Eyewitness memory is a person's episodic memory for a crime or other dramatic event that he or she has witnessed. Eyewitness testimony is often relied upon in the judicial system. It can also refer to an individual's memory for a face, where they are required to remember the face of their perpetrator, for example. However, the accuracy of eyewitness memories is sometimes questioned because there are many factors that can act during encoding and retrieval of the witnessed event which may adversely affect the creation and maintenance of the memory for the event. Experts have found evidence to suggest that eyewitness memory is fallible. It has long been speculated that mistaken eyewitness identification plays a major role in the wrongful conviction of innocent individuals. A growing body of research now supports this speculation, indicating that mistaken eyewitness identification is responsible for more convictions of the innocent than all other factors combined. This may be due to the fact that details of unpleasant emotional events are recalled poorly compared to neutral events. States of high emotional arousal, which occur during a stressful or traumatic event, lead to less efficient memory processing. The Innocence Project determined that 75% of the 239 DNA exoneration cases had occurred due to inaccurate eyewitness testimony. It is important to inform the public about the flawed nature of eyewitness memory and the difficulties relating to its use in the criminal justice system so that eyewitness accounts are not viewed as the absolute truth.
During the eventEdit
Challenges of identifying facesEdit
People struggle to identify faces in person or from photos, a difficulty arising from the encoding of faces. When participants were given a basic memory test from an array of photos or a lineup, they struggled to accurately identify the images and had low recognition. This finding provides a starting point for estimating the accuracy of eyewitnesses' identification of others involved in a traumatic event. It can only get more challenging for a person to accurately encode a face when they themselves are experiencing a traumatic event. Because courts rely on eyewitness facial recognition, it is important to acknowledge that identification is not always accurate. Face-specific cognitive and neural processes show contributions to holistic processing and recognition in the episodic memories of eyewitnesses. Unreliability of eyewitness identifications may be a result of mismatching between how faces are holistically processed and how composite systems retrieve features in faces during an event.
The other-race effect (i.e. the own-race bias, cross-race effect, other-ethnicity effect, same-race advantage) is one factor thought to impact the accuracy of facial recognition. Studies investigating this effect have shown that a person is better able to recognize faces that match their own race but are less reliable at identifying other more unfamiliar races, thus inhibiting encoding. Various explanations for this effect have been proposed. The perceptual expertise account suggests that with an increase of exposure to one's own race, perceptual mechanisms develop which allow people to be more proficient at remembering faces of their own race. The socio-cognitive account predicts that motivational and/or attentional components over focus on the race of a person. Another hypothesis is that each race pays attention to certain facial details to differentiate between faces. However, other races might not encode these same features. A final suggestion is that faces of the same race are encoded more deeply, leading a witness to have a more detailed memory for those faces; but there has not been much research to support this hypothesis. Research on the other race effect has mainly focused on the African American and Caucasian races. Most research has shown that white eyewitnesses exhibit the other-race effect, however this effect does extend to other races too. In general, memory is an individual process and that conceptualization of race causes racial ambiguity in facial recognition. Mono-racial eyewitnesses may depend on categorization more than multiracial eyewitnesses, who develop a more fluid concept of race. Perception may affect the immediate encoding of these unreliable notions due to prejudices, which can influence the speed of processing and classification of racially ambiguous targets. The ambiguity in eyewitness memory facial recognition can be attributed to the divergent strategies that are used when under the influence of racial bias. This phenomenon is not limited to race. Stereotypes of any kind (whether they be related to age, gender, etc.) can affect the encoding of information at the time of the event. For example, if one is held at gunpoint by two individuals, one of whom is a man and the other is a woman wearing a hat, the victim may quickly fall back on the belief that men are more likely to be aggressors. Consequently, the victim may encode the situation as involving two male assailants, yielding problematic effects in the process of identifying the assailants later on.
Stress and traumaEdit
Stress or trauma during an event can affect the encoding of the memory. Traumatic events may cause memory to be repressed out of conscious awareness. An inability to access the repressed memory is argued to occur in cases involving child sexual abuse. Another way encoding a memory can be affected is when the person involved in a traumatic event experiences dissociation; he or she mentally removes themselves from the situation, which may serve as a coping mechanism. Lastly, trauma may induce a flashbulb effect; the witness believes they vividly remember significant details of a salient event, although accuracy must be determined of such memories . In legal settings the mental state of an individual at both witnessing a crime and in testimony can affect the success of their memory retrieval. Stress in small amounts is thought to aid memory, whereby stress hormones released by the amygdala promote the consolidation of emotional memories. Nevertheless, stress in high amounts may hinder memory performance. Witnesses of severe crimes or trauma can suffer from further implications, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or even psychogenic amnesia.
Post traumatic stress disorderEdit
Explicit memory (used in legal testimony) is affected by post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); individuals diagnosed with PTSD can struggle to recall explicit events from their memory, usually those which are especially traumatic events. This may be due to the individual preferring not to think about the unpleasant memory, which they may rather forget. Implicit memory, on the other hand, does not seem to be affected in the same way that explicit memory does, rather some individuals with PTSD may score higher on implicit memory tests than non-PTSD individuals.
Psychogenic amnesia (or dissociative amnesia) can affect explicit memory for a particular event. Most often cases of psychogenic amnesia occur after witnessing an extremely violent crime or trauma, such as war.
Everyday memory can be affected by factors such as stress or mood. The 'mood congruency' effect refers to memory being aided by a matching of mood at the encoding/learning stage to the retrieval stage. If a memory is encoded under stressful conditions it may be more likely that the memory is better recalled if stress levels at retrieval are congruent to stress levels at encoding. Mood congruency may affect a witnesses ability to recall a highly stressful crime, if conditions of encoding and retrieval are different. Moderate amounts of stress may be beneficial to memory by the release of corticosteroids. Conversely, too much stress (and therefore an extreme influx of corticosteroids) can affect function of the hippocampus and therefore hinder memory. Very high levels of corticosteroid release may be very detrimental for memory.
The weapon focus effect suggests that the presence of a weapon narrows a person's attention, thus affects eyewitness memory. A person focuses on the central detail (for example, the weapon) and loses focus on the peripheral details thus resulting in worse perpetrator recall. While the weapon is remembered clearly, the memories of the other details of the scene suffer. The weapon focus effect occurs because additional items require more visual attention, therefore they are frequently not processed. This increased focus of attention on central aspects takes away attentional resources from peripheral details. For example, if a gun was brought into a school, it would attract significant amount of attention, because students are not used to seeing that item. When participants were watching a slideshow, and were seeing an unusual stimulus item, their reaction times were slower (regardless whether the stimulus was dangerous) in comparison to reaction times for more frequent stimulus. When the item was dangerous (i.e. a weapon), participants had a lower accuracy and confidence than the control group's. Another hypothesis is that seeing a weapon might cause an aroused state. In an aroused state, people focus on central details instead of peripheral ones.
The testimony of a witness can lose validity due to too many external stimuli, that may affect what was witnessed during the crime, and therefore obstruct memory. For example, if an individual witnesses a car accident on a very public street, there may be too many cues distracting the witness from the main focus. Numerous interfering stimulus inputs may suppress the importance of the stimulus of focus, the accident. This can degrade the memory traces of the event, and diminish the representation of those memories. This is known as the cue-overload principle.
After the eventEdit
Memory becomes susceptible to contamination when witnesses discuss the event with others and as time passes. This is because memory traces blend with other stories and events that the witness is exposed to after the stressful or traumatic event  Because memory is subject to contamination, the most reliable test of a memory is the initial test. Police procedures can reduce the effects of contamination on memory with proper testing protocols.
Witnesses can be subject to memory distortions that can alter their account of events. It is of particular interest that the memory of an eyewitness can become compromised by other information, such that an individual's memory becomes biased. This can increase eyewitnesses sensitivity to the misinformation effect. Individuals report what they believe to have witnessed at the time of the crime, even though this may be the result of a false memory. These effects can be a result of post-event information. It is very important to provide witnesses with helpful response options on memory tests and to be warned of misleading influences that might affect how the memory of the event is recalled at a later time. Many employees, police force workers, and others are trained in post-warning in order to reduce influences on the misinformation effect, which can be predicted before crime. In their studies, many researchers use eyewitnesses to study retrieval-blocking effects, which interfere with a witness' ability to recall information. Misleading information prior to the event can also influence misinformation effects. Other studies also address how the misinformation effect seems to amplify over increasing recall. Discussing events and being questioned multiple times may cause various versions of the testimonies. However, the earliest records prove to be the most accurate due to a minimized misinformation effect.
Many mistaken identifications are the result of unconscious transference, or the inability to distinguish between the perpetrator and another person who was encountered in a different context. In many of these cases, the culprit is confused with a different person who was present at the crime scene. Implicit processing takes place during the event, in which the witness encodes the general features of innocent bystanders, creating a sense of familiarity. At retrieval, this familiarity could cause people who were merely present in the crime scene to be confused with the culprit. After viewing a video of a crime involving a thief and two innocent bystanders, participants were asked to identify the perpetrator from a lineup including the three persons present in the video and three other people never before encountered. Most participants falsely identified an innocent person from the lineup. Furthermore, participants were more likely to misidentify one of the two innocent confederates in the video than one of the three unfamiliar people. Unconscious transference occurs in this instance when the witness misattributes his or her sense of familiarity of the perpetrator to a bystander. This confusing effect of familiarity is found in the mug shot procedure as well. The presentation of mug shot arrays alone does not seem to influence identification accuracy. However, this presentation can be influential if the police lineups include individuals who were earlier featured in the mug shot array. Individuals appearing in police lineups that also appeared in previous photo arrays may be identified as quickly as identifying the actual target. Therefore, in cases where a suspect is identified from mug shots following a line-up, it is uncertain whether the line-up identification is a result of the recognition of the perpetrator or of the detection of a person seen previously in mug shots.
