Islamic terrorism, Islamist terrorism or radical Islamic terrorism is defined as any terrorist act, set of acts or campaign committed by groups or individuals who profess Islamic or Islamist motivations or goals. Islamic terrorists justify their violent tactics through the interpretation of Quran and Hadith according to their own goals and intentions. The motivation for Islamic terrorism in part comes from the idea of Islamic supremacy which is encapsulated in the formula, "Islam is exalted and nothing is exalted above it."
The highest numbers of incidents and fatalities caused by Islamic terrorism occur in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. In 2015 four Islamic extremist groups were responsible for 74% of all deaths from terrorism: ISIS, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2016. In recent decades, such incidents have occurred on a global scale, affecting not only Muslim-majority states in Africa and Asia, but also several other countries, including those within the European Union, Russia, Australia, Canada, India, the United Kingdom and the United States. Such attacks have targeted Muslims and non-Muslims. In a number of the worst-affected Muslim-majority regions, these terrorists have been met by armed, independent resistance groups, state actors and their proxies, and elsewhere by condemnation coming from prominent Islamic figures.
The literal use of the phrase "Islamic terrorism" is disputed. Such use in Western political speech has variously been called "counter-productive", "highly politicized, intellectually contestable" and "damaging to community relations".
Some Muslim commentators assert that extremism within Islam goes back to the 7th century to the Kharijites. From their essentially political position, they developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. The Kharijites were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach of takfir, whereby they declared other Muslims to be unbelievers and therefore deemed them worthy of death.
After failed post-colonial attempts at state formation and the creation of Israel, a series of Marxist and anti-Western transformations and movements swept throughout the Arab and Islamic world. The growth of these nationalist and revolutionary movements, along with their views that terrorism could be effective in reaching their political goals, generated the first phase of modern international terrorism. In the late 1960s, Palestinian secular movements such as Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) began to target civilians outside the immediate arena of conflict. Following Israel's 1967 defeat of Arab forces, Palestinian leaders began to see that the Arab world was unable to militarily confront Israel. During the same time, lessons drawn from revolutionary movements in Latin America, North Africa, Southeast Asia as well as during the Jewish struggle against Britain in Palestine, saw the Palestinians turn away from guerrilla warfare towards urban terrorism. These movements were secular in nature but their international organization served to spread terrorist tactics worldwide.
While secular Palestinians were the most significant movement in the 1970s, religiously motivated groups also grew after the failure of Arab nationalism in the 1967 war. In the Middle East, Islamic movements came into conflict with secular nationalism. Islamic groups were supported by Saudi Arabia, to counter nationalist ideology.
According to Bruce Hoffman of RAND, in 1980 two out of 64 groups were categorized as having religious motivation, in 1995 almost half (26 out of 56) were religiously motivated with the majority having Islam as their guiding force.
The year 1979 was a turning point in international terrorism. Throughout the Arab world and the West, the Iranian Islamic revolution ignited fears of a wave of revolutionary Shia Islam. Meanwhile, the Soviet–Afghan War and the subsequent anti-Soviet mujahedin war, lasting from 1979 to 1989, started the rise and expansion of terrorist groups. Since their beginning in 1994, the Pakistani-supported Taliban militia in Afghanistan has gained several characteristics traditionally associated with state-sponsors of terrorism, providing logistical support, travel documentation, and training facilities. Since 1989 the increasing willingness of religious extremists to strike targets outside immediate country or regional areas highlights the global nature of contemporary terrorism. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, are representative of this trend.
The Global Terrorism Index report of 2015 illuminate the rise in death due to terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attack in this graphic:
Since World War II, Muslim immigrants have emigrated to western countries in large numbers because fellow Muslim countries that are well-off economically and socially do not accept them. Out of the 57 Muslim majority countries, only two nations (Turkey and Malaysia) offer a formal path for immigrants to become naturalized citizens, regardless of birthplace, religious beliefs, marital status or ethnic origin. Even the oil-rich Gulf states do not grant citizenship to immigrants, regardless of how long they have resided in those countries. To make matters more difficult, Gulf states have stringent laws which explicitly state that an immigrant or expat can become a citizen only if his/her father was a citizen or, in some cases, if an expat woman marries an Arab national. These laws make it almost impossible for expats (both Muslim and non-Muslim) to gain citizenship.
In 2014, the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the unrecognised Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, took advantage of this resentment among some Muslims living in other Arab states and urged those Muslims to emigrate to the new Islamic state. ISIS, also known as "The Islamic State", promised all Muslim immigrants "citizenship" immediately upon arrival. They even went as far as issuing "Caliphate Passports" to the newly arrived immigrants.
The Muslim world has been afflicted with economic stagnation for many centuries. In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that apart from crude oil, the exports of the entire Greater Middle East with its 400 million population roughly equals that of Switzerland. It has also been estimated that the exports of Finland, a European country of only five million, exceeded those of the entire 370 million-strong Arab world, excluding oil and natural gas. This economic stagnation is argued by historian David Fromkin in his work A Peace to End All Peace to have commenced with the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, with trade networks being disrupted and societies torn apart with the creation of new nation states. Although the Ottoman Empire was referred to as the Sick man of Europe, the parts of the Middle East under Ottoman rule still had a diverse and steady growing economy with more general prosperity.
Identity-based frameworks for analyzing Islamist-based terrorismEdit
Islamist-based fundamentalist terrorism against Western nations and the U.S. in particular, has numerous motivations and takes place the larger context of a complex and tense relationship between the 'West' and the Arab and Muslim 'world,' which is highlighted in the previous section on motivations and Islamic terrorism. Identity-based theoretical frameworks, including theories of social identity, social categorization theory, and psychodynamics are used to explain the reasons terrorism occurs.
Social identity is explained by Karina Korostelina as a "feeling of belonging to a social group, as a strong connection with social category, and as an important part of our mind that affects our social perceptions and behavior" This definition can be applied to the case of Osama bin Laden, who, according to this theory, had a highly salient perception of his social identity as a Muslim, a strong connection to the social category of the Muslim Ummah or 'community,' which affect his social perceptions and behaviors. Bin Laden's ideology and interpretation of Islam led to the creation of al-Qaeda in response to perceived threats against the Muslim community by the Soviet Union, the U.S. in particular due to its troop presence in Saudi Arabia, and American support for Israel. The Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda has a group identity, which includes "shared experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and interests of in-group members", and is "described through the achievement of a collective aim for which this group has been created", which in this case is to achieve "a complete break from the foreign influences in Muslim countries, and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate".
Social categorization theory has been discussed as a three-stage process of identification, where "individuals define themselves as members of a social group, learn the stereotypes and norms of the group, and group categories influence the perception and understanding of all situations in a particular context" This definition can be applied to the US-led war on terror, in which conflict features such as the phenomenon of Anti-Americanism and the phenomenon of non-Arab countries like Iran and Afghanistan lending support to Islamist-based terrorism by funding or harboring terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda against Western nations, particularly Israel and the United States are, according to social categorization theory, influenced by a three-stage process of identification. In this three-stage process of identification, the Arab and Muslim world(s) are the social group(s), in which their members learn stereotypes and norms which categorize their social group vis-à-vis the West. This social categorization process creates feelings of high-level in-group support and allegiance among Arabs and Muslims and the particular context within which members of the Arab and Muslim world(s) social group(s) understand all situations that involve the West. Social categorization theory as a framework for analysis indicates causal relationships between group identification processes and features of conflict situations.
One ideology that plays a role in terrorism by using the name of Islam, is Wahabism. Wahabism and its allies including Salafism (Salafi jihadism) supports war against any one and every one who is not like them. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab (militant group), Boko Haram, Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, Taliban, Sipah Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Hizbul Mujahideen follow Wahabi or Salafi ideology which is commonly opposed by other Muslims. Non-Muslims, Sufis, and Shias are attacked by hard-core Wahhabis, Deobandis, and jamaatis in the same way that socialists and other leftist proletarians were assaulted by Mussolini's bandits, Jews and others by the Nazis, and "bourgeois", "kulak", intellectual, Jewish, "Menshevik", and "Trotskyist" dissenters were assaulted by Stalinists. In India, Wahabism was spread in the name of Deobandi movement.
Transnational Islamist ideology, specifically of the militant Islamists, assert that Western policies and society are actively anti-Islamic, or as it is sometimes described, waging a "war against Islam". Islamists often identify what they see as a historical struggle between Christianity and Islam, dating back as far as the Crusades, among other historical conflicts between practitioners of the two respective religions. Osama bin Laden, for example, almost invariably described his enemies as aggressive and his call for action against them as defensive. Defensive jihad differs from offensive jihad by being "fard al-ayn", or a personal obligation of all Muslims, rather than "fard al-kifaya", a communal obligation, that is, some Muslims may perform it but it is not required of others. Hence, framing a fight as defensive has the advantage of both appearing to be a victim rather than appearing to be an aggressor, and giving the struggle the very highest religious priority for all good Muslims.
Many of the violent terrorist groups use the name of jihad to fight against certain Western nations and Israel. An example is bin Laden's al-Qaeda, which is also known as "International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders". Most militant Islamists oppose Israel's policies, and they often oppose its very existence.
According to U.S. Army Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, "ideology", rather than any individual or group, is the "center of gravity" of al-Qaeda and related groups, and that ideology is a "collection of violent Islamic thought called Qutbism". He summarizes the tenets of Qutbism as being:
- A belief that Muslims have deviated from true Islam and must return to "pure Islam" as originally practiced during the time of Muhammad.
- The path to "pure Islam" is only through a literal and strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith, along with implementation of Muhammad's commands.
- Muslims should interpret the original sources individually without being bound to follow the interpretations of Islamic scholars.
- That any interpretation of the Quran from a historical, contextual perspective is a corruption, and that the majority of Islamic history and the classical jurisprudential tradition is mere sophistry.
The historic rivalry between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian subcontinent has also often been the primary motive behind some of the most deadly terrorist attacks in India. According to a U.S. State Department report, India topped the list of countries most affected by Islamic terrorism.
In addition, Islamist militants, scholars, and leaders opposed Western society for what they see as immoral secularism. Islamists have claimed that such unrestricted free speech has led to the proliferation of pornography, immorality, secularism, homosexuality, feminism, and many other ideas that Islamists often oppose. Although bin Laden almost always emphasized the alleged oppression of Muslims by America and Jews when talking about them in his messages, in his "Letter to America", he answered the question, "What are we calling you to, and what do we want from you?" with
We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling's, and trading with interest (...) You separate religion from your policies, (...) You are the nation that permits Usury, which has been forbidden by all the religions (...) You are a nation that permits the production, trading and usage of intoxicants (...) You are a nation that permits acts of immorality (...) You are a nation that permits gambling in its all forms. (...) You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women.
Given their perceived piety, The Times noted the irony when an investigation discovered that Jihadists were seeking anonymity through some of the same networks used to distribute child pornography. The paper praised the raid's ability to "improve understanding of the mindsets of both types of criminals". Similarly, Reuters reported that pornography was found among the materials seized from Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad compound that was raided by U.S. Navy SEALs.
In 2006, Britain's then head of MI5 Eliza Manningham-Buller said of Al-Qaeda that it "has developed an ideology which claims that Islam is under attack, and needs to be defended". "This," she said "is a powerful narrative that weaves together conflicts from across the globe, presenting the West's response to varied and complex issues, from long-standing disputes such as Israel/Palestine and Kashmir to more recent events as evidence of an across-the-board determination to undermine and humiliate Islam worldwide." She said that the video wills of British suicide bombers made it clear that they were motivated by perceived worldwide and long-standing injustices against Muslims; an extreme and minority interpretation of Islam promoted by some preachers and people of influence; their interpretation as anti-Muslim of UK foreign policy, in particular the UK's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan." She also cautioned how difficult it was to gain a proper perspective, saying that although there are more important dangers we face daily without feeling so threatened by them, such as climate change and road deaths, and though terrorist deaths were few, the intelligence services had prevented some potentially large threats and that vigilance was needed.
Colonel Eikmeier points out the "questionable religious credentials" of many Islamist theorists, or "Qutbists", which can be a "means to discredit them and their message":
With the exception of Abul Ala Maududi and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, none of Qutbism's main theoreticians trained at Islam's recognized centers of learning. Although a devout Muslim, Hassan al-Banna was a teacher and community activist. Sayyid Qutb was a literary critic. Mohammed Abdul-Salam Farag was an electrician. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a physician. Osama bin Laden trained to be a businessman.
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, in their book, The Age of Sacred Terror, argue that Islamic terrorist attacks are purely religious. They are seen as "a sacrament ... intended to restore to the universe a moral order that had been corrupted by the enemies of Islam." It is neither political or strategic but an "act of redemption" meant to "humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God".
Two studies of the background of Muslim terrorists in Europe—one of the UK and one of France—found little connection between religious piety and terrorism. According to a "restricted" report of hundreds of case studies by the UK domestic counter-intelligence agency MI5,
[f]ar from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices. Very few have been brought up in strongly religious households, and there is a higher than average proportion of converts. Some are involved in drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes. MI5 says there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.
A 2015 "general portrait" by Olivier Roy (see above) of "the conditions and circumstances" under which people living in France become "Islamic radicals" (terrorists or would-be terrorists) found radicalisation was not an "uprising of a Muslim community that is victim to poverty and racism: only young people join, including converts".
