary captives were a source of greater profit that looted merchandise." Yet in Tunis corsair activity never became paramount as it long remained in Algiers.
The Bey (Turkish: gazi commander) in Tunisia was leading officer who "supervised the internal administration and the collection of taxes." In particular, the Bey's duties included control and collection of taxes in the tribal rural areas. Twice a year, armed expeditions (mahallas) patrolled the countryside, showing the arm of the central authority. For this purpose the Bey had organized, as an auxiliary force, rural cavalry (sipahis), mostly Arab, recruited from what came to be called "government" (makhzan) tribes.
Ramdan Bey had sponsored a Corsican named Murad Curso since his youth. After Ramdan's death in 1613, Murad then followed his benefactor into the office of Bey, which he exercised effectively (1613–1631). Eventually he was also named Pasha, by then a ceremonial post; yet his position as Bey remained inferior to the Dey. His son Hamuda Bey (r.1631–1666), with the support of the local notables of Tunis, acquired both titles, that of Pasha and that of Bey. By virtue of his title as Pasha, the Bey came to enjoy the social prestige of connection with the Sultan-Caliph in Constantinople. In 1640, at the death of the Dey, Hamuda Bey maneuvered to establish his control over appointments to that office. As a consequence the Bey then became supreme ruler in Tunisia.
Under Murad II Bey (reigned 1666–1675), son of Hamuda, the Diwan again functioned as a council of notables. Yet in 1673 the janissary deys, seeing their power ebbing, rose in revolt. During the consequent fighting, the janissaries and urban forces commanded by the deys fought against the Muradid Beys supported by largely rural forces under tribal shaykhs, and with popular support from city notables. As the Beys secured victory, so did the rural Bedouin leaders and the Tunisian notables, who also emerged triumphant. The Arabic language returned to local official use. Yet the Muradids continued to use Turkish in the central government, accentuating their elite status and Ottoman connection.
At Murad II Bey's death, internal discord within the Muradid family led to armed struggle, known as the Revolutions of Tunis or the Muradid War of Succession (1675-1705). The Turkish rulers of Algeria later intervened on behalf of one side in this struggle born of domestic conflict; these Algerian forces remained after the fighting slowed, which proved unpopular. Tunisia's unfortunate condition of civil discord and Algerian interference persisted. The last Muradid Bey was assassinated in 1702 by Ibrahim Sharif, who then ruled for several years with Algerian backing. Hence, the dynasty of the Muradid Beys may be dated from 1640 to 1702.
A gradual economic shift occurred during the Muradid era (c.1630s–1702), as corsair raiding decreased due to pressure from Europe, and commercial trading based on agricultural products (chiefly grains) increased due to an integration of the rural population into regional networks. Mediterranean trade, however, continued to be carried by European shipping companies. The Beys, in order to derive the maximum advantage from the export trade, instituted government monopolies which mediated between the local producers and foreign merchants. As a result, the rulers and their business partners (drawn from foreign-dominated elites well-connected to the Turkish-speaking ruling caste) took a disproportionate share of Tunisia's trading profits. This precluded the development of local business interests, whether rural landowners or a wealthy merchant strata. The social divide persisted, with the important families in Tunisia identified as a "Turkish" ruling caste.
- In the formulation of an African policy for Spain, the clergy had argued for attempting a complete conquest; however, King Ferdinand eventually decided on limited objectives that involved only the keeping of strong forts in a string of port cities. Henry Kamen, Empire. How Spain became a world power 1492–1763 (New York: HarperCollins 2003) at 29–31. After the reconquest, several such port cities, e.g., Oran, were favorable to Spanish influence. Kamen (2003) at 29–30.
- J. H. Elliot, Imperial Spain. 1469–1716 (New York: St. Martin's 1963; reprint Meridian 1977) at 52–55.
- Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its record and legacy (Princeton: C. Van Nostrand 1965) at 15–18.
