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The Institutional Revolutionary Party (Spanish: Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) is a Mexican political party founded in 1929 that held uninterrupted power in the country for 71 years from 1929 to 2000, first as the National Revolutionary Party (Spanish: Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR), then as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (Spanish: Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, PRM), and finally renaming itself as the Institutional Revolutionary Party in 1946.

Institutional Revolutionary Party

Partido Revolucionario Institucional
ChairpersonClaudia Ruiz Massieu
General SecretaryRubén Moreira Valdez
Founded4 March 1929 (as PNR)
30 March 1938 (as PRM)
18 January 1946 (as PRI)
HeadquartersAv. Insurgentes Norte 59 col. Buenavista
06359 Cuauhtémoc, Mexico City
NewspaperLa República
Youth wingRed Jóvenes x México
Labor wingConfederation of Mexican Workers
IdeologyRevolutionary nationalism[1][2][3]
Constitutionalism[4][5][6]
Technocracy[7]
Economic liberalism
Political positionCentre[8][9][10]
National affiliationTodos por México
Continental affiliationCOPPPAL
International affiliationSocialist International[11]
Colours             Green, white, red
Seats in the Chamber of Deputies
47 / 500
Seats in the Senate
14 / 128
Governorships
12 / 32
Seats in State legislatures
184 / 1,123
Website
pri.org.mx/SomosPRI/

The National Revolutionary Party was founded in 1929 by Plutarco Elías Calles, Mexico's paramount leader at the time and self-proclaimed "Jefe Máximo" (Supreme Chief) of the Mexican Revolution. The party was created with the intent of providing a political space in which all the surviving leaders and combatants of the Mexican Revolution could participate, and to solve the grave political crisis caused by the assassination of president-elect Álvaro Obregón in 1928. Although Calles himself fell into political disgrace and was exiled in 1936, the party continued ruling Mexico until 2000, changing names twice until it became the Institutional Revolutionary Party.

Throughout its nine-decade existence, the PRI has adopted a very wide array of ideologies (often determined by the President of the Republic in turn). In the 1980s, the party went through reforms that shaped its current incarnation, with policies characterized as centre-right, such as the privatization of State-run companies, closer relations with the Catholic church, and embracing free-market capitalism.[12][13][14] At the same time, the left-wing members of the party abandoned the PRI and founded the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD) in 1989.

Though it is a full member of the Socialist International (along with its rival, the left-wing PRD; Mexico is one of the few nations with two major, competing parties that are part of the same international grouping),[11] the PRI is not considered a social democratic party in the traditional sense.

The adherents of the PRI party are known in Mexico as "Priístas" and the party is nicknamed "El tricolor" (The tricolor) because of its use of the Mexican national colors of green, white and red, as found on the Mexican flag.

Contents

OverviewEdit

ProfileEdit

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is described by some scholars as a "state party",[13][15] a term which captures both the non-competitive history and character of the party itself, and the inextricable connection between the party and the Mexican nation-state for much of the 20th century. In 1990, Peruvian Nobel Prize laureate for literature, Mario Vargas Llosa, called the uninterrupted Mexican government under the PRI la dictadura perfecta ("the perfect dictatorship").[16]

The PRI has been criticized for using the colors of the national flag in its logo, something considered not unreasonable in many countries,[citation needed] but frowned upon in Mexico, while there is no law that forbids this act.[citation needed]

According to the Statesman Journal, for more than seven decades, the PRI ran Mexico under an "autocratic, endemically corrupt, crony-ridden government". The elites of the PRI ruled the police and the judicial system, and justice was only available if purchased with bribes.[17] During its time in power, the PRI became a symbol of corruption, repression, economic mismanagement, and electoral fraud; many educated Mexicans and urban dwellers worried that its return could signify a return to Mexico's past.[18]

Meaning of the nameEdit

At first glance, the PRI's name looks like a confusing oxymoron or paradox to speakers of English, for they normally associate the term "revolution" with the destruction of "institutions".[19] As Rubén Gallo contends, the Mexican concept of institutionalizing the Revolution simply refers to the corporatist nature of the PRI, that is, the PRI subsumed the "disruptive energy" of the Revolution (and thereby ensured its own longevity) by co-opting and incorporating its enemies into its bureaucratic government as new institutional sectors.[19]

Party practicesEdit

There is a lexicon of terms used to describe people and practices of the PRI, that were fully operative until the 1990s.  The most important was the dedazo, with the finger (“dedo”) of the president pointing to the PRI candidate for the presidency, meaning the president choosing his successor.  Right up until the moment the president considers optimal, several pre-candidates, but at least three, attempt to demonstrate their loyalty to the president and their high competence in their position, usually as a high cabinet member. Until the 2000 election, the party had no direct input into the president’s decision, although he could consult with constituencies.  The president’s decision was a closely kept secret, even from the victor.  The president revealed his choice in an announcement, el destape (the unveiling), with losing candidates learning only then themselves.[20] Once the destape occurred, in general the members of the PRI would demonstrate their enthusiasm for the candidate and their loyalty to the party, known as the cargada.  But the destape was also a delicate moment since party unity depended on the losers acceding to the president’s choice without public rancor or dissent.  When Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) chose Carlos Salinas de Gortari as the candidate in 1988, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo left the PRI to form a separate party, and Cárdenas challenged Salinas at the polls.  Manuel Bartlett, who was De la Madrid’s powerful Minister of the Interior, was passed over for the candidacy and was disgruntled.  The Ministry was in charge of the apparatus of the elections, now a responsibility of an independent entity, the Federal Election Institute (IFE), but then the ministry was a major component of rigging election results to make the PRI come out on top of any challenger.  Bartlett's ministry did not exert any of the usual efforts, with the election results naming Salinas the winner being by the narrowest margin (50.7%) heretofore and considered fraudulent even so.[21]  This time the so-called alquimistas, PRI specialists in vote-rigging, did not succeed in their magic.  To achieve a complete sweep of elections, the carro completo (“full car”), the party used the campaign mechanism of the acarreo (“hauling”), the practice of trucking PRI supporters to rallies to cheer the candidate and to polling places to vote for them in exchange for gifts of some kind.[22]  

Presidential succession before the party, 1920-1928Edit

 
Calles on the cover of Time Magazine, 1924

When it was founded in 1929, the party structure created a means to control political power and to perpetuate it with regular elections validating the party’s choice. Before the party was founded, political parties were not the generally the means achieve the presidency. The creation of the party in the wake of the assassination of revolutionary general, former president, and in 1928 president-elect Alvaro Obregón had laid bare the problem of presidential succession with no institutional structures. Obregón was one of three revolutionary generals from Sonora, with Plutarco Elías Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, who were important for the post-revolutionary history of Mexico. Their collective and then internecine struggles for power in the decade after the end of the military phase of the Mexican Revolution had a direct impact on the formation of the party in 1929.

 
President Obregón in a business suit, tailored to show that he lost his right arm in the Mexican Revolution. His assassination in 1928 touched off a political crisis leading to the formation of the party.

In 1920, the Sonorans staged a coup against President Venustiano Carranza, the civiian "First Chief" of the Constitutionalist faction that had won the Mexican Revolution. Carranza had attempted to impose his own candidate for the presidency, Ignacio Bonillas. Bonillas had zero revolutionary credentials and no power base of his own, with the implication that Carranza intended to hold onto power after the end of his term. This would have been a violation of the "no re-election" principle of post-revolutionary Mexico, which had its origins in the 19th century. With the support of the revolutionary army, the Sonoran generals' Plan of Agua Prieta successfully challenged Carranza’s attempt to perpetuate his power; Carranza was killed as he was fleeing the country. De la Huerta became interim president of Mexico and Obregón was elected president for a four-year term, 1920-24.

