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The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is the army of the Republic of South Sudan. The SPLA was founded as a guerrilla movement against the government of Sudan in 1983 and was a key participant of the Second Sudanese Civil War. Throughout the war, it was led by John Garang.

Sudan People's Liberation Army
Flag of South Sudan.svg
Flag of South Sudan
Founded1983
Service branchesGround Force
Air Force and Air Defence
Riverine/Navy[1]
HeadquartersWunyiek, Aweil East State
Mapel, Wau State
Leadership
Commander-in-ChiefPresident Salva Kiir Mayardit
Minister of DefenseِِِKuol Manyang Juuk
Chief of General StaffGeneral Gabriel Jok Riak (since 4 May 2018)[2]
Manpower
Military age18
Active personnel210,000, with paramilitary forces of an estimated 19,100
Reserve personnel76,000.
Expenditures
Budget10,240,750,031 SSP ($78,615,712) [2016/17]
Percent of GDP0.86% (2015 est.)
Industry
Domestic suppliersMilitary Industry Corporation
Foreign suppliers Israel
 Ethiopia
 United States of America
 Kenya
 Uganda
 Tanzania
 United Kingdom
 India
 China
 Russia
 Nigeria
 Egypt
 Canada
 Australia
 South Africa
 Ghana
 Japan
 South Korea
Related articles
HistoryMilitary history of South Sudan

Following John Garang's death in 2005, Salva Kiir was named the new Commander-in-Chief of SPLA.[3] Following South Sudan's independence in 2011, the SPLA became the new republic's regular army. As of 2018, the SPLA was estimated to have 185,000 soldiers as well as an unknown number of personnel in the small South Sudan Air Force.[4] As of 2010, the SPLA was divided into divisions of 10,000–14,000 soldiers.[3]

In May 2017, it was reported that South Sudanese President Salva Kiir was restructuring the army and changing its name from the SPLA to the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF).[5] In August 2017, it was reported that the new name would be the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF).[6][7]

Contents

HistoryEdit

In 1983 a number of mutinies broke out in the barracks of the Sudanese army in the southern regions, most notably in Bor. These mutineers would form the nucleus of SPLA.[8] By June 1983 the majority of mutineers had moved to Ethiopia, or were on their way towards Gambella. The Ethiopian government's decision to support the nascent SPLA was a means of exacting revenge upon the Sudanese government for their support of Eritrean rebels.[9]

SPLA was led by Commander-in-Chief John Garang de Mabior.[10][11] SPLA struggled for a united and secular Sudanese state.[12] Garang stated that the struggle of the South Sudanese was the same as that of marginalized groups in the north, such as the Nuba and Fur peoples.[13] Until 1985, SPLA directed its public denouncements of the Sudanese government specifically at Nimeiri. During the years that followed, SPLA propaganda denounced the Khartoum government as a family affair that played on sectarian tensions.[13] SPLA denounced the introduction of sharia law in September 1983.[14]

War in the 1980sEdit

 
Official flag of the Sudan People's Liberation Army until 2011

In the village of Bilpam, the first full-fledged SPLA battalion graduated in 1984. The name 'Bilpam' would carry a great symbolic importance for SPLA for years to come, as the epicentre of the uprising. After Bilpam, other SPLA training camps were established at Dimma, Bonga and Panyido.[9]

In the mid-1980s the SPLA armed struggle had blocked the development projects of the Sudanese government, such as the Jonglei Canal and the Bentiu Oil Fields.[15]

SPLA launched its first advance in Equatoria in 1985-1986. During this campaign, SPLA were confronted by a number of pro-government militias. The conduct of SPLA forces was chaotic, with many atrocities against the civilian population. The SPLA drove out around 35,000 Ugandan refugees (that had settled in Equatoria since the early 1980s) back into Uganda.[16]