A police lineup is a method for an eyewitness to identify a perpetrator by viewing a series of photos, or a live group of suspects. One possible outcome of a lineup is that the eyewitness can correctly identify the criminal. Another outcome is that the eyewitness can correctly state that the criminal is not in the lineup. A third option is that the eyewitness can fail to recognize that the culprit is present. Lastly, the eyewitness can incorrectly select another suspect. The ideal result is to correctly identify the offender, and the worst outcome is to mistakenly identify an innocent.
Police role in lineupEdit
There are specific guidelines for police to follow when administering a lineup, to reduce bias in the lineup and increase the accuracy of eyewitness judgements. Police must reduce the pressure that eyewitnesses feel to select a criminal from an array of photos or persons. They should make sure that the eyewitness is aware that the perpetrator might not be in the lineup. Also, police should conduct a double blind procedure that does not allow them to see the lineup. This prevents police from giving the eyewitness any information, intentional or not, about who in the lineup is a police suspect. It also prevents the police from giving any feedback to the eyewitness. Feedback can produce a false confidence in the witness' selection. When overseeing a lineup, the police can use speed of recognition to determine the validity of the identification. If the witness quickly identifies the perpetrator, then the selection is more likely to be correct.
Style of lineupEdit
A sequential lineup presents a witness with a series of photos one at a time, requiring the participant to identify if each photo matches his/her memory before moving forward. The witness does not know how many photos are in the group. In a simultaneous lineup, the photos or suspects are viewed together. Sequential lineups produce fewer identifications, since they are more challenging, and require absolute judgement. This means that the decision regarding the matching of the memory to the photo is independently made. On the other hand, a simultaneous lineup requires relative judgement, as the decision is not independent of the other possibilities. An absolute judgment is a judgment that requires the person to be 100 percent certain in their choice where a relative judgment is when someone makes up their mind based on what looks the closest. However, researchers such as Dr. Gary Wells from Iowa State University claim "during simultaneous lineups, witnesses use relative judgment, meaning that they compare lineup photographs or members to each other, rather than to their memory of the offender." Sequential lineups have been preferred historically, seeing as they do not rely on relative judgment. However, recent data suggests the preference for sequential lineups over simultaneous lineups may not be empirically supported. Individuals who participate in sequential lineups are less likely to make a selection at all, regardless if the selection is accurate or not. This suggests the sequential lineup fosters a more conservative shift in criterion to make a selection rather than an increased ability to pick the true perpetrator. Consequently, further research is needed before offering recommendations to police departments.
Size of lineupEdit
Lineup members should have diverse characteristics so that lineups are not biased toward or against the suspect. If the appearance of a person stands out amongst the otherwise indistinctive crowd, then an eyewitness is more likely to select that person regardless of their own recollection of the criminal. According to Schuster (2007), the suspect, if he is in the in person lineup or in a picture lineup, should not stand out from the others in the lineup. People's eyes are drawn to what is different. If you make sure that all the men or women in the pictures have a similar appearance, have the same background in their picture, race, age, and are wearing the same or similar clothing, just to name a few, then the risk of getting a false positive will decrease. Thus, this lineup is suggestive. Fillers should be added to the lineup in order to depict a broad spectrum of characteristics, but must match any known description of the offender. If lineup members do not all match the known description of the offender then the lineup is biased toward the suspect. Biased lineups have been shown to increase misidentifications, particularly in target-absent lineups. Increasing the nominal size of a lineup (the actual number of suspects that are compiled) often decreases the potential for a wrong selection. Functional size also plays a role in lineup bias. Functional size is the reciprocal of the fraction of mock witnesses that choose the suspect from a lineup. For example, in a lineup of nominal size 5, if 15 out of 30 mock witnesses (randomly chosen individuals that did not experience the offence) choose the suspect, the functional size of the lineup is the reciprocal of 15/30, which is 30/15, or 2. So although the lineup has 5 members, functionally it only has 2. Effective size is the number of probable suspects. Police use these three numbers to evaluate a lineup.
Many studies, as well as police procedures, are dependent on photo lineups or police lineups where the eyewitness views the suspects from a distance. This procedure is done in an attempt to eliminate suspects and identify the perpetrator. These types of lineups allow only small degrees of visual information for the eyewitness, such as limited viewing angles, which restrict the level of detail compared to a computerized virtual lineup where witnesses can see the targets from multiple angles and distances. One might anticipate that examination of the suspects from unlimited viewpoints would allow for better recognition cues, than when compared to limited views. However, unlimited visual information may be disadvantageous and counterproductive if the information offered at the time of retrieval was not actually present at the time of memory encoding. For example, if an eyewitness only saw the face of the perpetrator from one angle, seeing the lineup participants from other viewpoints might be distracting. Other studies have demonstrated that unlimited viewpoints do improve accuracy in police lineups. The eyewitness accuracy improves when the distance between the suspect and witness matches the distance during the initial witnessing of the crime.
Another phenomenon that may interfere with an eyewitness' memory is retroactive interference. This occurs when new information is processed that obstructs the retrieval of old information. A common source of interference that may occur after the event of a crime is the reporting of the crime. Police investigations include questioning that is often suggestive. The processing of new information may disrupt or entirely replace old information. If a police officer has reason to believe that a suspect is guilty the interrogator's bias can influence the eyewitness' memory. The interrogators can also put pressure on witnesses causing them to want to select a perpetrator from a police lineup. Eyewitnesses are often unsuspecting of the interrogator bias and believe their memories to be uncontaminated.
The presence of a co-witness can often contaminate memories. When witnesses confer about an event they can end up agreeing on an incorrect narrative. Research has found that 71% of witnesses changed their eyewitness accounts to include false components that their co-witnesses remembered. This makes it very difficult to reconstruct the actual account of an event. To prevent this effect, police should separate witnesses as early as possible before the reporting of the event. Unfortunately this is difficult, especially if the police do not get involved immediately after the event. Police should inform witnesses of the possibility of contamination as soon as possible. Witnesses should be interviewed as soon as possible with police noting if the witnesses have compared accounts. Once the accounts have been recorded, police should make notes of similarities or differences that could point to contaminated details or facts. 
A witness identifying a suspect can make a decision with little or great confidence. Level of confidence varies between different witnesses and situations. There are two types of confidence: confidence in a witness' own ability to make an identification (prior to viewing a police lineup) and confidence in having made an accurate identification or accurate rejection. It must be considered that memories are normally vulnerable to multiple influences and prone to distortions and deceptions: “they are never constant and never result in fully accurate representations [and] these changes occur without us being aware of them.” As a consequence, the witness' confidence in his/her ability to make a correct identification should not be used to assess the accuracy of identification. Witnesses should be asked to attempt identifications even if their confidence is low. Confidence ratings after identification of a suspect is a better ( but not perfect) predictor.
In many experiments, witnesses are asked to rate their confidence in their decision after making an identification from a lineup. A number of psychologists have investigated factors that might affect the confidence accuracy relationship. In a recent review of 15 experiments, suspect identifications made with high confidence were, on average, 97 percent accurate. On the other hand, witnesses who report low confidence are highly suggestive of inaccurate identification. University of Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett analyzed trial materials for 161 DNA exonerated individuals and found that in 57 percent of those cases, it was possible to determine that, in the initial (uncontaminated) memory test, the eyewitnesses were, at best, uncertain.
The optimality hypothesis states that factors influencing the optimality of information processing also influence the reliability of the confidence estimate. During situations in which information processing conditions are less than optimal (e.g. the perpetrator is disguised or duration of exposure is brief) witnesses' performance during identification decreases and they are less confident in their decision. The confidence accuracy correlation is thus estimated to be stronger in situations of optimal information processing such as longer exposure time, and weaker under conditions that are not optimal.
Certain factors affect identification accuracy without influencing confidence whereas other factors influence confidence without having an effect on identification accuracy. Reconstructive processes in memory (i.e. the influence of post-event information on stored memories) can influence identification accuracy while not necessarily affecting confidence. Social influence processes (i.e. committing to a decision) might have an effect on confidence judgements while having little to no effect on the accuracy of the identification.
The method of conducting an interview has great implication on the accuracy of the testimony. When the person being interviewed is forced to provide more information, he/she is more likely to engage in confabulation. For example, when participants were shown a video and instructed to answer all questions (answerable and unanswerable) about its content, they often fabricated information. When prodded too much to remember something, people often fall upon false memories. This effect is also seen in hypnosis: when people intensely try and are guided to remember something, they may end up mistaking a vivid imagination as a memory.