As Obregón's four-year term was ending, Calles bid for the presidency. Fellow Sonoran De la Huerta challended Calles in a massive and bloody uprising, supported by other revolutionary generals opposed to Calles. The De la Huerta rebellion was crushed, but the outbreak of violence was only a few years after the apparent end of the Mexican Revolution, raising the specter of renewed violence.[23] Calles succeeded Obregón in 1924, and shortly thereafter he began enforcing the restrictions on the Catholic Church in the 1917 Constitution, resulting in a huge rebellion by those opposed to such restrictions, known as the Cristero War (1926-29). The Cristero War was ongoing when elections were to be held.

Obregón sought to run again for the presidency in 1928 to succeed Calles, but because of the principle of no-reelection in the Mexican Constitution, the two Sonorans sought a loophole to allow the former president to run. The Constitution was amended to allow re-election if the terms were not consecutive.  With that change, Obregón ran for the 1928 election and won. But before his inauguration he was assassinated by a religious fanatic. Since Calles had just served as president, even with the constitutional change to allow a form of re-election, he was ineligible to run. The founding of a national political party that had an existence beyond elections became the mechanism to control power through peaceful means.

Founding of the PartyEdit

Emblem of the National Revolutionary Party (1929-1938), which was founded by Plutarco Elías Calles, president of Mexico from 1924 to 1928

The political party had two previous names before taking its third and current name, but its core has remained the same. It has been characterized as a "in the 1960s as 'strongly dominant party', in the 1970s a 'pragmatic hegemonic state', and in the 1900s as a 'single party'".[24] The close relationship between the PRI and the Mexican state has been examined by a number of scholars.[25][26]

PNR (1929–1938)Edit

Even though the armed phase of the Mexican Revolution had ended in 1920, Mexico continued to encounter political unrest. A grave political crisis caused by the July 1928 assassination of president-elect Álvaro Obregón led to the founding on 4 March 1929 of the National Revolutionary Party (Spanish: Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR) by Plutarco Elías Calles, Mexico's president from 1924 to 1928. Emilio Portes Gil was interim president of Mexico from December 1928 until February 1929, while a political rather than military solution was sought for presidential succession.

The intent to found the party was to institutionalize the power of particular victors of Mexican Revolution. Calles was ineligible to run for president, since he had just completed a four-year term, because of the prohibition in the 1917 Constitution of re-election directly after serving a term as president. Calles sought to stop the violent struggle for power between the victorious factions of the Revolution, particularly around the presidential elections and to guarantee the peaceful transmission of power for members of the party. A conclave of revolutionary generals including Calles met to create a national party, forging together their various regional strongholds. They were not primarily concerned with ideology, but rather to hold power.[27][28]

In the first years of the party's existence, the PNR was the only political machine in existence. During this period, known as Maximato (named after the title Calles gave himself as "Maximum Chief of the Revolution"), Calles remained the dominant leader of the country and Rubio]] (1929-32) and Abelardo L. Rodríguez (1932-34), were in practice subordinates of Calles.

Calles chose revolutionary general Lázaro Cárdenas as his successor.[29] Cárdenas was originally from the southern state of Michoacan, but he joined the Revolution in the north, serving with Calles. The Jefe Máximo had no idea that Cárdenas would take his own path as he settled into the presidency. He had campaigned widely throughout the country, making a national reputation for himself and forming personal connections throughout the country outside the corridors of power. Calles had become increasingly conservative in his views, ending land reform for all practical purposes and cracking down on organized labor. Under Cárdenas, unions went on strike, which were not suppressed by the government. As Cárdenas increasing diverged in his thinking and practice from Calles, Calles sought to regain control. Cárdenas, however, had outmaneuvered Calles politically, gaining allies in among labor unions and peasants, as well as the Catholic Church. Calles had attempted to strictly enforce the anticlerical provisions of the Constitution, which led directly to conflict with the Catholic Church and its loyalists, so that in the conflict between the two generals, the Church sided with Cárdenas. Cárdenas had Calles arrested along with many of his allies, exiling Calles to the United States.

PRM (1938–1946)Edit

Emblem of the Party of the Mexican Revolution (1938-1946), which was founded by Lázaro Cárdenas, president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940. Cárdenas was chosen as president under the PNR; it was not until 1938 that he founded the PRM.

Cárdenas became perhaps Mexico's most popular 20th-century president, most renowned for the 1938 expropriating the oil interests of the United States and European petroleum companies in the run-up to World War II. That same year Cárdenas put his own stamp on the party, reorganizing it in 1938 as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (Spanish: Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, PRM) whose aim was to establish a democracy of workers and socialism.[30] However, this was never achieved.

Cárdenas's intention was to establish the broad-based political alliances necessary for the party's long-term survival, as a national party with territorial presence in state and municipal governments, and organization of mass interest groups, via corporatism. The structure he established has remained intact. He created sectors of the party and structured them into mass organizations to represent different interest groups within the party, to protect the interests of workers and peasants.[31]

The PRM had four sectors: labor, peasant (campesino), "popular", mainly teachers and civil servants; and the military. The labor section was organized via the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM); the peasant sector by the National Confederation of Campesinos, (CNC); and the middle class sector by the Federation of Unions of Workers in Service to the State (FSTSE).[32] The party incorporated the majority of Mexicans through their mass organizations, but absent from the structure for ideological reasons were two important groups, private business interests and adherents of the Catholic Church.[33] Those two came together in 1939 to form the National Action Party (Mexico), which grew to be the major opposition party, winning the presidency in 2000.

The most powerful labor union prior to the formation of the party was the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), headed by Luis N. Morones, an ally of Obregón and Calles.[34] A dissident within the CROM, Marxist Vicente Lombardo Toledano, formed a rival labor confederation, the CTM in 1936, which became the mass organization of labor within the PRM.[35] Lombardo stepped down from the leadership of the CTM in 1941, after Cárdenas left the presidency. He was replaced by Fidel Velázquez, who remained head of the CTM until his death at age 97.[36] Within the party structure and the government, labor has had a continuous, formalized, visual corporate role, but with Velazquez's death in 1997, organized labor has fractured.[37]

By incorporating the military into the PRM structure, Cárdenas's aim was to make it politically dependent on the party rather than allow it to be a separate group outside the party and potentially a politically interventionist force. Although some critics questioned the military's incorporation into the party, Cárdenas saw it as a way to assert civilian control. He is quoted as saying, “We did not put the Army in politics. It was already there. In fact it had been dominating the situation, and we did well to reduce its voice to one in four.”[38] In general, the corporatist model is most often associated with fascism, whose rise in Germany and Italy in the 1930s coincided with Cárdenas's presidency.