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at volume I: 55–66, 83–85.
- Henry Kamen, Empire. How Spain became a world power 1492–1763 (New York: HarperCollins 2003) at 30–31 (Mers-el-Kebir), 32–33 (Oran), 31–32 (Bougie and Tripoli), 32 (Algiers).
- Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Payot 1931, 1961), translated as History of North Africa. From the Arab conquest to 1830 (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul 1970) at 279, 294 (Tlemcen), 282–284, 297–300 (Tunis).
- William Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 15–17, 22.
- Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica. 27 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 392. Goletta was occupied by the Spanish long after its use by the Turkish brothers Aruj and Khayr al-Din (see below). .
- Julian, History of North Africa (1961; 1970) at 148 (corsairs), 153 (Catalan bodyguard), 158 (European merchants).
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 148 (14th century corsairs: Christian and Muslim), 148–149 (15th century Hafsid's suzerainty over Tlemcen), 163–165 (early Spanish treaties), 177 (last three Hafsid sultans in the 16th century).
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 11 (commercial treaty between Tunis and Aragon), 15 (piracy: European and North African), 17 (Hafsid early hub facilitating Turkish corsairs).
- The 11th-century Spanish leader Ruy Díaz de Bivar was known to have fought alongside Muslims, even on the side of Muslims against Christians, e.g., for Almutamiz against García Ordóñez. His epithet El Cid meaning "lord" is derived from Siyyidi an expression of Arabic. Cf., Poema de Mio Cid (Madrid: Ediciones Rodas  1972) at 58–62 and 15 note.
- During the years 1538–1540 King Carlos of Spain negotiated with Khayr al-Din Pasha (the younger Barbarossa). Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 165, 169.
- Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philippe II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin 1949, 2d ed. 1966), translated as The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper & Row 1973, 1976) at II: 1144–1165. This flexible Spanish attitude continued into the 16th century, e.g., Philip II of Spain (r. 1556–1598) "for his part had always maintained diplomatic relations with the Turks." This Spanish King eventually treatied with the Ottoman Empire. Braudel at 1143 (quote).
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 91, 102–103.
- There was more than merely anti-Spain provisions in the Franco-Ottoman agreements. France also gained trading privileges in the East and a protectorate over Christian pilgrimage destinations there. Lucien Romier, L'Ancienne France: des Origenes a la Revolution (Paris: Hachette 1948), translated and 'completed' by A.L.Rouse as A History of France (New York: St. Martin's Press 1953) at 198–199.
- Cf., Kenneth J. Perkins, Tunisia. Crossroads of the Islamic and European worlds (Boulder: Westview 1986) at 51–52, 53–54.
- Abdallah Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthèse (Paris: Libraire François Maspero 1970), translated as A History of the Maghrib. An interpretive essay (Princeton University 1977) at 250–251. Spain managed a tacit alliance with Sa'did Morocco circa 1549.
- This Spanish alliance with Sa'did Morocco was renewed in 1576, and again with Ahmad al-Mansur (1578–1609). Henri Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc (Casablanca: Editions Atlantides 1949–1950), translated as History of Morocco (Atlantides 1952) at 120–124.
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 162–163. Yet Prof. Abun-Nasr here states:
The author earlier had attributed this Maghriban mood of intolerance, both popular and scholarly, to the 1492 fall of Granada to Spanish forces and its consequences (immigration of Moorish Andalusians, loss of the 'buffer state' of Granada). Abun-Nasr (1971) at 157–158.
"[T]he religious mood of the Muslims in the Maghrib at the turn of the sixteenth century was one of intolerance towards non-Muslims; and as their own rulers could not protect them against the Christians, they welcomed outside Muslim help. By exploiting the religious sentiments of the Maghriban Muslims, the Barbarossa brothers were able to establish a foothold in the Maghrib from which they gradually extended into the interior their own control, as well as the authority of the Ottoman sultan which they came to accept. But it would be wrong to assume that the Turks were readily or voluntarily accepted as rulers in any of the countries of the eastern and central Maghrib which they came to control." Abun-Nasr (1971) at 162–163.
