Talk:China Burma India theater

SEAC

I am not sure that Stilwell was under the command of SEAC (Mountbatten) but as it started in India that is likley. If you know bette please correct his page and fix the mention of the Ledo Road on the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II and Burma Campaign pages. Philip Baird Shearer 11:16, 16 Aug 2004 (UTC)

---

Philip, the point of my change was this: if a unit was part of CBI, it doesn't automatically mean it was part of SEAC; i.e. the US command (CBI) overlapped two separate Allied commands: SEAC and China. No-one could have persuaded Chiang to take orders from an India/SEAC CinC. Which is probably why Stilwell had his secondary role as Chiang's Chief of Staff -- having a US general as CoS both preserved Chiang's dignity, gave him a direct link to the White House, and gave the western Allies some influence (but not much, since Chiang apparently was more pre-occupied with stockpiling arms for a future war against Mao, as he was with fighting Japan.) As this article points out, the anomaly of the CBI overlap was eventually addressed by the separation of the US forces into USFBIT and USFCT. And whether or not USFCT was actually part of SEAC is another issue again. Grant65 (Talk) 00:01, Nov 30, 2004 (UTC)

Here we are. A US Army official history says: "The American air commander in the CBI had a status comparable to that of Stilwell, who also wore quite a number of hats. Part of Stratemeyer's command, the Tenth Air Force, had been integrated with the RAF in India in December and was operating under Mountbatten. Another part of it, the Fourteenth Air Force in China, was at least technically under the jurisdiction of Chiang as theater commander."The Second Front and the Secondary War The CBI: January-May 1944 Grant65 (Talk) 12:08, Nov 30, 2004 (UTC)

Yep there is some ambiguity about it. I came across a letter to from Chennault to FDR (26/1/1944) where he says:

Unfortunately, since the abandonment of the plan for a major campaign in Burma, the China program appears to consist exclusively of the Matterhorn Project, for long range bombing of Japan. No additions to the program seem likely. The Chinese leaders, while I am sure they will approve and cooperate in the operations which I suggest, are too preoccupied with domestic and financial problems to take the initiative. I am glad to say that I was recently able to explain the potentialities of an attack on Japanese shipping and air power to Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Wedemeyer. They immediately grasped its importance, and have promised to support the plan in the appropriate quarters. But they are in no position to do over-all planning for China, and an over-all plan is required.

Why would he be asking Mountbatten and General Wedemeyer "to do over-all planning for China" if his forces were not under SEAC? We know for certain that the strategic bomber forces in Asia and the Pacific were not under theatre command, just as they were not in Europe or the Med either, so we can say that the Twentieth Air Force was not under SEAC. However there are a number of stages in US tactical air forces in China.

• Tigers before the start of WWII
• Tigers after the start of WWII and during the fall of Rangoon. -- when did CBI start?
• 14th Air Force before SEAC
• 14th Air Force during SEAC before the loss of Airfields in China (1944)
• 14the Air Force during the last year of the war
• Some of the 14th were definatly under SEAC, eg No. 490 Bomb Squadron USAAF.

I think that we need to establish a time line and a battle order before developing the idea on the CBI page. I would be a good idea to do the same thing for the Tenth Air Force as well.--Philip Baird Shearer 13:23, 30 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Before I saw this I finished a major re-write. Apart from anything else there were numerous typos and fragmentary sentences. See what you think.Grant65 (Talk) 14:10, Nov 30, 2004 (UTC)

Better, but I have done a re-write on the first section. I have left a lot of things ambigious until the facts can be nailed down. Here is a reference which might helps a little: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/WCP/enchApxB4.html

