French Revolutionary Army
The French Revolutionary Army (French: Armée révolutionnaire française) was the French force that fought the French Revolutionary Wars from 1792 to 1802. These armies were characterised by their revolutionary fervour, their poor equipment and their great numbers. Although they experienced early disastrous defeats, the revolutionary armies successfully expelled foreign forces from French soil and then overran many neighboring countries, establishing client republics. Leading generals included Jourdan, Bonaparte, Masséna and Moreau.
|French Revolutionary Army|
French troops at the Battle of Jemmapes (November 1792)
|Country||French Republic, and European émigré groups.|
|Allegiance||First French Republic|
|Motto(s)||Honneur et Patrie|
|Engagements||War of the First Coalition|
War of the Second Coalition
Jean Victor Marie Moreau
As a general description of French military forces during this period, it should not be confused with the "revolutionary armies" (armées révolutionnaires) which were paramilitary forces set up during the Terror.
As the ancien regime gave way to a constitutional monarchy, and then to a republic, 1789–92, the entire structure of France was transformed to fall into line with the Revolutionary principles of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity". Reactionary Europe stood opposed, especially after the French king was executed. The signing of the Declaration of Pillnitz between Leopold II, Holy Roman Emperor and King Frederick William II of Prussia and the subsequent French declaration of war meant that from its formation, the Republic of France was at war, and it required a potent military force to ensure its survival. As a result, one of the first major elements of the French state to be restructured was the army.
Almost all of the ancien regime officer class had been drawn from the aristocracy. During the period preceding the final overthrow of the Monarchy, large numbers of officers left their regiments and emigrated. Between 15 September and 1 December 1791 alone 2,160 officers of the royal army fled France eventually to join the émigré army of Louis Joseph, Prince of Condé. Of those who stayed, many were either imprisoned or killed during the Reign of Terror. The few remaining officers from the old guard were promoted swiftly; this meant that the majority of the Revolutionary officers were far younger than their Monarchist counterparts. The high-ranking aristocratic officers who remained, among them Marquis de la Fayette, Comte de Rochambeau and Comte Nicolas Luckner, were soon accused of having monarchist sympathies and either executed or forced into exile.
Revolutionary fervour, along with calls to save the new regime, resulted in a large influx of enthusiastic, yet untrained and undisciplined, volunteers. These were the first sans-culottes, so called because they wore peasants' trousers rather than the knee-breeches used by the other armies of the time. France's desperate military situation meant that these men were quickly inducted into the army. One reason for the success of the French Revolutionary Army is the "amalgamation" (amalgame) strategy organized by military strategist Lazare Carnot, later Napoleon's Minister of War. He assigned, to the same regiment (but in different battalions), both young volunteers enthusiastic at the thought of dying for liberty and old veterans from the former royal army.
The transformation of the Army was most apparent in the officer corps. Before the revolution, 90% of the officers had been aristocrats, compared to only 3% in 1794. Revolutionary fervor was high, and was closely monitored by the Committee of Public Safety, which assigned Representatives on Mission to keep watch on the army generals. Indeed, during the war, some generals deserted, and others were removed or executed. The government demanded that soldiers be loyal to the government in Paris, not to their generals.
Officially, the Revolutionary Armies were operating along the guidelines set down in the 1791 Reglement, a set of regulations created during the years before the Revolution. The 1791 Reglement laid down several complex tactical maneuvers, maneuvers which demanded well trained soldiers, officers and NCOs to perform correctly. The Revolutionary Army was lacking in all three of these areas, and as a result the early efforts to conform to the 1791 Reglement were met with disaster. The untrained troops could not perform the complex maneuvers required, unit cohesion was lost and defeat was ensured.
Realizing that the army was not capable of conforming with the 1791 Reglement, commanders began experimenting with formations which required less training to perform. Many eminent French military thinkers had been clamoring for change decades before. In the period following the humiliating performance of the French Army during the Seven Years' War, they began to experiment with new ideas. Guibert wrote his epic Essai général de Tactique, Bourcet focused on staff procedures and mountain warfare, and Mesnil-Durand spent his time advocating l'ordre profond, tactics of maneuvering and fighting in heavy columnar formations, placing emphasis on the shock of cold steel over firepower.
In the 1770s, some commanders, among them the brilliant duc de Broglie performed exercises testing these tactics. It was finally decided to launch a series of experiments to try out the new tactics, and comparing them to the standard Fredrickian linear formation known as l'ordre mince which was universally popular throughout Europe. De Broglie decided that l'ordre profond worked best when it was supported by artillery and large numbers of skirmishers. Despite these exercises, l'ordre mince had strong and powerful supporters in the Royal Armée Française, and it was this formation which went into the 1791 Reglement as the standard.