Roy believes terrorism/radicalism is "expressed in religious terms" because
- most of the radicals have a Muslim background, which makes them open to a process of re-Islamisation ("almost none of them having been pious before entering the process of radicalisation"), and
- jihad is "the only cause on the global market". If you kill in silence, it will be reported by the local newspaper; "if you kill yelling 'Allahu Akbar', you are sure to make the national headlines". Other extreme causes—ultra-left or radical ecology are "too bourgeois and intellectual" for the radicals.
According to Indonesian Islamic leader Yahya Cholil Staquf in a 2017 Time interview, according to classical Islamic tradition, the relationship between Muslims and Non-Muslims is one of segregation and enmity. In his view extremism and terrorism are linked with orthodox Islam and that radical Islamic movements are nothing new. He also added that Western politicians should stop pretending that extremism is not linked to Islam.
Interpretations of the Qur'an and HadithEdit
Donald Holbrook, a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, analyzes a sample of 30 works by jihadist propagandists and finds several passages of the Quran exploited and distorted to suit the objectives of violent jihad. An-Nisa (4:74–75) is quoted most frequently; other popular passages are At-Taubah (9:13–15, 38–39, 111) and Al-Baqarah (2:190–191, 216). Consider Surah 9:5:
But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations and pay the zakat, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.
Holbrook notes they cherry-picked the first part "slay the idolaters" but fail to quote and discuss limiting factors at the end of the ayat, "but if they repent …" This, Holbrook argues, is how violent jihadists are "shamelessly selective in order to serve their propaganda objectives." Peter Bergen notes that bin Laden cited this verse in 1998 when making a formal declaration of war.
Michael Sells and Jane I. Smith (a Professor of Islamic Studies) write that barring some extremists like al-Qaeda, most Muslims do not interpret Qur'anic verses as promoting warfare today but rather as reflecting historically dated contexts. According to Sells, "[Most Muslims] no more expect to apply [the verses at issue] to their contemporary non-Muslim friends and neighbors than most Christians and Jews consider themselves commanded by God, like the Biblical Joshua, to exterminate the infidels." In his book No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam, Iranian-American academic Reza Aslan argues that there is an internal battle currently taking place within Islam between individualistic reform ideals and the traditional authority of Muslim clerics similar to that of the 16th-century reformation in Christianity, which was as old as Islam currently is at that period. He writes, "the notion that historical context should play no role in the interpretation of the Koran—that what applied to Muhammad's community applies to all Muslim communities for all time—is simply an untenable position in every sense."
Supporters of bin Laden have also pointed to reports according to which the Islamic prophet Muhammad attacked towns at night or with catapults, and argued that he must have condoned incidental harm to noncombatants, since it would have been impossible to distinguish them from combatants during such attacks. These arguments were not widely accepted by Muslims.
The Pakistani theologian Javed Ahmad Ghamidi blames Muslim madrasas that indoctrinate children with Islamic supremacist views, such as that Muslims are legally superior to unbelievers (particularly former Muslims), and that jihad will eventually bring about a single caliphate to rule the world.
Jihad and Islamic jurisprudenceEdit
The Princeton University Middle Eastern scholar Bernard Lewis states that classical Islamic jurisprudence does not allow terrorism, and the "classical jurists of Islam never remotely considered [jihad] the kind of unprovoked, unannounced mass slaughter of uninvolved civil populations". In 2001, Professor Lewis noted:
Being a religious obligation, jihad is elaborately regulated in sharia law, which discusses in minute detail such matters as the opening, conduct, interruption and cessation of hostilities, the treatment of prisoners and noncombatants, the use of weapons, etc.... Similarly, the laws of Jihad categorically preclude wanton and indiscriminate slaughter. The warriors in the holy war are urged not to harm non-combatants, women and children, "unless they attack you first". ... A point on which they insist is the need for a clear declaration of war before beginning hostilities, and for proper warning before resuming hostilities after a truce. What the classical jurists of Islam never remotely considered is the kind of unprovoked, unannounced mass slaughter of uninvolved civil populations that we saw in New York two weeks ago. For this there is no precedent and no authority in Islam.
While techniques of war are restricted by classical Islamic jurisprudence, the scope is not. Lewis states that Jihad is an unlimited offensive to bring the whole world under Islamic rule and law. Classical Islamic jurisprudence imposes, without limit of time or space, the duty to subjugate non-Muslims, according to Lewis. Wael Hallaq writes that in the modern era the notion of jihad has lost its jurisprudential relevance and instead gave rise to an ideological and political discourse. While modernists view jihad as defensive and compatible with modern standards of warfare, some Islamists go beyond the classical theory to insist that the purpose of jihad is the fight against oppressive regimes and conversion of non-Muslims to Islam.
Scott Atran has found the greatest predictors of suicide bombings to be not religion but group dynamics: While personal humiliation does not turn out to be a motivation for those attempting to kill civilians, the perception that others with whom one feels a common bond are being humiliated can be a powerful driver for action. "Small-group dynamics involving friends and family that form the diaspora cell of brotherhood and camaraderie on which the rising tide of martyrdom actions is based". Terrorists, according to Atran, are social beings influenced by social connections and values. Rather than dying "for a cause", they might be said to have died "for each other". Simon Cottee in the New York Times suggested that sexual frustration is a major motivating factor in Islamist suicide bombing.
Western foreign policyEdit
According to a graph by U.S. State Department, terrorist attacks have escalated worldwide since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.[unreliable source?] Dame Eliza Manningham Buller, the former head of MI5, told the Iraq inquiry, the security services warned Tony Blair launching the War on Terror would increase the threat of terrorism.[better source needed] Robert Pape has argued that at least terrorists utilizing suicide attacks—a particularly effective form of terrorist attack—are driven not by Islamism but by "a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland". However, Martin Kramer, who debated Pape on origins of suicide bombing, stated that the motivation for suicide attacks is not just strategic logic but also an interpretation of Islam to provide a moral logic. For example, Hezbollah initiated suicide bombings after a complex reworking of the concept of martyrdom. Kramer explains that the Israeli occupation of the South Lebanon Security Zone raised the temperature necessary for this reinterpretation of Islam, but occupation alone would not have been sufficient for suicide terrorism. "The only way to apply a brake to suicide terrorism," Kramer argues, "is to undermine its moral logic, by encouraging Muslims to see its incompatibility with their own values."
Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer argues that terrorist attacks (specifically al-Qaeda attacks on targets in the United States) are not motivated by a religiously inspired hatred of American culture or religion, but by the belief that U.S. foreign policy has oppressed, killed, or otherwise harmed Muslims in the Middle East, condensed in the phrase "They hate us for what we do, not who we are." U.S. foreign policy actions Scheuer believes are fueling Islamic terror include: the US–led intervention in Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq; Israel–United States relations, namely, financial, military, and political support for Israel; U.S. support for "apostate" police states in Muslim nations such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait; U.S. support for the creation of an independent East Timor from territory previously held by Muslim Indonesia; perceived U.S. approval or support of actions against Muslim insurgents in India, the Philippines, Chechnya, and Palestine.
a tiny minority, from within the non-Iraqi British Muslim communities, reacted with violence on 7 July 2005. To interpret this simply as a "nationalist struggle" to remove occupation ignores the blatantly obvious fact that, first, the terrorists were not Iraqis, they were British-Pakistanis (though British Iraqis have lived here for a long time); second, the vast majority of the Stop the War protesters were non-Muslims, yet only a handful from among a minority of Muslims reacted to the war with terrorism. Even though occupation may have caused agitation among the 7 July bombers, these northern-born lads with thick Yorkshire accents confessed in their suicide tapes to considering themselves soldiers with a mission to kill our people (Britons) on behalf of their people (Iraqis). The prerequisite to such a disavowal of one's country of birth is a recalibration of identity; this is the undeniable role of ideological narratives.
Profiles of terroristsEdit
According to Scott Atran, a NATO researcher studying suicide terrorism, the available evidence contradicts a number of simplistic explanations for the motivations of terrorists, including mental instability, poverty, and feelings of humiliation.
Forensic psychiatrist and former foreign service officer Marc Sageman made an "intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad", in his book Understanding Terror Networks. He concluded social networks, the "tight bonds of family and friendship", rather than emotional and behavioral disorders of "poverty, trauma, madness, [or] ignorance", inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad and kill.
What the recruits tended to have in common—besides their urbanity, their cosmopolitan backgrounds, their education, their facility with languages, and their computer skills—was displacement. Most who joined the jihad did so in a country other than the one in which they were reared. They were Algerians living in expatriate enclaves in France, Moroccans in Spain, or Yemenis in Saudi Arabia. Despite their accomplishments, they had little standing in the host societies where they lived.
Scholar Olivier Roy describes the background of the hundreds of global (as opposed to local) terrorists who were incarcerated or killed and for whom authorities have records, as being surprising for their Westernized background; for the lack of Palestinians, Iraqis, Afghans "coming to avenge what is going on in their country"; their lack of religiosity before being "born again" in a foreign country; the high percentage of converts to Islam among them; their "de-territorialized backgrounds"—"For instance, they may be born in a country, then educated in another country, then go to fight in a third country and take refuge in a fourth country"; their nontraditional belief that jihad is permanent, global, and "not linked with a specific territory."
This profile differs from that found among recent local (as opposed to global) Islamist suicide bombers in Afghanistan, according to a 2007 study of 110 suicide bombers by Afghan pathologist Dr. Yusef Yadgari. Yadgari found that 80% of the attackers studied had some kind of physical or mental disability. The bombers were also "not celebrated like their counterparts in other Muslim nations. Afghan bombers are not featured on posters or in videos as martyrs." Daniel Byman, a Middle East expert at the Brookings Institution, and Christine Fair, an assistant professor in peace and security studies at Georgetown University, say that many of the Islamic terrorists are foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable.
Studying 300 cases of people charged with jihadist terrorism in the United States since September 11, 2001, author Peter Bergen found the perpetrators were "generally motivated by a mix of factors", including "militant Islamist ideology; dislike of American foreign policy in the Muslim world; a need to attach themselves to an ideology or organization that gave them a sense of purpose"; and a "cognitive opening" to militant Islam that often was "precipitated by personal disappointment, like the death of a parent".
Muslim attitudes toward terrorismEdit
Muslim popular opinion on the subject of attacks on civilians by Islamist groups varies. Fred Halliday, a British academic specialist on the Middle East, argues that most Muslims consider these acts to be egregious violations of Islam's laws. Muslims living in the West denounce the September 11th attacks against United States, while Hezbollah contends that their rocket attacks against Israeli targets are defensive Jihad by a legitimate resistance movement rather than terrorism.
Views of modern Islamic scholarsEdit
Although Islamic terrorism is commonly associated with the Salafis (or "Wahhabis"), the scholars of the group have constantly attributed this association to ignorance, misunderstanding and sometimes insincere research and deliberate misleading by rival groups. Following the September 11 attacks, Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh, the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, made an official statement that "the Islamic Sharee'ah (legislation) does not sanction" such actions. A Salafi "Committee of Major Scholars" in Saudi Arabia has declared that "Islamic" terrorism, such as the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh, are in violation of Sharia law and aiding the enemies of Islam.
Timothy Winter wrote that the proclamations of bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri "ignore 14 centuries of Muslim scholarship", and that if they "followed the norms of their religion, they would have had to acknowledge that no school of mainstream Islam allows the targeting of civilians."
Fethullah Gülen, a prominent Turkish Islamic scholar, has claimed (c.f. No True Scotsman) that "a real Muslim", who understood Islam in every aspect, could not be a terrorist. There are many other people with similar points of view such as Ahmet Akgunduz, Harun Yahya and Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri. Huston Smith, an author on comparative religion, argued that extremists have hijacked Islam, just as has occurred periodically in Christianity, Hinduism and other religions throughout history. He added that the real problem is that extremists do not know their own faith.
Ali Gomaa, former Grand Mufti of Egypt, stated not only for the Islam but in general: "Terrorism cannot be born of religion. Terrorism is the product of corrupt minds, hardened hearts, and arrogant egos, and corruption, destruction, and arrogance are unknown to the heart attached to the divine."
In reference to suicide attacks, Hannah Stuart notes there is a "significant debate among contemporary clerics over which circumstance permit such attacks." Qatar-based theologian, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, criticized the 9/11 attacks but previously justified suicide bombings in Israel on the grounds of necessity and justified such attacks in 2004 against American military and civilian personnel in Iraq. According to Stuart, 61 contemporary Islamic leaders have issued fatawa permitting suicide attacks, 32 with respect to Israel. Stuart points out that all of these contemporary rulings are contrary to classical Islamic jurisprudence.
A 600-page legal opinion (fatwa) by Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri condemned suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism as kufr (unbelief), stating that it "has no place in Islamic teaching and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts." Iranian Ayatollah Ozma Seyyed Yousef Sanei has preached against suicide attacks and stated in an interview: "Terror in Islam, and especially Shiite, is forbidden."
A group of Pakistani clerics of Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnah (Barelvi movement) who were gathered for a convention denounced suicide attacks and beheadings as un-Islamic in a unanimous resolution. On July 2, 2013 in Lahore, 50 Muslim scholars of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) issued a collective fatwa against suicide bombings, the killing of innocent people, bomb attacks, and targeted killings. It considers them to be forbidden.
According to Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, the only purposes of Islamic jihad are putting an end to persecution—even that of the non-Muslims—and making the religion of Islam reign supreme in the Arabian peninsula, the latter type being specific to Muhammad and no longer operative; it can only be waged under a sovereign state; there are strict ethical limits for jihad which do not allow fighting non-combatants; acts of terrorism including suicide bombing are prohibited.
