Talk:Schräge Musik

Etymology

I don't agree with the explanation for the term Schräge Musik even though I found it on many other (but only non-German) sites. First: In my eyes a better literal translation is slanted music. Second: If there's a relation to jazz it's only a double entendre. With Musik as a slang expression for (machine) gunfire (sometimes used in old gangster movies) it's just an informal description of the installation of guns slanted upwards. Alureiter 08:15, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

I myself have attempted to change this "Jazz Music" explanation. Schräge Musik, indeed literally translating to slanted music, in fact describes awkward, fishy music and has nothing to do at all with "Jazz Music". But all my attempts have been reverted by a particular person, who points to a private Site of a Belgian who did some "original research". Being a native German, I find the connection between "Jazz" and "awkward Music" somewhat insulting, really, (racist Nazi propaganda would have called, and indeed did, "Jazz Music" "Negermusik (Negro music)" and said so in my edits, but to no avail - and I didn't want to get drawn into an Edit War. So, at least here, for the more educated folks, again: Schräge Musik means awkward or fishy music! :-) red (talk) 08:55, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Quote; Schräge Musik was first used operationally on the RAF raids on Peenemünde on the night of August 17, 1943. Three waves of aircraft bombed the area, and successful radar countermeasures by the RAF meant that only the last of the three waves was met by any sizable group of night fighters. The two Groups of the third wave, the 5th and Canadian 6th, lost 29 of their 166 planes, well over the 10% point at which losses were considered to become "unsustainable". In this raid 40 aircraft in total were lost; 23 Lancasters, 15 Halifaxes, and 2 Stirlings. Unquote; This is in fact incorrect - firstly the oblique cannon set-up had been trialed for a few months before the August raid, and the main cause of losses on this raid were the 'Wilde sau' free-hunting FW190's and BF109's who -due to their higher speed- managed to catch the final wave and attack visually. I will clean the article up presently [[Harryurz 13:33, 5 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I have given this a minor cleanup, but it still needs a lot of citations and some of its comments may need verification. Adrian M. H. 17:14, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, but act. it has nothing to do with 'music' at all, 'Musik' was a slang word for 'gun fire', 'schräg' translates to 'angled/slant', so 'Schräge Musik' just means 'gun fire at a slant angle'. It here has nothing to do with the, maybe more commen civile use of the term, 'schräge musik' that means 'dissonant music'. --DJ C (MUC) (talk) 11:18, 24 August 2013 (UTC)

I'm a native German speaker and I have never heard of Jazz being referenced as "schräge Musik" (neither has the German wikipedia entry for Jazz at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jazz). The article given as reference (Gustin) is clearly not an authority on language and contains numerous errors in that regard. To begin with, translating "schräge Musik" to "slanted music" is not even literally correct as it totally ignores context. It is only in a physical context that "schräg" means "slanted"/"at an angle". In a musical context, it only and exclusively refers to dissonant/non-harmonic/off-key/out-of-tune etc. (compare with "schräge Töne"). "Schräge Musik" means that the music is not harmonic.

"Schräge Musk" is a euphemistic play on words, mixing the idea of "music not quite in tune" with "guns not quite in alignment". I would be extremely surprised if contemporaries had missed this play of words, even if Jazz had been called "schräge Musik" at that time.

By the way, it is absolutely possible to translate this play on words into English: "off kilter music". Sansmalrst (talk) 15:32, 5 September 2013 (UTC)

If you can find an article in Die Welt from 6 March 1955 titled "Schräge Musik ist noch kein Jazz" by Gerd Scharnhorst then you might have better support for your argument, or it might be irrelevant. Some people in Germany in the 1940s might have been using the term "schräge Musik" as slang for jazz even though the slang died out by the time you were born. I'm sympathetic to your argument because I cannot find a single instance of "schräge Musik" in print from pre-war books. Binksternet (talk) 16:43, 5 September 2013 (UTC)

I'm indeed a couple of years too young to know how people referred to jazz music in the 40s in Germany. It appears that "schräge Musik" indeed was used in this sense. Then again, music from The Beatles was also designated "schräge Musik".

However, it really makes no sense to me what obliquely mounted guns have to do with jazz or why they would be called after it. Is there a source which sheds more light on this, maybe with a quote from a contemporary night fighter, mechanic or similar who can confirm that they used "schräge Musik" in reference to jazz? The above interpretation just seems more plausible. Don't have a reference for that either.Sansmalrst (talk) 01:16, 6 September 2013 (UTC)

Oooh, your Google fu is very strong. I'm impressed at your find which quotes a summer 1944 example of "schräge musik". Binksternet (talk) 03:24, 6 September 2013 (UTC)

At the time, jazz music was forbidden in Germany being regarded by the Nazi Government as 'neger musik' and 'un-Aryan', and so it's playing was confined to 'underground' venues, etc.,

If a German jazz-lover wanted to hear jazz music on the radio he/she would have had to listen to the BBC (which was also forbidden) or other non-German radio stations. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.220.15 (talk) 11:27, 27 January 2015 (UTC)

Finally edited this insane "Jazz music" insult. For the reasons, see my post above from 2013(!) red —Preceding undated comment added 20:43, 1 March 2016 (UTC)

A couple of quick notes

- I don't have the reference on hand, but Boeing B-17s supplied to the RAF for testing as night bombers had the ventral turret removed as the ball gunner was found to have an insufficient view. It might also be good to contextualise the relatively limited defensive armament with the RAF tendency to use evasive manoeuvres when under attack (RAF bombers being more manoeuvrable than American designs and hard to follow in the night sky - especially by heavier enemy night fighters)
- I noted the following line: "The Black Widow was the only night fighter of either side that had such a fully-traversable dorsal turret, as part of its design" - What about the Boulton-Paul Defiant?