Trial by fireEdit
The French struck first, with an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands proposed by foreign minister Charles François Dumouriez. This invasion soon turned into a debacle when it was found that the hastily trained Revolutionary forces badly lacked obedience: on one occasion, troops murdered their general to avoid a battle; on another, troops insisted on putting their commander's orders to a vote. The Revolutionary forces retreated from the Austrian Netherlands in disarray.
In August 1792, a large Austro-Prussian army commanded by the Duke of Brunswick crossed the frontier and began its march on Paris with the declared intention of restoring full power to Louis XVI. Several Revolutionary armies were easily defeated by the professional Austrian, Hessian, Brunswick and Prussian troops. The immediate result of this was the storming of the Tuileries Palace and the overthrow of the king. Successive Revolutionary forces failed to halt Brunswick's advance, and by mid-September it appeared that Paris would fall to the monarchists. The Convention ordered the remaining armies to be combined under the command of Dumouriez and François Christophe Kellermann. At the Battle of Valmy on 20 September 1792, the Revolutionary forces defeated Brunswick's advance guard, causing the invading army to begin retreating to the border. Much of the credit to the victory must go to the French artillery, widely viewed as the best in Europe thanks to the technical improvements of Jean Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval.
The Battle of Valmy ensured that the Revolutionary armies were respected by their enemies, and for the next ten years they not only defended the fledgling First French Republic, but under the command of Generals such as Moreau, Jourdan, Kléber, Desaix and Bonaparte expanded the borders of the French republic.
While the Cannonade of Valmy had saved the Republic from imminent destruction and caused its enemies to take pause, the guillotining of Louis XVI in January 1793 and the convention's proclamation that it would 'export the revolution' hardened the resolve of France's enemies to destroy the Republic and reinstate a monarchy.
In early 1793, the First Coalition was formed, not only from Prussia and Austria, but also Sardinia, Naples, the Dutch United Provinces, Spain and Great Britain. The Republic was under attack on several fronts, and in the fiercely Catholic region of La Vendée an armed revolt had broken out. The Revolutionary army was greatly overstretched, and it seemed that the fall of the republic was imminent.
In early 1793 Lazare Carnot, a prominent mathematician, physicist, and delegate to the Convention, was promoted to the Committee of Public Safety. Displaying an exceptional talent for organization and for enforcing discipline, Carnot set about rearranging the disheveled Revolutionary Armies. Realizing that no amount of reforming and discipline was going to offset the massive numerical superiority enjoyed by France's enemies, Carnot ordered (24 February 1793 decree of the national Convention) each département to provide a quota of new recruits, a number totaling around 300,000. By mid-1793, the Revolutionary Army had increased around 645,000 men.
Levée en masseEdit
On 23 August 1793, at Carnot's insistence, the Convention issued the following proclamation ordering a levée en masse
- "From this moment until such time as its enemies shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the services of the armies. The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothes and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn linen into lint; the old men shall betake themselves to the public squares in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic"
All unmarried able bodied men aged between 18 and 25 were to report immediately for military service. Those married, as well as the remaining men, women and children, were to focus their efforts on arming and supplying the army.
This increased the size of the Revolutionary Armies dramatically, providing the armies in the field with the manpower to hold off the enemy attacks. Carnot was hailed by the government as the Organizer of Victory. By September 1794, the Revolutionary Army had 1,500,000 men under arms. Carnot's levée en masse had provided so much manpower that it was not necessary to repeat it again until 1797.
Seeing the failure of the 1791 Reglement, several early revolutionary commanders followed de Broglie's example and experimented with the pre-revolutionary ideas, gradually adapting them until they discovered a system that worked. The final standard used by the early Revolutionary Armies consisted of the following.
- Troops with exceptional morale or skill became skirmishers, and were deployed in a screen in front of the Army. Their main fighting tactics were of a guerrilla-warfare nature. Both mounted and on foot, the large swarm of skirmishers would hide from enemies if possible, pepper their formations with fire and deploy ambushes. Unable to retaliate on the scattered skirmishers, the morale and unit cohesion of the better trained and equipped émigré and monarchist armies was gradually worn down. The incessant harassing fire usually resulted in a section of the enemy line wavering, and then the 'regular' formations of the Revolutionary Army would be sent into the attack.
- Troops with less skill and of more dubious quality, making up the 'regular' part of the army, were formed into battalion columns. The battalion column required little training to perfect, and provided commanders with potent "battering ram-style" formations with which to hit the enemy lines after the skirmishers had done their work. The skirmish screen also provided protection for those troops
Following the dissolution of the ancien regime, the system of named regiments was abandoned. Instead, the new army was formed into a series of numbered demi-brigades. Consisting of two or three battalions, these formations were designated demi-brigades in an attempt to avoid the feudal connotations of the term Regiment. In mid-1793, the Revolutionary Army officially comprised 196 infantry demi-brigades.