SPLA had a complicated relationship with Anyanya II. Anyanya II forces blocked the expansion of SPLA between 1984 and 1987, as Anyanya II attacked SPLA recruits heading towards the SPLA based in Ethiopia. Anyanya II also attacked civilians believed to be SPLA supporters.[17] The conflict between Anyanya II and SPLA had a political dimension, as Anyanya II sought to build an independent South Sudanese state.[18] SPLA did however try to win over the leaders of Anyanya II to their fold.[19] The Anyanya II commander Gordon Kong Chuol aligned with SPLA in late 1987. Other sectors of Anyanya II would follow his example over the coming years, rendering the remainder of Anyanya II (allied with the Sudanese government) marginalized.[19][20]

Another force which confronted SPLA were the Murahaleen militias in northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Warfare between SPLA and Muraleheen began in 1987. By 1988 SPLA controlled most of the northern Bahr el-Ghazal.[16] Unlike the Anyanya II, however, the Murahaleen had no political ambitions.[18]

In March 1986, the SPLA kidnapped a Norwegian aid worker of the Christian NGO Kirkens Nødhjelp (Norwegian Church Aid).[21] Moorcroft writes that by this time '..[t]raining, weapons, and discipline improved as the guerillas scored more and more victories.. In November 1987 the guerillas captured the small town of Kurmak near the Ethiopian border. It was 450 miles from the capital, but the nearby dam provided most of Khartoum's electricity.' The government showed itself very nervous about containing the SPLA advance.[22]

Political openingsEdit

SPLA boycotted the 1986 elections. In half of the constituencies of southern Sudan elections could not be held due to the SPLA boycott.[13][23] In September 1989, the RCC invited different sectors to a 'National Dialogue Conference'. The SPLA refused to attend.[24]

On November 15, 1988 SPLA entered into an alliance with the DUP. The two parties had agreed on the lifting of the state of emergency and abolition of sharia law. The press release was made public through an announcement on Radio SPLA. After DUP rejoined the government, a ceasefire with SPLA was achieved.[13][25] After the elections, negotiations between SPLA and Sadiq al-Mahdi had been started. But the talks were aborted as SPLA shot down a civilian airplane. 60 people were killed in the attack.[13]

With the NIF coup d'état in 1989, all peace talks ended.[26] SPLA launched a major offensive between 1989 and the fall of the Ethiopian Derg government in 1991. It captured various towns, such as Bor, Waat, Maridi, Mundri, Yambio, Kaya, Kajo-Kaji, Nimule, Kapoeta, Torit, Akobo and Nasir. By the middle of 1991, SPLA controlled most parts of southern Sudan with the exception of the major garrison towns (Juba, Yei, Malakal and Wau)[19] Between January 21 and January 29, 1990 SPLA shelled Juba town. SPLA forces also moved into the Nuba Mountains and the southern parts of the Blue Nile State. In comparison with its 1985–1986 offensive in Equatoria, the conduct of SPLA was now more orderly.[16]

1991: Setback and splitEdit

 
High-ranking SPLA officers at the South Sudan independence celebrations, 2011

But the downfall of the Derg government in Ethiopia in May 1991 caused a major set-back. The Ethiopian government had provided the SPLA with military supplies, training facilities and safe-haven for bases during 18 years. Soon after the change of government in Ethiopia, SPLA accompanied hundreds of thousands of refugees back into Sudan.[19]

A split in SPLA had simmered since late 1990, as Lam Akol and Riek Machar began to question Garang's leadership.[27] Lam Akol began secretly contacting SPLA officers to join his side, especially amongst the Nuer people and Shilluk people.[28] The situation deteriorated after the fall of the Derg.[27] As the Derg regime crumbled, Lam Akol published a document titled Why Garang Must Go Now.[28] The split was made public on August 28, 1991 in what became known as the Nasir Declaration. The dissidents called for democratization of SPLA and a stop to human rights abuses. Moreover, the dissidents called for an independent South Sudan (in contrast to the SPLA line of creating a united and secular Sudan). Kong Coul joined the rebellion. The 'SPLA-Nasir' was joined by the SPLA forces in Ayod, Waat, Adok, Abwong, Ler and Akobo.[12] A period of chaos reigned inside SPLA, as it was not clear which units sided with Garang and which units sided with SPLA-Nasir.[29]