Schrage Musik ammunition deliberately excluded the use of tracer so that when used there was no tell-tale line of fire visible. This was why the RAF Bomber Command often mistook the attacks as either being due to flak or other non-nightfighter related causes. There were reports from aircrew of German nightfighters trying to formate on RAF heavy bombers from below, but for the most part, these were disbelieved.

Generally, by then the RAF view was that if a bomber was found by a nightfighter it WOULD in all probability be shot-down, so they had moved on to using extensive countermeasures to prevent them being detected in the first place, e.g., No 100 Group. That and also mixing Mosquito night fighters in with the Bomber stream to seek-out and attack the German nightfighters and give them something else other than bombers to think about.

As regards the Sperry ball turret on the US-supplied Fortresses, the turret was so confined and lacking in view outside at night that when it was trialled on night operations gunners suffered severe claustrophobia, as the view outside was almost nil. The turret was later removed on RAF Fortresses and the mounting used for H2S. The problem with any ventral turret was simply one of view outside at night, the whole of Occupied Europe was blacked out from the borders with Spain right up to Sweden in the North, so there was no external lights other than moonlight, and by that stage in the war Bomber Command usually tried to bomb on nights with little or no moon.

This is also why the navigation problem had become so important, and why first GEE, and then OBOE and H2S were developed, because unlike when the Luftwaffe was bombing Britain, the German bombers were flying from airfields near the French coast, and so the distances flown were only in the order of a couple of hundred miles round-trip. For the RAF bombing Germany the distances were much greater, around 600 miles each way, so the navigation errors using dead reckoning became much greater.

BTW, I forgot to answer your query - the P-61 Black Widow did have a dorsal turret but its teardrop-shaped streamlined fairing was found to cause unacceptable buffeting when traversed to the side, so it was later deleted from the design. The Boulton Paul Defiant also had a fully-traversing dorsal turret, but it had been designed as a day fighter (a replacement for the Hawker Demon in-fact), and was only used as a nightfighter later.

Incidently, when it became necessary to form a dedicated German nightfighter force in around 1940-41 the Luftwaffe found that the only aircrew with the required night flying experience were the bomber crews who had previously been involved in the Blitz on British cities. These ex-bomber crews formed the nucleus of the Nachtjagdgeschwader and this accounts for the (perhaps rather surprising) lack of bitterness and rancour felt by the majority of Luftwaffe nightfighter crews towards their RAF adversaries. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.80.53 (talk) 10:04, 29 September 2010 (UTC)

The Defiant was planned for night-fighter use. I'll check for a source to back that up. It's in the article but the line is not specifically cited. The article also gives night fighting training from Feb 1940. GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:03, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

Haven't found it yet. I think it may be in Brewer's book - which went back to the library. So far Buttler has only mentioned day-and-night fighter for the following F.11/37 specification (which gets as far as the unarmed half-scale P.92/2. Beaufighter R2227 was fitted with AI radar and a dorsal turret as a prototype Beaufighter Mark V but that was the limit of that experiment. Digression aside I have it - Buttler British Secret Projects p51 "...F.9/35 for a two-seat day and night fighter...which gave birth to the Defiant" GraemeLeggett (talk) 20:28, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

Regardless of the requirement, the Defiant was intended to undertake primarily bomber interception and the night fighter role was not developed until the type was withdrawn from day operations. The circumstances that caused the woeful Defiant to take on single-seat fighters led to catastrophic results. The use of its dorsal turret was predicated on the "broadside" fighter interception and attack tactic. It is difficult to make a case for the Boulton Paul Defiant to be seen as a "purpose-built" night fighter, however, a solid and substantial argument can be pressed for it being a "last ditch" night fighter. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 20:46, 30 September 2010 (UTC).

Thanks for the replies and comments. Actually when I mentioned that the Defiant had been designed as a day fighter I meant that it wasn't designed with the rather specialised role of AI-equipped nightfighter that arose later with the introduction of airborne radar. When the Defiant was being designed Airborne Interception radar was still in its infancy and was in fact so secret that the designers would almost certainly not have known about it. At that time, the term 'nighfighter' meant (usually) a single-engined day fighter that had docile enough handling characteristics to be flown safely at night, there being no special equipment involved other than the fitment of some device to reduce the glare of the engine's exhaust, so as to make it invisible to the pilot - these are the prominent horizontal rectangular-plates fitted on the sides of the nose of some Hurricanes used in nighfighting - their sole purpose was to shield the pilot's eyes from the exhaust glare and prevent the loss of his night vision. The later nighfighting Defiant was fitted with some of the early 'arrowhead' Marks of AI but IIRC it was obsolete as a nightfighter by the time centimetric AI came into use, having been replaced by first the Beaufighter, and then the Mosquito.