Cognitive interview techniqueEdit
Researchers have developed a strategy, entitled the cognitive interview technique, to elicit the most accurate eyewitness memory. In this preferred protocol for conducting interviews, the interrogator should make the witness feel comfortable, ask open-ended questions, and grant the witness freedom in describing the event. In addition, the interviewer should encourage the witness to exhaust his/her memory by reinstating the context of the event, recalling the events in different orders, and viewing the event scene from different perspectives.
Distortions in a witness's memory can be induced by suggestive questioning procedures. Asking eyewitnesses to repeatedly retrieve information in multiple interviews may enhance memory because the event is being rehearsed many times or, as in many cases, increase suggestibility. Misleading information offered by the investigators may attract more attention than the originally encoded information, so the witness' memory of the event is altered to include erroneous details suggested during the interview. In addition, repeating questions could make the witness feel pressured to change his or her answer or elaborate on an already-given response with fabricated details. Open-ended questioning can reduce the level of retrieval-enhanced suggestibility because the witness is not subjected to testing manipulation by the interviewer.
Contextual reinstatement is a common technique used to help eyewitnesses remember details about a specific environment—reviewing the initial environment in which the original information was encoded. Taking a witness back to the scene where the event occurred, for example, will help facilitate the accuracy in identifying perpetrators. Reinstatement is thought to improve recall as it provides memory retrieval cues. Research has demonstrated that pairing faces of suspects or words with contextual cues at the scene of the crime will enhance performance on recognition tasks. Therefore, it seems practical that these results can be applied to eyewitness identification. Methods commonly used to examine context reinstatement include photographs of the environment/scene, mental contextual reinstatement cues, and guided recollection. Studies show that re-exposing participants to the crime scene does enhance performance in facial recognition. There were also notable effects for context reinstatement where improvement on correct identifications while increasing false alarms. Reports also show that the magnitude of improvement via context reinstatement increased in lifelike situations compared to laboratory studies.
An alteration of context was found to be one of the most important predictors of recognition accuracy. Such changes in experimental context have been shown to have effects similar to transformations in appearance, such as disguises. Criminal identifications can be influenced by a change in context. Investigators must account for the fact that encountering an acquaintance that we usually see in one context, such as work place, alters memory generalizability when compared to encountering the same acquaintance in another environment that acts like an unassociated context, such as a grocery store. The changes in environment make it difficult to identify this acquaintance. Initially, the individual might seem familiar but because this person is not in the normal context, it might be difficult to place the face and recall the name. Researchers have begun to implement procedures for reinstating the context surrounding a specific event in an attempt to improve identification accuracy. Reinstating the crime scene is often not possible. Sometimes, however it is possible to have eyewitnesses imagine and thus mentally reinstate the surroundings with imagery instructions and other mnemonic devices. In some instances, objects from the crime scene such as guns or clothing can be used additionally to help reinstate the context. Such methods have successfully shown to improve reliability and accuracy of eyewitness recall.
Verbal overshadowing effectEdit
The process of describing a face entails thinking about its features independently, but people process faces configurally (as a whole, encoding the features in relation to one another). So, the process of describing the face often impairs the memory of it—this is the verbal overshadowing effect. A verbal overshadowing effect typically refers to the negative effect on memory recall as a result of giving a verbal description of a visual object. For example, a witness who gives a verbal description of a face is likely to have subsequent impaired recognition for that face. However, Perfect et al. (2002) predicted that the verbal overshadowing effect would also be seen in voice recognition; that is that verbally describing a voice should also impair subsequent recognition of that voice. They predicted this because they argued that voices were difficult to articulate and so it is likely they would be vulnerable to the verbal overshadowing effect. This was found to be the case. Moreover, a dissociation between accuracy and confidence was observed. Participants' confidence that they had identified the correct voice in the audio-lineup was not influenced by the verbal overshadowing effect; in other words, verbal overshadowing had the effect of decreasing earwitnesses' recognition ability but without their knowledge.
Most of the research on eyewitness memory has involved adults, despite the fact that it is not uncommon for children to have been involved in a crime or to have been the central witness of a crime. Statistics from the Crown Prosecution Service revealed that 1,116 children under the age of 10 were witnesses to a crime in England and Wales in 2008/9.
Children's testimony refers to when children are required to testify in court after witnessing or being involved in a crime. In situations where a child is the main witness of a crime, the result of the hearing is dependent on the child's memory of the event. And there are several important issues associated with eyewitness memory of children. For example, the accuracy of the child's explanation, in such situations, coupled with how well the child can identify the setting of the crime and the individuals involved in the crime, influence the credibility of the child's testimony. Whilst research shows that it is possible for children to provide relevant and accurate forensic information, they appear less reliable than adult witnesses and like all witnesses, can create false memories.
Moreover, children often have a limited vocabulary, a desire to please the officer, or difficulty answering questions because of trauma. Using early childhood memories in eyewitness testimony can also be challenging because for the first 1–2 years of life, brain structures such as the limbic system, which holds the hippocampus and the amygdala and is involved in memory storage, are not yet fully developed. Research has demonstrated that children can remember events from before the age of 3–4 years, but that these memories decline as children get older (see childhood amnesia).
Children can be involved in testimony not only when they are witnesses, but also when they are victims. There have been several cases of children recovering false memories of childhood abuse. Children as especially suggestible and in cases of recovered memories, is hard to determine whether the recovered memory is accurate or imagined. Due to the sensitivity of these cases, strategic interviewing is implemented for children, which may result in the validity of the memory to suffer. Strategic interviewing must be assessed with sensitivity on an individual bases and without leading questions, as they may influence the child's answer. Additional influences may include individuals surrounding the child prior to, and during the hearing. If children hear new information from such individuals, studies show that children will more than likely agree with what the others said—regardless of the child's initial opinion.
Studies on children show that the average child is at greater risk for memory loss, due to the brain's immaturity and plasticity, when compared to an average adult. Poorer memory performance in young kids was shown when youth of different ages were asked to recall a doctor's visit. Children aged 3–5 answered with much less accuracy than individuals aged 6–15, indicating developmental differences in memory capacity. Furthermore, it has been shown that information encoded and stored in memory is dependent on the extent of knowledge regarding the event. That is, if a child is exposed to an event that he or she knows little about, their memory of the event will not be as accurate when compared to a child who is more knowledgeable on event-related topics. These results of increased sensitivity, suggestibility and memory loss in children lead one to question the competency of a child to serve as an eyewitness. Researchers have determined that a child should be considered a competent witness if he or she has the capacity to observe, communicate, produce sufficient memories, differentiate truth from lies, and understand the obligation to tell the truth. However, the same caution that is taken with all eyewitnesses should be taken with child testimony, as all eyewitness testimonies are prone to inaccuracies.
Intellectual ability and testimonyEdit
Individuals with intellectual disabilities are at a higher risk for sexual abuse and exploitation because they are often dependent on others and uneducated or physically incompetent in ways of self-protection. Therefore, much research has been devoted to investigating the accountability of these individuals in eyewitness testimonies. When a group of adults chosen by the Developmental Disabilities Association was compared to a control group of college students, they performed equally well when a target was absent from a lineup. However, the control group were better at recognizing when a target was present in a lineup, leading to the determination that people with intellectual disabilities are more suggestible and likely to confabulate. Children with intellectual disabilities show similar patterns in their eyewitness accounts. After watching a video of a crime, children with these disabilities performed worse than non-disabled kids of the same age on free recall, open-ended questions, and both general and specific misleading questions. These children performed better than the age-matched control group only on leading questions with yes or no answers, suggesting that they are more likely to acquiesce in the interview. These findings indicate that individuals with intellectual disabilities could be considered competent witnesses if interrogated in a non-leading manner.
Individuals who are said to possess eidetic memories are thought to hold to an image in mind for longer and with more accuracy than the average individual. But evidence for eidetic memory is limited, and there is no evidence for photographic memory or a memory being an exact replica of an event. The memories of those who claim to have superior eidetic memories are just as flawed as the memories of individuals who have normal mnemonic abilities; people who claim to have photographic memories are not immune to flawed eyewitness testimony. Witnesses who believe that they are able to retrieve an accurate mental photograph will also be much more confident in their account of the event and may influence the trial outcome. Accuracy recall of such visual scenes is a controversial issue. In the past, eidetikers were believed to have extremely accurate recall for visual displays, but modern research findings might reveal a different story. Some research demonstrates that eidetic children have greater recall accuracy for visual details compared to non-eidetic children. Other researchers have failed to find any advantage between the two groups. It is also hypothesized that eidetic imagery is not exactly related to memory and improves recall for visual details. As such, photographic memory is not useful in the courtroom.
The frequency of eidetic imagery is low in adults and shows greatest frequency in early child development. In fact, it is almost non-existent past the age of 7. When procedures are used to classify eidetic memory separate from the characteristic of afterimage and memory image, a small number of children are classified as true eidetikers. These children are still suggestible; their eyewitness testimonies may still have error.
Research investigating earwitness memory has only recently emerged from the shadow of the extensively investigated phenomena of eyewitness memory and eyewitness testimony, despite having been in use within the English justice system since the 1660s. Earwitness memory refers to a person's auditory memory for a crime or incriminatory information they have heard. Much of the research which has been conducted on earwitness memory focuses on speaker recognition, otherwise known as voice recognition, whilst there is less research which investigates memory for environmental sounds. The majority of the literature on voice and face recognition finds a robust face advantage; compared to voice recognition, face recognition appears to be the stronger pathway, with most individuals finding it much more difficult to recall a voice compared to recalling a face.