After the initial dismal performance of the Fédéré volunteer battalions, Carnot ordered that each demi-brigade was to consist of one regular (ex-Royal Army) and two fédéré battalions. These new formations, intended to combine the discipline and training of the old army with the enthusiasm of the new volunteers, were proven successful at Valmy in September 1792. In 1794, the new demi-brigade was universally adopted.
The Revolutionary Army had been formed from a hodgepodge of different units, and as such did not have a uniform appearance. Veterans in their white uniforms and tarleton helmets from the ancien regime period served alongside national guardsmen in their blue jackets with white turnbacks piped red and fédérés dressed in civilian clothes with only the red phrygian cap and the tricolour cockade to identify them as soldiers. Poor supplies meant that uniforms which had worn out were replaced with civilian clothes, and so the Revolutionary Army lacked any semblance of uniformity, with the exception of the tricolour cockade which was worn by all soldiers. As the war progressed, several demi-brigades were issued specific coloured uniform jackets, and the Revolutionary Armée d'Orient which arrived in Egypt in 1798 was uniformed in purple, pink, green, red, orange and blue jackets.
Along with the problem of uniforms, many men of the Revolutionary Army lacked weapons and ammunition. Any weapons captured from the enemy were immediately absorbed into the ranks. After the Battle of Montenotte in 1796, 1,000 French soldiers who had been sent into battle unarmed were afterwards equipped with captured Austrian muskets. As a result, uniformity was also lacking in weapons.
Besides the regular demi-brigades, light infantry demi-brigades also existed. These formations were formed from soldiers who had shown skill in marksmanship, and were used for skirmishing in front of the main force. As with the line demi-brigades, the light demi-brigades lacked uniformity in either weapons or equipment.
Supporting the skirmishers was the French artillery. The artillery had suffered least from the exodus of aristocratic officers during the early days of the Revolution, as it was commanded mostly by men drawn from the middle class. The man who would shape the era, Napoleon Bonaparte, himself was an artilleryman. The various technical improvements of Général Jean Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval in the years preceding the Revolution, and the subsequent efforts of Baron du Teil and his brother Chevalier Jean du Teil meant that the French artillery was the finest in Europe. The Revolutionary Artillery was responsible for several of the Republic's early victories; for example at Valmy, on 13 Vendémiaire, and at Lodi. The revolutionary cannon played a vital role in their success. The cannon continued to have a dominating role on the battlefield throughout the Napoleonic Wars.
The cavalry was seriously affected by the Revolution. The majority of officers had been of aristocratic birth and had fled France during the final stages of the monarchy or to avoid the subsequent Terror. Many French cavalrymen joined the émigré army of the Prince du Conde. Two entire regiments, the Hussards du Saxe and the 15éme Cavalerie (Royal Allemande) defected to the Austrians.
Lacking not only trained officers, but also mounts and equipment, the Revolutionary Cavalry became the worst equipped arm of the Revolutionary Army. By Mid 1793, the paper organisation of the Revolutionary Army included twenty six heavy cavalry regiments, two regiments of carabiniers, twenty dragoon regiments, eighteen regiments of chasseurs à cheval and ten hussar regiments. In reality, it was seldom that any of these regiments reached even half strength. However, unlike the infantry, where all battalions of the old Royal Army were merged with freshly raised volunteers to form new demi-brigades, the cavalry retained their regimental identities throughout the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. As one example, the Regiment de Chasseurs d'Alsace (raised in 1651) was renamed the 1er Regiment de Chasseurs in 1791 but otherwise remained unchanged until it was finally disbanded after Waterloo.
The French Aerostatic Corps (compagnie d'aérostiers) was the first French air force, founded in 1794 to use balloons, primarily for reconnaissance. The first military use of the balloon occurred on 2 June 1794, when it was used for reconnaissance during an enemy bombardment. On 22 June, the corps received orders to move the balloon to the plain of Fleurus, in front of the Austrian troops at Charleroi.
Notable generals and commandersEdit
Notable battles and campaignsEdit
Active Armies 1792–1804Edit
- Armies of 1792
- Armée du Nord
- Armée du Rhin
- Armée des Alpes
- Armée des Pyrénées
- Armée des côtes
- Armée du Centre
- Armée de réserve
- Armée du Var
- Armies after restructure of 1793
- Armée du Nord
- Armée des Ardennes
- Armée de Moselle
- Armée du Rhin
- Armée des Alpes
- Armée d'Italie
- Armée des côtes de Brest
- Armée des côtes de Cherbourg
- Armée des côtes de La Rochelle
- Armée des Pyrénées occidentales
- armée des Pyrénées orientales
On 1 October, the Armée de la Rochelle was redesignated as the armée de l'Ouest.