This enmity continued due to a bitter combination of European attacks, corsair raiding, and "by linking it to Ottoman championing of the cause of Islam." Abun-Nasr (1971) at 158.
"[T]his situation infused into Magriban theology an uncompromising strain comparable to the strictness of the Kharijite doctrine. [One well-known theologian] went to the extent of pronouncing infidels the Andalusians who were of the opinion that life in Spain was preferable to... the Magrhib, on the grounds that a true Muslim should always prefer to live under a Muslim prince. These standpoints would have been condemned by Muslim theologians during periods of strength and prosperity."
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 54.
- Henri Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc (Casablanca: Editions Atlantides 1949–1950), translated as History of Morocco (Atlantides 1952) at 120–124. The Ottoman efforts to control Morocco failed when the sultan they backed, although successful in gaining power, had then quickly entered into a Spanish alliance to counter Turkish designs. Terrasse (1952) at 121.
- Thus, Ottoman corsairs were denied use of Morocco's ports on the Atlantic. Later, the English approached Morocco seeking an anti-Spain treaty. Julien, A History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 230–232, 235.
- Piracy was then practically common across the entire Mediterranean, there being both Muslim and Christian corsairs. Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philip II (Librairie Armand Colin 1949, 2d ed. 1966), translated by Siân Reynolds as The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Wm. Collins/Harper & Row 1973, reprint 1976) at II: 865–891.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 163.
- Arrudj and Khayruddin is the style used by Prof. M. H. Cherif of the Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales, Tunis. Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya", 120–133, at 123, in General History of Africa, volume V (UNESCO 1992, 1999).
- The younger but more renown Khizr [Khidr] received the epithet 'kheireddin' ("gift of God"). Aruj was known to his crew as 'baba Aruj' ("father Aruj") which might be the origin of the nickname 'Barbarossa'. They were raised Muslim. Their father may have been either a corsair, a renegade, or a janissary. Their mother either a Greek priest's daughter or an Andalusian taken captive. Wm. Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 17–19. Other Muslim sailors also were attracked by the opportunities in the Maghrib.
- There exists a 16th-century anonymous manuscript written in Arabic, Ghazawat 'Aruj wa Khair al-Din, which was translated into French in 1837. Cited by Spencer (1976) at 20–21, 174.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 278.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 18–19.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 19.
- Understandably, the Andalucian Mudéjars and Moriscos expelled from Spain could be "uncompromising in their hatred of the Christians" and often "engaged in piracy against the Christians, especially the Spaniards." Cf., Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 238.
- Cf., Richard A. Fletcher, Moorish Spain (New York: Henry Holt 1992) at 166–169. The Muslim corsair raids long afflicting Spain's coastal residents led Spaniards to view their Morisco (and Mudéjar) neighbors with suspicion.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 19–22.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 163–164.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 279–280.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 280–281.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 164–165.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton 1977) at 249 (italics added).
- Rinehart, "Historical Setting" 1–70, at 21–22, in Tunisia. A country study (3d ed., 1986), ed. by Nelson. "The Hafsid sultan, Hassan, took refuge in Spain, where he sought the aid of the Habsburg king-emperor Charles V to restore him to his throne. Spanish troops and ships recaptured Tunis in 1535 and reinstalled Hassan. Protected by a large Spanish garrison at La Goulette, the harbor of Tunis, the Hafsids became the Muslim ally of Catholic Spain in its struggle with the Turks... ."
- R. Trevor Davies, The Golden Century of Spain. 1501–1621 (London: Macmillan 1937; reprint NY: Harper 1961) at 92–102, 105 (versus the Ottomans), 94–97 (Tunis 1535).
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 96–97.
- Henry Kamen, Empire. How Spain became a world power 1492–1763 (New York: HarperCollins 2003) at 72–74 (Barbarossa escapes).