 
Manuel Avila Camacho

But Cárdenas was emphatically opposed to fascism; however, he created the PRM and organized the Mexican state on authoritarian lines. That reorganization can be seen as the enduring legacy of the Cárdenas presidency. Although the PRM was reorganized into the Institutional Revolutionary Party in 1946, the basic structure was retained. Cárdenas's calculation that the military's incorporation into the PRM would undermine its power was essentially correct, since it disappeared as a separate sector of the party, but was absorbed into the “popular” sector.[39] The organizational change in the PNR to the PRM, and later the PRM to the PRI, were "imposed by Mexican presidents without any discussion within the party."[40]

Cárdenas followed the pattern of Calles and Obregón before him, designating his choice in the upcoming elections; for Cárdenas this was Manuel Avila Camacho. In the 1940 election, Avila Camacho's main rival was former revolutionary general Juan Andreu Almazán, with PRM victory coming via fraud after a violent campaign period.Cárdenas is said to have secured the support of the CTM and the CNC for Ávila Camacho by personally guaranteeing their interests would be respected.[41]

In the final year of Avila Camacho's term the party assembly decided on a new name, pushed by the circle of Miguel Alemán, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, pairing seemingly contradictory terms of "institutional" and "revolutionary."[42]

PRI (1946 – 1988)Edit

Change in structure and ideologyEdit

Three Names       One Party
4 March 1929
Plutarco Elías Calles
Founded as:
Partido Nacional
Revolucionario

(National Revolutionary
Party – PNR)
30 March 1938
Lázaro Cárdenas
PNR dissolved. New name:
Partido de la
Revolución Mexicana

(Party of the Mexican
Revolution – PRM)
18 January 1946
Manuel Ávila Camacho
PRM dissolved. New name:
Partido Revolucionario
Institucional

(Institutional Revolutionary
Party – PRI)

The party's name was changed in 1946, the final year of Manuel Ávila Camacho's term of office.[43] The sectoral representation in the party continued for the workers, peasants, and the popular sector, but the military was no longer represented by its own sector. The Mexican president was at the apex of the political system with the PRI. To reach the top of the government, as the candidate and then president of the republic, the path was only through membership and leadership in the party and government service. Within the party, there were factions, the técnicos, bureaucrats with specialized knowledge and training, especially with the economy, and políticos, the seasoned politicians, many of whom had regional roots in state politics.[44]

Miguel Alemán was the PRI's candidate in the 1946 elections, but he did not run unopposed. Alemán and his circle had hoped to abandon sectoral representation in the party and separate the party as an organism of the state, but there was considerable pushback from the labor sector and the CTM, which would have lost influence, along with the other sectors. The structure of the party remained sectoral, but the Alemanistas abandoned the goal that had been "the preparation of the people for the implementation of a workers' democracy and for the arrival of a socialist regime."[45] The party slogan was changed from the PRM's "For a workers' democracy" (Por una democracia de trabajadores) to the PRI's "Democracy and social justice" (Democracia y justicia).

In practice after Cárdenas left office, the party became more centrist, and his more radical agrarian policies were abandoned.[46] With Lombardo Toledano's replacement as leader of the CTM, labor under the CTM's Fidel Velázquez became even more closely identified with the party. The more radical left of the labor movement, under Vicente Lombardo Toledano, split from the PRI, the Partido Popular. Although the party gave voice to workers' demands, since it was outside the umbrella of the PRI and lost power and influence.[47] The leadership of component unions became advocates of PRI policy at the expense of the rank and file in exchange for political backing from the party and financial benefits. These charro ("cowboy") unions turned out the labor vote at election time, a guaranteed base of support for the party. During prosperous years, CTM could argue for benefits of the rank-and-file, such as higher wages, networking to provide jobs for union loyalists, and job security. The principle of no-reelection did not apply to the CTM, so that the party loyalist Velázquez provided decades of continuity even as the presidency changed every six years.[48]

The PRI won every presidential election from 1929 to 1982, by well over 70 percent of the vote—margins that were usually obtained by massive electoral frauds. Toward the end of his term, the incumbent president in consultation with party leaders, selected the PRI's candidate in the next election in a procedure known as "the tap of the finger" (Spanish: el dedazo), which was integral in the continued success of the PRI towards the end of the 20th century. In essence, given the PRI's overwhelming dominance, and its control of the electoral apparatus, the president chose his successor. The PRI's dominance was near-absolute at all other levels as well. It held an overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as every seat in the Senate and every state governorship.

The political stability and economic prosperity in the late 1940s and the 1950s benefited the party, so that in general Mexicans did not object to the lack of real democracy.

The "Mexican Miracle"Edit

 
Miguel Alemán, first civilian president following the Mexican Revolution, son of a revolutionary general

Starting with the Alemán administration (1946-1952) until 1970, Mexico embarked on a sustained period of economic growth, dubbed the "Mexican Miracle", fueled by import substitution and low inflation. From 1940 to 1970 GDP increased sixfold while the population only doubled,[49] and peso-dollar parity was maintained at a stable exchange rate.

Economic nationalist and protectionist policies implemented in the 1930s effectively closed off Mexico to foreign trade and speculation, so that the economy was fueled primarily by state investment and businesses were heavily reliant on government contracts. As a result of these policies, Mexico's capitalist impulses were channeled into massive industrial development and social welfare programs, which helped to urbanize the mostly-agrarian country, funded generous welfare subsidies for the working class, and fueled considerable advances in communication and transportation infrastructure. This period of commercial growth created a significant urban middle class of white-collar bureaucrats and office workers, and allowed high-ranking PRI officials to graft large personal fortunes through their control over state-funded programs. State monopoly over key industries like electricity and telecommunication allowed a small clique of businessmen to dominate their sectors of the economy by supplying government-owned companies with goods and commodities.

A major impact of Mexico's economic growth was urban population growth, transforming the country from a largely rural one to urban. The middle class grew substantially. The overall population of Mexico grew substantially with a greater proportion being under the age of 16. These factors combined to decrease the pull of the past. The policies promoting industrial growth helped fuel the growth of Mexico's north as a center of economic dynamism, with the city of Monterrey becoming Mexico's second largest.[50]

The general economic prosperity served to legitimize PRI hegemony in the eyes of most Mexicans, and for decades the party faced no real opposition on any level of government. On the rare occasions when an opposition candidate, usually from the conservative National Action Party, whose strength was in Mexico's north, garnered a majority of votes in an election. The PRI often used its control of local government to rig election results in its favor. Voter apathy was characteristic in this period, with low turnout in elections.[51] The PRI co-opted criticism by incorporating sectors of society into its hierarchy. PRI-controlled labor unions, ("charro unions") maintained a tight grip over the working classes; the PRI held rural farmers in check through its control of the ejidos (state-owned plots of land that peasants could farm but not own), and generous financial support of universities and the arts ensured that most intellectuals rarely challenged the ideals of the Mexican Revolution. In this way, PRI rule was supported by a broad national consensus that held firm for decades, even as polarizing forces gradually worked to divide the nation in preparation for the crises of the 1970s and 80s.[52] The consensus specifically held that Mexico would be capitalist in its economic model; that the masses of workers and peasants would be kept in check -- as separate units and not allowed to merge into a single sector that would have too much strength; that the state and the party would be the agent for this control; and that the state and private entrepreneurs would compete in the mixed economy.[53] So long as there was general prosperity, the system was stable economically and politically. Political balance meant that sectors had a voice within the party, but the party and the state were the arbiters of the system. Those supporting the system received material rewards that the state distributed. In this period, there was a continuing rapprochement with the United States, which built on their alliance in World War II. Although there was rhetoric about economic nationalism and defense of Mexican sovereignty, there was a broad based cooperation between the two countries.[54]

Cracks appeared in the system. There was significant labor unrest with strikes by railway workers, electricians, and even medical doctors that were brutally suppressed. Culturally the mood was changing as well, with Carlos Fuentes publishing The Death of Artemio Cruz (La Muerte de Artemio Cruz) in 1962, metaphorically the death of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution. The fictional Cruz had been a revolutionary soldier, corrupt politician, and businessman, now on his deathbed. Considered a landmark in Latin American literature, it highlighted aspects of Mexican history and its political system.[55]