Garang issued a statement through the SPLA radio communications system, denouncing the coup. Nine out of eleven (excluding himself) SPLA/M PMHC members sided with Garang.[11] The mainstream SPLA led by John Garang was based in Torit.[10] The two SPLA factions fought each other, including attacks on civilians in the home turf of their opponents.[30]

Battles of 1992Edit

As of 1992 the Sudanese government launched a major offensive against SPLA, which was weakened by the split with SPLA-Nasir. SPLA lost control of Torit (where SPLA was headquartered), Bor, Yirol, Pibor, Pochalla and Kapoeta.[31][32]

SPLA made two attacks on Juba in June–July 1992. SPLA nearly captured the town. After the attacks, the Sudanese government forces committed harsh reprisals against the civilian population. Summary executions of suspected SPLA collaborators were carried out.[33] On September 27, 1992 the deputy commander-in-chief of SPLA, William Nyuon, defected and took a section of fighters with him.[34] SPLA re-captured Bor on November 29, 1991.[35]

Mid-1990sEdit

As of the mid-1990s, the majority of the population of Southern Sudan lived in areas under the control of either the mainstream SPLA or SPLA-Nasir.[36]

2005 Comprehensive Peace AgreementEdit

In 2004, a year before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers, estimated that there were between 2,500 and 5,000 children serving in the SPLA.[37]

 
Salva Kiir Mayardit, Commander-in-Chief of SPLA

Following the signing of the CPA, a SPLA reorganisation process began. This process was actively supported through funding from the United States. In 2005, John Garang restructured the top leadership of SPLA, with a Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Oyay Deng Ajak, and four Deputy Chiefs of General Staff; Maj. Gen. Salva Mathok Gengdit (Administration), Maj. Gen. Bior Ajang Aswad (Operations), Maj. Gen. James Hoth Mai (Logistics) and Maj. Gen. Obuto Mamur Mete (Political and Moral Orientation).[3]

 
SPLA officer as part of Joint Integrated Units during the CPA era

The initial organization of the SPLA, based on divisions, was put together in mid-2005 but not actually put into practice in the field until early 2006. It was based on six divisions (in Upper Nile State; 2nd Division: Equatorias; 3rd Division: Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap states; 4th Division Unity State; the 5th Division in Lakes State, the 6th Division, SPLA personnel in the Joint Integrated Units) and four independent brigades.[38] The four independent brigades grouped SPLA forces in Southern Blue Nile, Bor (Jonglei), the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan) and Raja (Western Bahr el Ghazal).

Probably more important than the reorganization was the Juba Declaration agreement that was signed between Salva and General Paulino Matiep on 8 January 2006. Matiep commanded the South Sudan Defence Forces, the largest and best-equipped militia that remained beyond SPLA control up to that point. Paulino was appointed as a Deputy Chief of Staff, his subordinate generals became part of the SPLA without any reduction in rank, and about 50,000 SSDF were added to the SPLA payroll.[39] The number of generals in the SPLA also rose as Salva promoted hundreds of existing SPLA officers to match the arriving ex-SSDF generals. By 2011 and independence, the SPLA had 745 generals. At about the same time, the legislature voted to double the base pay of an infantryman from the equivalent of $75 a month (the rate under Khartoum's control) to $150 a month.

In 2007–08 the independent brigades in Blue Nile, Bor, and the Nuba Mountains became the 10th, 8th, and 9th divisions, respectively.[40] The 9th and 10th Divisions thus fell north of the 1-1-56 Independence dividing line between North and South Sudan. The last independent brigade, in Raja, became part of the 5th Division.

