|Founded||May 4, 1982(as 中国船舶工业总公司)|
|Zhang Yindgai (Chairman)|
Number of employees
|China State Shipbuilding Corporation|
|Alternative Chinese name|
|Dong Qiang (董强) (Chairman)|
|Parent||China State Shipbuilding Corporation|
|Website||China CSSC Holdings Limited|
|China State Shipbuilding Corporation Limited|
|Alternative Chinese name|
CSSC is one of the top 10 defence groups in China. It consists of various shipyards, equipment manufacturers, research institutes and shipbuilding-related companies that build both civilian and military ships. It owns some of the most well known shipbuilders in China, such as Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company, Jiangnan Shipyard, Hudong–Zhonghua Shipbuilding, Guangzhou Huangpu Shipbuilding and Guangzhou Wenchong Shipyard. Its subsidiary, China CSSC Holdings Limited (SSE: 600150), is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and in turn owns other subsidiaries including Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding. As of 2022, CSSC builds around 41 percent of all ships. All CSSC ships are built to military specifications, according to Chinese government doctrine.
Early developments edit
In 1964, the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building was created to oversee China's shipbuilding enterprises, which were predominantly engaged in military work. In July 1982, as part of defence industry reforms and "defence conversions", the ministry was converted into the China State Shipbuilding Corporation. CSSC remained under state control but was permitted to operate with "a degree of market-based economic autonomy". CSSC shifted the industry's focus to commercial work; by 1992, 80% of output was to the civilian sector, and in 1993 half of the commercial output was for export.
Spinning off CSIC edit
In the late 1990s, economic reforms broke up state-owned monopolies and introduced "a limited amount of free-market competition" to improve the efficiency of defence industries. In July 1999, the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) was spun off from CSSC. The shipbuilding industry was divided roughly along geographical lines: CSSC retained assets in the east and south, and CSIC gained control in the northeast and inland. Both reported to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). CSSC emerged as the smaller entity. Enterprises not affiliated with either conglomerate included shipyards owned by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), provinces, municipalities, foreign joint ventures, and Chinese shipping companies.
Merging with CSIC edit
Preparations for merging CSIC and CSSC date back to at least 2010, when Hu Wenming became CSSC's party secretary, in anticipation of an industry decline. Hu was a strong supporter of the merger; he was CSSC chairman from 2012 to 2015, and then CSIC chairman from March 2015 until his retirement in August 2019 because of corruption. The decision to merge the conglomerates may have influenced not only by a slowing economy, but also the discovery of widespread corruption in CSIC and Hu's involvement in it.
The CSIC and CSSC merger was approved by SASAC in October 2019, and occurred in November 2019; the combined entity took the CSSC name. The reorganization was complete by September 2020. The new entity was the world's largest shipbuilder with 20% global market share and US$110 billion in assets.
U.S. sanctions edit
In November 2020, American entities were prohibited by U.S. Presidential Executive Order 13959 from owning shares in companies—including CSSC—linked to the PLA by the United States Department of Defense.
See also edit
- Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (2020-06-24). "Defense Department produces list of Chinese military-linked companies, 20 years after mandate". Axios. Retrieved 2020-06-24.
- "Shipyard - CSSC GUANGZHOU HUANGPU SHIPBUILDING CO., Ltd".
- "Shipyard - Guangzhou Wenchong Shipyard (New Buildings)".
- "About Us".
- Waterfield, Bruno (26 December 2022). "Chinese fleet of militarised ships 'a threat to trade'". The Times. ISSN 0140-0460. Retrieved 2022-12-27.
- Collins and Grubb, pg. 6
- Medeiros et al., pg. 113
- Collins and Grubb, pg. 7
- Collins and Grubb, pg. 5
- Collins and Grubb, pg. 8
- Collins and Grubb, pg. 9-10
- Medeiros et al., pg. 114
- Medeiros et al., pg. 117
- Medeiros et al., pg. 120
- Collins and Grubb, pg. 9
- Medeiros et al., pg. 121
- Medeiros et al., pg. 115-116
- Minnie, Chan (26 October 2019). "Merger of China's shipbuilding giants gets the green light". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 26 October 2019. Retrieved 6 January 2021.
- Zi Yang (19 May 2020). "The Invisible Threat to China's Navy: Corruption". The Diplomat. Retrieved 6 January 2021.
- Nouwens, Meia (4 September 2020). "Is China's shipbuilding merger on course?". International Institute for Strategic Studies. Retrieved 6 January 2021.
- "Ex-Chairman of CSIC Under Investigation for Corruption". The Maritime Executive. Retrieved 2022-03-18.
- Watanabe, Shin (26 October 2019). "Top Chinese shipbuilders CSSC and CSIC win approval for merger". Nikkei Asian Review. Dalian, CH.
- "Beijing Gives Green Light for CSSC-CSIC Merger". The Maritime Executive. October 25, 2019.
- Chen, Shawna (November 12, 2020). "Trump bans Americans from investing in 31 companies with links to Chinese military". Axios. Retrieved November 12, 2020.
- Pamuk, Humeyra; Alper, Alexandra; Ali, Idrees (2020-11-12). "Trump bans U.S. investments in firms linked to Chinese military". Reuters. Retrieved 2020-11-12.
- Swanson, Ana (2020-11-12). "Trump Bars Investment in Chinese Firms With Military Ties". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2020-11-13.
- Collins, Gabriel; Grubb, Michael C. (August 2008). A Comprehensive Survey of China's Dynamic Shipbuilding Industry (Report). China Maritime Studies. Vol. 1. United States Naval War College. Retrieved 5 January 2021.
- Medeiros, Evan S.; Cliff, Roger; Crane, Keith; Mulvenon, James C. (2005). A New Direction for China's Defense Industry (PDF). RAND Corporation. ISBN 0-8330-3794-3.