- Gallup conducted tens of thousands of hour-long, face-to-face interviews with residents of more than 35 predominantly Muslim countries between 2001 and 2007. It found that more than 90% of respondents condemned the killing of non-combatants on religious and humanitarian grounds. John Esposito, using poll data from Gallup, wrote in 2008 that Muslims and Americans were equally likely to reject violence against civilians. He also found that those Muslims who support violence against civilians are no more religious than Muslims who do not.
- A subsequent Gallup poll released in 2011 suggested "that one's religious identity and level of devotion have little to do with one's views about targeting civilians... it is human development and governance—not piety or culture—that are the strongest factors in explaining differences in how the public perceives this type of violence." The same poll concluded that populations of countries in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference were slightly more likely to reject attacks on civilians in all cases, both military and individual, than those in non-member countries.
- Another poll conducted, in 2005 by the Fafo Foundation in the Palestinian Authority, found that 65% of respondents supported the September 11 attacks.
- In Pakistan, despite the recent rise in the Taliban's influence, a poll conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow in Pakistan in January 2008 tested support for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, other militant Islamist groups and Osama bin Laden himself, and found a recent drop by half. In August 2007, 33% of Pakistanis expressed support for al-Qaeda; 38% supported the Taliban. By January 2008, al-Qaeda's support had dropped to 18%, the Taliban's to 19%. When asked if they would vote for al-Qaeda, just 1% of Pakistanis polled answered in the affirmative. The Taliban had the support of 3% of those polled.
- Pew Research surveys in 2008, show that in a range of countries—Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Bangladesh—there have been substantial declines in the percentages saying suicide-bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets can be justified to defend Islam against its enemies. Wide majorities say such attacks are, at most, rarely acceptable. The shift of attitudes against terror has been especially dramatic in Jordan, where 29% of Jordanians were recorded as viewing suicide-attacks as often or sometimes justified (down from 57% in May 2005). In the largest majority-Muslim nation, Indonesia, 74% of respondents agree that terrorist attacks are "never justified" (a substantial increase from the 41% level to which support had risen in March 2004); in Pakistan, that figure is 86%; in Bangladesh, 81%; and in Iran, 80%.
- A poll conducted in Osama bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia in December 2008 shows that his compatriots have dramatically turned against him, his organisation, Saudi volunteers in Iraq, and terrorism in general. Indeed, confidence in bin Laden has fallen in most Muslim countries in recent years.
Hezbollah were the first to use suicide bombers in the Middle East. An increasingly popular tactic used by terrorists is suicide bombing. This tactic is used against civilians, soldiers, and government officials of the regimes the terrorists oppose. A recent clerical ruling declares terrorism and suicide bombing as forbidden by Islam. However, groups who support its use often refer to such attacks as "martyrdom operations" and the suicide-bombers who commit them as "martyrs" (Arabic: shuhada, plural of "shahid"). The bombers, and their sympathizers often believe that suicide bombers, as martyrs (shaheed) to the cause of jihad against the enemy, will receive the rewards of paradise for their actions.
Islamic terrorism sometimes employs the hijacking of passenger vehicles. The most infamous were the "9/11" attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people on a single day in 2001, effectively ending the era of aircraft hijacking.
Kidnappings and executionsEdit
Along with bombings and hijackings, Islamic terrorists have made extensive use of highly publicised kidnappings and executions, often circulating videos of the acts for use as propaganda. A frequent form of execution by these groups is decapitation, another is shooting. In the 1980s, a series of abductions of American citizens by Hezbollah during the Lebanese Civil War resulted in the 1986 Iran–Contra affair. During the chaos of the Iraq War, more than 200 kidnappings foreign hostages (for various reasons and by various groups, including purely criminal) gained great international notoriety, even as the great majority (thousands) of victims were Iraqis. In 2007, the kidnapping of Alan Johnston by Army of Islam resulted in the British government meeting a Hamas member for the first time.
Islamist militants, including Boko Haram, Hamas, al-Qaeda and the ISIS, have used kidnapping as a method of fundraising, as a means of bargaining for political concessions, and as a way of intimidating potential opponents.
Michael Rubin argued in 2005 that hostage-taking became popular among terrorist groups as a tactic that can hold the attention of a public that had become inured to mass death techniques such as suicide bombing, and that it can garner significant "political and diplomatic" payoff. Rubin writes that Islamist kidnappers have the additional, "ideological goals" of using hostages both to "shock the outside world" and to "appeal to their own constituency", and that the public humiliation of hostages is a specific Islamist goal. He also deems hostage taking as an effective technique for cowing a population by making governments appear weak and by inspiring fear of opposing the Islamists. He does not regard kidnapping as an effective recruitment technique.
In his 2007 book, Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East, military historian Shaul Shay argued in 2014 that Islamists consider hostage taking as a strategic tool that can effectively gain concessions from targeted governments.
Kidnapping as political tacticEdit
In September 2014, the German Foreign Ministry reported that the Islamist militant group Abu Sayyaf had kidnapped two German nationals and was threatening to kill them unless the German government withdraw its support for the war against ISIS and also pay a large ransom. In September 2014 an Islamist militant group kidnapped a French national in Algeria and threatened to kill the hostage unless the government of France withdrew its support for the war against ISIS.
According to the International Business Times, in October, 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) released a five-point justification of its right to take non-Muslims hostage, and decapitate, ransom or enslave them. British Muslim cleric Anjem Choudary told The Clarion Project that kidnapping and even beheading hostages is justified by Islam.
Kidnapping as revenueEdit
Nasir al-Wuhayshi leader of the Islamist militant group Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula describes kidnapped hostages as "an easy spoil... which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure."
A 2014 investigation, by journalist Rukmini Maria Callimachi published in The New York Times demonstrated that between 2008 and 2014, Al Qaeda and groups directly affiliated with al-Qaeda took in over US$125 million from kidnapping, with $66 million of that total paid in 2013 alone. The article showed that from a somewhat haphazard beginning in 2003, kidnapping grew into the group's main fundraising strategy, with targeted, professional kidnapping of civilians from wealthy European countries—principally France, Spain and Switzerland—willing to pay huge ransoms. US and UK nationals are less commonly targeted since these governments have shown an unwillingness to pay ransom.
Boko Haram kidnapped Europeans for the Ransom their governments would pay in the early 2010s. For example, in the spring of 2013, Boko Haram kidnapped and within 2 months released a French family of 7 and 9 other hostages in exchange for a payment by the French government of $3.15 million.
According to Yochi Dreazen writing in Foreign Policy, although ISIS received funding from Qatar, Kuwait and other Gulf oil states, "traditional criminal techniques like kidnapping", are a key funding source for ISIS. Armin Rosen writing in Business Insider, kidnapping was a "crucial early source" of funds as ISIS expanded rapidly in 2013. In March, upon receiving payment from the government of Spain, ISIS released 2 Spanish hostages working for the newspaper El Mundo, correspondent Javier Espinosa and photographer Ricardo Garcia Vilanova, who had been held since September, 2013. Philip Balboni, CEO of GlobalPost told the press that he had spent "millions" in efforts to ransom journalist James Foley, and an American official told the Associated Press that demand from ISIS was for 100 million ($132.5). In September 2014, following the release of ISIS Beheading videos of journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff, British Prime Minister David Cameron appealed to members of the G7 to abide by their pledges not to pay ransom "in the case of terrorist kidnap".
Holding foreign journalists as hostages is so valuable to ISIS that Rami Jarrah, a Syrian who has acted as go-between in efforts to ransom foreign hostages, told the Wall Street Journal that ISIS had "made it known" to other militant groups that they "would pay" for kidnapped journalists. ISIS has also kidnapped foreign-aid workers and Syrians who work for foreign-funded groups and reconstruction projects in Syria. By mid-2014, ISIS was holding assets valued at US$2 billion, which made it the world's wealthiest Islamist group.
According to CNN, the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant "justifies its kidnapping of women as sex slaves citing Islamic theology" in an article entitled, 'The revival (of) slavery before the Hour,' (of Judgement Day), published in the ISIL online magazine, "Dabiq", claimed that Yazidi women can be taken captive and forced to become sex slaves or concubines under Islamic law, "One should remember that enslaving the families of the kuffar—the infidels—and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah, or Islamic law."
Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, a Nigerian extremist group, said in an interview "I shall capture people and make them slaves" when claiming responsibility for the 2014 Chibok kidnapping.
Kidnapping as psychological warfareEdit
According to psychologist Irwin Mansdorf, Hamas demonstrated effectiveness of kidnapping as a form of psychological warfare in the 2006 capture of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit when public pressure forced the government of Israel to release 1027 prisoners, including 280 convicted of terrorism by Israel, in exchange for his release. According to The New York Times, "Hamas has recognized the pull such incidents have over the Israeli psyche and clearly has moved to grab hostages in incidents such as the death and ransoming of Oron Shaul."
In the beginning of the 21st century, emerged a worldwide network of hundreds of web sites that inspire, train, educate and recruit young Muslims to engage in jihad against the United States and other Western countries, taking less prominent roles in mosques and community centers that are under scrutiny. According to The Washington Post, "Online recruiting has exponentially increased, with Facebook, YouTube and the increasing sophistication of people online".
Examples of organizations and actsEdit
Some prominent Islamic terror groups and incidents include the following:
The Armed Islamic Group, active in Algeria between 1992 and 1998, was one of the most violent Islamic terrorist groups, and is thought to have takfired the Muslim population of Algeria. Its campaign to overthrow the Algerian government included civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. It also targeted foreigners living in Algeria, killing more than 100 expatriates in the country. In recent years it has been eclipsed by a splinter group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), now called Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.
During the 1990s Muslims in Kenya received religious radical instruction from al-Qaeda and Somali group l-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI). AIAI sought to create an Islamic government over Somalia and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. In Kenya, it recruited among Somalis in Kenya living in the North Eastern Province and the Eastleigh district in Nairobi.
On 28 November 2002, Al-Qaeda militants attacked an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa where 15 were killed. Militants also fired shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles at an airliner which escaped unharmed.
On Saturday 21 September 2013, four al-Shabaab militans attacked a shopping mall in Nairobi, shooting and throwing grenades at shoppers. The civilian death toll was 61, along with six soldiers and five of the attackers.
After al-Shabaab abducted foreign aid workers and tourists in Kenya, Kenyan troops were sent to Somalia in October 2011 to pursue al-Shabab militants. In the wake of the intervention, Kenya has suffered a number of attacks carried out both by al-Shabaab militants as well as Kenyan Muslim recruited by radical clerics in North-Eastern and Coast provinces.
The majority of the perpetrators directly and indirectly involved in the 2004 Madrid train bombings were Moroccans. In the aftermath of that attack, Morocco became a focus of attention for anti-terrorist authorities in Spain.
While Morocco is generally seen as a secure destination for tourists as the last terrorist attack happened in 2011 where 17 people were killed by bomb at a restaurant in Marrakesh, over 1600 people have travelled from Morocco to join the Islamic State in the Syrian Civil War. Moroccan authorities initially ignored the people who joined ISIS but later on realised they could return to commit terrorist offences in Morocco. As a result, the Bureau Central d'Investigations Judiciaires (BCIJ) was formed.
In the 2013-2017 period anti-terrorist authorities in Morocco, in cooperation with their counterparts in Spain, conducted up to eleven joint operations against jihadist cells and networks.
In 2016, the government developed a strategy to further adherence to the Maliki Islamic school of thought. The authorities removed Quranic passages that were deemed too violent from religion education textbooks. As a result, the textbooks were reduced to 24 lessons from the 50 lessons they had before.
In 2017 it was estimated that Moroccans and 2000 Moroccan-Europeans had travelled to join the Islamic State caliphate in the 1623Syrian Civil War, which along with other fighters from MENA countries contributed a significant force to ISIS.
According to a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Moroccan authorities appear to have a good grip on the jihadist situation and cooperates with European and US authorities. Moroccans are overrepresented in "diaspora terrorism", that is terrorism which takes place outside the borders of Morocco. For example, two Moroccans were behind the 2017 London Bridge attack and a Moroccan killed people by driving his van into pedestrians in La Rambla in the 2017 Barcelona terrorist attacks.
Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon insurgency by Boko HaramEdit
Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group based in northeastern Nigeria which began violent attacks in 2009, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. In the 2009-2018 period, more than 27 000 people have been killed in the fighting in the countries around Lake Chad. Boko Haram consists of two factions, one is led by Abubakar Shekau and it uses suicide bombings and kill civilians indiscriminately. The other is named Islamic State West Africa Province and it generally attacks military and government installations.
Somalia and the Horn of AfricaEdit
Al-Shabaab is a militant jihadist terrorist group based in East Africa, which emerged in 2006 as the youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union. A number of foreign jihadists[who?] have gone to Somalia to support al-Shabaab. In 2012, it pledged allegiance to the militant Islamist organization Al-Qaeda. It is a participant in the Somali Civil War, and is reportedly being used by Egypt to destabilize Ethiopia, and attracting converts from predominantly Christian Kenya.
In 2010, the group killed 76 people watching the 2010 World Cup in Uganda.
In 2017, al-Shabaab was estimated to have about 7000-9000 fighters. It has imposed a strict Sharia law in areas it controls, such as stoning adulterers and amputating hands of thieves.
On 11 April 2002, a Tunisian Al-Qaeda operative used a truck bomb to attack the El Ghriba synagogue on Djerba island. The attack killed 19 people and injured 30 and was planned by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and financed by a Pakistani resident of Spain.
On 18 March 2015, three militants attacked the Bardo National Museum in the Tunisian capital city of Tunis, and took hostages. Twenty-one people, mostly European tourists, were killed at the scene, and an additional victim died ten days later. Around fifty others were injured. Two of the gunmen, Tunisian citizens Yassine Labidi and Saber Khachnaoui were killed by police. Police treated the event as a terrorist attack.