Ministry of DefenceEdit

In 2007, the SPLM/A established a Ministry of Defence. Gen. Dominic Dim Deng an SPLA veteran and distinguished General, was chosen to become the first Minister for SPLA Affairs subsequently the first political officer of the SPLA. General Dim died in a plane crash in 2008 alongside his wife Madam Josephine Apieu Jenaro Aken and other SPLA officers. He is buried alongside his wife at the SPLA headquarters in Bilpham, Juba.[3]

Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) James Hoth Mai replaced Oyay Deng Ajak as Chief of General Staff in May 2009.[41]

In 2010 U.S. diplomats reported that Samora "made a point to discuss how the SPLA needed to be reorganized. He stated that the SPLA was top heavy, carrying nearly 550 general officers and providing more than 200 security guards for each minister."[42]

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement stipulated that the SPLA in northern Sudan were to move south of the 1956 North-South boundary during the interim period, excepting those part of the Joint Integrated Units, composed of equal numbers from the SPLA and the Sudanese Armed Forces.[43] Officially, this move did take place, in 2008, with the 10th Division relocating its headquarters to Guffa, five kilometers south of the Blue Nile-Upper Nile border, and most of its troops to al-Fuj, Yafta and Marinja on the southern side.[44] However some fighters, more than 1,600, actually remained north of the line. In early June 2011, following the lack of progress on popular consultations in Southern Kordofan & Blue Nile, the SAF attempted to forcefully disarm Nuba SPLA soldiers, and fighting began in Southern Kordofan.[45] After the fighting began, former SPLA 9th and 10th Division fighters proclaimed themselves as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLA-N), under Malik Agar as Chairman and Commander-in-Chief.[46]

The Government of Southern Sudan named the SPLA General Headquarters outside Juba 'Bilpam'.[9] The headquarters staff was expanded after 2008 to match the ten-division structure. This expansion coincided with the completion of the GHQ facility at Bilpam, built by DynCorp with funds from the U.S. State Department’s Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP).[47]

Work on a national security strategy began in late 2012.[48]

Southern Civil WarEdit

On December 15, 2013, fighting broke out in Juba between different factions of the armed forces in what the South Sudanese government described as a coup d'état. President Salva Kiir announced that the attempt had been put down the next day, but fighting resumed December 16. Military spokesman Colonel Philip Aguer said that some military installations had been attacked by armed soldiers but that "the army is in full control of Juba." He added that an investigation was under way.[49]

Eventually the Sudan People's Liberation Movement split into two main factions, divided on the issue over leadership of the ruling party:

  • Sudan People's Liberation Movement (In Government) – this group was led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit; ruling faction that signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. Salva Kiir served as president of the Transitional Autonomous Region of South Sudan from its formation in 2005 after the death of John Garang to the countries independence in 2011. The SPLM-IO faction formally withdrew from the SPLM ruling faction in 2013.
  • Sudan People's Liberation Movement (In Opposition) – this group was formed in 2013 is led by former South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar. The group is the major opponent to the SPLM-IG faction in the Southern Sudanese civil war.

The coordination of the April-July 2015 attack by the SPLA-IG in Unity State — involving multiple divisions across multiple sectors — indicates a high level of operational planning from Juba.[50] The ferocity by which people were chased into the swamps to be killed was aimed at annihilating the SPLM/A-in-Opposition’s support base, and led to a systematic destruction of villages and towns.

The Tiger Faction New Forces (also called Tiger Faction or 'The Tigers')[51] split from the SPLA in late October 2015. A Shilluk militia, it aimed reversing the division of South Sudan into 28 (later 32) states in order to restore the territory of the Shilluk Kingdom to its 1956 borders.[51] Led by Yoanis Okiech, the TFNF started an insurgency against the SPLM government.[52] In the course of 2016, however, it also came into conflict with the SPLM-IO rebels, leading to Okiech's death and the group's destruction in January 2017.