Eyewitness vs. earwitness accuracyEdit
A substantial proportion of the literature into witness testimony finds a robust recall advantage for visual stimuli compared to auditory stimuli. We seem to have a profound memory advantage for visual objects and scenes whilst being poorer at remembering auditory information. This therefore has clear implications for eyewitness and earwitness memory; what is seen should be more likely to be remembered than what is heard by a witness. This finding can be extended to faces and voices; within the person recognition literature, it has been found that individuals are far better at identifying a person by their face as opposed to their voice.
Non-verbal memory: environmental soundEdit
Researchers define environmental sounds as those that are either animate, inanimate, artificial or natural; sounds produced by real events as opposed to machine-generated sounds; sounds that are more complex than laboratory-produced sounds and those that are dynamic and convey a sense of activity. Examples include the ring of a doorbell, coughing, rain, a car engine, a railroad crossing signal, and so on. Such environmental sounds are important sources of information and provide us with knowledge of our surroundings.
Research has found that recall for environmental sounds can be dependent upon the storage and retrieval of verbalizable interpretations. In one study, individuals heard a selection of ambiguous environmental sounds and attempted to label each sound as they were presented. A week later, individuals labelled the sounds again and it was found that re-labelling the sounds subsequently caused individuals to perform much better in the recognition test. Recognition of environmental sounds therefore appears dependent upon labeling both at input and in the test phase, either when labels are created by subjects as they hear the sounds, or when labels are generated by the experimenter and presented to subjects. More recent research has found that it is possible to memorize the loudness of an environmental sound. However, a lot of research investigating environmental sound and memory recall is conducted in a laboratory setting and so has limited ecological validity and generalizability.
Verbal memory: voice recognitionEdit
Compared to memory recall for faces, voice recall appears to be significantly more vulnerable to interference. These consistent findings suggest that earwitness memory is far more vulnerable to the effects of interference compared to eyewitness memory; although the weight placed on eyewitness memory in court should also be carefully considered as there is much evidence to suggest its fallibility. For example, some studies have found that eyewitness identification can be impaired by effects such as the weapon focus effect or verbal overshadowing. Nevertheless, voice recognition appears to be the pathway most significantly impaired by interfering factors.
Face overshadowing effect
A face overshadowing effect is often found to occur, whereby individuals' voice recognition performance is impaired with the co-presentation of a face. Visual information therefore appears to have the ability to significantly interfere with the recall of auditory information. However, research has investigated whether earwitness memory is impaired to the same extent when the face of the one speaking is concealed in some way. Research shows that when a face is covered, with a balaclava for instance, accuracy for voice identification slightly improves; however a face overshadowing effect still exists despite the earwitness being able to see fewer facial features.
Pitch of voiceEdit
Voice pitch has also been identified as a factor that can affect voice recognition performance. Individuals are likely to exaggerate their memory for pitch; upon hearing a high pitched voice in an initial presentation (such as the perpetrator's voice in a crime), individuals are likely to choose an even higher-pitched voice in the test phase (audio line-up). Similarly, upon hearing a low-pitched voice, they are likely to remember the voice as being even lower in pitch when voices are presented in an audio line-up. Comparable cognitive functions seem to operate when individuals attempt to remember faces; ambiguity surrounding the ethnicity or gender of faces is likely to result in the individual's recall of faces to be exaggerated with regards to ethnic and gender-related features. Researchers call this the accentuation effect. It is suggested that voice pitch, alongside other 'surface properties' of speech such as speech content, are instantaneously encoded into memory. This contrasts with auditory features such as amplitude and speaking rate, of which there is contrary evidence about whether they are automatically encoded into memory.
There is evidence to suggest that witnesses may find it harder to identify a perpetrator's voice if the perpetrator speaks the witness's native language with an accent compared to without one. It is thought that more cognitive effort is required to process a non-native speaker's voice. This is because a 'cost' is placed on the listener, with accented voices violating the 'speech schema' the listener is familiar with in their own geographic region. Therefore, listeners may be required to expend more effort in order to recognize and distinguish the non-native speaker's phonetic segments and words.
An accent also has the potential to interfere with the witness's ability to recognize the perpetrator's appearance. It has been found that when witnesses are asked to recall a perpetrator, the perpetrator's physical appearance is remembered less well when they have an accent compared to when they do not. This appears the case with different accents, speech content and how long a listener is exposed to the speaker. One proposed explanation for why accents can negatively affect the recall of visual information and eyewitness memory draws from Wickens' (2002; 2008) multiple resource theory. Wickens' theory suggests that attentional resources are separated into distinct 'pools'. Only visual and auditory tasks have access to visual and auditory attentional resources, respectively. However, when a task arises which requires the use of attentional resources from both modalities, this leads to competition for resources, in turn leading the inability to accomplish one or both tasks or resulting in poorer performance. Therefore, fewer general resources may have been available in order to encode and remember the perpetrator's appearance after witnesses had used attentional resources for the processing of the accented voice and speech content.
Direct hearing vs. devicesEdit
Whilst many earwitness accounts are attained directly and 'in-the-moment', many will be acquired over a telephone or over other communication devices. Whether the earwitness hears a conversation or other auditory information in person or hears it over a communication device could impact their rate of accuracy. However, contrary to this prediction, research has found no significant differences between the accuracy of voice identification when the voice was heard directly or over a mobile phone, despite the sound quality seeming poorer in the latter.
Researchers have also investigated to what extent the distinctiveness of a voice, such as heightened emotion, can aid or impair an individual's recollection of it. There is evidence that faces are better remembered if they display emotion compared to when they appear neutral; in one study healthy control participants remembered more accurately happy faces than they did neutral faces. Likewise, a host of studies have found that memories that are more emotional in nature are more complex and are less likely to be forgotten compared to memories that are more neutral. It therefore seems logical for researchers to explore whether auditory material which is emotional in nature is also remembered better. Research has produced conflicting results. Bradley and Lang (2000) found that there was a memory advantage for auditory material when it was more emotional compared to when it was more neutral. The authors also found that participants' physiological activity when they listened to emotionally arousing sounds was very similar to the physiological arousal produced when they were shown emotional images. However, studies investigating emotion in voices have found no significant differences between recall rates for emotional voices and neutral voices, with some research even demonstrating that emotion can impair memory recall for the voice. For instance, it was found that angry voices were recalled to a lesser extent compared to if they were neutral in tone. This finding has been supported by other studies which have also found that rather than enhancing voice identification, emotion may significantly interfere with it. However, ethical guidelines will confine the levels of emotionality that are appropriate to be induced in participants in a laboratory study environment.
The amount of time between when an individual hears incriminatory information or the voice of their perpetrator, for instance, and the time they are required to recall the auditory information as an earwitness can affect their recall accuracy rate. Memory for auditory information including voice recognition appears to decline over time; studies have found that participants can recall more correct auditory information immediately after the initial presentation than after a four-day time interval, supporting several other studies finding similar results. Furthermore, the extent to which the time-interval affects memory recall for auditory information depends upon whether the witness just heard the auditory information of whether it was accompanied by visual information too, such as the face of the perpetrator. One study has found that recall is enhanced when both auditory information is heard and visual information is seen, as opposed to just hearing auditory information. Still, when individuals are asked to remember the voice and the speech content, they are only likely to have remembered the gist of what has been said as opposed to remembering verbatim. This clearly has implications for the amount of weight that is placed upon earwitness testimony in court. Earwitnesses are not typically required to give statements or recall a voice or auditory information immediately after an event has occurred, but instead are required to recall information after a time-delay. This could significantly impair the accuracy of their recall. The testimonies of those who have only heard the voice of a suspect compared to a witness who has both seen the face and heard the voice of a suspect should also be treated with extreme caution in court.
Children's earwitness memoryEdit
It is of critical importance that research into children's earwitness memory is also conducted in order to secure justice for child victims and witnesses. Compared to adult earwitness memory, the area of child earwitness memory has been largely neglected. In one of few studies comparing adult and child earwitnesses, Öhman, Eriksson & Granhag (2011) found that only children in the older age-group of 11–13 years performed at above chance levels for voice recognition, compared to the younger-age group of children (aged 7–9) and adults. They suggest that under the age of 10 a child may be overwhelmed by the cognitive demands of the task and so do not perform above chance levels on the task. Meanwhile, adults made the highest percentage (55%) of false identifications. They also found that voice pitch level and speaker rate was highly correlated with children's but not adults' false identification rates. Overall however, the results confirmed other studies which have also shown that in general, earwitness performance for unfamiliar voices is poor.
Other research found that children aged 11 to 13 years old who were tested very shortly after exposure to a voice made more correct identifications compared with children who were tested after a time interval of two weeks. This was found not to be the case for adult witnesses.
Auditory memory in blind individualsEdit
It has been suggested that blind individuals have an enhanced ability to hear and recall auditory information in order to compensate for a lack of vision. However, whilst blind adults' neural systems demonstrate heightened excitability and activity compared to sighted adults, it is still not exactly clear to what extent this compensatory hypothesis is accurate. Nevertheless, many studies have found that there appears to be a high activation of certain visual brain areas in blind individuals when they perform non-visual tasks. This suggests that in blind individuals' brains, a reorganization of what are normally visual areas has occurred in order for them to process non-visual input. This supports a compensatory hypothesis in the blind.