IIRC the Defiant was quite a good attempt at meeting the specification, it flew and handled well, and was quite a good-looking aeroplane, but it should have had some forward-firing armament, even if it was only a couple of .303s, but I suspect that the addition of them would have pushed the weight up to the point where performance suffered even more, and if a more powerful version of the Merlin (c 1,600hp) had been available then that might have been possible, but that wasn't developed till long after the Defiant was obsolete as a fighter.

Bill is right of course, the Defiant was envisaged as being used for attacking invading bombers, the turret firing 'broadside' on to them a la warship practice, a perfectly reasonable mode of operation as long as there are no opposing single-engined fighters to worry about, and as I mentioned elsewhere, the French surrender invalidated this premise - when the Defiant was designed any attacking German bombers were assumed to be have been flying from bases in Germany itself, and so the distance involved would have made (at the time) an escort of single-engined fighters impossible.

Since the signing of the Entente cordiale back in the early 1900s Britain and France had co-ordinated their defence roles on the assumption that neither country would become unavailable to the other should a war affecting both countries arise. So RAF fighters had all been designed with performance in-mind on the assumption that the French Armée de l'Air would handle any air incursions further inland on mainland Europe, any RAF fighters being flown to advanced airfields on French soil should the necessity arise (similarly to the AASF), so long range for a single-engined RAF fighter was not seen as important, (especially with the thought in the minds of the drawers-up of the Specifications that Chain Home was in the-offing). This also applied to the opposing Bf 109, which was also designed with performance in mind, but the moving-forward of the Luftwaffe fighter airfields to the French coast made it possible for it to provide, albeit limited, escort for the attacking German bombers.

I am including this (possibly irrelevant-seeming) information here to show how the French surrender in 1940 seriously affected the whole defence implications of the UK and British Empire as a whole, as it greatly altered the likely tactical situations for-which the RAF's aircraft had originally been designed, the likely scenarios for their use being greatly changed to their disfavour, the Defiant being one of those affected. The Hurricane and Spitfire, so often criticised for their 'short range', were also designed on the above assumptions, it being inconceivable at that time that a country with an army the size of France's could be beaten. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.82.134 (talk) 11:04, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

The covering aspects of French and RAF defence are paralleled in the naval situation in the Med. With the French Navy no longer containing the Italian, the RN has to pick up the slack. One other aspect of the turret fighter is the ability not just to engage "broadside" but in coordination with the other turret fighters - two or more could engage the same target simultaneously without risking a collision. Not that it worked out like that and the claims would have invovled (1/4 of a kill?) GraemeLeggett (talk) 13:16, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

Part of the philosophy that created the Defiant leaked into both the Beaufighter and Mosquito programs when the Air Ministry thought that it would be good idea to have a Boulton-Paul turret added, just in case. Fortunately, after some testing of the concept, it was dropped. According to Buttler B-P rebuilt the prototype Defiant as a single-seater with forward firing armament and the result was a fighter which had a similar top speed to the Spitfire II...by nthen it was a little too late for the P.94, with the likes of the Typhoon etc appearing. Just on the lack of tracer being used by Schräge Musik - there was a common myth amongst BC crews that the Germans were firing so-called "Scarecrow" shells which looked exactly like bombers blowing up; apparently this was partly due to crews seeing real bombers blowing up after being attacked by Schräge Musik. Minorhistorian (talk) 20:06, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

True - the UK's reaction to the French surrender, and subsequent attack on the French Fleet at Mers el Kebir is also more understandable when you comprehend the perilous situation the unilateral French surrender put the UK in. Despite the (perhaps understandable) hurt French feelings over the attack, the British had every reason to be seriously-pissed-off with the French. Luckily, that was all (hopefully) forgiven in June 1944.

I suspect that they (as you say) would have just 'shared' kills as-per when two fighters collectively shot-down an opponent, e.g., 1/2 kill each.

You're quite right about the 'Scarecrow' shells, these were almost certainly bombers blowing up after being attacked from below. There is RAF film of night raids over Germany and occasionally in one there is a blinding flash in mid-air as a bomber carrying a 4,000lb 'Cookie' blows-up. These were quite likely the Schräge Musik attacks mistaken for 'Scarecrows' shells. IIRC, the Mosquito was trialled with a four-gun BP mid-upper turret because the Air Ministry wasn't sure about sending an 'unarmed' bomber out over Germany, but you may be right, it may have been for other reasons as well. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.59.8 (talk) 11:33, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

This is also why the navigation problem had become so important, - as an additional aside, this greater distance (compared to the Luftwaffe's night attack on the UK) made accurate navigation at night almost impossible using dead reckoning, as it only needed a slight error in a forecast wind to send the bombers way-off course, (it not usually being possible to get a ground 'fix' after leaving the English coast, navigators relying on Gee until it became unusable due to German jamming as one flew further east - all RAF Navigators were also trained in astro-navigation and all RAF bombers had an astrodome for using a sextant, but often high cloud or poor weather conditions, turbulence, etc., made their use difficult, if not impossible), with the resulting lack-of-bombing-accuracy that later became apparent in the Butt Report. That was why RAF Bomber Command resorted to attacking whole cities, as it was just about the only thing they could be sure to find at night. By the end of 1944, beginning of 1945, when the advancing Allied armies had moved forward far enough it became possible to move mobile Oboe ground stations (mounted in vehicles) much closer to the German targets (Oboe's range was limited by the curvature of the Earth), and then RAF Bomber Command could bomb with an accuracy that made it possible to target individual factories and installations, but by then it was all academic, as Germany was (for the most part) in ruins.