- Abu-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 164–165.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton: 1977) at 251.
- Uluj Ali, also spelled Ochiali, was a Christian renegade of Italian (Neapolitan, Calabrian) origin. Later the Ottoman Sultan gave him the name Kilij [Turkish for "sword"], so that he might then also be known as Kilij Ali. J.P.D.B.Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries. The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: Wm. Morrow, Quill 1977) at 271.
- Uluj Ali's most commonly used epithet "Uluj" signifies "renegade". Abdallah Laroui, A History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton University 1977) at 251, n.19.
- Miguel de Cervantes calls Uluj Ali "el Uchalí" in his El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quíjote de la Mancha (Madrid: Juan de la Cuesta 1605; reprint Barcelona: Editorial Ramón Sopena 1981), at chapters XXXIX and XL. El Uchalí's escape from the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto in 1571 is mentioned, and his later 1574 capture of Tunis is described by Cervantes, who was once his captive. About el Uchalí the Spanish author writes, "Era calabrés de nación, y moralmente fue hombre de bien, y trataba con mucha humanidad a sus cautivos... ." ["He was Calabrian by birth, and morally a good man, who treated with much humanity his captives... ."] Chapter XL, first page of prose.
- Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973, 1976) at II: 1066–1068. Here Uluj Ali is called Euldj 'Ali.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 173.
- The combined fleets of various Christian powers, including Spain as well as Venice and Genoa, under the leadership of Don Juan de Austria (half-brother of Philipe II de España) met and defeated the Turkish fleet off the coast of western Greece. Algerian ships under Uluj Ali escaped. J.Beeching, The Galleys at Lepanto (New York: Scribner's 1982) at 184–187, 219, 233–234.
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 177.
- When Eulj Ali [Uluj Ali] returned to capture Tunis in 1574, he oversaw Sinan Pasha (a Turkish commander) who was in direct charge. Abu-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 173, 177.
- Robert Rinehart, "Historical Setting" 1–70 at 22, in Tunisia. A country study (Washington, D.C.: American University 3rd ed. 1986), edited by Harold D. Nelson.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 300–301.
- Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Paris: 1949, 1966; New York 1973, 1976) at 1161–1165. Braudel opines that by this treaty Spain did not walk out on her allies, as Spain continued to protect Italy. Braudel at 1165.
- During this long back-and-forth contest, the two powerful Empires were also otherwise engaged. The Spanish contended with an ongoing Protestant challenge, including the later Dutch Revolt, with several Muslim insurgencies in Spain, e.g., the Morisco Revolt, and of course with America. The Ottoman was entangled in intermittent warfare elsewhere, e.g., in [[Safavid Peref>During this long back-and-forth contest, the two powerful Empires were also otherwise engagedrsia]], and in Habsburg Hungary. Cf., Itzkowitz,Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (University of Chicago 1972) at 66, 68–71.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970, Princeton 1977) at 215–223, 227–228.
- Cf., Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 96–97.
- Wm. Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 47.
- Jane Soames Nickerson, A Short History of North Africa. Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco from Pre-Roman days to the present (New York: Devin-Adair 1961) at 72.
- Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Islamischen Völker und Staaten (München: R. Oldenbourg 1939), translated as History of the Islamic Peoples (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1949; reprint NY: Capricorn 1960) at 256.
- Mughal India was perhaps its early distant rival, but its realm was majority Hindu. The Mughals, too, were of Turkish origin from Central Asia. S. M. Ikram, Muslim Civilization in India (Columbia University 1964) at 136.
- Muslim Egypt was conquered by the Ottomans in 1516–1517. The figurehead caliph of Egypt Mutawekkil, last of the Abbasids, before he died in 1538 bequeathed "his title and rights to the sultan of Turkey." The legitimacy of it has been questioned, but "the sultans of Turkey have been the de facto caliphs of the greater part of orthodox Islam ever since" [i.e., until 1922, 1924]. Stanley Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen 1901) at 355.