One of the things to rember about the CBI is that only ground combat troops the US had in theater were the 3000 of Merrill's Marauders, and they nearly ended up as part of the Chindits so it is not supprising that the official US Army view of the Burma campaign was that it was only being fought to aid the construction of airbases in China. This is not the British view! But which ever way it is cut if the Japanese had captured Dimapur on the Northeast Indian Railways during World War II then supplies to the Hump and the the Ledo Road would have been cut. You might find Ledo Road#The British strategic view about it interesting. Philip Baird Shearer 20:10, 30 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Why move from CBI Theater WWII

The problem with the word theater is that it has more than one meaning. Philip Baird Shearer 10:06, 15 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Is there a theatrical theatre called the "China Burma India Theatre"? :-) Grant65 (Talk) 11:22, Dec 15, 2004 (UTC)

Not that I know of, but south east Asian theatre turned up a number of hits on Google! So far all the "theatres " end in World War II and "theaters of operations" do not ( "European Theatre of World War II", "South East Theater of World War II") As this was a theater and not a "theater of operations" I would like to keep the original name so that there is no future ambiguity, with someone wanting to stick a See ....(disambiguation) at the top. As I created the original article and name I would like to claim squaters rights on it, so unless you have strong feeling about it I would like to move the page back and keep a redirect from "China Burma India Theater".

An examples of what I mean are Digger (which I sorted out when sorting out levellers), and stormtrooper which listed links to Sturmabteilung-brown shirts, Imperial Stormtroopers-Star wars, and Sturmtruppen-Italian commic with the total explanation of the word as "Regular army assault/shock troops. From the German Sturmtruppen."

PS. I spoke too soon looking at the "levellers" link someone had altered it link to the levellers(disambiguation) page (Sigh!) Philip Baird Shearer 13:19, 15 Dec 2004 (UTC)

If you do not reply within 24 hours, I'll assume that you do not mind if the page is moved back to its original name. Philip Baird Shearer 16:27, 16 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Hmmm...don't think its 24 hours. I really don't think there is any room for confusion, I mean what else is the "CBI" conjunction used for? It's far, far less common than even (e.g.) "south west pacific area" which does turn up some non-WW2-related travel/tourism sites on Google (I think).Grant65 (Talk) 15:49, Dec 17, 2004 (UTC)

Woops moved at 13:28:41, Sorry it seemed like a lot longer than 24 hours since I posted the above. Why do you want to move it? Philip Baird Shearer 22:13, 17 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I know where you're coming from, I recently started Air raids on Darwin, February 19, 1942 and there have already been suggestions it should be moved to "Attack on Darwin", "Air raid on Darwin", etc. My reasoning was that people will do web searches for "china burma india theater" and find it, so the "wwii" was superfluous. It doesn't really matter though. Grant65 (Talk) 01:13, Dec 18, 2004 (UTC)

Task forces

I have just moved the tags for the British-task-force, Chinese-task-force, Indian-task-force, and Japanese-task-force to South-East Asian theater of World War II, which is the general article on the theatre as a whole in 1941-45. CBI was basically US technical jargon for a US supply area. Grant65 | Talk 06:08, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

Not a theater of operations

See China Burma India Theater of World War II#U.S. Land forces

The US forces in the CBI theater were grouped together for administrative purposes under the command of General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, but unlike the other theaters in the war, for example the European Theater of Operations, it was never a "theater of operations" and did not have an overall operational command.

The theater of operations was the South-East Asian theatre of World War II --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 00:59, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

According to the Center of Military History for the United States Army, published a document called Burma, 1942 (CMH Pub 72-21) which states:

• "Even as Stilwell assembled his staff in Washington and began the long journey to the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of Operations, the situation in Burma was deteriorating rapidly"

• "As Stilwell prepared for his new assignment, the 10th U.S. Air Force was activated in Ohio and slated for deployment to the CBI Theater of Operations."