Attempts at party reformEdit

 
Carlos A. Madrazo, reformist PRI politician

When Alemán became president in 1946, the PRI had begun experiments in internal primaries, but Alemán cracked down on this democratic opening and had congress pass a law against parties from holding primaries. President of the PRI, revolutionary general Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada had been in favor of primaries, but Alemán's viewpoint prevailed and PRI candidates were chosen in closed party assemblies. Sánchez was replaced as titular head of the party, and the president of the republic remained firmly in control.[56]

During the early presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Carlos A. Madrazo was appointed president of the party and undertook serious reforms in 1964-65. PRI legislators were attempting to negate the principle of no-reelection for members of congress, which many of supported. Madrazo went further in reform attempts, seeking to democratize the electoral process for municipal candidates, which sectoral leaders and local PRI bossed opposed because it would undermine their hold on local elections. It was implemented in just seven states. Madrazo was forced to resign.[57] Madrazo died in an airplane crash in 1969, which at the time was considered suspicious.[58]

Only in 2000 did the PRI choose its presidential candidate through a primary; its candidate, Francisco Labastida, lost that election.

Political impact of the 1968 Tlatelolco massacreEdit

The improvement of the economy had a disparate impact in different social sectors and discontent started growing within the middle class as well as the popular classes. The doctors' strike in 1965 was a manifestation of middle class discontent. Seeking better wages and workplace conditions, doctors demanded redress from the government. Rather than give into such demands, President Díaz Ordaz sent in riot troops to suppress the strike with brute force and arrest leaders. Two hundred doctors were fired.[59] Díaz Ordaz's hard line on this strike by a sector of the middle class presaged even harsher suppression during the summer of 1968.

With the choice of capital for the venue for the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games slated for October, the government poured huge resources into preparing facilities. Mexico wanted to showcase its economic achievements and sought the international focus on the country. Maintaining an image of a prosperous and well-ordered Mexico was important for the Mexican government. However, things began to go badly wrong. In a relatively low-level conflict in late July 1968 between young people in Mexico City, the Granadero riot police used violence to tamp down the incident. However, the crackdown had the opposite effect, with students at the National University (UNAM) and the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) putting aside their traditional rivalries and joining together in protest in the Mexican Student Movement.

 
Tanks in the Zócalo, summer 1968

They protested lack of democracy and social justice in Mexico. Middle class university students had largely been apolitical up until this point. President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) ordered the army to occupy the university to suppress the mobilization and minimize the disruption of the Olympic Games. Orderly large-scale protests in downtown Mexico City showed the discontent of students and their largely middle-class supporters.[60] As the opening ceremonies of the Olympics approached, the government sought help from the United States in dealing with the protests. Unaccustomed to this type of protest, the Mexican government made an unusual move by asking the United States for assistance, through LITEMPO, a spy-program to inform the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US to obtain information from Mexico. The CIA responded by sending military radios, weapons and ammunition.[61] The LITEMPO had previously provided the Díaz Ordaz government with 1,000 rounds of .223 Remington ammunition in 1963.[62]

After weeks of huge and largely peaceful demonstrations in Mexico City in August and September by students and middle class Mexicans, the government cracked down on October 2, with army and special tactical units opening fire on a relatively small demonstration in Tlatelolco, a section of the metropolis. They killed and wounded a large but unknown number of protesters. Despite that the Olympics went forward on schedule, with the President of the Olympic Committee declaring that the protests were against the Mexican government and not the Olympics themselves, so the games proceeded.[63]

Political life in Mexico, however, was changed that day. October 2, 1968, the date of what is known as the Tlatelolco massacre, is a turning point in Mexican history. That date "marks a psychological departure in which Mexicans -- particularly urban, well-educated citizens, intellectuals, and even government officials themselves--began to question the efficiency and morality of an authoritarian state that required violence against middle-class students to maintain its position of authority and legitimacy to govern."[64] Intellectuals were alienated from the regime, after decades of cooperation with the government and receiving benefits for that service. The poet and essayist Octavio Paz, who would later win the Nobel Prize in Literature, resigned as Mexican Ambassador to India. Novelist Carlos Fuentes denounced the repression.[65][66]

Díaz Ordaz chose Luis Echeverría as the PRI candidate in the 1970 election. As the Minister of the Interior, Echeverría was operationally responsible for the Tlatelolco massacre.[67]

Economic crisis of the 1970sEdit

By the early 1970s, fundamental issues were emerging in the industrial and agricultural sectors of Mexico's economy. Regional underdevelopment, technological shortages, lack of foreign competition, and uneven distribution of wealth led to chronic underproduction of investment and capital goods, putting the long-term future of Mexican industry in doubt. Meanwhile, ubiquitous poverty combined with a dearth of agricultural investment and infrastructure caused continuous migration from rural to urban areas; in 1971, Mexican agriculture was in such a state that the country had become a net importer of food. Overvaluation of the peso led to a decline in the tourism industry (which had previously compensated for failures in industry and agriculture) meant that by the early 1970s, the economy had begun to falter, and the only sure source of capital was external borrowing.[68]

Díaz Ordaz chose his Government Secretary, Luis Echeverría, to succeed him as President. Echeverría's administration (1970–76) increased social spending, through external debt, at a time when oil production and prices were surging. However, the growth of the economy came accompanied by inflation and then by a plummeting of oil prices and increases in interest rates. Investment started fleeing the country and the peso became overvalued,[citation needed] to prevent a devaluation and further fleeing of investments, the Bank of Mexico borrowed 360 million dollars from the Federal Reserve with the promise of stabilizing the economy. External debt reached the level of $25 billion.[69] Unable to contain the fleeing of dollars, Echeverría allowed the peso to float for the first time on August 31, 1976, then again later and the peso lost half of its value.[69] Echeverría designated José López Portillo, his Secretary of Finance, as his successor for the term 1976-82, hoping that the new administration would have a tighter control on inflation and to preserve political unity.[69]

Election of 1976, PRI runs unopposedEdit

 
José López Portillo

In the 1976 election, the PRI presidential candidate José López Portillo faced no real opposition, not even the National Action Party, which did not field a candidate in this election due to an ideological split. The lack of the appearance of democracy in the national elections undermined the legitimacy of the system. He proposed a reform called Ley Federal de Organizaciones Políticas y Procesos Electorales which gave official registry to opposition groups such as the Mexican Democratic Party and the Mexican Communist Party. This law also created positions in the lower chamber of congress for opposition parties through proportionality of votes, relative majority, uninominal and plurinominal. As a result, in 1979, the first independent (non-PRI) communist deputies were elected to the Congress of Mexico.[70] Within the PRI, party president Carlos Sansores pushed for what he called "transparent democracy", but the effort went nowhere.[71]

Although López Portillo's term started with economic difficulties, the discovery of significant oil reserves in Mexico allowed him to borrow funds from foreign banks to be repaid in dollars against future revenues to allocate funds for social spending immediately. The discovery of significant oil sites in Tabasco and Campeche helped the economy to recover and López Portillo promised to "administer the abundance." The development of the promising oil industry was financed through external debt which reached 59 billion dollars[70] (compared to 25 billion[69] during Echeverría). Oil production increased from 94,000 barrels per day (14,900 m3/d) at the beginning of his administration to 1,500,000 barrels per day (240,000 m3/d) at the end of his administration and Mexico became the fourth largest oil producer in the world.[70] The price for a barrel of oil also increased from three dollars in 1970 to 35 dollars in 1981.[70] The government attempted to develop heavy industry. However, waste became the rule as centralized resource allocation and distribution systems were accompanied by inefficiently located factories incurring high transport costs.