Over the course of the war, the SPLA has become dominated by Dinka, in particular Dinka from greater Bahr el-Ghazal. The Panel of Experts wrote in 2016 that '..While other tribes are represented in SPLA, they are increasingly marginalized, rendering the multi-tribal structure of the army largely a façade that obscures the central role that Dinka now play in virtually all major theatres of the conflict. (S/2016/963, 8)

On May 16, 2017, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir announced that the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) name would be changed to South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF).[53]

A cessation of hostilities agreement was agreed in December 2017, but it never really took effect. The negotiations stalled over disagreement among the parties about power sharing, future security arrangements and whether Riak Machar could return from exile to political life in South Sudan. In early May 2018, a two-day meeting of the Parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) started in Addis Ababa. The parties were to take stock of the progress so far of the R-ARCSS, the pending tasks, and debate the way forward.

Structure and equipmentEdit

The SPLA is commanded by the Chief of General Staff (COGS). Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) James Hoth Mai replaced Oyay Deng Ajak as Chief of General Staff in May 2009.[54] James Hoth Mai was superseded by Paul Malong Awan as COGS in 2014, and Malong was superseded by James Ajongo Mawut (May 2017-April 2018). On 28 April 2018, Chief of General Staff James Ajongo Mawut died in Cairo from a short illness.[55] He was replaced by General Gabriel Jok Riak on 4 May 2018.[2]

The COGS oversees five directorates, each led by a Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCOGS):

  • Administration
  • Operations
  • Logistics
  • Political and Moral Orientation
  • Training and Research

The SPLA currently has nine divisions and a small air force, all of which report to the DCOGS, Operations:

  • 1st Division : Renk, Upper Nile State. Established 2006. After the CPA, George Athor was appointed a major general and confirmed in overall commander of Division I (2005-07) before being moved to SPLA HQ in Bilpam as director for administration.[56] The Small Arms Survey wrote in early 2016 that '..[the] Division, stationed in Renk and widely regarded as the best fighting force in the country, is largely Nuer. Until 2 December 2015, it was under the command of Stephen Buay, a Bul Nuer who was subsequently redeployed to lead the SPLA’s 4th Division in Rubkona, Unity State.'[57]
  • 2nd Division : Giada Barracks, Juba, Central Equatoria State Established 2006. By 2013 division headquarters was at Mogiri east of Juba.[58] On 19 August 2011, it was reported that the UN SRSG would visit Kapoeta to meet the County Commissioner and the Commander of Brigade 9 of the SPLA's 2nd Division.[59]
  • 3rd Division : Winejok, Northern Bahr el Ghazal[60] (also covers Warrap State)
  • 4th Division : Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal[61] (formerly at Rubkona)  Established 2006. Rands wrote in 2010 that "Upon integrating into the SPLA, the core forces of Paulino Matiep, under the command of Tahib Gatluak, [remained] in Mayom County in Unity State. Some were then redeployed to Juba to join Matiep’s bodyguard. The remaining men were deployed as part of the 4th Division in Duar, Unity State." News reports on December 21, 2013 from Bentiu said the 4th Division commander, James Koang Chuol, had declared that he has deposed the caretaker governor and that his forces were no longer loyal to President Salva Kiir.[62] Chuol said he had overthrown Governor Joseph Monytuel after surviving an assassination attempt. Koang said that the 4th Division’s tank unit allegedly tried to kill him at around 7pm on Friday evening upon being ordered by Monytuel at the behest of senior SPLA members in Juba. Significant forces from Division IV defected to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition, with their arms and ammunition.[63] Division IV was involved in the April-July Unity State offensive by the SPLA, alongside Bul Nuer youth, other SPLA forces, and other armed groups.[64] In 2015-16, the division was placed under the command of Stephen Buay.
  • 5th Division : Girinti Barracks, Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal State[65] (formerly at Rumbek) [1]
  • 6th Division : Maridi, Western Equatoria. On 13 August 2016, some 800 to 900 troops from SPLA Division VI launched an incursion into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, crossing the border and engaging in a battle with SPLM/A in Opposition.[66]
  • 7th Division : Owachi, Upper Nile State[67] Rands wrote in 2010 that '..[m]uch of the SPLA’s 7th Division operating west of the Nile in the Shilluk areas of Upper Nile State is composed of former forces of the SSDF commander Peter Gadet, now a major general in the SPLA. Gadet stayed with SAF Military Intelligence during the Juba Declaration process and many were suspicious of his allegiances. As of the time of writing when Rands wrote, Gadet's authority over his former men in the 7th Division was unclear.[68] Still under command of Peter Gadet in 2013. Significant forces from Division VII defected to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition, with their arms and ammunition.[63] Gadet died on 15 April 2019.
  • 8th Division : Bor, Jonglei State
  • Mechanized Division : Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal State[69] Circa July 15, 2017, the Mechanized Division, with the 8th Infantry Division, was to deploy forces to the Juba-Bor road to ensure the safety of travelers, the SPLA spokesperson announced. The move came after a series of deadly road attack by armed men.[70]
  • Special Forces brigade with four battalions
  • The Sudan People's Air Force : Juba, Central Equatoria State