In June 2015, a mass shooting claimed by the Islamic State was carried out at a hotel by Seifeddine Rezgui. Thirty-eight people were killed, the majority of whom were tourists from the United Kingdom.
According to Human Rights Watch, Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin forces have "sharply escalated bombing and other attacks" against civilians since 2006. In 2006, "at least 669 Afghan civilians were killed in at least 350 armed attacks, most of which appear to have been intentionally launched at civilians or civilian objects".
The government blamed the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) for training those responsible for carrying out a suicide car bombing of a police station in Khujand on September 3, 2010. Two policemen were killed and 25 injured.
On February 16, 1999, six car bombs exploded in Tashkent, killing 16 and injuring more than 100, in what may have been an attempt to assassinate President Islam Karimov. The IMU was blamed.
The IMU launched a series of attacks in Tashkent and Bukhara in March and April 2004. Gunmen and female suicide bombers took part in the attacks, which mainly targeted police. The violence killed 33 militants, 10 policemen, and four civilians. The government blamed Hizb ut-Tahrir, though the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) claimed responsibility.
On July 30, 2004, suicide bombers struck the entrances of the US and Israeli embassies in Tashkent. Two Uzbek security guards were killed in both bombings. The IJU again claimed responsibility.
- 1992 Ürümqi bombings
- 1997 Ürümqi bus bombings
- 2010 Aksu bombing
- 2013 Tiananmen Square attack
- Kunming station massacre
- April 2014 Ürümqi attack
- May 2014 Ürümqi attack
In Bangladesh, the group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh was formed sometime in 1998, and gained prominence in 2001. The organization was officially banned in February 2005 after attacks on NGOs, but struck back in August when 300 bombs were detonated almost simultaneously throughout Bangladesh, targeting Shahjalal International Airport, government buildings and major hotels.
The Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), also called Ansar Bangla is an Islamic extremist organization in Bangladesh, implicated in crimes including some brutal attacks and murders of atheist bloggers from 2013 to 2015 and a bank heist in April 2015.
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (Arabic: حركة الجهاد الإسلامي, Ḥarkat al-Jihād al-Islāmiyah, meaning "Islamic Jihad Movement", HuJI) is an Islamic fundamentalist organisation most active in South Asian countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India since the early 1990s. It was banned in Bangladesh in 2005.
Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Al Badr & Hizbul Mujahideen are militant groups seeking accession of Kashmir to Pakistan from India. The Lashkar leadership describes Indian and Israel regimes as the main enemies of Islam and Pakistan that is an extremist thought but is not real. Lashkar-e-Toiba, along with Jaish-e-Mohammed, another militant group active in Kashmir are on the United States' foreign terrorist organizations list, and are also designated as terrorist groups by the United Kingdom, India, Australia and Pakistan. Jaish-e-Mohammed was formed in 1994 and has carried out a series of attacks all over India. The group was formed after the supporters of Maulana Masood Azhar split from another Islamic militant organization, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Jaish-e-Mohammed is viewed by some as the "deadliest" and "the principal terrorist organization in Jammu and Kashmir". The group was also implicated in the kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl. All these groups coordinate under leadership of Syed Salahuddin's United Jihad Council.
The Abu Sayyaf Group, also known as al-Harakat al-Islamiyya, is one of several militant Islamic-separatist groups based in and around the southern islands of the Philippines, in Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (Jolo, Basilan, and Mindanao) where for almost 30 years various Muslim groups have been engaged in an insurgency for a state, independent of the predominantly Christian Philippines. The name of the group is derived from the Arabic ابو, abu ("father of") and sayyaf ("Swordsmith"). Since its inception in the early 1990s, the group has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and extortion in their fight for an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago with the stated goal of creating a pan-Islamic superstate across southeast Asia, spanning from east to west; the island of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, the island of Borneo (Malaysia, Indonesia), the South China Sea, and the Malay Peninsula (Peninsular Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar). The U.S. Department of State has branded the group a terrorist entity by adding it to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Most of the terrorist incidents in Thailand are related to the South Thailand insurgency.
|Planned and foiled Jihadist terror attacks in Europe|
|Source: Petter Nesser, a researcher at Norwegian Defence Research Establishment writing for Politico. Numbers for 2017 and 2018 are preliminary.|
Lethal attacks on civilians in Europe which have been credited to Islamist terrorism include the 2004 bombings of commuter trains in Madrid, where 191 people were killed, the 7 July 2005 London bombings, also of public transport, which killed 52 commuters, and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, in Paris, where 12 people were killed in response to the satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo depicting cartoons of Muhammad. On November 13, 2015 the French capital suffered a series of coordinated attacks, claimed by ISIS, that killed 129 people in restaurants, the Bataclan theatre and the Stade de France.
Out of 1,009 arrests for terrorism in 2008, 187 were in relation to Islamist terrorism. The report showed that the majority of Islamist terror suspects were second or third generation immigrants.
In 2009, a Europol report showed that more than 99% of terrorist attacks in Europe over the last three years were, carried out by non-Muslims.[page needed] Swedish economist Tino Sanandaji has criticised the use of statistics where the number of attacks are counted instead of the number of killed, since 79% of terrorist deaths 2001-2011 in Europe were due to Islamic terrorism. Therefore statistics focusing on the number of attacks instead of the number killed are exploited by those who wish to trivialise the phenomenon. The great difference in the number of attacks versus the number of killed is that separaist attacks in Spain, typically involve vandalism and not killing. So in statistics, the global terrorist plot leading to the 9/11 attack and a party headquarters being vandalised and painted with slogans by domestic terrorists each count as one terrorist attack. According to a report by Europol on terrorism in the European Union, in 2016 "nearly all reported fatalities and most of the casualties were the result of jihadist terrorist attacks." A majority of about two-thirds of all terrorist-related arrests in the EU were also jihadist-related.
The majority of deaths by terrorism in Europe from 2001 to 2014 were caused by Islamic terrorism, even while not including Islamic terrorist attacks in Russia.
According to the British think tank ICSR, up to 40% of terrorist plots in Europe are part-financed through petty crime such as drug-dealing, theft, robberies, loan fraud and burglaries. Jihadists use ordinary crime as a way to finance their activity and have also argued this to be the "ideologically correct" way to wage jihad in non-Muslim lands.
The pattern of jihadist attacks in 2017 led Europol to conclude that terrorists preferred to attack ordinary people rather than causing property damage or loss of capital.
- Indiscriminate killings: London March & June attacks and Barcelona attacks.
- Attacks on Western lifestyle: the Manchester bombing in May 2017.
- Attacks on symbols of authority: Paris attacks in February, June and August.
The agency's report also noted that jihadist attacks had caused more deaths and casualties than any other type of terrorist attack, that such attacks had become more frequent, and that there had been a decrease in the sophistication and preparation of the attacks.
According to Susanne Schröter, the 2017 attacks in European countries showed that the military defeat of the Islamic State did not mean the end of Islamist violence. Schröter also wrote that the events in Europe looked like a delayed implementation of jihadist strategy formulated by Abu Musab al-Suri in 2005, where an intensification of terror should destabilise societies and encourage Muslim youth to revolt. The expected civil war never materialised Europe, but did occur in other regions such as North Africa and the Philippines.
In April 2018, EU anti-terror coordinator estimated there to be 50,000 radicalized Muslims living in Europe.
France and BelgiumEdit
Had its first occurrences with religious extremism in the 1980s due to French involvement in the Lebanese civil war. In the 1990s, a series of attacks on French soil were executed by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA). In the 1990–2010 time span, France experienced repeated attacks linked to international jihadist movements. Le Monde reported on 26 July 2016 that "Islamist Terrorism" had caused 236 dead in France in the preceding 18-month period.
The deadly attacks in 2015 in France changed the issue of Islamist radicalization from a security threat to also constitute a social problem. Prime minister François Hollande and prime minister Manuel Valls saw the fundamental values of the French republic being challenged and called them attacks against secular, enlightenment and democratic values along with "what makes us who we are".
Despite its proximity to the Middle East and North Africa, relatively porous borders, and a large influx of migrants from Muslim majority countries, Italy has not experienced the same surge in radicalization as other European countries. Just 125 individuals with ties to Italy left to join jihadist groups, compared with Belgium's 470 and Sweden's 300 such individuals in the same period from their much smaller populations. Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, there have been a small number of plots either thwarted or failed. Two individuals born in Italy have been involved in terrorist attacks, Youssef Zaghba one of the trio of attackers in the June 2017 London Bridge attack while ISIS sympathizer Tomasso Hosni attacked soldiers at Milan's Central station in May 2017.
Deportation (expulsion) of suspects who are foreign nationals has been the cornerstone of Italy's preventive counter-terrorism strategy against jihadists. Deportees are prohibited from re-entering Italy and the entire Schengen Area for at least five years. This measure is particularly effective because in Italy, unlike in other Western European countries, many radicalized Muslims are first-generation immigrants without Italian citizenship. As elsewhere in Europe prison inmates show signs of radicalization while incarcerated and in 2018 41 individuals were deported upon release. Of the 147 deported in the 2015-2017 all were related to Islamist radicalization and 12 were imams. From January 2015 to April 2018, 300 individuals were expelled from Italian soil. The vast majority of the deportees come from North Africa, with most of the deportees come from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. A noted group came from the Balkans, with 13 individuals from Albania, 14 from Kosovo and 12 from Macedonia. A smaller group were from Asia, with Pakistanis constituting the largest group.
In 2012, two men were sentenced in Oslo to seven and a half years in jail for an attack against Mohammad-cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. This was the first sentence under the new anti-terror legislation. A third man was freed from the accusation of terrorism, but was sentenced for helping with explosives and he received a fourth month prison sentence.
Politically and religiously motivated attacks on civilians in Russia have been traced to separatist sentiment among the largely Muslim population of its North Caucasus region, particularly in Chechnya, where the central government of the Russian Federation has waged two bloody wars against the local secular separatist government since 1994. In the Moscow theater hostage crisis in October 2002, three Chechen separatist groups took an estimated 850 people hostage in the Russian capital; at least 129 hostages died during the storming by Russian special forces, all but one killed by the chemicals used to subdue the attackers (whether this attack would more properly be called a nationalist rather than an Islamist attack is in question). In the September 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis more than 1,000 people were taken hostage after a school in the Russian republic of North Ossetia–Alania was seized by a pro-Chechen multi-ethnic group aligned to Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs; hundreds of people died during the storming by Russian forces.
Since 2000, Russia has also experienced a string of suicide bombings that killed hundreds of people in the Caucasian republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, as well as in Russia proper including Moscow. Responsibility for most of these attacks were claimed by either Shamil Basayev's Islamic-nationalist rebel faction or, later, by Dokka Umarov's pan-Islamist movement Caucasus Emirate which is aiming to unite most of Russia's North Caucasus as an emirate since its creation in 2007. Since the creation of the Caucasus Emirate, the group has abandoned its secular nationalist goals and fully adopted the ideology of Salafist-takfiri Jihadism which seeks to advance the cause of Allah on the earth by waging war against the Russian government and non-Muslims in the North Caucasus, such as the local Sufi Muslim population, whom they view as mushrikeen (polytheists) who do not adhere to true Islamic teachings. In 2011, the U.S. Department of State included the Caucasus Emirate on its list of terrorist organisations.
Jihadists were present in Spain from 1994, when an al-Qaeda cell was established. In 1996, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), an organisation affiliated with al-Qaeda, founded a cell in the province of Valencia. In the 1995-2003 period, slightly over 100 people were arrested for offences releated to militant salafism, an average of 12 per year.
In 2004, Madrid commuters suffered the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which were perpetrated by remnants of the first al-Qaeda cell, members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) plus a gang of criminals turned into jihadists.
In the period 2004-2012, the there were 470 arrests, an average of 52 per year and four times the pre-Madrid bombings average which indicated that the jihadist threat persisted after the Madrid attack. In the years after the Madrid attack, 90% of all jihadists convicted in Spain were foreigners, mainly from Morocco, Pakistan and Algeria, while 7 out of 10 resided in the metropolitan areas of Madrid or Barcelona. The vast majority were involved in cells linked to organisations such as al-Qaeda, the GICM, the Algerian salafist group Group for Preaching and Combat which had replaced the GIA, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
In the period 2013, jihadism in Spain transformed to be less overwhelmingly associated with foreigners. Arrests 2013-2017 show that 4 out of 10 arrested were Spanish nationals and 3 out of 10 were born in Spain. Most others had Morocco as country of nationality or birth with its main focus among Moroccan descendants residing in the North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The most prominent jihadist presence was the province of Barcelona. In 2013 and 2014 there were cells associated with Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
In April 2018 there were an estimated 5000 radicalized Muslims living on Spanish soil.
In the 2000s, Islamists in Sweden were not primarily seeking to commit attacks in Sweden, but were rather using Sweden as a base of operations against other countries and for providing logistical support for groups abroad.
In 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi-born Swedish citizen, attempted to kill christmas shoppers in Stockholm in the 2010 Stockholm bombings. According to investigations by FBI, the bombing would likely have killed between 30 and 40 people had it succeeded, and it is thought that al-Abdaly operated with a network.