There are references of both as a theater and theater of operations which are published and documented by the United States Military. -Signaleer (talk) 15:37, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

If it was a Theatre of Operations then what was the operational command for the theater? --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:56, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

That's a question that should be directed towards the Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. -Signaleer (talk) 11:34, 3 September 2008 (UTC)

I think the problem we run into here is problems of semantics. It took me some time but I found in the copy of the Official History. The following

"In the absence of further, conflicting evidence, it must be assumed that both the War Department and General Stilwell regarded the Department's 22 June radio as sufficient authority for the establishment of an American theater of operations in China, Burma, and India." (p. 193 United States Army in World War II China-Burma-India Theater, Stillwell's Mission to China by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland)

It is hardly a ringing endorsement of the claim in the U.S Army Official History! --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 00:23, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

The United States Army's Center of Military History is a reliable and credible source of information, considering that they are responsible for the history of the United States Army, more so than yourself. -Signaleer (talk) 12:07, 5 September 2008 (UTC)

I'll toss in my 2 cents. All of the contemporary literature and documents, and the official histories later based on them, show that the "CBI" was an often-mentioned area of the world, but a composite description of two U.S. theaters (whether or not these "theaters" met anyone's "official" definition): the India-Burma theater, and the China theater. At some future date a brief section might put all these notions together without any need to be "definitive". Such "loose" descriptions occurred throughout WWII. All this posturing, esp. the negatives tossed in, is a waste of energy.--Reedmalloy (talk) 17:29, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

Narrative

The article is full of useful information but lacks a narrative, which I am adding. It is based on the material I wrote (alone) for Citizendium in 2008, and found at Citizendium Rjensen (talk) 14:24, 20 June 2011 (UTC)

This has got to go

In 1941 and 1942, Japan was overextended. Its naval base could not defend its conquests, and its industrial base could not beef up the navy. To cut off China from Allied aid, it went into Burma, captured Rangoon on March 8, 1942, cutting the Burma Road lifeline to China. Moving north the Japanese took Tounggoo, Burma, then captured Lashio in upper Burma on April 29. The British, primarily concerned with India, looked to Burma as the main theater of action against Japan and wanted Chinese troops to fight there.[5] The United States conjured up visions of millions of Chinese soldiers who would hold the Japanese then throw them back, while providing close-in airbases for a systematic firebombing of Japanese cities. The overland supply route from India to China had to go through Burma. Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek realized it was all fantasy. On the other hand, there were vast sums of American dollars available if he collaborated. He did so and managed to feed his starving soldiers, but they were so poorly equipped and led that offensive operations against the Japanese in China were impossible. However, Chiang did release two Chinese armies for action in Burma under Stilwell. They were smashed by the Japanese and Stilwell, on foot, barely escaped to India; the recovery of Burma and construction of the Ledo Road to supply China via Burma became an obsession for Stilwell.[6]

I will do some copyediting but I hope others will join in.....this writing does not belong in wikipedia. DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:05, 29 December 2016 (UTC)

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Army Air Forces, India-Burma Theater

Some stub data for this new article, from Craven & Cate

• " It was evident enough that the American military organization in Asia, shaped partially by the exigencies of war and partly by political necessity, was not ideal. All U.S. Army forces in CBI were under the command of Stilwell, who maintained a forward echelon headquarters at Chungking, where he spent most of his time, and a rear echelon at New Delhi. The Tenth Air Force, operating from Assam and Bengal, had headquarters at New Delhi. The Fourteenth's headquarters was at Kunming, some distance from Chungking. The India-China Wing of ATC had its headquarters at Chabua.

--p449--

   The majority of the American troops in the theater were AAF, and the principal function of ASF troops had been support of air operations. The approaching ground offensive in Burma could be expected to alter this situation, however, and Stilwell's emphasis on the importance of the Ledo Road caused apprehension among AAF leaders that the air effort might suffer from diversions to that project. Accordingly, it seemed to them advisable that a high-ranking AAF officer should be placed on Stilwell's staff.63 For different reasons, Stilwell himself had made a similar suggestion as early as March 1943. Anticipating an effort to gain for Chennault the command of all CBI air forces, he had suggested the appointment of some other officer as theater air commander.64 It is altogether possible that this suggestion had some effect on the decision to send General Stratemeyer on a special mission to the Far East in the spring, and that even this early Marshall and Arnold had him in mind for the proposed command. In any case, Stratemeyer, following his return to Washington early in June, possessed firsthand information regarding the problems of CBI which made of him a logical choice. On 28 June 1943 the President informed the Generalissimo that General Stratemeyer would be sent with a small staff of air officers to straighten out the movement of personnel and supplies through India and Burma to China.65

