Perspectivism (German: Perspektivismus) is the view that perception, experience, and reason change according to the viewer's relative perspective and interpretation.[citation needed]

There are many possible conceptual schemes, or perspectives in which judgment of truth or value can be made. This is often taken to imply that no way of seeing the world can be taken as definitively "true", but does not necessarily entail that all perspectives are equally valid. Leibniz integrated this view into his philosophy, but Nietzsche fully developed it.[citation needed]

It rejects both the idea of perspective-free or interpretation-free objective reality.[1]

Nietzsche’s perspectivismEdit

Perspectivism rejects objective metaphysics, claiming that no evaluation of objectivity can transcend cultural formations or subjective designations.[2] Therefore, there are no objective facts, nor any knowledge of a thing-in-itself. Truth is separated from any particular vantage point, and so there are no ethical or epistemological absolutes.[3] Rules (i.e., those of philosophy, the scientific method, etc.) are constantly reassessed according to the circumstances of individual perspectives.[4] Truth is thus created by integrating different vantage points together.

People always adopt perspectives by default – whether they are aware of it or not – and the concepts of one's existence are defined by the circumstances surrounding that individual. Truth is made by and for individuals and peoples.[5] This view differs from many types of relativism which consider the truth of a particular proposition as something that altogether cannot be evaluated with respect to an absolute truth, without taking into consideration culture and context.[6]

This view is outlined in an aphorism from Nietzsche's posthumously-assembled collection The Will to Power:

In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable [emphasis in original] otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.—"Perspectivism." It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. [emphasis added] Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.

— Friedrich Nietzsche; trans. Walter Kaufmann, The Will to Power, §481 (1883–1888)[7]

The importance of perspective appears in Nietzsche's published works as early as The Gay Science, where he describes the effects of seeing things from different viewpoints.

From a distance.— This mountain makes the landscape it dominates charming and significant in every way. Having said this to ourselves a hundred times, we become so unreasonable and grateful that we suppose that whatever bestows so much charm must also be the most charming thing around — and we climb the mountain and are disappointed. Suddenly the mountain itself and the whole landscape around us, below us, have lost their magic. We have forgotten that some greatness, like some goodness, wants to be beheld only from a distance and by all means only from below, not from above; otherwise it makes no impression.

— Friedrich Nietzsche; trans. Walter Kaufmann, The Gay Science, §15

InterpretationEdit

Richard Schacht, in his interpretation of Nietzsche's thought, argues that this can be expanded into a revised form of objectivity in relation to subjectivity as an aggregate of singular viewpoints. These aggregated perspectives illuminate, for example, a particular idea in seemingly self-contradictory ways. Upon further consideration they reveal a difference of contextuality and of rule by which such an idea (that is fundamentally perspectival) can be validated. Therefore, it can be said each perspective is subsumed into and, taking account of its individuated context, adds to the overall objective measure of a proposition under examination. Nevertheless, perspectivism does not implicate any method of inquiry nor a structural theory of knowledge in general.[8]

Perspectivism can survive self-referential paradoxes about truth and justification.[9]

Contemporary philosophyEdit

In contemporary philosophy, perspectivism was revived by José Ortega y Gasset.[10]

OriginEdit

Perspectivism was thought about in Plato's rendition of Protagoras (c. 490 BC – c. 420 BC).

See alsoEdit

ReferencesEdit

  • Edwards, David (1979). "The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics" (PDF). Synthese. 42: 1–70.
  1. ^ "Perspectivism - New World Encyclopedia". www.newworldencyclopedia.org. Retrieved 2019-10-17.
  2. ^ Lacewing, Michael. "Nietzsche's perspectivism" (PDF). A-Level Philosophy. Routledge.
  3. ^ Mautner, Thomas, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, 2005, page 418
  4. ^ Schacht, Richard, Nietzsche, 1993, page 61.
  5. ^ Scott-Kakures, Dion, History of Philosophy, 1993, page 346
  6. ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1878). "Section 16". Human, All Too Human.
  7. ^ Original German: Soweit überhaupt das Wort »Erkenntniß« Sinn hat, ist die Welt erkennbar: aber sie ist anders deutbar, sie hat keinen Sinn hinter sich, sondern unzählige Sinne. – »Perspektivismus«. ¶ Unsere Bedürfnisse sind es, die die Welt auslegen; unsere Triebe und deren Für und Wider. Jeder Trieb ist eine Art Herrschsucht, jeder hat seine Perspektive, welche er als Norm allen übrigen Trieben aufzwingen möchte. (Wille zur Macht, Nr. 481.)
  8. ^ Schacht, Richard, Nietzsche, 1993.[page needed]
  9. ^ Songsuk Hahn, Susan (May 2015). Forster, Michael N.; Gjesdal, Kristin (eds.). "Perspectivism". The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford Handbooks Online. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696543.013.0032.
  10. ^ Holmes, Oliver, "José Ortega y Gasset", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).