BTW, I'm including this additional information here as the navigation problems that RAF Bomber Command faced are not always obvious to the layman, who may well come across this talk page and wonder why the RAF BC did what it did. Flying long distances (for the time) at night over completely blacked-out territory and relying on getting to where you're going-to, is completely different from trying to do the same thing on a nice, sunny day.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.63.77 (talk) 11:02, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

Diagram

This is a great new diagram - can we have another one - maybe a simple sketch showing where the actual mirros were placed?Engineman (talk) 19:51, 28 September 2010 (UTC)

Yep, but it needs to be moved down into the WWII section. Just to note that the lead does not currently summarise any of the largish section of pre-WWII information. Template:Infobox aviation could be added to good effect. Nimbus (Cumulus nimbus floats by) 23:57, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

Great points, this is still "a-work-in-progress" and any suggestions, advice, and help is greatly appreciated. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 00:13, 1 October 2010 (UTC).

Aren't they all Bill?!! I often wondered what that curved rail was for on an SE.5, I thought it was to bring the gun down to reload it? Maybe they did that as well (but how many magazines could be carried in the small cockpit?). Nimbus (Cumulus nimbus floats by) 00:28, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

I just read that bit, ignore me!! Nimbus (Cumulus nimbus floats by) 00:30, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

sighting adjustment

Its is still not clear to me how the pilot sigghted the shot visually after being talked in by the radar guy. With the barrels way back in the fuselage, surely impossible to have an optical system using simply mirrors to relay an actual gun sight mounted onthe gun barrel.

If not how was it done?

An indpendent optical site at the front of the plane would have to be adjusted by firing the gun so how would they do that? Did they tipe the plane on its nose and fire at a ground target for adjustment - seems unlikely? Engineman (talk) 13:19, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

The usual method was to use a separate normal Revi (reflector) gunsight mounted in the canopy roof pointing upwards, so that the pilot just tilted his head back and looked-up through the gunsight at the target bomber. The nighfighter then had two separate gunsights, one for normal, forward-firing use, the other for the Schräge Musik guns - likewise for the gun-firing buttons, one for the forward-firing ones, another, separate one, for the Schräge Musik ones. As for the alignment (harmonising) of the Schräge Musik cannon, I must admit to not having a clue - I suspect that some sort of sighting-tower was used, the guns being aligned with a target at the top, but I may be wrong.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.59.8 (talk) 17:58, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

ok I like the sighting tower idea - they might just park the plane under it and a simply deflector sight in the fuselage would do without having to have a complicated optical relay from the actual gun. Does anyone know? Engineman (talk) 19:41, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

was it worth it?

A number of studies indicate that the whole bomber command city busting campaign, whilst carried out courageoulsy by highly trained young men was largley a waste of time - roughly speaking it traded one airmen's life for one average german non compbatant. there is no evidence that it had any effect on morale or armaments production due to Harris's refusal to attach targets such as tranportation or synthetic oil.

About the most that can by said for it, was that it tied up huge numbers of anti aircraft guns which could have been fired at the Russians. ok easy to say in hindsight.Engineman (talk) 11:56, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

That's a discussion for Strategic bombing during World War II and/or RAF Bomber Command.GraemeLeggett (talk) 12:17, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

I don't know - having to live amongst piles of rubble that used to be one's home or city ought to at least have some effect on the care with which one voted the next time.

Unfortunately for the reputation of the RAF Bomber Offensive, the people carrying out the post-war surveys were for the most part, US ones, the USSBS having an axe-to-grind over 'who did the most', etc., as a result, the US policy of 'precision bombing' (sic) was favoured in the results, which was what their political and military leaders wanted to hear. In addition, many politicians and other people with power and influence at home in Britain had been blissfully unaware of the result of 'Area Bombing' and exactly what the term meant - see image -

Area Bombing - Wesel, 1945

and so in 1945 after the fighting had ceased there were many who, upon learning the facts, felt ashamed by the bombing, and it wasn't helped by Harris organising 'Cook's Tours' whereby he flew UK politicians and VIPs in bombers around Germany visiting the burnt-out cities showing what the RAF had done. Many were 'horrified' (whether truthfully or not) and at around that time, when they were all safe from German bombs, a number started trying to distance themselves from the policy, mainly because of the negative effects they perceived it having on their subsequent careers and reputations - Churchill is famous for attempting this. All this tended to bias the opinion of some people to the point that a number questioned the effectiveness of the RAF Bomber Offensive, often citing the increased German production of aircraft, tanks, etc., implying that the bombing had little beneficial (to the Allies) effect. That may be so, but then one has to ask oneself what Germany's war production would have attained without the bombing. Generally, skilled workers work better in warm, dry and comfortable buildings, and by 1945 this was just what was not available to the average German machinist or welder - the exception of course is when one is using slave labour, in-which case the employers don't really mind or care what their working conditions are.