   As senior air officer in the theater, it was to be expected that Stratemeyer would have command control over the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces. The Generalissimo had previously objected to such an arrangement, however, and the President's communication of 28 June gave assurance that the new commander would be instructed not to interfere with the special relations between Chennault and Chiang. Stilwell quickly protested the concession to Chiang, asking permission of Marshall to withhold the President's message from the Generalissimo until the whole question could be reconsidered.66 But General Marshall informed Stilwell on 1 July that the question had already been discussed with the Generalissimo by Dr. Soong, and that the condition stated in the President's letter represented the only one upon which Stratemeyer could be appointed.67 Stratemeyer would have only advisory authority over the Fourteenth Air Force. This decision led to a division of the AAF in CBI into the India-Burma Sector (IBS) and the China Sector, with Stratemeyer given little more than control of the Tenth Air Force. Taking advantage of the organizational changes pending in CBI, the Generalissimo also sought to end the Chennault-

--450--

   Bissell friction by requesting on 17 July that the latter be removed by the President.68 Three days later the decision was made to replace Bissell, and on 20 July, Davidson was appointed commanding general of the Tenth Air Force. Davidson assumed command on 19 August, and the next day Stratemeyer assumed command of Headquarters, USAAF IBS, CBI.69

   Patience and tact were of the highest importance in the ticklish position Stratemeyer assumed. The Air Adjutant General on 28 July had authorized activation of "The Headquarters of the Commanding General, Army Air Force Units, India-Burma Theater and Air Adviser to the Asiatic Theater Commander," and directed that it be activated at the earliest possible moment by the commanding general of the United States Army Forces in China-Burma-India. The letter did nothing to clarify the situation, for at that time there was neither an "India-Burma Theater" nor an "Asiatic Theater"; nor was Stratemeyer to be vested with command of all air force units in the CBI. Nevertheless, on authority of the above letter, Stilwell announced on 20 August 1943 the activation of Headquarters, United States Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, China-Burma-India, under the command of Stratemeyer.70 At the same time Stilwell announced activation of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, China-Burma-India Air Service Command (Prov.) and asked authority to inactivate the X and XIV Air Service Commands, the latter of which had been activated on 19 May. He notified the War Department that the Karachi American Air Base Command, which since early 1943 had engaged in the training of Chinese pilots, was to be inactivated and announced the activation of Headquarters, China-Burma-India Air Forces Training Unit (Prov.) at Karachi under Brig. Gen. Julian Haddon. Thus training of the Chinese-American air units, control of which theretofore had been exercised indirectly by Chennault, passed to the theater air adviser.* Stilwell also announced that the headquarters of the Tenth Air Force would be moved to Calcutta as soon as possible, at which time the India Air Task Force would be inactivated. Meanwhile, the following units were assigned to Stratemeyer's command: Tenth Air Force; Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, China-Burma-India Air Service Command (Prov.); China-Burma-India Air Forces Training Unit; 10th Weather Squadron; 10th AAC Squadron; and 22d

   * See below, p. 529.