Mexico increased its international presence during López Portillo: in addition to becoming the world's fourth oil exporter, Mexico restarted relations with the post Franco-Spain in 1977, allowed Pope John Paul II to visit Mexico, welcomed American president Jimmy Carter and broke relations with Somoza and supported the Sandinista National Liberation Front in its rebellion against the United States supported government. López Portillo also proposed the Plan Mundial de Energéticos in 1979 and summoned a North-South World Summit in Cancún in 1981 to seek solutions to social problems.[70] In 1979, the PRI founded the COPPPAL, the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean, an organization created "to defend democracy and all lawful political institutions and to support their development and improvement to strengthen the principle of self determination of the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean".[72]

Social programs were also created through the Alliance for Production, Global Development Plan, el COPLAMAR, Mexican Nourishing System, to attain independence on food, to reform public administration. López Portillo also created the secretaries of Programming and Budgeting, Agriculture and Water Resources, Industrial Support, Fisheries and Human Settlements and Public Works. Mexico then obtained high economic growth, a recuperation of salaries and an increase in spending on education and infrastructure. This way, social and regional inequalities started to diminish.[70] The attempted industrialization had not been responsive to consumer needs. Therefore, unprecedented urbanization and overcrowding followed and so, substandard pre-fabricated apartment blocs had to be built in large cities.

All this prosperity ended when the over-supply of oil in early 1982 caused oil prices to plummet and severely damaged the national economy. Interest rates skyrocketed in 1981 and external debt reached 86 billion dollars and exchange rates went from 26 to 70 pesos per dollar and inflation of 100%. This situation became so desperate that Lopez Portillo ordered the suspension on payments of external debt and the nationalization of the banking industry in 1982 consistent with the Socialist goals of the PRI. Capital fled Mexico at a rate never seen before in history. The Mexican government provided subsidies to staple food products and rail travel; this diminished the consequences of the crises on the populace. Job growth stagnated and millions of people migrated North to escape the economic stagnation. López Portillo's reputation plummeted and his character became the butt of jokes from the press.[70] In his last presidential address on September 1, 1982, he nationalized foreign banks. During his campaign, López Portillo promised to defend the peso "como un perro" ("like a dog"),[70] López Portillo refused to devalue the currency[69] saying "The president who devalues, devalues himself."[70]

First of the technocratic presidents, 1982Edit

 
Miguel de la Madrid

When López Portillo left office in December 1982, the economy was in shambles. He designated Miguel de la Madrid as the PRI candidate, the first of a series of economists to rule the country, a technocrat who turned his back on populist policies to implement neoliberal reforms, causing the number of state-owned industries to decline from 1155 to a mere 412. After the 1982 default, crisis lenders were unwilling to loan Mexico and this resulted in currency devaluations to finance spending. An earthquake in September 1985, in which his administration was criticised for its slow and clumsy reaction, added more woe to the problems. As a result of the crisis, black markets supplied by goods stolen from the public sector appeared. Galloping inflation continued to plague the country, hitting a record high in 1987 at 159.2%.

1988 - 2000Edit

Left-wing splits from the PRIEdit

 
Cárdenas, seen here in 2002, split from the PRI, running unsuccessfully for president in 1988, 1994 and 2000.

In 1986, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (former Governor of Michoacán and son of the former president of Mexico Lázaro Cárdenas) formed the "Democratic Current" (Spanish: Corriente Democrática) of the PRI, which criticized the federal government for reducing spending on social programs to increase payments on foreign debt. The members of the Democratic Current were expelled from the party and formed the National Democratic Front (FDN, Spanish: Frente Democrático Nacional) in 1987. The following year, the FDN elected Cárdenas as presidential candidate for the 1988 presidential election[73] which was won by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, obtaining 50.89% of the votes (according to official figures) versus 32% of Cárdenas. The official results were delayed, with the Secretary of the Interior (until then, the organizer of elections) blaming it on a computer system failure. Cárdenas, who claimed to have won and claimed such computer failure was caused by a manipulation of the system to count votes. Manuel Clouthier of the National Action Party (PAN, Spanish: Partido Acción Nacional) also claimed to have won, although not as vocally.

Miguel de la Madrid, Mexico's president at the time of the 1988 election, admitted in 2004 that, on the evening of the election, he received news that Cárdenas was going to win by a majority, and that he and others rigged the election as a result.[74]

Clouthier, Cárdenas and Rosario Ibarra de Piedra then complained before the building of the Secretary of the Interior.[75] Clouthier and his followers then set up other protests, among them one at the Chamber of Deputies, demanding that the electoral packages be opened. In 1989, Clouthier presented an alternative cabinet (a British style Shadow Cabinet) with Diego Fernández de Cevallos, Jesús González Schmal, Fernando Canales Clariond, Francisco Villarreal Torres, Rogelio Sada Zambrano, María Elena Álvarez Bernal, Moisés Canales, Vicente Fox, Carlos Castillo Peraza and Luis Felipe Bravo Mena as cabinet members and Clouthier as cabinet coordinator. The purpose of this cabinet was to vigilate the actions of the government. Clouthier died next October in an accident with Javier Calvo, a federal deputy. The accident has been claimed by the PAN as a state assassination since then.[76] That same year, the PRI lost its first state government with the election of Ernesto Ruffo Appel as governor of Baja California.

Attempt at internal reform 1990sEdit

Luis Donaldo Colosio at the time party president atttempted a "democratic experiment" to open up the party at the level of candidates for gubernatorial and municipal elections, which would bar precandidates from campaigning for the nomination, but without a democratic tradition within the party and a basic a fact as the lack of lists of party membership meant the experiment failed. Carlos Salinas de Gortari resisted any attempts to reform the party. At the end of 1994, after the assassination of Colosio who had been designated the PRI presidential candidate, the party did move toward greater internal democracy.[77]

Political turmoil, decline of powerEdit

In 1990, Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa called the government under the PRI la dictadura perfecta ("the perfect dictatorship").[16] Despite that perception, a major blow came with the assassination of the 1994 PRI candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, the first high-level assassination since that of president-elect Alvaro Obregón in 1928, which led to Calles forming the PRN to deal with the political vacuum. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari designated Colosio's campaign director, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, as the new PRI candidate, who was subsequently elected. The 1994 elections were the first Mexican presidential election monitored by international observers.

A number of factors, including the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, caused the PRI to lose its absolute majority in both chambers of the federal congress for the first time in 1997.

After several decades in power the PRI had become a symbol of corruption and electoral fraud.[78] The conservative National Action Party (PAN) became a stronger party after 1976 when it obtained the support from businessmen after recurring economic crises.[78] Consequently, the PRI's left wing separated and formed its own party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in 1989.

Critics claim electoral fraud, with voter suppression and violence, was used when the political machine did not work and elections were just a ritual to simulate the appearance of a democracy. However, the three major parties now make the same claim against each other (PRD against Vicente Fox's PAN and PAN vs. López Obrador's PRD, and the PRI against the PAN at the local level and local elections such as the Yucatán state election, 2007).[citation needed] Two other PRI presidents Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas de Gortari privatized many outmoded industries, including banks and businesses, entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and also negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement.