In April 2017 Rakhmat Akilov, a 39-year-old rejected asylum seeker born in the Soviet Union and a citizen of Uzbekistan, drove a truck down a pedestrian area in Stockholm and killed 5 people and injured dozens of others in the 2017 Stockholm truck attack. He has expressed sympathy with extremist organizations, among them the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
Middle East/Southwest AsiaEdit
Historians have said that militant Islamism first gained ground among Kurds before its appeal grew among ethnic Turks and that the two most important radical Islamist organizsations have been an outgrowth of Kurdish Islamism rather than Turkish Islamism. The Turkish or Kurdish Hizbullah is a primarily Kurdish group has its roots in the predominantly Kurdish southeast of Turkey and among Kurds who migrated to the cities in Western Turkey. The members of the IBDA-C were predominantly Kurds, most members if not all are ethnic Kurds like its founder, as in the Hizbullah. The IBDA-C stressed its Kurdish roots, and is fighting Turkish secularism, and is also anti-Christian. The Hizbula reestablished in 2003 in southeastern Turkey and "today its ideology might be more widespread thean ever among Kurds there". The influence of these groups confirms "the continuing Kurdish domination of Turkish islamism". Notable Kurdish Islamists include also(an Iraqi Kurd born in Sudan) co-founder of the Islamist terrorist network al-Qaeda. There is a strong Kurdish element in Turkish radical Islamism. Kurdish and Turkish Islamists have also co-operated together, one example being the 2003 Istanbul bombings, and this co-operation has also been observed in Germany, as in the case of the Sauerland terror cell. Political scientist Guido Steinberg stated that many top leaders of Islamist organizations in Turkey fled to Germany in the 2000s, and that the Turkish Hizbullah has also "left an imprint on Turkish Kurds in Germany". Also many Kurds from Iraq (there are about 50,000 to 80,000 Iraqi Kurds in Germany) financially supported Kurdish-Islamist groups like Ansar al Islam. Many Islamists in Germany are ethnic Kurds (Iraqi and Turkish Kurds) or Turks. Before 2006, the German Islamist scene was dominated by Iraqi Kurds and Palestinians, but since 2006 Kurds and Turks from Turkey are dominant.
Hezbollah in Turkey (unrelated to the Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon) is a Sunni terrorist group accused of a series of attacks, including the November 2003 bombings of two synagogues, the British consulate in Istanbul and HSBC bank headquarters that killed 58. Hizbullah's leader, Hüseyin Velioğlu, was killed in action by Turkish police in Beykoz on 17 January 2000. Besides Hizbullah, other Islamic groups listed as a terrorist organization by Turkish police counter-terrorism include Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front, al-Qaeda in Turkey, Tevhid-Selam (also known as al-Quds Army) and Caliphate State. Islamic Party of Kurdistan and Hereketa İslamiya Kurdistan are also Islamist groups active against Turkey, however unlike Hizbullah they're yet to be listed as active terrorist organizations in Turkey by Turkish police counter-terrorism.
The area that has seen some of the worst terror attacks in modern history has been Iraq as part of the Iraq War. In 2005, there were more than 400 incidents of suicide bombing attacks, killing more than 2,000 people. In 2006, almost half of all reported terrorist attacks in the world (6,600), and more than half of all terrorist fatalities (13,000), occurred in Iraq, according to the National Counterterrorism Center of the United States. Along with nationalist groups and criminal, non-political attacks, the Iraqi insurgency includes Islamist insurgent groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who favor suicide attacks far more than non-Islamist groups. At least some of the terrorism has a transnational character in that some foreign Islamic jihadists have joined the insurgency.
Israel and the Palestinian territoriesEdit
Hamas ("zeal" in Arabic and an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) grew in power and began attacks on military and civilian targets in Israel at the beginning of the First Intifada in 1987. The 1988 charter of Hamas calls for the destruction of Israel. Hamas's armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was established in mid 1991 and claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israelis, principally suicide bombings and rocket attacks. Hamas has been accused of sabotaging the Israeli-Palestine peace process by launching attacks on civilians during Israeli elections to anger Israeli voters and facilitate the election of harder-line Israeli candidates. Hamas has been designated as a terrorist group by Canada, the United States, Israel, Australia, Japan, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and Human Rights Watch. It is banned in Jordan. Russia does not consider Hamas a terrorist group as it was "democratically elected". During the second intifada (September 2000 through August 2005) 39.9 percent of the suicide attacks were carried out by Hamas. The first Hamas suicide attack was the Mehola Junction bombing in 1993. Hamas claims its aims are "To contribute in the effort of liberating Palestine and restoring the rights of the Palestinian people under the sacred Islamic teachings of the Holy Quran, the Sunna (traditions) of Prophet Mohammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) and the traditions of Muslims rulers and scholars noted for their piety and dedication."
Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine is a Palestinian Islamist group based in the Syrian capital, Damascus, and dedicated to waging jihad to eliminate the state of Israel. It was formed by Palestinian Fathi Shaqaqi in the Gaza Strip following the Iranian Revolution which inspired its members. From 1983 onward, it engaged in "a succession of violent, high-profile attacks" on Israeli targets. The Intifada which "it eventually sparked" was quickly taken over by the much larger Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas. Beginning in September 2000, it started a campaign of suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians. The PIJ's armed wing, the Al-Quds brigades, has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks in Israel, including suicide bombings. The group has been designated as a terrorist organization by several Western countries.
Popular Resistance Committees is a coalition of a number of armed Palestinian groups opposed to what they regard as the conciliatory approach of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah towards Israel. The PRC is especially active in the Gaza Strip, through its military wing, the Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades. The PRC is said to have an extreme Islamic worldview and operates with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movement. The PRC has carried out several attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers including hundreds of shooting attacks and other rocket and bombing attacks.
This section may contain an excessive amount of intricate detail that may interest only a particular audience.August 2017) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)(
Hezbollah first emerged in 1982, as a militia during the 1982 Lebanon War. Its leaders were inspired by the Ayatollah Khomeini, and its forces were trained and organized by a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Hezbollah's 1985 manifesto listed its three main goals as "putting an end to any colonialist entity" in Lebanon, bringing the Phalangists to justice for "the crimes they [had] perpetrated", and the establishment of an Islamic regime in Lebanon. Hezbollah leaders have also made numerous statements calling for the destruction of Israel, which they refer to as a "Zionist entity... built on lands wrested from their owners."
Hezbollah, which started with only a small militia, has grown to an organization with seats in the Lebanese government, a radio and a satellite television-station, and programs for social development. They maintain strong support among Lebanon's Shi'a population, and gained a surge of support from Lebanon's broader population (Sunni, Christian, Druze) immediately following the 2006 Lebanon War, and are able to mobilize demonstrations of hundreds of thousands. Hezbollah along with some other groups began the 2006–2008 Lebanese political protests in opposition to the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. A later dispute over Hezbollah preservation of its telecoms network led to clashes and Hezbollah-led opposition fighters seized control of several West Beirut neighborhoods from Future Movement militiamen loyal to Fouad Siniora. These areas were then handed over to the Lebanese Army.
A national unity government was formed in 2008, in Lebanon, giving Hezbollah and its opposition allies control of 11 of 30 cabinets seats; effectively veto power. Hezbollah receives its financial support from the governments of Iran and Syria, as well as donations from Lebanese people and foreign Shi'as. It has also gained significantly in military strength in the 2000s. Despite a June 2008 certification by the United Nations that Israel had withdrawn from all Lebanese territory, in August, Lebanon's new Cabinet unanimously approved a draft policy statement which secures Hezbollah's existence as an armed organization and guarantees its right to "liberate or recover occupied lands". Since 1992, the organization has been headed by Hassan Nasrallah, its Secretary-General. The United States, Canada, Israel, Bahrain, France, Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Netherlands regard Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, while the United Kingdom, the European Union and Australia consider only Hezbollah's military wing or its external security organization to be a terrorist organization. Many consider it, or a part of it, to be a terrorist group responsible for blowing up the American embassy and later its annex, as well as the barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops and a dozens of kidnappings of foreigners in Beirut. It is also accused of being the recipient of massive aid from Iran, and of serving "Iranian foreign policy calculations and interests", or serving as a "subcontractor of Iranian initiatives" Hezbollah denies any involvement or dependence on Iran. In the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the other hand, Hezbollah is regarded as a legitimate and successful resistance movement that drove both Western powers and Israel out of Lebanon. In 2005, the Lebanese Prime Minister said of Hezbollah, it "is not a militia. It's a resistance."
Fatah al-Islam is an Islamist group operating out of the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. It was formed in November 2006, by fighters who broke off from the pro-Syrian Fatah al-Intifada, itself a splinter group of the Palestinian Fatah movement, and is led by a Palestinian fugitive militant named Shaker al-Abssi. The group's members have been described as militant jihadists, and the group itself has been described as a terrorist movement that draws inspiration from al-Qaeda. Its stated goal is to reform the Palestinian refugee camps under Islamic sharia law, and its primary targets are the Lebanese authorities, Israel and the United States.
According to recent government statements Islamic terrorism is the biggest threat to Canada. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) reported that terrorist radicalization at home is now the chief preoccupation of Canada's spy agency. The most notorious arrest in Canada's fight on terrorism, was the 2006 Ontario terrorism plot in which 18 Al-Qaeda-inspired cell members were arrested for planning a mass bombing, shooting, and hostage taking terror plot throughout Southern Ontario. There have also been other arrests mostly in Ontario involving terror plots.
Between 1993 and 2001, the major attacks or attempts against U.S. interests stemmed from militant Islamic jihad extremism except for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people were killed in New York City, Washington, DC, and Stonycreek Township near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, during the September 11 attacks organized by 19 al-Qaeda members and largely perpetrated by Saudi nationals, sparking the War on Terror. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden considers homegrown terrorism to be the most dangerous threat and concern faced by American citizens today. As of July 2011, there have been 52 homegrown jihadist extremist plots or attacks in the United States since the September 11 attacks.
One of the worst mass shootings in U.S. history was committed by a Muslim against LGBT people. Omar Mateen, in an act motivated by the terrorist group Islamic State, shot and murdered 49 people and wounded more than 50 in a gay nightclub, Pulse, in Orlando, Florida.
- 2014 Endeavour Hills stabbings
- 2014 Sydney hostage crisis
- 2015 Parramatta shooting
- 2017 Brighton siege
- 2018 Melbourne stabbing attack
The 1992 attack on Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, was a suicide bombing attack on the building of the Israeli embassy of Argentina, located in Buenos Aires, which was carried out on 17 March 1992. Twenty-nine civilians were killed in the attack and 242 additional civilians were injured. A group called Islamic Jihad Organization, which has been linked to Iran and possibly Hezbollah, claimed responsibility.
An incident from 1994, known as the AMIA bombing, was an attack on the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine Israelite Mutual Association) building in Buenos Aires. It occurred on July 18 and killed 85 people and injured hundreds more. A suicide bomber drove a Renault Trafic van bomb loaded with about 275 kilograms (606 lb) of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and fuel oil explosive mixture, into the Jewish Community Center building located in a densely constructed commercial area of Buenos Aires. Prosecutors Alberto Nisman and Marcelo Martínez Burgos formally accused the government of Iran of directing the bombing, and the Hezbollah militia of carrying it out. The prosecution claimed that Argentina had been targeted by Iran after Buenos Aires' decision to suspend a nuclear technology transfer contract to Tehran.
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (July 2011)
Al-Qaeda's stated aim is the use of jihad to defend and protect Islam against Zionism, Christianity, Hinduism, the secular West, and Muslim governments such as Saudi Arabia, which it sees as insufficiently Islamic and too closely tied to the United States. Formed by Osama bin Laden and Muhammad Atef in the aftermath of the Soviet–Afghan War in the late 1980s, al-Qaeda called for the use of violence against civilians and military of the United States and any countries that are allied with it.
Prevalence relative to other forms of terrorismEdit
Statistics compiled by the United States government's Counterterrorism Center present a complicated picture: of known and specified terrorist incidents from the beginning of 2004 through the first quarter of 2005, slightly more than half of the fatalities were attributed to Islamic extremists but a majority of over-all incidents were considered of either "unknown/unspecified" or a secular political nature. The vast majority of the "unknown/unspecified" terrorism fatalities did however happen in Islamic regions such as Iraq and Afghanistan, or in regions where Islam is otherwise involved in conflicts such as the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, southern Thailand and Kashmir.
- Abu Sayyaf, Philippines
- Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Gaza Strip and West Bank
- Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Egypt
- Al-Qaeda, worldwide
- Al-Shabaab, Somalia
- Ansar al-Islam, Iraq
- Ansar al-sharia, Libya
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Algeria
- Boko Haram, Nigeria
- Caucasus Emirate (IK), Russia
- East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), China
- Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egypt
- Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (IBDA-C), Turkey
- Hamas, Gaza Strip and West Bank
- Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami, Pakistan
- Hezbollah, Lebanon
- Islamic Movement of Central Asia, Central Asia
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan
- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, worldwide
- Jaish-e-Mohammed, Pakistan and Kashmir
- Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna, Iraq
- Jemaah Islamiyah, Indonesia
- Lashkar-e-Taiba, Pakistan and Kashmir
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Pakistan
- Maute group, Philippines
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Philippines
- Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Morocco and Europe
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Gaza Strip and West Bank
- Tawhid and Jihad, Iraq
- Arab–Israeli conflict
- Christian terrorism
- Criticism of Islamism
- Domestic terrorism
- History of terrorism
- Iran and state-sponsored terrorism
- Islam: What the West Needs to Know
- Islamic extremism
- Jewish religious terrorism
- List of Islamist terrorist attacks
- Palestinian political violence
- Religion and peacebuilding
- Religion of peace
- Religious war
- United States and state-sponsored terrorism
- B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 89–97. ISBN 978-0231126991
- Holbrook, Donald (2010). "Using the Qur'an to Justify Terrorist Violence". Perspectives on Terrorism. Terrorism Research Initiative and Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. 4 (3).