--451--

   Statistical Control Unit. Included with these, of course, was the air base command in Assam.71

   Stratemeyer's duties, then, included direct control of the Tenth Air Force and the CBI Air Service Command. Furthermore, he was responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Fourteenth Air Force in China and for protection of the Hump route. In addition, he was expected to coordinate activities of the India-China Wing, ATC with theater operations, assist Stilwell in over-all planning for air warfare, and supervise the air training of Chinese personnel at Karachi.72

   Because of geographical and political considerations it was contemplated that Stratemeyer's headquarters should be small and highly mobile.73 Consequently, on 21 August 1943 a selected group of officers reported for duty, and on 23 August were given their new assignments. These included: Col. Charles B. Stone, III, Chief of Staff; Col. Edward P. Streeter, Deputy Chief of Staff; Col. Alvin R. Luedecke, Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Operations, Training, and Intelligence; Col. James H. Higgs, Assistant Chief of Staff, Administration; Col. W. Frank DeWitt, Surgeon; Lt. Col. Joseph S. Clark, Jr., Management Control; Lt. Col. Frank R. Schneider, Deputy Chief of Management Control. Personnel of the Tenth Air Force and X Air Service Command were used to round out the staff.74

   Despite this economical utilization of personnel, it soon became evident that an organization different from that originally contemplated was required. Lack of adequate communications and the necessity for Stratemeyer to have ready access to various administrative and policymaking agencies with which he had to work were important considerations. The location at New Delhi of British and Indian authorities, of the U.S. Services of Supply, of Stilwell's rear echelon, of the British army's GHQ, and of Air Headquarters, India Command, RAF made this the only logical location for Stratemeyer's staff. Plans for a mobile group had to be abandoned in favor of a permanently located headquarters, and hope for establishing the headquarters in a forward area near the actual scene of combat was given up. After it was seen that mobility of headquarters was impracticable and that doing double duty was working hardships on officers serving in dual capacities, Stratemeyer asked that allotment of personnel for his headquarters be increased.75 On 1 October 1943 approval was granted for 302 officers, 16 warrant officers, and 1,004 enlisted men; but even this substantial increase represented only 75 per cent of the personnel requested.76

--452--

   Almost simultaneously with these changes in the American military organization came plans determined upon at the QUADRANT conference, meeting at Quebec in August 1943, for even more far-reaching organizational changes in Asia. As the time for offensive action in Burma approached, the need for closer cooperation between the Allies became more acute. The creation of a unified command with a supreme allied commander was an obvious procedure, but selection of a commander acceptable to the United States, Great Britain, and China, not to mention the fixing of geographical limits for such a command, presented almost insuperable obstacles. A British commander for the entire theater would not be acceptable to the Chinese. An American commander might satisfy the Chinese, but the British could not agree to such a plan because of the necessity for bolstering the Empire's prestige. A Chinese commander was not seriously considered.

   Once more the political situation was the governing force which led to further confusion of an already complicated organizational setup. At Quebec the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) was established, and Lord Louis Mountbatten was designated Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief, with Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. From the operational sphere of SEAC, however, China, Indo-China, and India were excluded.77 Mountbatten would have no control over American-trained Chinese ground forces except through Stilwell in his capacity as chief of staff of the Chinese army, which meant, of course, that ultimate authority rested with the Generalissimo. Although SEAC did not include India, the major part of its assigned forces would have to be based there. Mountbatten's command did not include the large Indian army.

   Meanwhile, Stilwell continued in his capacity as commanding general of United States Army Forces in China-Burma-India and as such was in direct command of all American troops, whether in India, Burma, or China. The position to be occupied by Stratemeyer in this new organization was not immediately clear. It was contemplated, however, that he would be in command of all AAF units assigned to SEAC. The difficulties were recognized, and on 28 August 1943, General Arnold wrote letters to Stilwell, Stratemeyer, and Chennault, asking each to do his best to make the unwieldy organization function."

-Craven & Cate, 449-453, "Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. IV The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944", Chap 12, at HyperWar, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/AAF-IV-13.html This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.

Move discussion in progress

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CBI, service

My father, Staff Sergeant Ross, served at the CBI. I'm interested in the stories. 97.121.145.234 (talk) 22:44, 28 February 2024 (UTC)