In the final decades of the PRI regime, the connections between the party and drug cartels became more evident, as the drug trade saw a massive increase, which worsened corruption in the party and at all spheres of Government. In 1984, journalist Manuel Buendía was murdered by agents of the Federal Security Directorate (Buendía had been investigating possible ties between Drug cartels, the CIA and the FSD itself).[79]In 1997, general Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, who had been appointed by president Ernesto Zedillo as head of the Instituto Nacional de Combate a las Drogas, was arrested after it was discovered that he had been collaborating with the Juárez Cartel.[80] In another infamous incident, Mario Villanueva, a member of the PRI and outgoing governor of Quintana Roo, was accused of drug trafficking charges in 1999. When the evidence against Villanueva became strong enough to warrant an arrest, he dissappeared from the public eye two days before the end of his term, being absent at the ceremony at which he was to hand the office over to his elected successor, Joaquín Hendricks Díaz. Villanueva remained a fugitive from justice for many years, until being captured and arrested in 2001.[81]

2000 - 2012Edit

Loss of the presidency of MexicoEdit

Prior to the 2000 general elections, the PRI held its first primaries to elect the party's presidential candidate. The primary candidates, nicknamed "los cuatro fantásticos" (Spanish for The Fantastic Four), were:[82]

The favorites in the primaries were Labastida and Madrazo, and the latter initiated a campaign against the first, perceived as Zedillo's candidate since many former secretaries of the interior were chosen as candidates by the president. His campaign, produced by prominent publicist Carlos Alazraki, had the motto "Dale un Madrazo al dedazo" or "Give a Madrazo to the dedazo" with "madrazo" being an offensive slang term for a "strike" and "dedazo" a slang used to describe the unilaterally choosing of candidates by the president (literally "finger-strike").

The growth of the PAN and PRD parties culminated in 2000, when the PAN won the presidency, and again in 2006 (won this time by the PAN with a small margin over the PRD.) Many prominent members of the PAN (Manuel Clouthier,[76] Addy Joaquín Coldwell and Demetrio Sodi), most of the PRD (most notably all three Mexico City mayors Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Marcelo Ebrard), the PVEM (Jorge González Torres) and New Alliance (Roberto Campa) were once members of the PRI, including many presidential candidates from the opposition (Clouthier, López Obrador, Cárdenas, González Torres, Campa and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, among many others).

In the presidential elections of July 2, 2000, its candidate Francisco Labastida Ochoa was defeated by Vicente Fox, after getting only 36.1% of the popular vote. It was to be the first Presidential electoral defeat of the PRI. In the senatorial elections of the same date, the party won with 38.1%, or 33 out of 128 seats in the Senate of Mexico.

As an opposition partyEdit

After much restructuring, the party was able to make a recovery, winning the greatest number of seats (5% short of a true majority) in Congress in 2003: at these elections, the party won 224 out of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, remaining as the largest single party in both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. In the Federal District the PRI obtained only one borough mayorship (jefe delegacional) out of 16, and no first-past-the-post members of the city assembly. The PRI recouped some significant losses on the state level (most notably, the governorship of former PAN stronghold Nuevo León). On August 6, 2004, in two closely contested elections in Oaxaca and Tijuana, PRI candidates Ulises Ruiz Ortiz and Jorge Hank Rhon won the races for the governorship and municipal presidency respectively. The PAN had held control of the president's office of the municipality of Tijuana for 15 years. Six out of eight gubernatorial elections held during 2005 were won by the PRI: Quintana Roo, Hidalgo, Colima, Estado de México, Nayarit, and Coahuila. The PRI then controlled the states on the country's northern border with the US except for Baja California.

Later that year Roberto Madrazo, president of the PRI, left his post to seek a nomination as the party's candidate in the 2006 presidential election. According to the statutes, the presidency of the party would then go to Elba Esther Gordillo as party secretary. The rivalry between Madrazo and Gordillo caused Mariano Palacios Alcocer instead to become president of the party, (Elba Esther Gordillo would later on be declared a criminal and arrested in 2013.).[83] After what was perceived an imposition of Madrazo as candidate a group was formed called Unidad Democrática (Spanish: "Democratic Unity"), although nicknamed Todos Unidos Contra Madrazo (Spanish: "Everybody United Against Madrazo" or "TUCOM")[84] which was formed by governors and former state governors:

Montiel won the right to run against Madrazo for the candidacy but withdrew when it was made public that he and his French wife had multi-million properties in Europe.[88] Madrazo and Everardo Moreno contended in the primaries which was won by the first.[89] Madrazo then represented the PRI and the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM) in the Alliance for Mexico coalition.

During his campaign Madrazo declared that the PRI and PRD were "first cousins", to this Emilio Chuayffet Chemor responded that if that was the case then Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), candidate of the PRD would also be a first cousin and he might win the election.[90]

AMLO was, by then, the favorite in the polls, with many followers within the PRI. Madrazo, second at the polls, then released TV spots against AMLO with little success, his campaign was managed again by Alazraki. Felipe Calderón ran a more successful campaign and then tied with Madrazo and later surpassed him as the second favorite. Gordillo, also the teachers' union leader, resentful against Madrazo, helped a group of teachers constitute the New Alliance Party. Divisions within the party and a successful campaign of the PAN candidate caused Madrazo to fall to third place. The winner, as announced by the Federal Electoral Institute and valuated by the Mexican Election Tribunal amidst a controversy, was Felipe Calderón of the ruling PAN. On November 20 of the same year, a group of young PRI politicians launched a movement that is set to reform and revolutionize the party.[91] The PRI candidate failed to win a single state in the 2006 presidential election.

In the 2006 legislative elections the party won 106 out of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 35 out of 128 Senators.

In 2007 the PRI re-gained the governorship of Yucatán and was the party with the most mayorships and state congresspeople in the elections in Yucatán (tying with the PAN in the number of deputies), Chihuahua, Durango, Aguascalientes, Veracruz, Chiapas and Oaxaca. The PRI obtained the most mayorships in Zacatecas and the second most deputies in the congressional elections of Zacatecas and Baja California.[92]

In 2009, the PRI re-gained plurality control of Mexican congress. This is the first time congress will be controlled by the PRI since the first initial victory by the opposing party PAN in the year 2000.[93]

2012 - 2018Edit

Return of the PRIEdit

Under Enrique Peña Nieto and after ruling for most of the past century in Mexico, the PRI returned to the presidency as it had brought hopes to those who gave the PRI another chance and fear to those who worry about the old PRI tactics of making deals with the cartels in exchange for relative peace.[94] According to an article published by The Economist on June 23, 2012, part of the reason why Peña Nieto and the PRI were voted back to the presidency after a 12-year struggle lies in the disappointment of the ruling of the PAN.[95] Buffeted by China's economic growth and the economic recession in the United States, the annual growth of Mexico's economy between 2000 and 2012 was 1.8%. Poverty exacerbated, and without a ruling majority in Congress, the PAN presidents were unable to pass structural reforms, leaving monopolies and Mexico's educational system unchanged.[95] In 2006, Felipe Calderón chose to make the battle against organized crime the centerpiece of his presidency. Nonetheless, with over 60,000 dead and a lack of any real progress, Mexican citizens became tired of a fight they had first supported, and not by majority.[95] The Economist alleged that these signs are "not as bad as they look," since Mexico is more democratic, it enjoys a competitive export market, has a well-run economy despite the crisis, and there are tentative signs that the violence in the country may be plummeting. But if voters want the PRI back, it is because "the alternatives [were] weak".[95] The newspaper also alleges that Mexico's preferences should have gone left-wing, but the candidate that represented that movement – Andrés Manuel López Obrador – was seen with "disgraceful behaviour". The conservative candidate, Josefina Vázquez Mota, was deemed worthy but was considered by The Economist to have carried out a "shambolic campaign". Thus, Peña Nieto wins by default, been considered by the newspaper as the "least bad choice" for reform in Mexico.[95]