- Holbrook, Donald (2014). The Al-Qaeda Doctrine. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 30ff, 61ff, 83ff. ISBN 978-1623563141.
- Yohanan, Friedmann (2003). Morgan, David, ed. Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521827034. OCLC 57256339.
- "Global Terrorism Index Report 2015" (PDF). Institute for Economics & Peace. November 2015. p. 10. Retrieved October 5, 2016.
- Global Terrorism Index 2016 (PDF). Institute for Economics and Peace. 2016. p. 4. Retrieved 14 December 2016.
- Siddiqui, Mona (August 23, 2014). "Isis: a contrived ideology justifying barbarism and sexual control". The Guardian. Archived from the original on August 24, 2014. Retrieved January 7, 2015.CS1 maint: Unfit url (link)
- Constanze Letsch. "Kurdish peshmerga forces arrive in Kobani to bolster fight against Isis". The Guardian. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- Charles Kurzman. "Islamic Statements Against Terrorism". UNC.edu. Retrieved Jan 31, 2017.
- Fawaz A. Gerges. "Al-Qaida today: a movement at the crossroads". openDemocracy. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- Christine Sisto. "Moderate Muslims Stand against ISIS". National Review Online. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- Jackson, Richard (2007). "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse". Government and Opposition. 42 (3): 394–426. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x. ISSN 0017-257X.
- "Obama Would Rather Declare War on the English Language than Speak of Islamic Terrorism".
- Terrorism (4 April 2016). "4 Problems With Obama Censoring 'Islamist Terrorism'". The Federalist.
- Terrorism (20 June 2016). "Obama Admin Deletes ISIS References From Orlando 911 Calls". The Federalist.
- "Why can't we talk frankly about Islamic terrorism?".
- "Another battle with Islam's 'true believers'". The Globe and Mail.
- Mohamad Jebara More Mohamad Jebara. "Imam Mohamad Jebara: Fruits of the tree of extremism". Ottawa Citizen.
- John Moore. "The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: an Overview". PBS Frontline.
- "GCC Citizenship Debate: A Place To Call Home". Gulf Business. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
- "GCC residents demand Gulf states grant citizenship – Politics & Economics". ArabianBusiness.com. 2007-12-17. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
- "ISIS Urges Muslims To Emigrate To 'New State'". Sky News. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- "ISIS allegedly issues 'caliphate' passport". Al Arabia. July 5, 2014. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Chaney, Eric (October 24, 2007). "Economic Development, Religious Competition, and the Rise and Fall of Muslim Science" (PDF). eml.berkeley.edu. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- "Islamic world faces intellectual stagnation". Nationmultimedia.com. Archived from the original on 2013-08-28. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
- Singletary, Michelle (19 May 2011). "The economics of Obama's Arab Spring speech". The Washington Post.
- "How the Islamic World Lost Its Edge". Businessweek.com. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- Fromkin, David (1989) . A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922 (PDF). Andre Deutsch. Archived from the original (PDF) on August 22, 2014.
- "The Muslim world and the West: the roots of conflict". 2005. Web. 16 April 2010.
- "Perspectives on Terrorism – Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach". Web. 16 April 2010.
- Korostelina, K. (2007). Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics and Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- "Osama bin Laden's growing anxiety". The Christian Science Monitor – CSMonitor.com. Web. 16 April 2010
- "Al-Qaeda Blames 9/11 on US Support for Israel – Defense/Middle East – Israel National News." Web. 16 April 2010.
- "Understanding Arab anti-Americanism". Lee Smith Slate. Web. 30 April 2010.
- "Hizballah (Party of God)". Web. 30 April 2010.
- "Analysis Of Al Qaeda In Afghanistan and Pakistan". Eurasia Review. Web. 30 April 2010.
- "Hezbollah and its Goals". Web. 30 April 2010.
- "Al-Qaida". Web. 30 April 2010.
- "Global Connections. Stereotypes". PBS. Web. 30 April 2010.
- Korostelina, K. (2007) Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics and Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Naval Postgraduate Naval Postgraduate School (19 March 2015). Wahhabism: Is It a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. ISBN 978-1508936138.
- Charles Allen (1 March 2009). God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad. Da Capo Press, Incorporated. ISBN 978-0786733002.
- Natana J. DeLong-Bas (2007). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. I.B.Tauris. pp. 4–. ISBN 978-1845113223.
- "How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism". Huffington Post. 20 January 2015.
- Choksy, Carol E. B.; Jamsheed K. Choksy (May–June 2015). "The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad". World Affairs. Archived from the original on May 9, 2015.
- Habib, S. Irfan (November 19, 2014). "Radical face of Saudi Wahhabism". The Hindu. Chennai, India. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Karuvarakundu, Luqman (July 25, 2011). "Wahhabism, Terrorism, Islam – Interview with Stephen Suleyman Schwartz". Center for Islamic Pluralism. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Aubrey, Stefan M. (2004), The New Dimension of International Terrorism, vdf Hochschulverlag AG, p. 94, ISBN 978-3728129499, retrieved 4 August 2016
- Eikmeier, Dale C. (Spring 2007). "Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism". Parameters. XXXVII (1): 85–98. Archived from the original on June 9, 2007.
- Full text: bin Laden's 'letter to America' accessed 24 May 2007
- Dangerous and depraved: paedophiles unite with terrorists online, Richard Kerbaj, Dominic Kennedy, Richard Owen and Graham Keeley, The Times, 17 October 2008. Retrieved 30 November 2008.
- Exclusive: Pornography found in bin Laden hideout: officials, "Reuters", 13 May 2011
- Manningham-Buller, Eliza (November 10, 2006). "Transcript of speech: The International Terrorist Threat to the UK". ICJS Research. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Daniel Benjamin; Steven Simon (2002). The Age of Sacred Terror. Random House. p. 40. ISBN 978-0756767518.
- "Does Islam fuel terrorism?". CNN. 13 January 2015. Retrieved 29 September 2017.
- Travis, Alan (20 August 2008). "MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 6 November 2015.
- Roy, Olivier (18 December 2015). "What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism?". Inside Story. ISSN 1837-0497. Retrieved 25 February 2016.
- "Orthodox Islam and Violence 'Linked' Says Top Muslim Scholar". Time. Retrieved 2017-12-27.
Western politicians should stop pretending that extremism and terrorism have nothing to do with Islam. There is a clear relationship between fundamentalism, terrorism, and the basic assumptions of Islamic orthodoxy. So long as we lack consensus regarding this matter, we cannot gain victory over fundamentalist violence within Islam. Radical Islamic movements are nothing new. They've appeared again and again throughout our own history in Indonesia. The West must stop ascribing any and all discussion of these issues to "Islamophobia." Or do people want to accuse me—an Islamic scholar—of being an Islamophobe too?
- "F.A.Z. exklusiv: Terrorismus und Islam hängen zusammen". FAZ.NET (in German). 2017-08-18. ISSN 0174-4909. Retrieved 2017-12-27.
- Peter Bergen (13 Jan 2015). "Does Islam fuel terrorism?". CNN. Retrieved 28 Jun 2016.
- Michael Sells (August 8, 2002). "Understanding, Not Indoctrination". The Washington Post.
- Jane I. Smith (2005). "Islam and Christianity". Encyclopedia of Christianity. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195223934.
- Shasha, David (January 2002). "No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam". International Journal of Kurdish Studies.
- Author of No god but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam to speak on campus. Stanford University press release. Published October 20, 2006. Accessed May 7, 2009.
- 'No god but God': The War Within Islam (Book Review) |By Max Rodenbeck| nytimes.com| May 29, 2005
- Peters, Rudolph; Cook, David (2014). "Jihād". The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acref:oiso/9780199739356.001.0001. ISBN 9780199739356. (Subscription required (help)).
- Jahangir, Junaid (18 January 2017). "Freedom Of Speech Does Not Mean Freedom To Hate". Huffington Post. Retrieved 6 April 2017.
Islamic grand teacher, Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, who is in self-imposed exile due to death threats, has clearly stated that the root cause of Muslim terrorism is religious ideology.
- Lewis, Bernard, 'Islam: The Religion and the People' (2009). pp. 53, 145–50
- Bernard Lewis (September 27, 2001). "Jihad vs. Crusade". Opinionjournal.com. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Bukhari 50:891
- Quran (8:12)
- Lewis, Bernard, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2000 Years, pp. 233–34
- Lewis, Bernard, The Political Language of Islam, p. 73
- Wael B. Hallaq (2009). Sharī'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations. Cambridge University Press. p. 335. ISBN 978-1107394124.
- Wael B. Hallaq (2009). Sharī'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 338–39. ISBN 978-1107394124.
- The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism Archived 2015-06-23 at the Wayback Machine pp. 138, 144
- Burke, Jason (23 October 2010). "Talking to the Enemy by Scott Atran – [book] review". The Observer. Retrieved 19 October 2014.
- Rees, John (January 7, 2015). "What you need to know about terrorism and its causes: a graphic account". stopwar.org.uk. Archived from the original on January 11, 2015.
- For example, according to Pape, from 1980 to 2003 suicide attacks amounted to only 3% of all terrorist attacks, but accounted for 48% of total deaths due to terrorism—this excluding 9/11 attacks, from Pape, Dying to Win, (2005), p. 28
- McConnell, Scott (2005). "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism". The American Conservative magazine. The American Conservative. Archived from the original on June 22, 2006. Retrieved June 25, 2006.
- "Suicide Terrorism in the Middle East: Origins and Response". Washingtoninstitute.org. Archived from the original on January 12, 2009. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- Scheuer (2004), p. 9
"The focused and lethal threat posed to U.S. national security arises not from Muslims being offended by what America is, but rather from their plausible perception that the things they most love and value—God, Islam, their brethren, and Muslim lands—are being attacked by America."
- "US Support for Israel prompted 9/11". The Australian. AFP. September 14, 2009. Retrieved August 7, 2016.
- Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen (2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0374177720.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)
- "Six shot, one killed at Seattle Jewish federation". Seattle Post-Intelligencer. 27 July 2006.
- Purdy, Matthew (25 February 1997). "The Gunman Premeditated The Attack, Officials Say". The New York Times.
- "Frontline: Al Qaeda's New Front: Interviews: Michael Scheuer". Retrieved March 8, 2008.
Bin Laden has had success because he's focused on a limited number of U.S. foreign policies in the Muslim world, policies that are visible and are experienced by Muslims on a daily basis: our unqualified support for Israel; our ability to keep oil prices at a level that is more or less acceptable to Western consumers. Probably the most damaging of all is our 30-year support for police states across the Islamic world: the Al Sauds and the Egyptians under [Hosni] Mubarak and his predecessors; the Algerians; the Moroccans; the Kuwaitis. They're all police states.
- Scheuer (2004), pp. 11–13
- "Age of extremes: Mehdi Hasan and Maajid Nawaz debate". New Statesman. London. 4 July 2012. Retrieved 24 October 2013.
- Sageman (2004)
- Marc Sageman (September 11, 2001). "Understanding Terror Networks". Upenn.edu. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- Wright, Loming Tower (2006), p. 304
- "Olivier Roy Interview (2007): Conversations with History". Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. May 3, 2007. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "Disabled Often Carry Out Afghan Suicide Missions". Npr.org. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- Byman, Daniel; Christine Fair (July–August 2010). "The Case for Calling Them Nitwits". Atlantic Magazine. Archived from the original on June 10, 2010. Retrieved July 8, 2010.
- Bergen, Peter (15 June 2016). "Why Do Terrorists Commit Terrorism?". New York Times. Retrieved 16 June 2016.
- Halliday, Fred: Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 107
- "Statement of purpose". Almashriq.hiof.no. March 20, 1998. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "Hizbullah: Views and Concepts". Almashriq.hiof.no. June 20, 1997. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- ""The Book, "Is Salafiyyah a cause of Terrorism""
- ""The Mufti of Saudi Arabia on the New York Attacks"
- ""The Major Scholars on the Salafi Position Towards the Suicide Bombings by the Khawaarij in Riyadh"
- "Abdal-Hakim Murad, Bin Laden's Violence is a Heresy Against Islam". Islamfortoday.com. Archived from the original on January 3, 2010. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "The terrorist attacks in London". Rumi Forum. 2005. Archived from the original on June 26, 2007. Retrieved August 1, 2006.
- "A Real Muslim cannot be a Terrorist". Interview with Nuriye Akman of Zaman Daily. Fethullah Gülen's Website. 2004. Archived from the original on March 11, 2005. Retrieved August 1, 2006.
- Zeki Saritoprak. "Fethullah Gulen's Thoughts on State, Democracy, Politics, Terrorism". Retrieved January 1, 2010.
- Power, Carla (March 12, 2010). "Eminent Pakistani Cleric Issues Fatwa Against Terrorism". Time.com. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "A Muslim cannot be a Terrorist and a Terrorist cannot be a Muslim". Fethulah Gulen's Website. 2002. Archived from the original on November 9, 2005. Retrieved August 1, 2006.
- "Islam Denounces Terrorism". Harun Yahya's Website. 2006. Archived from the original on May 21, 2016. Retrieved August 1, 2006.
- "Fatwa: Suicide Bombing and Terrorism". Islamicresearcher.com. July 7, 2005. Archived from the original on March 8, 2010. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "Man of faiths: Preeminent religion scholar Huston Smith reflects on Judaism and Chasing the Divine". Jewish News Weekly of Northern California. Jweekly.com. June 25, 2009. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "Terrorism has no religion". Retrieved 2013-08-25.