Research has investigated how to improve the accuracy of earwitness performance. One study investigated whether an interview called a Cognitive Interview would improve adult or child (11–13 years) voice recognition performance or speech content recall if it was administered immediately after the event. It was predicted that a cognitive interview would improve the likelihood of witnesses making a correct identification and improve recall of speech content, whether immediately after the event of after a time-delay and regardless of age. It was also predicted that adults would recall more content than children, because other studies have indicated that children provide less detail than adults during free recall. However, results revealed poor correct identification rates, regardless of the type of interview earwitnesses had received (19.8%), as well as high false identification rates; 38.7% of participants incorrectly identified an innocent suspect. It did not seem to matter if an interview had been conducted shortly after the event or not. Moreover, there did not seem to be any difference between children and adults in terms of the number of suspects they correctly identified by their voice. Many researchers would suggest that this furthers the case for children (aged 11–13) to be thought of as equally capable of proving potentially helpful earwitness accounts within court settings.
In 1984, Jennifer Thompson-Cannino selected Ronald Cotton from both a photographic line-up and later a physical line-up as her rapist, leading to his conviction of rape and burglary and a sentence of life in prison plus fifty-four years. Ronald Cotton spent eleven years in prison due to faulty eyewitness memory before DNA evidence exonerated him in 1995. Despite Jennifer's strong intent to study her rapist's features during the traumatic event for the purpose of identifying him afterward, she fell victim to encoding limitations at the time of the assault. Jennifer undoubtedly experienced a great degree of stress on the night of her assault with a knife pressed to her neck and a feeling of absolute powerlessness. “There in my memory, at the knife-edge of fear, time distorted”. She also fell prey to factors after the incident that affected the accuracy of her recall. Even if memories are correctly encoded at the time of the event, interference and decay can alter these memories in negative ways. The simple passage of time entails memory loss, and any new information presented between the time of the crime and testimony can interfere with a witness's recall. When Jennifer was asked to identify her perpetrator from a series of photographs, she was told by officers that she should not feel compelled to make an identification. However, Jennifer's faith in the legal system led her to believe that the police must have had a suspect to warrant her participation in photographic identification. And when Jennifer selected the photo of Ronald, the police told her she did great. The photograph of Jennifer's true rapist, Bobby Poole, was not included in the lineup. The positive feedback Jennifer received allowed her to begin incorporating details from the photograph into her memory of the attack. The fact that Jennifer took five minutes to study the pictures before she selected Ronald Cotton's photo also allowed Jennifer ample opportunity to encode Ronald's face as her assailant and thereby interfere with her original memory. The photographs were presented simultaneously, allowing Jennifer to compare the photographs to each other as opposed to her memory of the event. As a result, when she was later asked to choose her assailant from a physical line-up, Jennifer saw Ronald in her memory and thus chose him. The police further solidified her choice by telling her “We thought that might be the guy…it’s the same person you picked from the photos.”. As a result, the authorities viewed Jennifer as the ideal eyewitness, one who was motivated to remember the face of her assailant during the event and subsequently confident in her identification of the target. Unfortunately, the level of confidence in an eyewitness' recall is not associated with accuracy of identification. The eyewitness' confidence in his or her recall is, however, strongly associated with the jury's belief in the accuracy of the eyewitness' testimony, thus increasing the risk of assigning guilty verdicts to innocent individuals. In conclusion, unconscious transference essentially contaminated Jennifer's memory. Even after Jennifer learned of Ronald's innocence, she still saw his face in her memory of the attack years later. It wasn't until she met with Ronald face-to-face and he gave her his forgiveness did she begin to see Ronald for himself rather than as her assailant, thus beginning a remarkable and unexpected friendship.
- Loftus, E. F. (1980). "Impact of expert psychological testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification". Journal of Applied Psychology. 65 (1): 9–15. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.65.1.9. PMID 7364708.
- Megreya, Ahmed M.; Burton, A. Mike (2008). "Matching faces to photographs: Poor performance in eyewitness memory (without the memory)". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. 14 (4): 364–372. doi:10.1037/a0013464. PMID 19102619.
- Wells, G.L.; Bradfield, A.L. (1998). ""Good, you identified the suspect": Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience". Journal of Applied Psychology. 83 (3): 360–376. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.83.3.360.
- Scheck, B.; Neufeld, P.; Dwyer, J (2000). Actual Innocence. New York, NY: Random House.
- Haber, R. N.; Haber, L. (2000). "Experiencing, remembering and reporting events". Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 6 (4): 1057–1097. doi:10.1037/1076-8918.104.22.1687.
- Christianson, S.-Å. (1992). "Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: a critical review". Psychological Bulletin. 11 (2): 284–309. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.112.2.284. PMID 1454896.
- Ask, K.; Granhag, P.A. (2010). "Perception of line-up suggestiveness: Effects of identification outcome knowledge". Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling. 7 (3): 214–230. doi:10.1002/jip.123.
- Megreya, A. M.; Burton, A. M. (2008). "Matching faces to photographs: Poor performance in eyewitness memory (without the memory)". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. 14 (4): 364–372. doi:10.1037/a0013464. PMID 19102619.
- Bruce, V.; Henderson, Z.; Greenwood, K.; Hancock, P. J. B.; Burton, A. M.; Miller, P. (1999). "Verification of face identities from images captured on video". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. 5 (4): 339–360. doi:10.1037/1076-898x.5.4.339.
- Kanwisher, N.; Yovel, G. (2006). "The fusiform face area: A cortical region specialized for the perception of faces". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 361 (1476): 2109–2128. doi:10.1098/rstb.2006.1934. PMC 1857737. PMID 17118927.
- Wells, G. L.; Hasel, L. E. (2007). "Facial composite production by eyewitnesses". Current Directions in Psychological Science. 16 (1): 6–10. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.585.8279. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00465.x. S2CID 30857180.
- Shriver, E. R.; Young, S. G.; Hugenberg, K.; Bernstein, M. J.; Lanter, J. R. (2008). "Class, race, and the face: Social context modulates the cross-race effect in face recognition". Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 34 (2): 260–274. doi:10.1177/0146167207310455. PMID 18212334. S2CID 39633102.
- Herzmann, G.; Willenbockel, V.; Tanaka, J. W.; Curran, T. (2011). "The neural correlates of memory encoding and recognition for own-race and other-race faces". Neuropsychologia. 49 (11): 3103–3115. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.07.019. PMID 21807008. S2CID 676546.
- Brigham, J. C., Bennett, L. B., Meissner, C. A., & Mitchell, T. L. (2007). The Influence of Race on Eyewitness Memory. In R.C.L. Lindsay, D. F. Ross, J. D. Read, & M. P. Toglia (Eds.), The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology: Memory for People (pp. 257–281). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Pauker, K.; Ambady, N. (2009). "Multiracial faces: How categorization affects memory at the boundaries of race". Journal of Social Issues. 65 (1): 69–86. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.01588.x. PMC 3849032. PMID 24311822.
- Jianjian Qin; Jodi A. Quas; Allison D. Redlich; Gail S. Goodman (1997). "Children's Eyewitness Testimony: Memory development in the legal context". In Nelson Cowan; Charles Hulme (eds.). The Development of Memory in Childhood. UK: Psychology Press. pp. 301–341.
- Loftus, Elizabeth F. (1993). "The reality of repressed memories" (PDF). American Psychologist. 48 (5): 518–537. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.48.5.518. PMID 8507050.
- McGaugh, J (2004). "The amygdala modulates the consolidation of memories of emotionally arousing experiences". Annual Review of Neuroscience. 27: 1–28. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144157. PMID 15217324. S2CID 17502659.
- Amir, N.; Leiner, A. S.; Bomyea, J. (2010). "Implicit memory and posttraumatic stress symptoms". Cognitive Therapy and Research. 34: 49–58. doi:10.1007/s10608-008-9211-0. S2CID 39762757.
- Pujol, M.; Kopelman, M. D. (2003). "Psychogenic Amnesia". Practical Neurology. 3 (5): 292–299. doi:10.1046/j.1474-7766.2003.05159.x.
- Pyszora, N. M.; Barker, A. F.; Kopelman, M. D. (2003). "Amnesia for criminal offenses: A study of life sentence prisoners". Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology. 14 (3): 475–490. doi:10.1080/14789940310001599785. S2CID 146746827.
- Joseph, R (1998). "Traumatic amnesia, repression, and hippocampus injury due to emotional stress, corticosteroids, and enkephalins". Child Psychiatry and Human Development. 29 (2): 169–179. doi:10.1023/A:1025092117657. PMID 9816735. S2CID 27999269.
- Robinson-Riegler, Bridget (2012). Cognitive Psychology: Applying the Science of the Mind, 3rd Edition. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. pp. 305–322. ISBN 978-0-205-03364-5.
- Carlson, C; Young, D; Weatherford, D; Carlson, M; Bednarz, J; Jones, A (2016). "The influence of perpetrator exposure time and weapon presence/timing on eyewitness confidence and accuracy". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 30 (6): 898–910. doi:10.1002/acp.3275.