Aftermath of the return of the PRI and public receptionEdit

 
  States governed by the PRI in 2017

When it was tossed from the presidency in the year 2000, few expected that the "perfect dictatorship", a description coined by Mario Vargas Llosa, would return again in only 12 years.[96] Associated Press published an article in July 2012 noting that many immigrants living in the United States were worried about the PRI's return to power and that it could dissuade many from returning to their homeland.[97] The vast majority of the 400,000 voters outside of Mexico voted against Peña Nieto, and said they were "shocked" that the PRI – which largely convinced them to leave Mexico – had returned.[97] Voters that favored Peña Nieto, however, believed that the PRI "had changed" and that more jobs would be created under the new regime.[98] Moreover, some U.S. officials were concerned that Peña Nieto's security strategy meant the return to the old and corrupt practices of the PRI regime, where the government made deals and turned a blind eye on the cartels in exchange for peace.[99] After all, they worried that Mexico's drug war, which had already cost over 50,000 lives, would make Mexicans question on why they should "pay the price for a US drug habit".[99] Peña Nieto denied, however, that his party would tolerate corruption, and stated he would not make deals with the cartels.[99] In spite of Peña's words, a poll from September 20, 2016, revealed that 83% of Mexican citizens perceived the PRI as the most corrupt political party in Mexico.[100]

The return of the PRI brought some perceived negative consequences, among them:

  • Low levels of presidential approval of EPN and allegations of presidential corruption: The government of president of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN) has faced multiple scandals, and allegations of corruption. Reforma who has run a surveys of presidential approval since 1995, revealed EPN had received the lowest presidential approval in modern history since they started surveying about it in 1995. Revealed EPN had received a mere 12% approval rating. The lowest since they started to survey for presidential approval, the second lowest approval was for the Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) also from the PRI. While also revealing both presidents elected from National Action Party (PAN), Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderon (2006-2012), both had higher presidential approvals than the PRI presidents.[101]
  • PRI corrupt ex-governors declared criminals by the Mexican government: During EPN's government multiple members of the PRI political party have been declared criminals by the Mexican government, specially alarming the fact that many of those PRI members in fact campaigned with the PRI, and in fact where elected as state governors within the Mexican government, among those are: the aforementioned Tomas Yarrington from Tamaulipas (along his predecessor Eugenio Hernandez Flores), Javier Duarte from Veracruz,[102] César Duarte Jáquez from Chihuahua[103] (no family relation between both Duarte), and Roberto Borge from Quintana Roo, along their unknown multiple allies who enabled their corruption.[104] All those supported (or campaigned for state governors) EPN during his presidential campaign.[105][106][107]
  • State of Mexico allegations of electoral fraud (2017): The 2017 elections within the state of Mexico were highly controversial, with multiple media outlet feeling there was electoral fraud committed by the PRI. In November 2017, magazine Proceso published an article accusing the PRI of breaking at least 16 state laws during the elections, which were denounced 619 times. They said that all of them were broken in order to favor PRI candidate for governor Alfredo del Mazo (whom is the cousin of Enrique Peña Nieto and whom several of his relatives have also been governors of said entity). The article claims it has been the most corrupt election in modern Mexican history, and directly blames the PRI. Despite all the evidence, Alfredo del Mazo was declared winner of the election by the electoral tribunals, and is currently serving as governor.[108]

The Chamber of Deputies also suffered from controversies from members of the PRI:

  • Law 3 of 3 Anticorruption controversy: In early 2016, a controversy arose when all the Senate disputes from the PRI, voted against the "Ley 3 de 3 (Law 3 of 3)". A law that would have obligated every politician to declare three things: make an obligatory public patrimonial declaration, interests declaration, and fiscal. A light version of the law was accepted but it doesn't oblige politicians to declare.[109][110] While it was completely legal for the deputies from the PRI, to vote against such law, some news media outlets interpreted the votes against the promulgation of such law as the political party protecting itself from the findings that could surface if such declarations were to be made.[111][112]
  • In November 2017, Aristegui Noticias reported that "the PRI and their allies were seeking to approve the "Ley de Seguridad Interior (Law of Internal Security)". Whom the Mexican National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) had previously said, that it violated Human Rights, because it favors the discretional ussage of the army forces. Endangering citicenz by giving a blank check to the army" and the president, to order an attack towards any group of people they consider a danger without requiring an explanation. This could include people such as social activists.[113][114]

Presidential election 2018Edit

On November 27, 2017, José Antonio Meade announced he would compete in the 2018 presidential election, representing the PRI. He has been reported to have been handpicked directly by president Enrique Peña Nieto through the traditional and now controversial practice known as El Dedazo (the literal translation would be "The big finger", the slang phrase regards towards the incumbent president directly pointing towards his successor).[115][116]

There were concerns about the possibility of fraud in the presidential election following allegations of electoral fraud concerning the election of Enrique Peña Nieto's cousin Alfredo del Mazo Maza as governor of the state of Mexico, in December 2017. The Mexican newspaper Regeneración, which is officially linked to the MORENA party, warned about the possibility of the PRI committing an electoral fraud. Cited was the controversial law of internal security that the PRI senators approved as the means to diminish the protests towards such electoral fraud.[117] The website Bloomberg also supported that possible outcome, with Tony Payan, director of the Houston's Mexico Center at Rice University's Baker Institute, suggesting that both vote buyout and computer hackings were possible, citing the 1988 previous electoral fraud committed by the PRI. Bloomberg's article also suggested Meade could also receive unfair help from the over-budget amounts of money spent in publicity by incumbent president Enrique Peña Nieto (who also campaigned with the PRI).[118] A December 2017 article in the The New York Times reported Peña Nieto spending about 2,000 million dollars on publicity during his first 5 years as president, the largest publicity budget ever spent by a Mexican President. Additionally, the article noted concerns of news journalists, 68 percent of whom claimed to not believe they have enough freedom of speech. To support the statement, the cited award-winning news reporter Carmen Aristegui, who was controversially fired shortly after revealing the Mexican White House scandals concerning a conflict of interest regarding a house owned by Peña Nieto.[119]

In April 2018, Forbes published the British news program Channel 4 News story claiming the existence of proof of ties between the PRI and Cambridge Analytica, implicated in Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, suggesting a "modus operandi" in Mexico similar to the one in the United States. The information indicated they worked together at least until January 2018.[120][121][122] An investigation was requested.[123] The PRI has denied ever contracting Cambridge Analytica.[124] The New York Times acquired the 57-page proposal of Cambridge Analytica's outlining a strategy of collaboration to benefit the PRI by hurting MORENA's candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The political party rejected Cambridge Analytica's offer but paid the firm to not help the other candidates.[125]

In the 2018 general election, the PRI suffered a monumental legislative defeat, scoring the lowest number of seats in the party's history. Presidential candidate José Antonio Meade also only scored 16.4% of the votes, finishing in third place, while the party only managed to elect 42 deputies (down from 203 of 2015) and 14 senators (down from 61 in 2012).