- Cemal Kafador, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State (University of California 1995) at 62–90.
- Cf., Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 1–9 (history); 139–143 (literature).
- Stories of such intermittent warfare may compare to those of the Spanish medieval frontier, i.e., Al-Andalus, e.g., the 12th-century Poema de mio Cid (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Zig-Zag 1954, 1972), edited by Juan Luveluk, text established by Menéndez Pidal.
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 103–104, 134–139, 146. Earlier Ottoman law making is discussed by Shaw at 22–27 and 62.
- Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 62.
- Colin Imber, Ebu's-su'ud. The Islamic legal tradition (Stanford University 1997) at 269. Ebu us-Suud Efendi's legal writings are in both Arabic and Turkish, but his fatwas were in Turkish, it being the language of the elite. Imber (1997) at 14–15.
- The state-crafted laws qanun were often ultimately derived from customary usage 'urf. Cf., Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 22.
- Turkish was then written in an Arabic script and contained words borrowed from Arabic and Persian. "634 words of Turkish origin [are] used today in Algeria." Spencer, Algier in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 70. The then street lingua franca called 'Franco' or 'Sabir' (from Spanish saber, "to know") combined these languages: Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, Italian, and Provençal. Ibid.
- Najib Ullah, Islamic Literature (New York: Washington Square 1963) at xi–xii. "Each of the three languages of the Islamic world belongs to a different language group. Turkish is an Ural-Altaic language." Ullah (1963) at 370.
- Cf., Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its record and legacy (Princeton: C. Van Nostrand 1965) at 70–73.
- Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire (1965) at 76–77, 65–66, 122–123. Coffee derived from Turkish Yemen, ultimately from Ethiopia.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 55 (quotation).
- M. H. Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya: the Ottomans and their heirs" 120–133, at 124, in General History of Africa, volume V (UNESCO 1992, 1999), edited by B. A. Ogot.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 55–56.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970, Princeton 1977) at 252–253.
- Cf., Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 169.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 280–281, 292, 301–302.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 166, 177–178.
- Cf., Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris: 1970; Princeton 1977) at 227–229, 238, 242.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 273, 277–279.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177–178.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976). "Algiers' urban origins are obscure, and its rank among both classical and Islamic cities remained insignificant throughout the periods of Roman, Byzantine, Vandal, and Arab domination of the southern shores of the 'Great Sea'." "The medieval Muslim scholars who dealt with Islamic North Africa rarely mention the city." Spencer (1976) at vii and 3 (quotations), and cf. 3–8.
- I. Hrbek, "The disintegration of political unity in the Maghrib" 34–43, at 36, in General History of Africa, volume IV (1988, 1997), edited by J. Ki-Zerbo and D. T. Niani. "The three dynasties which now ruled in the Maghrib were the Hafsids (1228–1574) in Tunis, the 'Abd al-Wadids or Zayyanids (1235–1554) in Tlemcen, and the Marinids (c.1230–1472) in Morocco."
- In foreground (by the pictured Ottoman fleet) the Spanish presidio of La Goletta (Arb: Halk el Oued [or Halk el Wadi], "Throat of the River"). Behind it lies the Lake of Tunis (Arb: El Bahira). At the top of the drawing, in back of the Lake and green fields, the city of Tunis spreads out.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 274, 281 (Constantine); at 298–299 (Tripoli [Tarabulus]).
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 175, 177 (Constantine); at 193 (Tripoli [Tarabulus]).
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris: 1970; Princeton 1977) at 240.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 277–284, 292 (no diwan).