- Hannah Stuart (2014). Marco Lombardi, ed. Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism. IOS Press. pp. 74–76. ISBN 978-1614994695.
- Jerome Taylor (March 3, 2010). "Sheikh issues fatwa against all terrorists". The Independent. London. Retrieved April 9, 2010.
- "Top Islamic scholar issues 'absolute' fatwa against terror". Nationalpost.com. March 3, 2010. Retrieved April 25, 2010.[dead link]
- "Leading Iranian Cleric Calls on Regime to Avoid War With Israel". Haaretz. 2012. Retrieved Aug 3, 2016.
- "Interview Grand Ayatollah Yusef Saanei". PBS/Frontline. Retrieved Aug 3, 2016.
- "Top Pak clerics declare suicide attacks un-Islamic". The Times of India. May 17, 2009. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- "Fatwa issued against suicide bombings, targeted killings and terrorism". Lahore. 2 July 2013.
- Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad (September 3, 2009). "The Permission for Jihad". Al-Mawrid. Archived from the original on October 9, 2011.
- Saleem, Shehzad (September 8, 2009). "No Jihad without the State: View of the Jurists". Al-Mawrid. Archived from the original on October 9, 2011.
- Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad (September 6, 2009). "Ethical Limits". Al-Mawrid. Archived from the original on July 19, 2011.
- Saleem, Shehzad (September 8, 2009). "Suicide Bombers". Al-Mawrid. Archived from the original on July 24, 2011.
- "Excerpt: 'Who Speaks for Islam?'". NPR. 2008-03-04.
- "Views of Violence". Gallup. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
- 65% of Palestinians Applaud Terror Attacks on US and Europe IsraelNationalNews.com
- "The_MIPT_Terrorism_Annual" (PDF). tkb.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on November 29, 2007. Retrieved February 6, 2008.
- Casciani, Dominic (2 March 2010). "Muslim scholar condemns terrorism". BBC News.
- Shay, Shaul (December 2013). Global Jihad and the Tactic of Terror Abduction: A Comprehensive Review of Islamic Terrorist Organizations. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1845196110.
- Rubin, Michael. "How to Deal with Kidnappings in Iraq". Middle East Quarterly (December 2005). Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- Shay, Shaul (2007). Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1845191672.
- Caschetta, A.J. (Mar 1, 2008). "Review of Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East by Shaul Shay". Middle East Quarterly. Retrieved Aug 4, 2016.
- Thomas, Andrea (September 24, 2014). "Germany Confirms Kidnapping of Two Citizens by Islamist Group in Philippines". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved October 7, 2014. (Subscription required (help)).
- Willsher, Kim (September 23, 2014). "Algerian Islamists threaten to execute hostage unless France halts Isis attacks". The Guardian. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Johnlee, Varghese (6 October 2014). "ISIS Lists Out 5 Islamic Reasons to Justify Beheading Alan Henning and other Captives". International Business Times. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
- Mauro, Ryan. "UK's Anjem Choudary Justifies Beheading of James Foley". Retrieved 13 October 2014.
- Callimachi, Rukmini Maria (July 29, 2014). "Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror". New York Times. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- Hill, J.N.C. "Boko Haram, the Chibok Abductions and Nigeria's Counterterrorism Strategy". Combating Terrorism Center. West Point Military Academy. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- Kington, Tom (March 10, 2012). "Nigerian kidnappers 'received ransom downpayment'". The Guardian. Archived from the original on September 5, 2014. Retrieved September 4, 2014.CS1 maint: Unfit url (link)
- BBCnigeria (June 1, 2012). "Italian Abducted in Nigeria Freed". BBC. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- Caulderwood, Kathleen (May 16, 2014). "Fake Charities, Drug Cartels, Ransom and Extortion: Where Islamist Group Boko Haram Gets Its Cash". International Business Times. Retrieved 29 September 2014.
- Dreazen, Yochi. "ISIS Uses Mafia Tactics to Fund Its Own Operations Without Help From Persian Gulf Donors". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on June 17, 2014. Retrieved September 4, 2014.
- Rosen, Armin (Aug 20, 2014). "ISIS Has Been Taking Foreign Hostages Since The Very Beginning – And Getting Paid For Them". Business Insider. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- BBCMarch (March 30, 2014). "Syria crisis: Spanish journalists freed after ISIS kidnapping". BC. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- CBSNews (Aug 21, 2014). "Multiple kidnappings for ransom funding ISIS, source says". CBS News. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- McTague, Tom (Sep 3, 2014). "Cameron tells European leaders to 'be good to their word' and stop funding ISIS with ransom payments". London: Mail. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- Malas, Nour (Aug 22, 2014). "Hostage-Taking Central to Islamic State Strategy in Syria". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- Chulov, Martin (June 16, 2014). "Iraq arrest that exposed wealth and power of Isis jihadists". The Guardian. Archived from the original on June 16, 2014. Retrieved June 17, 2014.CS1 maint: Unfit url (link)
- Moore, Jack (11 June 2014). "Mosul Seized: Jihadis Loot $429m from City's Central Bank to Make Isis World's Richest Terror Force". International Business Times UK. Retrieved 19 June 2014.
- Abdelaziz, Salma (13 October 2014). "ISIS states its justification for the enslavement of women". CNN. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
- Lister, Tim (June 5, 2015). "Boko Haram: The essence of terror". CNN. Retrieved 13 May 2014.
- Hill, Jonathan N.C. (July 30, 2014). "Boko Haram, the Chibok Abductions and Nigeria's Counterterrorism Strategy". Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. Retrieved 4 September 2014.
- Marina Lazreg, "Consequences of Political Liberalisation and Sociocultural Mobilisation for Women in Algeria, Egypt and Jordan", in Anne-Marie Goetz, Governing Women: Women's Political Effectiveness in Contexts of Democratisation and Governance Reform (New York: Routledge/UNRISD, 2009), p. 47.
- Gorzewski, Andreas (July 22, 2014). "Hamas uses kidnapping as a strategic tool". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Kershner, Isabel; Jodi Rudoren (July 22, 2014). "A Blast, a Fire and an Israeli Soldier Goes Missing". The New York Times. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Friedman, Thomas L. (December 15, 2009). "www.jihad.com". The New York Times. Archived from the original on December 17, 2009.
- John Pike (June 27, 2008). "Backgrounder: Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists) (a.k.a. GIA, Groupe Islamique Armé, or al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha)". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- Kepel, Gilles, Jihad, (2003)
- Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche. "Burkina Faso: Islamistische Gefahr aus dem Innern | DW | 20.10.2017". DW.COM (in German). Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche. "Burkina Faso: Islamistische Gefahr aus dem Innern | DW | 20.10.2017". DW.COM (in German). Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- "Terrorist Attacks in Kenya Reveal Domestic Radicalization". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2012-10-29. Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- "The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab's Media Strategy". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2013-10-24. Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- "Kenya university attack kills 147". 2015-04-03. Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- Vidino; et al. (2018). DE-RADICALIZATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - Comparing Challenges and Approaches (PDF). Milano: ISPI. pp. 13–15, 24, 26, 35–36, 42–43, 48, 62–63, 69–70. ISBN 9788867058198.
- "Hundreder af tikkende bomber i landet, som Islamisk Stat styrede udenom i syv år". jyllands-posten.dk. 2018-12-20. Retrieved 2018-12-23.
- "FOCUS - Morocco reforms religious education to fight extremism". France 24. 2016-12-13. Retrieved 2018-12-27.
- "Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?". BBC News. 2017-12-22. Retrieved 2019-01-04.
- "Chad troops kill 17 Boko Haram militants after 6 killed in Lake Chad attacks". The Defense Post. 2018-09-29. Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- "Chad troops kill 17 Boko Haram militants after 6 killed in Lake Chad attacks". The Defense Post. 2018-09-29. Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- "In prison with al-Shabab: What drives Somali militants?". BBC News. 2013-10-05. Retrieved 2019-01-04.
- Reinares, Fernando (2016). Al-Qaeda's Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings. Columbia University Press. p. 88. ISBN 9780231801409.
- "Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2017-04-14. Retrieved 2019-03-18.
- "The Latest: French President Mourns Tunisia Victims". nytimes.com. 18 March 2015. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
- "Museum attack a 'great calamity' for Tunisia's young democracy". latimes.com. 18 March 2015. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
- Death toll rises to 23, msn.com; accessed 19 March 2015.
- "21 dead in Tunisia attack, Including Gunmen". aljazeera.com. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
- Marszal, Andrew (18 March 2015). "Gunmen 'take hostages' in attack on Tunisia parliament". The Telegraph. Retrieved 18 March 2015.
- "Scores killed in terror attack on Tunisian beach resort". France 24. 2015-06-26. Retrieved 2019-03-19.
- The Human Cost: The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan. April 2007. Volume 19, No. 6(C). Human Rights Watch/
- "Car Bomber Kills 2 in Tajikistan". The Moscow Times. September 6, 2010. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Polat, Abdumannob; Butkevich, Nickolai (November 28, 2000). "Unraveling the Mystery of the Tashkent Bombings: Theories and Implications". Archived from the original on June 11, 2003. Retrieved February 9, 2016.
- "Central Asia Report: April 7, 2004". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.
- Peimani, Hooman (April 21, 2004). "Uzbekistan's reaction to Tashkent bombings generate doubts on efficacy". cacianalyst.org. Archived from the original on June 17, 2004.
- Saidazimova, Gulnoza (September 6, 2007). "Germany: Authorities Say Uzbekistan-Based Group Behind Terrorist Plot". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Archived from the original on September 11, 2007.
- Pannier, Bruce (July 27, 2004). "Uzbekistan: 'Terror' Trial Likely To Hold Few Surprises". Radio Free Europe. Archived from the original on December 13, 2008.CS1 maint: Unfit url (link)
- "US FBI joins Uzbek blast inquiry". BBC News. August 3, 2004. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Rotar, Igor (May 19, 2005). "Terrorism in Uzbekistan: A self-made crisis". Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation. 2 (8). Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Knox, Kathleen (2004). "Uzbekistan: Who's Behind The Violence?" (18 – JRL 8147). Johnson's Russia List. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Archived from the original on April 4, 2004.
- Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), from South Asia Terrorism Portal
- Hossain, Maneeza (February 16, 2006). "The Rising Tide of Islamism in Bangladesh". defenddemocracy.org. Archived from the original on April 5, 2006.
- The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism, Columbia University Press (2007), pp. 69–70
- "Ansarullah Bangla Team banned". dhakatribune.com. May 25, 2015. Archived from the original on May 27, 2015.CS1 maint: Unfit url (link)
- "Lashkar-e-Toiba". dictionary.com. 2003. Archived from the original on August 11, 2004. Retrieved August 27, 2006.
- Mir, Amir (2005). "The jihad lives on". Asia Times Online Ltd. Retrieved June 24, 2006.
- "Speech by the Prime Minister the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP to the Confederation of Indian Industry Bangalore, India 5 January 2002". britishhighcommission.gov. January 2002. Archived from the original on 23 November 2007. Retrieved June 24, 2006.
- Thompson, Geoff (May 13, 2004). "Is Lashkar-e-Toiba still operating in Pakistan?". PM. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved August 5, 2016.
- "Wars and Armed Conflicts: Current Situation". Peace Pledge Union. July 27, 2002. Archived from the original on December 19, 2005. Retrieved June 25, 2006.
- "SOUTH ASIA | Jaish-e-Mohammad: A profile". BBC News. February 6, 2002. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "Attack May Spoil Kashmir Summit". Spacewar.com. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (PDF). fas.org. Retrieved February 6, 2008.
- United Jihad Council#cite note-1
- "FBI updates most wanted terrorists and seeking information – War on Terrorism Lists" (Press release). FBI National Press Office. February 24, 2006. Archived from the original on August 5, 2009.
- "Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)". MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Archived from the original on August 27, 2006. Retrieved September 20, 2006.
- Nesser, Petter (2018-12-05). "Europe hasn't won the war on terror". POLITICO. Retrieved 2018-12-09.
- Dearden, Lizzie (15 November 2015). "Paris attack: Isis warns 'This is just the beginning' after killing at least 127 people in French capital". The Independent. Retrieved 17 November 2015.
- "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report TE-SAT 2009" (PDF). Europol. 2009. p. 21. Retrieved July 29, 2015.
- "Islamists caused overwhelming majority of terrorist deaths in Europe during last decade". Tino Sanandaji blog. 20 February 2011.
- EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017. EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (Te-Sat). Europol. 2017. p. 10. ISBN 978-9295200791.
- "Daily chart: Terror attacks". The Economist. 15 January 2015.
- Archetti, Cristina (2012-10-29). Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 103. ISBN 9780230360495.
The London think tank, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) [...]
- "Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus / ICSR". The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. 2016-10-11. Retrieved 2018-07-14.
- European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE SAT 2018) (PDF). Europol. 2018. pp. 5–9, 22–25, 35–36. ISBN 978-92-95200-91-3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 June 2018. Retrieved 23 June 2018.
- European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE SAT 2018) (PDF). Europol. 2018. p. 4. ISBN 978-92-95200-91-3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 June 2018. Retrieved 23 June 2018.
- European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE SAT 2018) (PDF). Europol. 2018. pp. 5–9, 22–25, 35–36. ISBN 978-92-95200-91-3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 June 2018. Retrieved 23 June 2018.
- Storm, Linde. "Dschihadisten als Elitetruppe des Islams. Eine klare Ablehnung dieser Position durch islamische Verbände in Deutschland fehlt / Von Susanne Schröter". www.normativeorders.net (in German). Retrieved 2018-12-01.