The PRI was also defeated on each of the 9 elections for state governors where the National Regeneration Movement won 4, PAN 3, and Social Encounter Party and Citizens' Movement each with 1.[126]

Electoral historyEdit

Presidential elections 1929-2018Edit

Election year Candidate Votes % Outcome Notes
1929 Pascual Ortiz Rubio 1,947,848 93.6  Y Elected as PNR, first election after the formation of the party. The opposition candidate José Vasconcelos claimed victory for himself and refused to recognize the official results, claiming that the elections were rigged; then he unsuccessfully attempted to organize an armed revolt. He was jailed and later exiled to the United States. Former President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) and party founder removed Ortiz Rubio from the presidency, replacing him with Abelardo L. Rodríguez in 1932.
1934 Lázaro Cárdenas 2,225,000 98.2  Y Elected as PNR. Revolutionary general. First president to serve a six-year term; chosen by Calles as party candidate
1940 Manuel Ávila Camacho 2,476,641 93.9  Y Elected as PRM. Revolutionary general. The opposition candidate Juan Andreu Almazán refused to recognize the official results, claiming that a massive electoral fraud had taken place. He later fled to Cuba and unsuccessfully tried to organize an armed revolt.
1946 Miguel Alemán Valdés 1,786,901 77.9  Y Elected First civilian president since the Mexican Revolution. Son of revolutionary general Miguel Alemán González.
1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 2,713,419 74.3  Y Elected The opposition candidate Miguel Henríquez Guzmán claimed victory and refused to recognize the official results, claiming that a massive electoral fraud had taken place.
1958 Adolfo López Mateos 6,767,754 90.4  Y Elected
1964 Gustavo Díaz Ordaz 8,368,446 88.8  Y Elected
1970 Luis Echeverría Álvarez 11,970,893 86.0  Y Elected
1976 José López Portillo 16,727,993 100.0  Y Elected unopposed
1982 Miguel de la Madrid 16,748,006 74.3  Y Elected
1988 Carlos Salinas de Gortari 9,687,926 50.7  Y Elected Son of PRI official Raúl Salinas Lozano. Lowest percentage of voters to date. Opposition candidates claimed that the election was rigged and refused to recognize the official results; Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Manuel Clouthier both claimed victory.
1994 Ernesto Zedillo 17,181,651 48.6  Y Elected Chosen the PRI candidate after the 23 March 1994 assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio
2000 Francisco Labastida 13,579,718 36.1  N Defeated First PRI presidential candidate chosen by a primary
2006 Roberto Madrazo 9,301,441 22.2  N Defeated Coalition: Alliance for Mexico. Candidate is son of reformist PRI politician Carlos A. Madrazo
2012 Enrique Peña Nieto 19,226,284 38.2  Y Elected Coalition: Commitment to Mexico
2018 José Antonio Meade 9,289,378 16.4  N Defeated Coalition: Todos por México

Congressional electionsEdit

Chamber of DeputiesEdit

Election year Constituency PR # of seats Position Presidency Note
votes % votes %
1940
172 / 173
Majority Manuel Ávila Camacho  
1946 1,687,284 73.5
141 / 147
Majority Miguel Alemán Valdés  
1952 2,713,419 74.3
151 / 161
Majority Adolfo Ruiz Cortines  
1958 6,467,493 88.2
153 / 162
Majority Adolfo López Mateos  
1964 7,807,912 86.3
175 / 210
Majority Gustavo Díaz Ordaz  
1970 11,125,770 83.3
175 / 210
Majority Luis Echeverría Álvarez  
1976 12,868,104 85.0
195 / 237
Majority José López Portillo  
1982 14,501,988 69.4 14,289,793 65.7
299 / 400
Majority Miguel de la Madrid  
1988 9,276,934 51.0 9,276,934 51.0
260 / 500
Majority Carlos Salinas de Gortari  
1991 14,051,349 61.4 14,145,234 61.4
320 / 500
Majority Carlos Salinas de Gortari  
1994 16,851,082 50.2 17,236,836 50.3
300 / 500
Majority Ernesto Zedillo  
1997 11,305,957 39.1 11,438,719 39.1
239 / 500
Minority Ernesto Zedillo  
2000 13,720,453 36.9 13,800,306 36.9
207 / 500
Minority Vicente Fox  
2003 6,166,358 23.9 6,196,171 24.0
224 / 500
Minority Vicente Fox  
2006 11,629,727 28.0 11,689,110 27.9
121 / 500
Minority Felipe Calderón   Coalition: Alliance for Mexico
2009 12,765,938 36.9 12,809,365 36.9
241 / 500
Minority Felipe Calderón  
2012 15,166,531 31.0 15,513,478 31.8
212 / 500
Minority Enrique Peña Nieto   Coalition: Commitment to Mexico
2015 11,604,665 34.2 11,638,556 29.2
203 / 500
Minority Enrique Peña Nieto   Coalition: Commitment to Mexico
2018 4,351,824 7.78 9,310,523 16.54
45 / 500
Minority Andrés Manuel López Obrador   Coalition: Todos por México

Senate electionsEdit

Election year Constituency PR # of seats Position Presidency Note
votes % votes %
1964 7,837,364 87.8
64 / 64
Majority Gustavo Díaz Ordaz  
1970 11,154,003 84.4
64 / 64
Majority Luis Echeverría Álvarez  
1976 13,406,825 87.5
64 / 64
Majority José López Portillo  
1982
63 / 64
Majority Miguel de la Madrid  
1988 9,263,810 50.8
60 / 64
Majority Carlos Salinas de Gortari  
1994 17,195,536 50.2
95 / 128
Majority Ernesto Zedillo  
1997 11,266,155 38.5
77 / 128
Majority Ernesto Zedillo  
2000 13,699,799 36.7 13,755,787 36.7
51 / 128
Minority Vicente Fox  
2006 11,622,012 28.1 11,681,395 28.0
39 / 128
Minority Felipe Calderón   Coalition: Alliance for Mexico
2012 18,477,441 37.0 18,560,755 36.9
61 / 128
Minority Enrique Peña Nieto   Coalition: Commitment to Mexico
2018 3,855,984 6.86 9,013,658 15.90
13 / 128
Minority Andrés Manuel López Obrador   Coalition: Todos por México

ControversiesEdit

Vote-buyingEdit

Due to weak law enforcement and weak political institutions, vote-buying and electoral fraud are a phenomenon that typically does not see any consequences. As a result of a pervasive, tainted electoral culture, vote buying is common among major political parties that they sometimes reference the phenomenon in their slogans, "Toma lo que los demás dan, ¡pero vota Partido Accion Nacional!" (English: Take what the others give, but vote National Action Party!)[127][128]

In popular cultureEdit

Film depictionEdit

The perceived political favoritism of Televisa towards the PRI, and the concept of the "cortinas de humo (smoke screens)" was explored in the Mexican black-comedy film The Perfect Dictatorship (2014), directed and written by Luis Estrada, whose plot directly criticizes both the PRI and Televisa.[129] Taking place in a Mexico with a tightly controlled media landscape, the plot centers around a corrupt politician (a fictional stand-in for Enrique Peña Nieto) from a political party (serving as a fictional stand-in for the PRI), and how he makes a deal with TV MX (which serves as a stand-in to Televisa) to manipulate the diffusion of news towards his benefit, in order to save his political career.[130] The director made it based on the perceived media manipulation in Mexico.[131]

See alsoEdit

ReferencesEdit

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Further readingEdit

  • Camp, Roderic A. “Mexican Presidential Candidates: Changes & Portents for the Future.” Polity, vol. 16, no. 4, 1984, pp. 588–605. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3234631.
  • Smith, Peter H. "Mexico Since 1946" in Mexico Since Independence, Leslie Bethell, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press 1991

External linksEdit