- When he was called by the Sultan to head the Ottoman navy, beylerbey Khayr al-Din left Hassan Agha (1536–1543) as his khalifa (successor). Next (after Hassan Agha) came Khayr al-Din's son Hassan Pasha (1544–1552), followed by Salah Rais (1552–1556). Then once more the son Hassan Pasha became beylerbey (1557–1567), followed by Muhammad ibn Salah Rais (1567–1568). Uluj Ali became the last beylerbey (1568–1587). Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 280–281, 293–297, 301–302.
- In 1556 the janissaries of Algiers unsuccessfully "tried to have their popular agha, Hasan Qusru, appointed beylerbey." Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 173.
- Uluj Ali when appointed Beylerbey was told by the Porte to take Tunis; while beylerbey Uluj Ali remained an Ottoman admiral and commanded the fleet. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 173.
- Julien History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 297–301, quote at 297.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 119–121 (conquests: 1534, 1569, 1574; between Murid and Husaynid dynasties: 1705; succession struggle: 1740, 1759; special commercial rights rejected: 1806; and, rôle reversal in 1830).
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 166, 173–174, and 179–180, 181–182.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 57–58, 60, 61.
- Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya: the Ottomans and their heirs" 120–133, at 131, in General History of Africa, volume V (UNESCO 1992, 1999), edited by B. A. Ogot. Cherif notes that the Algerians profited by their armed incursions into Tunisia.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 166.
- In Turkish the western provinces were called "Garb-Ojaklari". Bohdan Chudoba, Spain and the Empire. 1519–1643 (University of Chicago 1952) at 66. Cf., Cherif (1992, 1999) at 123: "odjaks of the west".
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 301–302.
Julien (1961; 1970) at 301–302 (quotation, emphasis added). For iyala see Cherif (1992, 1999) at 123.
"[T]he sultan judged the moment opportune to bring the African conquests within the normal framework of Ottoman organisation, and he transformed Tripolitania, Tunisia, and Algeria into three regencies [Trk: iyala] administered by pashas subject to periodic replacement. These measures involved the abolition of the beylerbey of Algiers... [replaced] by a pasha on a three-year posting. The Barbary provinces ceased to be a bastion of the Turkish Empire against the Spanish Empire: they became ordinary provinces, only more remote."
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 119.
- M. H. Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya: The Ottomans and their heirs", 120–133, at 124, in General History of Africa, volume V: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (UNESCO 1992, 1999).
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 55–57.
- Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya: The Ottomans and their heirs", 120–133, at 126–127, in General History of Africa, vol. V (1992, 1999). After being "stripped of any real power" by the military "the Tunisian pasha was nonetheless retained as a symbol of Ottoman allegiance."
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 178–179.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–57.
- Glasse, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (1989), "Caliph" at 84.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56.
- The janissaries probably originated in the preexisting Ghulam practice of the Abbasids, which was then adopted by the Seljuk Turks, and later by the Ottomans. It began with the treatment of captured enemy soldiers. "A ghulam was a slave highly trained for service in the ruler's palace and state structure." Eventually, instead of captured enemy soldiers, the recruits were taken from the levy on children of Christian subjects. Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (University of Chicago 1972) at 49.
- J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford University 1971) at 68, 80–83.
- Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its record and legacy (Princeton: C. Van Nostrand 1965) at 30–33, 135–138, quotations herein are found at 137 and 138 (taken from Penzer). Vucinich at 135–138 provides a descriptive excerpt on the Janissaries taken from N. M. Penzer, The Harem (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, n.d.) at 89–93; the full title of Penzer's book being The Harem. An account of the institution as it existed in the Palace of the Turkish Sultans with a history of the Grand Seraglio from its foundation to modern times (London: George P. Harrap 1936); reprints, e.g., Dorset 1993; Dover 2005. The Palace being the Topkapi in Istanbul.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 284.
- Cf., Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 21–22. The janissary ruling class in Algiers was strictly organized to retain power in their hands alone. Spencer here describes an aspect of their government leadership:
"Authority was vested in the ocak (literally, "hearth" in Turkish) the military garrison... . Not only were native North Africans excluded from positions in the military government, but equally excluded were the kul oğlari, sons of members of the ocak by native women."