- Hope, Lorraine; Daniel Wright (November 2007). "Beyond unusual? Examining the role of attention in the weapon focus effect". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 21 (7): 951–961. doi:10.1002/acp.1307. S2CID 4134227.
- Kerri L. Pickel (2007). "Remembering and Identifying Menacing Perpetrators: Exposure to Violence and the Weapon Focus Effect". In R.C.L. Lindsay; David F. Ross; J. Don Read; Michael P. Toglia (eds.). The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology: Memory for People. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 339–360.
- Anderson, M. C.; Bjork, R. A.; Bjork, E. L. (1994). "Remembering can cause forgetting: Retrieval dynamics in long-term memory". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 20 (5): 1063–1087. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.119.3933. doi:10.1037/0278-7322.214.171.1243. PMID 7931095.
- Paterson, H; Kemp, R; Ng, J (2011). "Combating co-witness contamination: attempting to decrease the negative effects of discussion on eyewitness memory". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 25 (1): 43–52. doi:10.1002/acp.1640.
- Mickes, John Wixted, Laura. "Eyewitness Memory Is a Lot More Reliable Than You Think". Scientific American. Retrieved 2017-09-27.
- Loftus, E. (1979). "Malleability of human memory". American Scientist. 67 (3): 312–320. Bibcode:1979AmSci..67..312L. PMID 475150.
- Echterhoff, G.; Hirst, W.; Hussy, W. (2005). "How eyewitnesses resist misinformation: Social postwarnings and the monitoring of memory characteristics". Memory & Cognition. 33 (5): 770–782. doi:10.3758/BF03193073. PMID 16383166.
- Eakin, D. K.; Schreiber, T. A.; Sergent-Marshall, S. (2003). "Misinformation effect in eyewitness memory: The presence and absence of memory impairment as a function of warning and misinformation accessibility". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 29 (5): 813–825. doi:10.1037/0278-73126.96.36.1993. PMID 14516215.
- Roediger, III J; Jacoby, D.; McDermott, K. B. (1996). "Misinformation effects in recall: creating false memories through repeated retrieval". Journal of Memory and Language. 35 (2): 300–318. doi:10.1006/jmla.1996.0017. S2CID 27038956.
- Davis, Deborah; Elizabeth F. Loftus; Samuel Vanous; Michael Cucciare (July 2008). "'Unconscious transference' can be an instance of change blindness". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 22 (5): 605–623. doi:10.1002/acp.1395.
- Brewer, Neil; Gary L. Wells (February 2011). "Eyewitness identification". Current Directions in Psychological Science. 20 (1): 24–27. doi:10.1177/0963721410389169. S2CID 220321932.
- Steblay, N; Dysart, J (2003). "Eyewitness accuracy rates in sequential and simultaneous lineup presentations: a meta-analytic comparison". Law and Human Behavior. 25 (5): 459–473. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.110.8546. doi:10.1023/a:1012888715007. PMID 11688368. S2CID 10906056.
- Steblay, Nancy K.; Hannah L. Dietrich; Shannon L. Ryan; Jeanette L. Raczynski; Kali A. James (August 2011). "Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness Accuracy". Law and Human Behavior. 35 (4): 262–274. doi:10.1007/s10979-010-9236-2. PMID 20632113. S2CID 9881910.
- Wells, G.L., and E. Seelau, "Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups," Psychology, Public Policy and Law 1 (1995): 765–791.
- Kornell, N. (2014). Should Police Lineups Be Sequential or Simultaneous? Psychology Today. Retrieved from <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/everybody-is-stupid-except-you/201406/should-police-lineups-be-sequential-or-simultaneous>.
- Ask, Karl; Par Anders Granhag (October 2010). "Perception of Line-up Suggestiveness: Effects of Identification Oucome Knowledge". Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling. 7 (3): 213–229. doi:10.1002/jip.123.
- Roy S. Malpass; Colin G. Tredoux; Dawn McQuiston-Surrett (2007). "Lineup Construction and Lineup Fairness". In R.C.L. Lindsay; David F. Ross; J. Don Read; Michael P. Toglia (eds.). The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology: Memory for People. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 155–178.
- Luus, C. A. E.; Wells, G. L. (1991). "Eyewitness identification and the selection of distracters for lineups". Law and Human Behavior. 15: 43–57. doi:10.1007/bf01044829. S2CID 145351420.
- 5Malpass, R.S. & Devine, P.G. (1981). Eyewitness identification: Lineup instructions and the absence of the offender" Journal of Applied Psychology 66 (4), 482–489.
- Wells, G. L.; Leippe, M. R.; Ostrom, T. M. (1979). "Guidelines for empirically assessing the fairness of a lineup". Law and Human Behavior. 3 (4): 285–293. doi:10.1007/bf01039807. S2CID 19885102.
- Bailenson, J; Davies, A (2008). "The effects of witness viewpoint distance, angle, and choice on eyewitness accuracy in police lineups conducted in immersive virtual environments". Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments. 17 (3): 242–255. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.363.7583. doi:10.1162/pres.17.3.242. S2CID 768717.
- Lindsay, R; Semmler, C (2008). "How variations in distance affect eyewitness reports and identification accuracy". Law and Human Behavior. 32 (6): 526–535. doi:10.1007/s10979-008-9128-x. PMID 18253819. S2CID 40723977.
- Barnes, J. M.; Underwood, B.J. (1959). "Fate of first-list association in transfer theory". Journal of Experimental Psychology. 58 (2): 97–105. doi:10.1037/h0047507. PMID 13796886.
- Chan, J. C. K.; Thomas, A. K.; Bulevich, J. B. (2009). "Recalling a witness increases eyewitness suggestibility". Psychological Science. 20 (1): 66–72. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02245.x. PMID 19037905. S2CID 4833910.
- Smith, Johnathon E.; Robert J. Pleban; David R. Shaffer (February 1982). "Effects of Interrogator Bias and a Police Trait Questionnaire on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification". The Journal of Social Psychology. 116: 19–26. doi:10.1080/00224545.1982.9924392.
- Christian A. Meissner; Siegfried L. Sporer; Jonathon W. Schooler (2007). "Person Descriptions as Eyewitness Evidence". In R.C.L. Lindsay; David F. Ross; J. Don Read; Michael P. Toglia (eds.). The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology: Memory for People. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 3–34.
- Gabbert, F.; Memon, A.; Allan, K. (2003). "Memory conformity: can eyewitnesses influence each other's memories for an event?". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 17 (5): 533–543. doi:10.1002/acp.885. S2CID 145429260.
- Paterson, Helen M.; Richard I. Kemp; Jodie R. Ng (January–February 2011). "Combating Co-Witness Contamination: Attempting to Decrease the Negative Effects of Discussion on Eyewitness Memory". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 25 (5): 43–52. doi:10.1002/acp.1640.
- Ofengenden, Tzofit (2014). "Memory formation and belief" (PDF). Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences. 7 (2): 34–44.
- Sporer, S; Penrod, S (1995). "Choosing, confidence, and accuracy: a meta-analysis of the confidence–accuracy relation in eyewitness identification studies ". Psychological Bulletin. 118 (3): 315–327. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.118.3.315.
- Deffenbacher, K (1980). "Eyewitness accuracy and confidence: Can we infer anything about their relationship?". Law and Human Behavior. 4 (4): 243–260. doi:10.1007/bf01040617. S2CID 73650509.
- Leippe, MR (1980). "Effects of integrative memorial and cognitive processes on the correspondence of eyewitness accuracy and confidence". Law and Human Behavior. 4 (4): 261–274. doi:10.1007/bf01040618. S2CID 4430830.
- Pezdek, Kathy; Kathryn Sperry; Shana Owens (1 October 2007). "Interviewing Witnesses: The Effect of Forced Confabulation on Event Memory". Law and Human Behavior. 31 (5): 463–478. doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9081-5. JSTOR 4499549. PMID 17245633. S2CID 20593055.
- Using hypnosis in eyewitness memory: Past and current issues. Mazzoni, Giuliana; Lynn, Steven Jay Toglia, Michael P. (Ed); Read, J. Don (Ed); Ross, David F. (Ed); Lindsay, R. C. L. (Ed), (2007). The handbook of eyewitness psychology, Vol I: Memory for events, pp. 321–338. Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, xii, 703 pp.
- Fisher, Ronald P (1992). Memory-enhancing techniques for investigative interviewing: The cognitive interview. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. p. 220. ISBN 978-0-398-06121-0.
- Chan, Jason C.K.; Jessica A. LaPaglia (22 August 2011). "The dark side of testing memory: Repeated retrieval can enhance eyewitness suggestibility". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. 17 (4): 418–432. doi:10.1037/a0025147. PMID 21859229.
- Poole, Debra A.; Lawrence T. White (September 1993). "Two years later:Effect of question repetition and retention interval on the eyewitness testimony of children and adults". Developmental Psychology. 29 (5): 844–853. doi:10.1037/0012-16188.8.131.524.
- Gilbert, Julian A. E.; Fisher, Ronald P. (2006). "The effects of varied retrieval cues on reminiscence in eyewitness memory". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 20 (6): 723–739. doi:10.1002/acp.1232.
- MacLeod, M (2002). "Retrieval-induced forgetting in eyewitness memory: forgetting as a consequence of remembering". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 16 (2): 135–149. doi:10.1002/acp.782. S2CID 37359269.