- Armies Formed for Specific Tasks
- Army of Sambre-et-Meuse
- Armée de Rhin-et-Moselle
- Armée de Rome Formed from the Army d'Italie for the occupation of Rome.
- Armée d'Angleterre Originally formed to fight the British in 1797, it was redesignated Armée d'Orient and divided into
- Armée de Réserve Formed in secret by Napoleon and led by him personally during the Italian campaign of 1800, culminating in the Battle of Marengo.
- Armée d'Allemagne
- Armée du Danube
- Armée de Hollande
- Armée des Grisons
- Armée des côtes de l'Océan This army was formed for the invasion of England, and in 1805 it became La Grande Armée.
- Émigré armies of the French Revolutionary Wars Royalist French forces in opposition to the Revolutionary government of France.
- Social background of officers and other ranks in the French Army, 1750–1815
- Cobb, Richard (1987). The People's Armies. New Haven: Yale UP. ISBN 0300040423.
- Munro Price, "The Fall of the French Monarchy", ISBN 0-330-48827-9
- Robert Doughty and Ira Gruber, ed. Warfare in the Western World: volume 1: Military operations from 1600 to 1871 (1996) p 187
- Hazen, C.D. - The French Revolution Vol II, pp 666
- Terry Crowdy, pages 18-19, "French Revolutionary Infantry 1789–1802", ISBN 1-84176-660-7
- Emir Bukhari, page 15 "Napoleon's Line Chasseurs", ISBN 0-85045-269-4
- Jeremy Beadle and Ian Harrison, First, Lasts & Onlys: Military, p. 42
- F. Stansbury Haydon, Military Ballooning During the Early Civil War, pp.5-15
- Charles Coulston Gillispie, Science and Polity in France: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Years, pp. 372-373
- Bertaud, Jean-Paul. The Army of the French Revolution: From Citizen-soldier to Instrument of Power (Princeton University Press, 1988)
- Chandler, David G.. Campaigns of Napoleon, 1216 pages. 1973. ISBN 0-02-523660-1; covers each battle
- Elting, John Robert. Swords Around the Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée, 784 pages. 1997. ISBN 0-306-80757-2
- Forrest, Alan. Soldiers of the French Revolution (1989)
- Forrest, Alan. Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during Revolution and the Empire (1989) excerpt and text search
- Griffith, Paddy. The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789–1802 (1998) excerpt and text search
- Hazen, Charles Downer - The French Revolution (2 vol 1932) 948 pages. ASIN: B00085AF0W
- Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Napoleon's Military Machine (1995) excerpt and text search
- Lynn, John A. The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94 , (1984) 356 pages, ISBN 0-8133-2945-0
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. (1980). The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-31076-8.
- Scott, Samuel F. "The Regeneration of the Line Army during the French Revolution." Journal of Modern History (1970) 42#3 pp 308–330. in JSTOR
- Scott, Samuel F. From Yorktown to Valmy: The Transformation of the French Army in an Age of Revolution (1998) online
- Skocpol, Theda. "Social revolutions and mass military mobilization." World Politics (1988) 40#2 pp 147–168.
- Royal, Republican, Imperial, a History of the French Army from 1792–1815: Vol 1 - Infantry - History of Line Infantry (1792–1815), Internal & Tactical Organization; Revolutionary National Guard, Volunteers Federes, & Compagnies Franches; and 1805 National Guard., Nafziger, George. 98 pages. (https://archive.is/20121220114621/http://home.fuse.net/nafziger/NAFNAP.HTM)
- Royal, Republican, Imperial, a History of the French Army from 1792–1815: Vol 2 - Infantry - National Guard after 1809; Garde de Paris, Gendarmerie, Police, & Colonial Regiments; Departmental Reserve Companies; and Infantry Uniforms., Nafziger, George. 104 pages. (https://archive.is/20121220114621/http://home.fuse.net/nafziger/NAFNAP.HTM)
- Royal, Republican, Imperial, a History of the French Army from 1792–1815: Vol 3 - Cavalry - Line, National Guard, Irregular, & Coastal Artillery, Artillery & Supply Train, and Balloon Companies., Nafziger, George. 127 pages.
- Royal, Republican, Imperial, a History of the French Army from 1792–1815: Vol 4 - Imperial Guard, Nafziger, George. 141 pages. (https://archive.is/20121220114621/http://home.fuse.net/nafziger/NAFNAP.HTM)