According to a 2015 security agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition, military forces currently stationed in Juba, Bor and Malakal are to be moved to bases at least 25 kilometers outside of each respective city. The Presidential Guard at Giada Barracks and SPLA's General Headquarters in Bilpam are authorized exceptions to the agreement.[71]

EquipmentEdit

 
A T-72 in SPLA service

As of 2013 the SPLA's land forces operated the following heavy equipment:

As of 2013 the South Sudan Air Force operated the following aircraft:

Defence expenditureEdit

According to the 2013 edition of the International Institute for Strategic Studies' report The Military Balance, South Sudan's defence budgets since 2011 have been as follows:

Year South Sudanese pounds US dollar equivalent
2011 1.6bn 533m
2012 2.42bn 537m
2013 2.52bn

NotesEdit

  1. ^ "SPLA renamed South Sudan Defense Force in a major army shake up". Eye Radio Network. 2017-05-16. Retrieved 2018-06-17.
  2. ^ a b "New South Sudan army chief sworn in". Radio Tamazuj. Retrieved 2018-06-17.
  3. ^ a b c d Rands, Richard (2010). In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond (PDF). Small Arms Survey HSBA.
  4. ^ IISS 2018, p. 487.
  5. ^ AfricaNews. "South Sudan president restructures army, changes its name to SSDF - Africanews". africanews.com. Retrieved 1 April 2018.
  6. ^ Isabirye, Joel (August 8, 2017). "From SPLA to SSPDF: The Detailed Account of why South Sudan is changing the name of its Heroic National Army". The Investigator. Retrieved October 9, 2017.
  7. ^ "South Sudan president says changed SPLA name to represent will of people". Sudan Tribune. Juba. August 4, 2017. Retrieved October 9, 2017.
  8. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 16
  9. ^ a b c Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. pp. 252-253
  10. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. xiv
  11. ^ a b Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 210
  12. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 90
  13. ^ a b c d e Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. pp. 18-19
  14. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 23
  15. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 65
  16. ^ a b c Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. pp. 153-155
  17. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 1
  18. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 27
  19. ^ a b c d Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. pp. 21, 23
  20. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 101
  21. ^ Norsk Bistandshistorie (Norwegian aid history), Randi Rønning Balsvik, 2016. p. 115 https://www.idunn.no/ht/2017/02/randi_roenning_balsvik_norsk_bistandshistorie
  22. ^ Moorcroft, 'Omar al-Bashir and Africa's Longest War,' 2015, 72.
  23. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 22
  24. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 25
  25. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster: an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 53
  26. ^ Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 128
  27. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 25
  28. ^ a b Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 208
  29. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 91
  30. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 3
  31. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 35
  32. ^ Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo. Civil wars of the world: major conflicts since World War II. 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 748.
  33. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. pp. 56-58
  34. ^ Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 220
  35. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 99