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 166–167.
- Cf., Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 284–285.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177–178, quote at 178.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (Cambridge University 1971) at 178.
- Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 303–305, 304.
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (Cambridge University 1971) at 178–179.
- Compare: Kenneth J. Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–57.
- William Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 46.
- The certificate the pirate lacks is the Letter of marque (in European law) issued by a sovereign state which here grants the recipient limited right to capture a specified class of vessels. Cf., Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973, 1976) at 866–868.
- The word corsair evidently derives from Italian: il corso or "the course", a reference to the act of running down a merchant ship to capture it. Cf., Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 46.
- Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 870, 877–891.
- Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 873. Later, in the 17th century, Protestant renegades (Dutch and English) assisted Algiers in getting pirate vessels that could strike at merchant ships in the Atlantic. Braudel (1973) at 884–885
- William Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 127–131.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 50–51 (1550s), 56 (mid-16th), 59 (late 17th), 64 (1819).
- Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 873.
- The U.S.A. also then became involved in various negotiations, and its Navy with suppression activities along the Barbary coast, chiefly against Tripoli and against Algiers. Clark, Stevens, Alden, Krafft, A Short History of the United States Navy (Philadelphia: Lippincott 1910; Alden's revised edition 1927) at 43 (1793), 61–92 (1800–1805), 204–206 (1807, 1812–1815); 61, 206 (treaties with Tunis mentioned).
- Cf., William Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 46, 47, et sequentia.
- Abdullah Laroui voices the common complaint that, in light of their importance, too often too much is made of the Barbary Corsairs. Larouri, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton 1977), e.g., at 244.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 47–48.
- Cf., Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 884, which provides a description of the foreign population (the source of renegade crews) in 16th-century Algiers, and a brief view of the city's business life, it being dependent on corsair activity.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 48–49.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 48.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 49–50.
- Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983), "Part 3. The Redemption" at 105–164. The Trinitarians (founded 1201) and the Mercedarians (founded 1218) (Sp: merced, "favor, grace, mercy") were two prominent religious orders, among others. Friedman (1983) at 106.
- Employed mostly in hard and difficult work (e.g., rowing oars in galleys [at 63–65], mining [at 65–66], and general slave labor [67–68]). A few managed better positions (trades, even management) [69–70]; wealthy captives might offer bribes [70–71]. Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983).
- Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983). Captive prisoners might enjoy "exceptional" religious privileges [at 77–90], including churches and liturgies, although sometimes the permitted clergy were subjected to retaliation for reports of anti-Muslim actions in Spain [at 87–88]. Later, the Trinitarian Order set up hospitals to care for the sick and dying [at 91–102]. At Tunis in 1620 the Spanish founded a hospital with the help of the ruling Bey of Tunis [at 101–102]. Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983).
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 50, 127.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 308. "Important though piracy was to the economy of Tunis, it never acquired such exclusive importance as at Algiers." Julien (1970) at 308. Slave markets, where mute human captives are auctioned, now appear inherently indecent, whether in the east or in the west.
- Jane Soames Nickerson, A Short History of North Africa (1961) at 86: "The capture of Christian ships and the enslavement of Christian crews was not only a profitable enterprise but also a holy war against the infidel who had driven the Moors out of Spain."
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177–179, quote at 178.
- Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 303–305.
- Cf., Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–57.
- Murad Curso's name indicates his Corsican origin ["Curso"]. A Spanish intelligence report of 1568 estimated that there were 10,000 renegades in Algiers, of whom 6,000 were Corsicans. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. (1949, 1966, 1973) at I: 159–160.
- Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (1970, 1977) at 255–256.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–58, 60.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 178–180.
- Government control of the economic wealth was evidently common in the region during the 16th century. Cf., Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World (1949, 1966, 1973) at I: 449–451. From such systematic policy in practice would later emerge the Mercantilist economic theory.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 58–61.