The fact was that by the time Germany surrendered in 1945 the great majority of their manufacturing factories (and indeed most other buildings in their cities and towns) were roofless, burnt out, and in ruins. Had the war gone on longer the Germans would have been reduced to either trying to build massive underground manufacturing facilities (such as the V2-producing Mittelwerk one) or of trying to build aircraft, tanks, submarines, etc. in the open air. The judging of the success (or failure) of the RAF's bombing offensive needs to bear in mind the utterly ruinous state in which Germany was in in 1945, so much so that the phrase 'Year Zero' ("Stunde Null") was coined, as German people likened their living conditions to living like prehistoric cavemen. When the first Soviet troops entered the outskirts of Berlin in 1945 many could not understand why so many of the buildings were already in ruins. Most of this was the result of RAF Bomber Command, the USAAC/USAAF dropping considerably less bomb tonnage (despite what one may find stated on the Internet or here on Wikipedia) due to their sending out bombers with a smaller bombload, in smaller numbers, and less frequently. This is not to decry or minimise the bravery and valour of the US-bomber crews, but at the time the USAAF was definitely playing second-fiddle to the RAF (at least in Europe), and most of the-then US aircrews had the grace to admit it, something that has since been written-out of subsequent (especially US) histories, which, with the decline of the British Empire, and the rise of American power, and especially the build-up of US forces in Europe with the founding of NATO, have tended to underestimate or minimise the considerable power possessed by the RAF by 1945. By 1944 RAF Bomber Command Main Force could drop around 2,000-3,000 tons in a night (and another 2,000-3,000 tons the following day, if necessary), and go back there again the next night, and the next, in any weather.

The only answer I can give to your question is that no-one knew what was necessary at the time, or whether it was going to be worth it or not. So one does what seems best at the time. To the unfortunate Germans who had to live through all this I can only say that it was done because it seemed like the best (or at least a possible) way of getting rid of Hitler, the Germans seeming to have little inclination to getting rid of him themselves. This may seem unfair, as the Germans made a number of attempts at removing Hitler and his government from power, not the least being the 20 July plot, but they seemed to have abysmal luck doing it. Another thing that didn't help was the UK Government's refusal to allow the SOE to have any contact with the German Resistance movement, so the anti-Hitler Germans where pretty much left to themselves, their only support coming from the pro-Soviet communists. The only good thing to have come out of all this is that since 1945 the German people have managed to create a democracy and country that they can be proud of.

As regards whether it would have been better to have gone after the oil and transportation targets, the answer is that Harris regarded these (along with the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt) as 'panacea' targets, i.e., ones that their proponents hoped, if-attacked, would magically bring the German war economy to its knees. The truth is (as Speer subsequently said) they just re-designed their machinery to use plain bearings and similar. The simple answer is that if Harris had transferred BC's attention to the oil and transportation targets, the Germans would have re-organised things to offset the attacks - a change in tactics by one side is almost always met by a corresponding change in the tactics of the other - something that is often forgotten by people, especially those with '20/20 hindsight' today. Schweinfurt was eventually attacked by RAF BC (after several previous attacks by the USAAF), and one raid by them put the factories effectively out of the ball-bearing business until after the war.

It might also be as well to point out that the net results of the RAF Bomber Command night offensive against Nazi Germany is exactly the effect intended to be produced by strategic nuclear weapons, although thankfully their use so-far has been confined to the unfortunate inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Let's hope (for all our sakes) it remains that way. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.63.77 (talk) 22:35, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

Well enunciated but entirely placed in the wrong forum for such a discussion, see Strategic bombing during World War II and/or RAF Bomber Command talk pages. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 22:40, 6 October 2010 (UTC).

That's OK - I was merely answering a question - feel free to move it.

Confusing quote in the article

"What a contrast with SCHRÄGE MUSIK! Again the technique was to approach deliberately at a lower level, but this time all the night fighter pilot had to do was slow up a little, rise up below the bomber and hold formation. An NJG experte could follow his observer's directions, acquire the bomber visually, close and destroy it within 60 seconds. The firing position, with the bomber 65° to 70° above the fighter, was an almost ideal one. The fighter could see the bomber clearly, as a darker silhouette either blotting out the stars or against paler sky or high cloud. It presented the biggest possible target and reflected any light from searchlights, ground fires or TIs. With the two aircraft in close formation, there was an ideal no-deflection shot. And the fighter was perfectly safe, because it was well below the MONICA beam and could not be seen by any member of the bomber's crew. The only snag was that the Luftwaffe's guns were so effective that the night fighter usually had to get out of the way very fast. It was rather like 1916, except that a Lancaster with one wing blown off tumbled downwards and backwards faster than an ignited airship.” [18]

This part of the article has no reference to who is actually being quoted- it is referenced but needs a preamble to put the quote into context. Can anyone expand from the Gunston reference? Thanks Harryurz (talk) 13:39, 9 January 2011 (UTC)

Why mention Manfred Meurer?