  36. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 12
  37. ^ "SPLA to demobilize all child soldiers by end of the year - Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan". Sudan Tribune. Retrieved 2012-06-20.
  38. ^ Rands, Richard (2010). In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond (PDF). Small Arms Survey HSBA. p. 9.
  39. ^ Young, John (2012). The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process. Zed Books. pp. 121–2. in Alex de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, Polity 2015 96.
  40. ^ Rands, Richard (2010). In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond (PDF). Small Arms Survey HSBA. p. 10.
  41. ^ "Kiir appoints new army Chief of Staff, relieves deputies". Sudan Tribune. June 1, 2009. Retrieved January 7, 2014.
  42. ^ 10ADDISABABA176
  43. ^ CPA Annexure I, Part 1, Article 7.1.2
  44. ^ International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile Crisis Group Africa Report N°204, 18 June 2013, p.14
  45. ^ https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8591.pdf, p.3
  46. ^ ibid ODI p.7
  47. ^ Rands 2010, 11
  48. ^ a b c d e f g h i j IISS 2013, p. 532.
  49. ^ "Heavy gunfire rocks South Sudan capital". Al Jazeera. 16 December 2013. Retrieved 17 December 2013.
  50. ^ Interim Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2015/656, 21 August 2015, Annex V, p.37
  51. ^ a b "Tiger faction of ethnic Shilluk kingdom dismisses integration into SPLM-IO". Sudan Tribune. 11 March 2016. Retrieved 26 November 2017.
  52. ^ "The Conflict in Upper Nile State". Small Arms Survey. 8 March 2016. Retrieved 28 November 2017.
  53. ^ AfricaNews. "South Sudan president restructures army, changes its name to SSDF - Africanews". africanews.com.
  54. ^ "Kiir appoints new army Chief of Staff, relieves deputies". Sudan Tribune. June 1, 2009. Retrieved January 7, 2014.
  55. ^ Dumo, Denis. "Wartorn South Sudan's army chief dies". U.S. Retrieved 2018-06-17.
  56. ^ Kuyok, Kuyok Abol (2015). South Sudan: The Notable Firsts. AuthorHouse.
  57. ^ Small Arms Survey. "The Conflict in Upper Nile State" (PDF).
  58. ^ https://allafrica.com/stories/201312171665.html
  59. ^ https://allafrica.com/stories/201108221292.html
  60. ^ https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/south-sudan-army-defection-wunyiik
  61. ^ https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/missing-money-spla-div-4-widows-unpaid
  62. ^ http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49274
  63. ^ a b "S/2016/656" (PDF). p. 22.
  64. ^ Interim Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2016/656, 21 August 2015, Annex V.
  65. ^ "SPLA launches military operations against SPLA-IO forces in Bahr-el-Ghazal region - Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan". www.sudantribune.com. Retrieved 1 April 2018.
  66. ^ Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2016/963, p.3
  67. ^ "SSDM/A-Upper Nile". www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. Retrieved 1 April 2018.
  68. ^ Rands 2010, 15.
  69. ^ "The Conflict in Bahr el Ghazal". www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. Retrieved 1 April 2018.
  70. ^ https://eyeradio.org/spla-deploys-soldiers-juba-bor-road/
  71. ^ Desk, News. "SPLA Starts redeploying forces out of Juba". thenationmirror.com. Retrieved 1 April 2018.

ReferencesEdit

Further readingEdit

  • Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad, and Daly, M. W., Civil war in the Sudan, London ; New York : British Academic Press : Distributed by St. Martinʾs Press in the United States of America and Canada, 1993. (See Douglas and Prunier article on origins of SPLA)
  • Further reading: African Rights, 1997. Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism, London: African Rights. Militarism and brutality of the early SPLA.

External linksEdit