- "El coordinador antiterrorista de la UE: "Lo de Barcelona volverá a pasar, hay 50.000 radicales en Europa"". ELMUNDO (in Spanish). Retrieved 2018-09-09.
- "Le terrorisme islamiste a fait 236 morts en France en 18 mois". Le Monde (in French). 26 July 2016. Retrieved 27 July 2016.
De l'attaque de « Charlie Hebdo » et de l'« Hyper casher » en janvier 2015 à la mort du père Jacques Hamel à Saint-Etienne-de-Rouvray, mardi 26 juillet, ce sont 236 personnes qui ont perdu la vie dans des attentats et attaques terroristes
- Dec 12, Jonathon Gatehouse · CBC News · Posted:; December 12, 2018 2:23 PM ET | Last Updated:. "By the numbers: France's battle against terror | CBC News". CBC. Retrieved 2018-12-23.
- ispisito (2018-12-14). "The measure of expulsions for extremism". ISPI. Retrieved 2018-12-21.
- Marone, Dr Francesco (2017-03-13). "The Use of Deportation in Counter-Terrorism: Insights from the Italian Case".
- "Terror-Prozess in Oslo: Haftstrafen für geplanten Mord an Mohammed-Zeichner". Spiegel Online. 2012-01-30. Retrieved 2018-09-09.
- Van Ginkel, Bibi; Boutin, Bérénice; Chauzal, Grégory; Dorsey, Jessica; Jegerings, Marjolein; Paulussen, Christophe; Pohl, Johanna; Reed, Alastair; Zavagli, Sofia (2016-04-01). "The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU - Profiles, Threats & Policies". ICCT: 46. doi:10.19165/2016.1.02.
- Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008, p. 74, "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model"
- "Changing face of terror in Russia". Financial Times. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- Darion Rhodes, Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate, International Institute for Counter-terrorism, March 2014
- "Designation of Caucasus Emirate". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 2018-03-01. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- Vidino; et al. (2018). DE-RADICALIZATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - Comparing Challenges and Approaches (PDF). Milano: ISPI. pp. 24, 35–37. ISBN 9788867058198.
- "Bomben skulle ha dödat 40 personer". Svenska Dagbladet (in Swedish). 5 December 2011.
- "Uzbek suspect in Swedish attack sympathized with Islamic State: police" Archived 20 May 2017 at the Wayback Machine. Reuters. 10 April 2017. Retrieved 12 April 2017.
- *German Jihad: On the Internationalisation of Islamist Terrorism by Guido Steinberg. Columbia University Press, 2013
- Mamdouh Mahmud Salim
- John Pike. "Turkish Hizbullah". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- Kohlmann, Evan (November 25, 2003). "Terrorized Turkey: Pointing fingers at al Qaeda". nationalreview.com. Archived from the original on February 17, 2004.
- "Türkıye'De Halen Faalıyetlerıne Devam Eden – Başlica Terör gütlerı" [Current Operations Continuing in Turkey – Major Terrorist Organizations]. egm.gov.tr (in Turkish). Archived from the original on August 27, 2002.
- Atran, Scott (2006). "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism" (PDF). The Washington Quarterly. 29 (2): 131. doi:10.1162/wash.2006.29.2.127. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 23, 2015.
- Report on Terrorist Incidents – 2006 6600 out of 14000
- Iraqi Insurgency Groups the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates roughly 1,000 foreign Islamic jihadists
- p. 154, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel (2002)
- "The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)". Mideastweb.org. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "About us". Al-Qassam Brigades Information Office. Retrieved 15 July 2016
- Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, (2002), p. 331
- Waked, Ali; Roee Nahmias (February 9, 2006). "Putin: Hamas not a terror organization". Israel: YnetNews.com. Retrieved May 22, 2015.
- Benmelech, Efraim; Berrebi, Claude (Summer 2007). "Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers" (PDF). Journal of Economic Perspectives. 21 (3): 223–38. doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.223. ISSN 0895-3309. Archived from the original (PDF) on July 7, 2010.
- Katz, Samuel (2002). The Hunt for the Engineer. Lyons Press. ISBN 978-1585747498. p. 74.
- p. 122, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel
- Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (September 15, 2009). "Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories" (PDF). London: The Guardian. Retrieved 15 July 2016.
- "The Popular Resistance Committees: Hamas' New Partners? – Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi". Retrieved 15 July 2016.
- Jamail, Dahr (2006-07-20). "Hezbollah's transformation". Asia Times. Retrieved 2007-10-23.
- "Who are Hezbollah". BBC News. 2008-05-21. Retrieved 2008-08-15.
- Shatz, Adam (April 29, 2004). "In Search of Hezbollah". The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on May 3, 2004. Retrieved August 14, 2006.CS1 maint: Unfit url (link)
- author unknown. "The Hizballah Program" (PDF). provided by standwithus. com (StandWithUs). Archived from the original (PDF) on October 29, 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-29.
- Stalinsky, Steven. "An Islamic Republic Is Hezbollah's Aim". The New York Sun. 2 August 2006. 1 November 2007.
- Deeb, Lara (2006-07-31). "Hizballah: A Primer". Middle East Report. Archived from the original on 2010-06-20. Retrieved 2006-07-31.
- "Briefing: Lebanese Public Opinion". September–October 2006. Archived from the original on 2012-01-18. Retrieved 2007-10-08.
- "Huge Beirut protest backs Syria". BBC News. 8 March 2005. 7 February 2007.
- Ghattas, Kim (2006-12-01). "Political ferment in Lebanon". BBC News. Retrieved 2008-08-15.
- "Lebanese army moves into W. Beirut after Hezbollah takeover". Haaretz. Archived from the original on May 12, 2008. Retrieved 2008-05-10.
- "Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)". Council on Foreign Relations. 2008-09-13. Archived from the original on 2008-09-13. Retrieved 2008-09-15.
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2006-03-29). "Lebanon: The many hands and faces of Hezbollah". Retrieved 2006-08-17.
- "Iranian official admits Tehran supplied missiles to Hezbollah". Haaretz.com. 4 August 2006. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- Frykberg, Mel (2008-08-29). "Mideast Powers, Proxies and Paymasters Bluster and Rearm". Middle East Times. Archived from the original on September 2, 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-29.
And if there is one thing that ideologically and diametrically opposed Hezbollah and Israel agree on, it is Hezbollah's growing military strength.
- "Security council endorses secretary-general's conclusion on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as of 16 June". United Nations Security Council. 2000-06-18. Retrieved 2006-09-29.
- "Bahrain's parliament declares Hezbollah a terrorist group". Jerusalem Post. March 26, 2013.
- Spangler, Timothy (25 March 2011). "Bahrain complains over Hezbollah comments on protests". Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 22 November 2011.
- "Bahrain arrests bombing suspects and blames Hezbollah". Reuters. November 6, 2012.
- "Jewish Leaders Applaud Hezbollah Terror Designation by France | Jewish & Israel News". Algemeiner.com. 2013-04-04. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
- "GCC: Hezbollah terror group". Arab News. June 3, 2013. Retrieved June 3, 2013.
- Kanter, James; Rudoren, Jodi (22 July 2013). "European Union Adds Military Wing of Hezbollah to List of Terrorist Organizations". The New York Times.
- Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam, Harvard University Press, (1994), p. 115
- Pape, Robert, Dying to Win, Random House, 2005, p. 129
- Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb'allah in Lebanon, St. Martins Press, 1997 pp. 89–90
- Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb'allah in Lebanon, St. Martins Press, 1997, p. 54
- Kepel, Gilles, Jihad, (2002), p. 129
- Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb'allah in Lebanon, St. Martins Press, 1997, p. 127
- Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb'allah in Lebanon : The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, p. 60
- Jul 20, 2006 (July 20, 2006). "Middle East News – Hezbollah's transformation". Asia Times Online Atimes.com. Retrieved April 25, 2010.
- "Hezbollah disarmament unclear". CNN. May 7, 2005. Retrieved August 5, 2006.
- International Herald Tribune (15 March 2007).  Archived May 15, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
- Le Figaro (16 April 2007). "Fatah Al-Islam: the new terrorist threat hanging over Lebanon". Retrieved 20 May 2007.
- [dead link]
- Reuters (20 May 2007). "Facts about militant group Fatah al-Islam". Retrieved 20 May 2007.
- "Harper says 'Islamicism' biggest threat to Canada". CBC News – Cbc.ca. 2011-09-06. Retrieved 2011-10-16.
- Macleod, Ian (March 14, 2008). "CSIS focuses on homegrown terrorism threat". The Ottawa Citizen. Archived from the original on March 17, 2008. Retrieved October 16, 2011.
- Seymour, Andrew (2010-08-26). "RCMP say homegrown terror suspects were preparing to build IEDs". Ottawacitizen.com. Retrieved 2011-10-16.
- United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (U.S.) (2007). Terrorism in the United States 2002-2005 (PDF) (2 ed.). U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. p. 43.
- Yager, Jordy (July 25, 2010). "Former intel chief: Homegrown terrorism is a 'devil of a problem'". The Hill.
- Saslow, Eli (July 12, 2011). "A one-man mission to stop homegrown Somali terrorism in U.S." The Seattle Times. The Washington Post. Archived from the original on September 22, 2011. Retrieved July 12, 2011.
- Ellis, Ralph; Ashley Fantz; Faith Karimi; Eliott C. McLaughlin (June 13, 2016). "Orlando shooting: 49 killed, shooter pledged ISIS allegiance". CNN.com. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- "Interviews – Robert Baer – Terror And Tehran". PBS Frontline. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
- "AMIA Bombing Commemorated", Dateline World Jewry, World Jewish Congress, September 2007
- "AMIA Attack in Argentina". ADL.
- "Discursos". OAS. Retrieved 2013-03-04.
- "Iran, Hezbollah charged in 1994 Argentine bombing". Daily Jang. October 25, 2006. Archived from the original on September 1, 2007. Retrieved October 25, 2006.
- "Iran charged over Argentina bomb". BBC News. October 25, 2006. Archived from the original on 7 November 2006. Retrieved October 25, 2006.
- Acusan a Irán por el ataque a la AMIA, La Nación, October 26, 2006
- "Full transcript of bin Ladin's speech". Al Jazeera. November 1, 2004. Archived from the original on November 14, 2006.
- Michael, Maggie (October 29, 2004). "Bin Laden, in statement to U.S. people, says he ordered Sept. 11 attacks". sandiegouniontribune.com. Associated Press. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- "Excerpts: Bin Laden video". BBC News. October 29, 2004. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
- Langhorne, R. (2006). The Essentials of – Global Politics. Hodder Arnold.
- Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674010901.
- Bin Laden, Osama; Lawrence, Bruce (2005). Messages to the world: the statements of Osama Bin Laden. Verso. ISBN 978-1844670451.
- Cooper, William Wager; Yue, Piyu (2008). Challenges of the muslim world: present, future and past. Emerald Group Publishing. ISBN 978-0444532435.
- Dreyfuss, Robert (2006). Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. Macmillan. ISBN 978-0805081374.
- Sageman, Marc (2004). Understanding terror networks. ISBN 978-0812238082.
- Scheuer, Michael; Anonymous (2004). Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books (formerly Brassey's, Inc.). ISBN 978-0965513944.
- Amir, Taheri (1987). Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism. Adler & Adler. ISBN 978-0917561450.
- Atran, Scott (2010). Talking to the Enemy. Ecco Press / HarperCollins, US; Allen Lane/Penguin, UK. ISBN 978-0061344909.
- Bostom, Andrew (2005). The Legacy of Jihad. Prometheus Books. ISBN 978-1591023074.
- Dennis, Anthony J. (1996). The Rise of the Islamic Empire and the Threat to the West. Wyndham Hall Press, Ohio. ISBN 978-1556052682.
- Dennis, Anthony J. (2002). Osama Bin Laden: A Psychological and Political Portrait. Wyndham Hall Press, Ohio. ISBN 978-1556053412.
- Durie, Mark (2010). The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom. Deror Books. ISBN 978-0980722307.
- Esposito, John L. (1995). The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?. Oxford University Press, US. ISBN 978-0195102987.
- Esposito, John L. (2003). Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. Oxford University Press, US. ISBN 978-0195168860.
- Falk, Avner (2008). Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International. ISBN 978-0313357640.
- Fregosi, Paul (1998). Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries. Prometheus Books. ISBN 978-1573922470.
- Gabriel, Brigitte. (2006). Because They Hate: A Survivor of Islamic Terror Warns America. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0312358377
- Halliday, Fred (2003). Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics of the Middle East. I.B. Tauris, New York. ISBN 978-1860648687.
- Hirsi Ali, Ayaan (2007). Infidel. Free Press. ISBN 978-0743295031.
- Ibrahim, Raymond (2007). The Al Qaeda Reader. Broadway, US. ISBN 978-0767922623.
- Janos Besenyo: Low-cost attacks, unnoticable plots? Overview on the economical character of current terrorism, Strategic Impact (Romania) ISSN 1841-5784. 62/2017: (Issue No. 1) pp. 83–100.
- Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.
- Kepel, Gilles. The War for Muslim Minds.
- Swarup, Ram (1982). Understanding Islam through Hadis. Arvind Ghosh. ISBN 978-0682499484.
- Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad (2011). Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings. London: Minhaj-ul-Quran. ISBN 978-0955188893.
- Warraq, Ibn (1995). Why I Am Not a Muslim. Prometheus Books. ISBN 978-0879759841.
- Warraq, Ibn (2017). The Islam in Islamic Terrorism: The Importance of Beliefs, Ideas, and Ideology. New English Review. ISBN 978-1943003082.