The section "Operationan Use" mentions that the pilot Manfred Meurer died because of an mid-air collision. I would understand the relevance if he had actually collided with a bomber he had previously shot down with Schräge Musik. But according to what is written in this article, he collided with a Bf 110. The wikipedia page on the pilot mentions he collided with a Lancaster. I don't have the book used as reference here, but whoever has, can maybe clear that up? Sansmalrst (talk) 16:12, 5 September 2013 (UTC)

2006 article in MIT's Technology Review Magazine

Fascinating insight into RAF Bomber Command's initial failure to discover Schräge Musik and develop effective countermeasures to it is provided in this web-accessible article from MIT by prominent physicist Freeman Dyson, who recalls the time he spent developing analytical methods to help the British Royal Air Force bomb German targets during World War II: "A Failure of Intelligence" | By Dr. Freeman Dyson on November 1, 2006 | MIT Technology Review Magazine | November/December 2006
Page 4 of 6

I later applied the same method of analysis to the question of whether experience helped crews to survive. Bomber Command told the crews that their chances of survival would increase with experience, and the crews believed it. They were told, After you have got through the first few operations, things will get better. This idea was important for morale at a time when the fraction of crews surviving to the end of a 30-­operation tour was only about 25 percent. I subdivided the experienced and inexperienced crews on each operation and did the analysis, and again, the result was clear. Experience did not reduce loss rates. The cause of losses, whatever it was, killed novice and expert crews impartially. This result contradicted the official dogma, and the Command never accepted it. I blame the ORS, and I blame myself in particular, for not taking this result seriously enough. The evidence showed that the main cause of losses was an attack that gave experienced crews no chance either to escape or to defend themselves. If we had taken the evidence more seriously, we might have discovered Schräge Musik in time to respond with effective countermeasures.

Fascinating stuff. Check out the full article, which is applicable to many subjects here on Wikipedia, not just jazzmusic... Azx2 18:55, 20 October 2013 (UTC)

Azx2 (a belated reply): I've read the article with interest, but I think Dyson may have been beating himself up unnecessarily over this. If the RAF were designing aircraft that had oblique-firing guns for attacking bombers in the 30's, and in fact had invented the system during the First World War, it seems a little remiss of the hierarchy not to have considered the possibility of the same system being used against them during the Second. It was hardly Dyson's fault. Xyl 54 (talk) 22:49, 22 July 2019 (UTC)

PS: Another question that springs to mind is why the RAF didn't feel the need for such a weapon system for its own night-fighters in WWII, but achieved satisfactory results from aircraft with forward-firing guns for most of the conflict.  One answer, maybe, is that the British night-fighters (eg the Beaufighter) had a considerable power advantage over the German bombers they faced, so they could approach and strike rapidly from any direction; whereas the Me 110 was barely 20mph faster than, say the Lancaster, making a climbing attack with forward-firing guns impractical. Just a thought... Xyl 54 (talk) 22:53, 22 July 2019 (UTC)

Intro and the Lancaster

(Note: I should note that the "quotes" I give below are not actual quotes of anything that anyone wrote, but mere paraphrases, and the "specific reference to the Avro Lancaster" I mentioned was actually a specific reference about the fact that some Lancasters had periscope-aimed ventral turrets, not a simple reference to the bomber itself, just to clear it up a bit.).45Colt 04:05, 11 September 2015 (UTC)

I may be jumping the gun, but I suspect my edit will be reverted again shortly. I deleted the specific reference to the Lancaster in the intro, since the intro is supposed to be about shrage musik, not details about a specific bomber. The Lancaster is not the only Allied bomber with periscope-aimed ventral turret (on very few early machines, at that). I mean, shrage musik was invented because most Lancasters had NO ventral armament; the fact that some versions also had periscope-aimed ventral-turrets that didn't work changes NOTHING. What is the difference between a Lancaster without any turret and one with a turret that doesn't work? Nothing. SM was invented to take advantage of weak ventral armament, whether it was a lack of turret, or lack of an effective turret. It does not need to be stated that "some Lancasters had a periscope-aimed ventral turret, although it didn't work any better than having no turret at all". That is totally irrelevant...to the night fighter crews, it might as well have not had any turret. What is relevant is that most Allied bombers lacked effective armament, making the belly an attractive target.

"Shrage musik was invented because the Germans found it easier to attack the vulnerable underside of Allied bombers. Some Avro Lancasters had periscope-aimed ventral turrets, but they didn't work and were soon deleted". Which part of that phrase can be deleted without changing the overall message of the quote at all?

My opinion is that being the intro, all that should be said is that most Allied bombers lacked ventral armament, which would include the Lancaster as well. I only mentioned US bombers specifically, because they were the only ones that DID have effective ventral armament. I debated even doing that, since these bombers didn't even fly missions at night, but I decided a few words on the side of accuracy wouldn't hurt anything. Perhaps I'll go and modify my own text to say something like "most night-flying Allied bombers lacked effective ventral armament", to avoid ruffling any feathers by neglecting to mention the Lancaster while mentioning US bombers. In fact, I think I will. Anyway, the intro is supposed to be a short, several sentence blurb on shrage musik as a concept is, i.e. "shrage musik was invented to take advantage of the lack of ventral armament on most Allied bombers". Listing the specific armament on a single Allied bomber is not part of the overall concept of shrage musik. There is already a section in the body of the text detailing individual bombers and their armament. That's where the topic of the Lancaster belongs, even if it is a relatively minor point about turrets on early models, but it doesn't belong in the introduction. If one INSISTS on mentioning the Lancaster in the intro, it ought to say "shrage musik was adopted by the Luftwaffe to take advantage of the weak armament of night-flying Allied bombers, primarily the Avro Lancaster." Mention of the turret, however, is pointless, as it's ineffective armament in either case..45Colt 03:46, 11 September 2015 (UTC)

Okay, done. It now reads:

  "Most of the Allied bombers types of that era which were used for nocturnal bombing missions (primarily the Avro Lancaster) lacked effective ventral armament, leaving them easy prey to attacks from below, an advantage the Luftwaffe capitalized on."