- Smith, S; Vela, E (1992). "Environmental context-dependent eyewitness recognition". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 6 (2): 125–139. doi:10.1002/acp.2350060204. S2CID 145770979.
- Smith, S; Vela, E (2001). "Environmental context-dependent memory: a review and meta-analysis". Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 8 (2): 203–20. doi:10.3758/bf03196157. PMID 11495110.
- Macrae, C. Neil; Lewis, Helen L. (2002-03-01). "Do I Know You? Processing Orientation and Face Recognition". Psychological Science. 13 (2): 194–196. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00436. ISSN 0956-7976. PMID 11934008. S2CID 32308973.
- Schooler, Jonathan W; Engstler-Schooler, Tonya Y (January 1990). "Verbal overshadowing of visual memories: Some things are better left unsaid". Cognitive Psychology. 22 (1): 36–71. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(90)90003-M. PMID 2295225. S2CID 6044806.
- Perfect, Timothy J.; Hunt, Laura J.; Harris, Christopher M. (December 2002). "Verbal overshadowing in voice recognition". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 16 (8): 973–980. doi:10.1002/acp.920.
- "Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)".
- Öhman, Lisa; Eriksson, Anders; Granhag, Pär Anders (16 September 2010). "Overhearing the Planning of A Crime: Do Adults Outperform Children As Earwitnesses?". Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. 26 (2): 118–127. doi:10.1007/s11896-010-9076-5. S2CID 145642034.
- Pozzulo, Joanna (2007). "What the little eye spied: The dos and don'ts of interviewing children" (PDF). Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette. 69 (1): 20–21. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-06-27. Retrieved 2012-06-03.
- Phelps, E (2004). "Human emotion and memory: Interactions of the amygdala and hippocampal complex". Current Opinion in Neurobiology. 14 (2): 198–202. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2004.03.015. PMID 15082325. S2CID 13888599.
- Richmond, Jenny; Nelson, Charles A. (2007). "Accounting for change in declarative memory: A cognitive neuroscience perspective". Developmental Review. 27 (3): 349–373. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2007.04.002. PMC 2094108. PMID 18769510.
- Fivush, R; Schwarzmueller A (1999). "Children remember childhood: implications for childhood amnesia". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 12 (5): 455–473. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199810)12:5<455::AID-ACP534>3.0.CO;2-H.
- Clevelend, E.; Reese, E (2008). "Children Remember Early Childhood: Long-term recall across the offset of childhood amnesia". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 22 (1): 127–142. doi:10.1002/acp.1359.
- Schacter, Daniel (1996). Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the past. New York: Basic Books. pp. 248–279.
- Pipe, M. E., Thierry, K. L., & Lamb, M. E. (2007). The development of event memory: Implications for child witness testimony. Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 453–478.
- Goodman, G. S.; Schaaf, J. M. (1997). "Over a decade of research on children's eyewitness testimony: What have we learned? Where do we go from here?". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 11 (7): S6–S20. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199712)11:7<S5::AID-ACP545>3.0.CO;2-C.
- Ma, L.; Ganea, P. A. (2010). "Dealing with conflicting information: Young children's reliance on what they see versus what they are told". Developmental Science. 13 (1): 151–160. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00878.x. PMID 20121871. S2CID 33074775.
- Gordon, B. N.; Baker-Ward, L.; Ornstein, P. A. (2001). "Children's Testimony: A review on research of memory for past experiences". Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review. 4 (2): 157–81. doi:10.1023/A:1011333231621. PMID 11771794. S2CID 35720611.
- Ternes, Marguerite; John C. Yuille (November 2008). "Eyewitness memory and eyewitness identification performance in adults with intellectual disabilities". Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities. 21 (6): 519–531. doi:10.1111/j.1468-3148.2008.00425.x.
- Henry, Lucy A.; Gisli H. Gudjonsson (April 2007). "Individual and developmental differences in eyewitness recall and suggestibility in children with intellectual disabilities". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 21 (3): 361–381. doi:10.1002/acp.1280. S2CID 52025255.
- Turtle, J.; Want, S. C. (1 October 2008). "Logic and Research Versus Intuition and Past Practice as Guides to Gathering and Evaluating Eyewitness Evidence". Criminal Justice and Behavior. 35 (10): 1241–1256. doi:10.1177/0093854808321879. S2CID 146576923.
- Haber, Lyn; Haber, Ralph Norman (1 January 1998). "Criteria for judging the admissibility of eyewitness testimony of long past events". Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 4 (4): 1135–1159. doi:10.1037/1076-89184.108.40.2065.
- Brady, T; Konkle, T (2008). "Visual long-term memory has a massive storage capacity for object details". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 105 (38): 14325–14329. Bibcode:2008PNAS..10514325B. doi:10.1073/pnas.0803390105. PMC 2533687. PMID 18787113.
- Inoue, Sana; Matsuzawa, Tetsuro (December 2007). "Working memory of numerals in chimpanzees". Current Biology. 17 (23): R1004–R1005. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.10.027. PMID 18054758. S2CID 17695250.
- Yarmey, A. Daniel (1994). Adult Eyewitness Testimony. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101–124. ISBN 978-0521432559.
- Hollien, H; Bennett, G; Gelfer, MP (January 1983). "Criminal identification comparison: aural versus visual identifications resulting from a simulated crime". Journal of Forensic Sciences. 28 (1): 208–21. doi:10.1520/JFS12253J. PMID 6680738.
- Clifford, Brian (1980). "Voice identification by human listeners: On earwitness reliability". Law and Human Behavior. 4 (4): 373–394. doi:10.1007/bf01040628. S2CID 146317449.
- Marcell, M; Malatanos, M; Leahy, C; Comeaux, C (August 2007). "Identifying, rating, and remembering environmental sound events". Behavior Research Methods. 39 (3): 561–9. doi:10.3758/bf03193026. PMID 17958168.
- McAllister, Dale, Bregman, HA, RHI, NJ (1993). "When eyewitnesses are also earwitnesses: Effects on visual and voice identifications". Basic and Applied Social Psychology (Submitted manuscript). 14 (2): 161–170. doi:10.1207/s15324834basp1402_3.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
- Stevenage, Howland, Tippelt, S. V., A., A. (2011). "Interference in eyewitness and earwitness recognition". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 25 (1): 112–118. doi:10.1002/acp.1649.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
- Yarmey, Yarmey, Yarmey, A.D., A.L., M.J. (2001). "Commonsense beliefs and the identification of familiar voices". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 15 (3): 283–299. doi:10.1002/acp.702.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
- Cohen, M. A.; Horowitz, T. S.; Wolfe, J. M. (23 March 2009). "Auditory recognition memory is inferior to visual recognition memory". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 106 (14): 6008–6010. Bibcode:2009PNAS..106.6008C. doi:10.1073/pnas.0811884106. PMC 2667065. PMID 19307569.
- Barsics, Catherine (2014). "Person Recognition Is Easier from Faces than from Voices" (PDF). Psychologica Belgica. 54 (3): 244–254. doi:10.5334/pb.ap.
- Stevenage, Sarah V; Howland, Amy; Tippelt, Anna (January 2011). "Interference in eyewitness and earwitness recognition". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 25 (1): 112–118. doi:10.1002/acp.1649.
- McAllister, Hunter A.; Dale, Robert H.I.; Bregman, Norman J.; McCabe, Allyssa; Cotton, C. Randy (June 1993). "When Eyewitnesses Are Also Earwitnesses: Effects on Visual and Voice Identifications". Basic and Applied Social Psychology (Submitted manuscript). 14 (2): 161–170. doi:10.1207/s15324834basp1402_3.
- Ballas, J. A.; Howard, J. H. (1 January 1987). "Interpreting the Language of Environmental Sounds". Environment and Behavior. 19 (1): 91–114. doi:10.1177/0013916587191005. S2CID 145163828.
- Shaw, edited by William H. Warren, Jr., Robert E. (1985). Persistence and change : proceedings of the First International Conference on Event Perception. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 978-0898593914.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
- Bartlett, JC (July 1977). "Remembering environmental sounds: The role of verbalization at input". Memory & Cognition. 5 (4): 404–14. doi:10.3758/bf03197379. PMID 24203007.
- Kuwano, Sonoko; Namba, Seiichiro; Kato, Tohru (2008). "Auditory memory and evaluation of environmental sounds" (PDF). The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America. 123 (5): 3159. Bibcode:2008ASAJ..123.3159K. doi:10.1121/1.2933198.
- Stevenage, Sarah V.; Neil, Greg J.; Barlow, Jess; Dyson, Amy; Eaton-Brown, Catherine; Parsons, Beth (29 August 2012). "The effect of distraction on face and voice recognition". Psychological Research. 77 (2): 167–175. doi:10.1007/s00426-012-0450-z. PMID 22926436. S2CID 29994359.
- McAllister, Hunter A.; Dale, Robert H. I.; Keay, Cynthia E. (June 1993). "Effects of Lineup Modality on Witness Credibility". The Journal of Social Psychology (Submitted manuscript). 133 (3): 365–376. doi:10.1080/00224545.1993.9712155.
- Woocher, Fredric D. (May 1977). "Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification". Stanford Law Review. 29 (5): 969–1030. doi:10.2307/1228141. JSTOR 1228141.
