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The idea of preference falsification was formalized by social scientist Timur Kuran in his book Private Truth, Public Lies in 1997

Preference falsification is the act of communicating a preference that differs from one's true preference. Individuals frequently convey, especially to researchers or pollsters, preferences that differ from what they genuinely want, often because they believe the conveyed preference is more socially acceptable than their actual preference. The idea of preference falsification was put forth by the social scientist Timur Kuran in his book Private Truth, Public Lies as part of his theory of how people's stated preferences are responsive to social influences. It laid the foundation for his theory of why unanticipated revolutions can occur. It is related to ideas of social proof as well as choice blindness.

Original formulationEdit

According to the theory, when articulating preferences individuals frequently tailor their choices to what appears socially acceptable. In other words, they convey preferences that differ from what they genuinely want. Kuran calls the resulting misrepresentation "preference falsification". In his 1995 book, Private Truths, Public Lies, he argues that the phenomenon is ubiquitous and that it has huge social and political consequences. These consequences all hinge on interdependencies between individuals' decisions as to what preference to convey publicly. A person who hides his discontent about a fashion, policy, or political regime makes it harder for others to express discontent.

One socially significant consequence of preference falsification is widespread public support for social options that would be rejected decisively in a vote taken by secret ballot. Privately unpopular policies may be retained indefinitely as people reproduce conformist social pressures through individual acts of preference falsification.

In falsifying preferences, people hide the knowledge on which it rests. In the process, they distort, corrupt, and impoverish the knowledge in the public domain. They make it harder for others to become informed about the drawbacks of existing arrangements and the merits of their alternatives. Another consequence of preference falsification is thus widespread ignorance about the advantages of change. Over long periods, preference falsification can dampen a community's capacity to want change by bringing about intellectual narrowness and ossification.

The first of these consequences is driven by people's need for social approval, the second by their reliance on each other for information.

Kuran has applied these observations to a range of contexts. He has used the theory developed in Private Truths, Public Lies to explain why major political revolutions catch us by surprise, how ethnic tensions can feed on themselves, why India's caste system has been a powerful social force for millennia, and why minor risks sometimes generate mass hysteria.[1]

Academic researchEdit

Kuran has published a number of papers on the themes of preference falsification (his book Private Truth, Public Lies is based on these papers).[2]

The idea of preference falsification has been studied by a number of social scientists. Economist Robert H. Frank reviewed Timur Kuran's book and offered his own thoughts on the political economy of preference falsification.[3] William Davis considered preference falsification within the economics profession.[4]

See alsoEdit

ReferencesEdit

  1. ^ Kuran, Timur, Private Truths, Public Lies, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
  2. ^ Kuran, Timur (1987). "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism". The Economic Journal. 97 (387): 642–665. doi:10.2307/2232928. JSTOR 2232928.
  3. ^ Frank, Robert (1996). "The Political Economy of Preference Falsification". Journal of Economic Literature. 34 (1): 115–123. JSTOR 2729412.
  4. ^ Davis, William. "Preference Falsification in the Economics Profession". Retrieved 2013-01-30.