Short, sweet, and to the point (which isn't easy for me, as you may have noticed!) Hopefully this is an acceptable compromise?.45Colt 03:56, 11 September 2015 (UTC)

The ventral turret was not installed as at night there was almost no visibility from any feasible sighting position - the RAF also trialled some Fortress III's at night, and even with the Sperry ball turret there was no visibility whatsoever, gunners inside them got severe claustrophobia due to the pitch darkness. The only time such a turret may have been useful was when visibility was good, such as when over the fires of the target, but as there was usually large amounts of flak present, the German night fighters kept away as they risked being brought down by their own anti-aircraft defences.

From reports filtering out from POW camps - from shot down RAF aircrew - it was found that statistically most losses were due to night fighters that had never been seen by the shot down crew, thus any ventral turret would have been of little or no use anyway. It was for this reason that the turrets retained the .303 until late in the war as visibility was so bad - you were trying to see an unlit night fighter against a dark background - even looking out of a normal window that the calibre's range was more than adequate, i.e., the visibility at night was usually well within the effective range of the .303. And they didn't want air gunners opening fire on night fighters that might possibly not have seen them.

The Lancaster and Halifax's ventral turret position was instead used for mounting the H2S radar scanner when it became available, or in the Wellington's case when it was no longer used as a bomber, the Leigh Light.

The whole of western Europe - with the exceptions of Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, was blacked-out at night, and therefore there was no light other than starlight - by 1942 the RAF had stopped flying operations over Germany on nights when there was a full moon. Schräge Musik worked because while you could see a bomber silhouetted against the starlight above, it was impossible to see an aircraft approaching from below against the blackened ground. And if you can't see it, or don't know it's there, you can't shoot at it.

I don't mean this sarcastically, but at night in the air over a completely blacked-out country, from horizon to horizon, it really is very dark. For this very reason the TRE developed the AGLT.

BTW, prior to Schräge Musik the standard German night fighter attack method was to approach the bomber from behind and below and then when ready to open fire to raise the fighter's nose violently and fire at the bomber's wings - where the fuel tanks were - from below using the forward-firing cannon. The night fighter then sometimes stalled. Schräge Musik did away with the need for this tactic and allowed the night fighter to fly along underneath the bomber normally, and fire when flying straight and level.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.31.130.20 (talk) 19:43, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

World War I section

Ironical that is was the British who discovered the "no-deflection" principle that was the real teeth behind Schräge Musik, and in 1915! Anyway this section was a bit of a mess - lots of repetition, and much information about WWI British night fighter aircraft that had little or no relevance to this article. Also corrected a few errors of fact - especially about the Foster mount. The revised section is not well referenced as yet - will be working on this (promise). --Soundofmusicals (talk) 11:58, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

To me, it looks like the WWI and Interwar sections are riddled with – even founded on – original research and synthesis of sources. Having the ability to aim a gun up at an angle is nothing like deciding that your whole weapon strategy is to aim upward at an angle, with no other options. Binksternet (talk) 15:43, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

I think we should ditch most of the WWI and Interwar text and return to a simple explanation of previous art and directly relevant experience, in the following manner. Binksternet (talk) 15:55, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

Background

During World War I, forward firing Lewis Guns were frequently mounted on the top plane of a biplane to fire over the revolving propeller, using a Foster mounting to tilt the gun back and change ammunition drums. The gun could also be fired upwards at an angle. The guns of the Nieuport 11 and Nieuport 17 fighters, especially in British service, and the Royal Aircraft Factory S.E.5a were often used in this way, to attack enemy bomber or reconnaissance aircraft from the "blind spot" below the tail. The British ace Albert Ball, in particular, was a great proponent of this technique. The first "multi-gun" fighter design to see combat, the Sopwith Dolphin, featured an "as-equipped" armament setup of two forward-firing Vickers machine guns in the usual location just forward of the cockpit, but also had a pair of Lewis machine guns located on the forward cross-tube that comprised part of the cabane strut structure, and intended to be aimed forwards and upwards as an anti-Zeppelin armament scheme. The concept of off-set or oblique mounted weaponry in night fighting was first used by Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2c night fighters to attack airships from below—this was highly successful, and most British night fighters for the remainder of the war (for instance the Sopwith Camels of No. 151 Squadron RAF in 1918) used wing mounted Lewis guns in preference to the synchronised Vickers preferred for day fighting—in part for this reason. Similar arrangements were trialled by the Germans in 1917, when Gerhard Fieseler of Jasta 38 fitted two machine guns pointing upwards and forwards.

Prior to the introduction of Schräge Musik in 1943, German night fighters were simply heavy fighters equipped with radar in the nose. This meant that the fighter had to approach the target bomber from the rear in order to get into a firing position. This presents a much smaller target area and Royal Air Force bombers were all equipped with multi-gun hydraulic rear turrets to help fend off such attacks.

Night fighter pilots then developed a new tactic to avoid the turrets. Instead of approaching directly from the rear, they would approach about 1500 ft below the plane. They would then pull up sharply and start firing when the nose of the bomber appeared in the gunsight. As their plane slowed and the bomber passed over them, the wings were sprayed with cannon or machine gun rounds. This maneuver was effective, but difficult to perform. There was a significant risk of collision and if the bomb-load exploded, it could take down the night fighter too.