- Stein, E. (1 December 2003). "The admissibility of expert testimony about cognitive science research on eyewitness identification". Law, Probability and Risk. 2 (4): 295–303. doi:10.1093/lpr/2.4.295.
- Loftus, Elizabeth F.; Loftus, Geoffrey R.; Messo, Jane (1987). "Some facts about "weapon focus."". Law and Human Behavior. 11 (1): 55–62. doi:10.1007/BF01044839. S2CID 145376954.
- Dodson, Chad S.; Johnson, Marcia K.; Schooler, Jonathan W. (March 1997). "The verbal overshadowing effect: Why descriptions impair face recognition". Memory & Cognition. 25 (2): 129–139. doi:10.3758/BF03201107. PMID 9099066.
- Cook, Susan; Wilding, John (December 1997). "Earwitness testimony 2. Voices, faces and context". Applied Cognitive Psychology. 11 (6): 527–541. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199712)11:6<527::AID-ACP483>3.0.CO;2-B.
- Stern, Steven E.; Mullennix, John W.; Corneille, Olivier; Huart, Johanne (1 January 2007). "Distortions in the Memory of the Pitch of Speech". Experimental Psychology. 54 (2): 148–160. doi:10.1027/1618-3220.127.116.11. PMID 17472098.
- Corneille, Olivier; Huart, Johanne; Becquart, Emilie; Brédart, Serge (2004). "When Memory Shifts Toward More Typical Category Exemplars: Accentuation Effects in the Recollection of Ethnically Ambiguous Faces". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 86 (2): 236–250. doi:10.1037/0022-3518.104.22.168. hdl:2268/65594. PMID 14769081. S2CID 7386237.
- Abercrombie, David (1982). Elements of general phonetics (Paperback ed., repr. ed.). Edinburgh: University Press. ISBN 978-0852244517.
- Goh, WD (January 2005). "Talker variability and recognition memory: instance-specific and voice-specific effects". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 31 (1): 40–53. doi:10.1037/0278-7322.214.171.124. PMID 15641903.
- Nygaard, Lynne C.; Sommers, Mitchell S.; Pisoni, David B. (January 1995). "Effects of stimulus variability on perception and representation of spoken words in memory". Perception & Psychophysics. 57 (7): 989–1001. doi:10.3758/BF03205458. PMC 3495320. PMID 8532502.
- Munro, MJ; Derwing, TM (1995). "Processing time, accent, and comprehensibility in the perception of native and foreign-accented speech". Language and Speech. 38 (3): 289–306. doi:10.1177/002383099503800305. PMID 8816082. S2CID 25307392.
- Pickel, Kerri L.; Staller, Joshua B. (2011). "A perpetrator's accent impairs witnesses' memory for physical appearance". Law and Human Behavior. doi:10.1007/s10979-011-9263-7. S2CID 144533540.
- Wickens, Christopher D. (January 2002). "Multiple resources and performance prediction". Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science. 3 (2): 159–177. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.602.5010. doi:10.1080/14639220210123806. S2CID 32243134.
- Wickens, C. D. (1 June 2008). "Multiple Resources and Mental Workload". Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 50 (3): 449–455. doi:10.1518/001872008X288394. PMID 18689052. S2CID 8237955.
- Ohman, Lisa (2010). "Mobile Phone Quality Vs. Direct Quality: How the Presentation Format Affects Earwitness Identification Accuracy". The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context. 2 (2).
- Ridout, Nathan; Astell, Arlene; Reid, Ian; Glen, Tom; O'Carroll, Ronan (January 2003). "Memory bias for emotional facial expressions in major depression". Cognition and Emotion. 17 (1): 101–122. doi:10.1080/02699930302272. PMID 29715743. S2CID 13746665.
- Bradley, Margaret M.; Codispoti, Maurizio; Cuthbert, Bruce N.; Lang, Peter J. (2001). "Emotion and motivation I: Defensive and appetitive reactions in picture processing". Emotion. 1 (3): 276–298. doi:10.1037/1528-35126.96.36.1996. PMID 12934687. S2CID 2588423.
- Putman, Peter; van Honk, Jack; Kessels, Roy P.C; Mulder, Martijn; Koppeschaar, Hans P.F (August 2004). "Salivary cortisol and short and long-term memory for emotional faces in healthy young women". Psychoneuroendocrinology. 29 (7): 953–960. doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2003.09.001. PMID 15177712. S2CID 35047476.
- Bradley, MM; Codispoti, M; Cuthbert, BN; Lang, PJ (September 2001). "Emotion and motivation I: defensive and appetitive reactions in picture processing". Emotion. 1 (3): 276–98. doi:10.1037/1528-35188.8.131.526. PMID 12934687.
- Saslove, H; Yarmey, AD (February 1980). "Long-term auditory memory: speaker identification". Journal of Applied Psychology. 65 (1): 111–6. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.65.1.111. PMID 7364704.
- Read, Daniel; Craik, Fergus I. M. (1995). "Earwitness identification: Some influences on voice recognition". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. 1 (1): 6–18. doi:10.1037/1076-898X.1.1.6.
- Campos, Laura; Alonso-Quecuty, María (January 2006). "Remembering a criminal conversation: Beyond eyewitness testimony". Memory. 14 (1): 27–36. doi:10.1080/09658210444000476. PMID 16423739. S2CID 386308.
- HJELMQUIST, ERLAND; GIDLUND, ÅKE (1985). "Free recall of conversations". Text - Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse. 5 (3). doi:10.1515/text.1.19184.108.40.206. S2CID 144619619.
- Ohman, Lisa (2013). All Ears: Adults' and Children's Earwitness Testimony. ISBN 978-9162886233.
- Öhman, Lisa; Eriksson, Anders; Granhag, Pär Anders (January 2013). "Angry Voices from the Past and Present: Effects on Adults' and Children's Earwitness Memory". Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling. 10 (1): 57–70. doi:10.1002/jip.1381.
- Röder, Brigitte; Rösler, Frank; Neville, Helen J (April 2001). "Auditory memory in congenitally blind adults: a behavioral-electrophysiological investigation". Cognitive Brain Research. 11 (2): 289–303. doi:10.1016/S0926-6410(01)00002-7. PMID 11275490.
- Röder, Brigitte; Teder-Sälejärvi, Wolfgang; Sterr, Anette; Rösler, Frank; Hillyard, Steven A.; Neville, Helen J. (8 July 1999). "Improved auditory spatial tuning in blind humans". Nature. 400 (6740): 162–166. Bibcode:1999Natur.400..162R. doi:10.1038/22106. PMID 10408442. S2CID 4305679.
- Cohen, Leonardo G.; Celnik, Pablo; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Corwell, Brian; Faiz, Lala; Dambrosia, James; Honda, Manabu; Sadato, Norihiro; Gerloff, Christian; Catala´, M. Dolores; Hallett, Mark (11 September 1997). "Functional relevance of cross-modal plasticity in blind humans". Nature. 389 (6647): 180–183. Bibcode:1997Natur.389..180C. doi:10.1038/38278. PMID 9296495. S2CID 4422418.
- Uhl, F.; Franzen, P.; Lindinger, G.; Lang, W.; Deecke, L. (April 1991). "On the functionality of the visually deprived occipital cortex in early blind persons". Neuroscience Letters. 124 (2): 256–259. doi:10.1016/0304-3940(91)90107-5. PMID 2067724. S2CID 7803807.
- Kujala, Teija; Huotilainen, Minna; Sinkkonen, Janne; Ahonen, Antti I.; Alho, Kimmo; Hämälä:inen, Matti S.; Ilmoniemi, Risto J.; Kajola, Matti; Knuutila, Jukka E.T.; Lavikainen, Juha; Salonen, Oili; Simola, Juha; Standertskjöld-Nordenstam, Carl-Gustaf; Tiitinen, Hannu; Tissari, Satu O.; Näätänen, Risto (January 1995). "Visual cortex activation in blind humans during sound discrimination". Neuroscience Letters. 183 (1–2): 143–146. doi:10.1016/0304-3940(94)11135-6. PMID 7746476. S2CID 17924026.
- Ross, edited by Stephen J. Ceci, Michael P. Toglia, David F. (1987). "The Memory of Children". Children's Eyewitness Memory. New York: Springer US. pp. 178–208. doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-6338-5_10. ISBN 978-1-4684-6338-5.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
- Öhman, Lisa; Eriksson, Anders; Granhag, Pär Anders (April 2013). "Enhancing Adults' and Children's Earwitness Memory: Examining Three Types of Interviews". Psychiatry, Psychology and Law. 20 (2): 216–229. doi:10.1080/13218719.2012.658205. S2CID 144400316.
- Thompson-Cannino, Jennifer, Ronald Cotton, and Erin Torneo. Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of Injustice and Redemption. New York: St. Martin's, 2009. Print. pp 13.
- Thompson-Cannino, Jennifer, Ronald Cotton, and Erin Torneo. Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of Injustice and Redemption. New York: St. Martin's, 2009. Print. pp 37.
- Wells, G. L.; Lindsay, R. C.; Ferguson, T. J. (1979). "Accuracy, confidence, and juror perceptions in eyewitness identification". Journal of Applied Psychology. 64 (4): 440–448. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.64.4.440. PMID 489504. S2CID 31526434.