There is certainly a good deal of redundant matter in the background section - why two different, and widely spaced, treatments of the use of the Defiant turret fighters for instance? Surely one, much shorter mention would be adequate. I concentrated on the WWI section as this is "my period" - adequate referencing for this bit could be nicked (for instance) from the B.E.2 and Foster mounting articles, and this was my intent, but I'll hold off on that for the moment while we're sorting out what still needs to be deleted. The B.E 2 night fighter reference is the main one really - this really was effectively a "prototype" of Schräge Musik, since the weapon could only be aimed and fired upwards, while the Foster was mainly a device for firing forward over rather than through the propeller and was only incidentally able to fire upwards. As you will notice I cut out a good deal of information about British WWI night fighters in general. What information is left in needs to be accurate, however! The earlier version is O.R. in the worst sense, as it widely differed from our most reliable sources.

In fact the whole article is poorly referenced, filled with repeated, redundant and even contradictory matter, and generally poorly organised. It seems to have morphed into a general article on upward firing guns rather than the specific WWII Luftwaffe night fighter application - there is probably a good case for replacing it with a greatly condensed article of much more limited, but strictly relevant scope. --Soundofmusicals (talk) 22:04, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

If someone wishes to write an article on fixed upward-firing aircraft weapons, or even on any fixed aircraft weapons that are not aimed forward, I would not stand in their way. But this article should concentrate on the German WWII effort, to match the title. My stance is to remove anything that is not found in the literature on Schräge Musik, stuff that a well-meaning wiki editor thought would be of interest to the reader, but is not connected to Schräge Musik in the source material. Binksternet (talk) 22:13, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

Yes, this one has indeed been allowed to "grow like Topsy". The same thing happened to the Synchronization gear article - it had sort of lost its way and got tied up with devices to prevent aircraft armament shooting off parts other than the propeller and even naval guns being "interrupted" to avoid sinking their own ship. We fixed this by defining a very specific scope for the article and sticking to it - the result was a much better article. NO, I am not doing it for this one - for starters I now know how much work is involved in doing something like this properly - and secondly I am really not interested enough anyway. At a pinch (if asked nicely) I will do a "very short and strictly relevant" version of the WWI bit by further condensing what I did last night and adding suitable references from elsewhere - what else needs to be done will need a dedicated "WWII person" who can cut and spice great swathes of well-meant "let's add this" from the bulk of the article. In fact I am tempted to just give up altogether and take this off my watchlist. --Soundofmusicals (talk) 22:50, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

<od>Or, we could move the page as it is to a more appropriate title: See below...Xyl 54 (talk) 23:07, 22 July 2019 (UTC)

Page move?

@ Binksternet, Soundofmusicals: Following on from the last suggestion, above, we could, instead of hacking lumps out of this article, move it to a title that reflects the content.
This was written in May 2003; by April 2007 it had expanded to include the development of the weapon in WWI, and by October 2010 it was broadly as it is today. So I would suggest that for most of its existence this has been a general article on oblique/upward firing weapons systems, rather than simply about the German Schräge Musik system; or, putting it another a way, the term Schräge Musik is being used (incorrectly, and anachronistically) for all applications of the system, including those that pre-date the WWII German example.
So, I would suggest moving the page as it is to a more general descriptive title, and redirecting Schräge Musik to the "German developments" section here: or maybe after moving it splitting out and summarizing the Schräge Musik stuff to its own article. Thoughts? Xyl 54 (talk) 23:05, 22 July 2019 (UTC)

I think Schräge Musik is a perfectly good article name, quite adequate to describe the widely known German development in WWII. I would not want to see the Schräge Musik material moved entirely to another article about guns firing at an angle. Instead, the tangentially related stuff in this article can be moved to the new article, whatever its name will be, and a brief section of it can refer the reader to Schräge Musik. Binksternet (talk) 00:40, 23 July 2019 (UTC)

I don't disagree that Schräge Musik is a perfectly good title to describe the German weapon system; my point is that this article isn't just about that, and hasn't been for a long time. If we were having this conversation in, say 2007 (or 2010), it'd make sense to move the more generalized stuff out to a new article. But as it is, after 9 years worth of edits on the wider subject, it now makes more sense (IMO) for practical reasons, as well as for attribution purposes, to do it the other way round (ie move everything here, with the edit history, to the generalized title, then split the German development section (and any other relevant bits) back to Schräge Musik leaving a summary and main article link here. D'you see what I'm getting at? Xyl 54 (talk) 23:40, 23 July 2019 (UTC)

Discovery

Freeman Dyson says in the video that the Allies didn't know about Schraege Musik until after the war. Can that really be right, though? The page photo shows a captured Schraege Musik setup in 1944, I mean, come on. Surely Dyson was oversimplifying. --Jtle515 (talk) 18:59, 8 May 2020 (UTC)

It seems that it was a failure of intelligence. This is a well researched article on Schräge Musik cannons. However, it also seems that Dyson is misremembering or was not aware of the full picture. The article notes that Bomber High Command eventually figured out what was going on, though it took them until 1944. Somebody could slightly amend the statement: "Bomber High Command was unaware of the weapon for a significant amount of time." 73.14.181.43 (talk) 04:41, 14 June 2020 (UTC)Julius