Automatic train protection
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Automatic train protection (ATP) is a type of train protection system which continually checks that the speed of a train is compatible with the permitted speed allowed by signalling, including automatic stop at certain signal aspects. If it is not, ATP activates an emergency brake to stop the train. ATP systems are now a legacy, defunct technology that has been superseded throughout Europe and internationally by the European Rail Traffic Management System.
Accidents and ATPEdit
Accidents preventable by ATPEdit
- Russell Hill Subway Crash - 1995 - Driver passed two signals at danger, resulting in a collision between two subway trains. The line was equipped with train stops, but they were installed incorrectly and thus did not function.
- Hines Hill train collision - 1996 - driver misjudges end of crossing loop during simultaneous cross with opposing train. Two killed.
- Watford rail crash - 1996 - Signal passed at danger resulting in collision with coaching stock. One killed.
- Southall rail crash - 1997 - Signal passed at danger, resulting in a collision between a passenger train and a freight train crossing the track in front of it.
- Glenbrook train disaster - 1999 - too fast after Stop and Proceed.
- Pécrot rail crash - 2001 - Train departed a station passing by a red (closed) signal. 8 killed, 12 injured.
- 21 September 2001 - Speeding cattle train comes off rails and collides with two passenger trains in Petrie, Queensland.
- Waterfall train disaster - 2003 - too fast around very sharp curve after driver suffered a heart attack.
- 17 September 2005 - Too fast through turnouts between Joliet and Chicago.
- Amagasaki rail crash - 2005 - Overspeed through sharp curve. 107 killed, 555 injured.
- Chatsworth train collision - 2008 - driver of commuter train passes red signal and collides head-on with freight train - 25 killed
- Hordorf rail crash - 2011 - Signal passed at danger resulting in collision between a passenger train and a freight train - 10 dead, 23 injured.
- 2012 Buenos Aires rail disaster - 2012 - Collision at the end of the track - 51 dead, 703 injured.
- 2013 Buenos Aires rail disaster - 2013 - Signal passed at danger resulting in collision with a stationary train - 3 dead, 315 injured.
- Santiago de Compostela derailment - 2013 - Overspeed through sharp curve. - 80 killed, 140 injured.
- 12 July 2014, Kaloyanovets - Overspeed through turnouts set to diverging track. Driver dead, 14 injured. ATC (EBICAB) was available but wasn't turned on.
Accidents not preventable by ATPEdit
- Clapham Junction rail crash - 1988 - wrong-side failure - both signal and balise would have shown false green lights. 35 killed, 100 plus injured.
- Cowan rail crash - 1990 - wrong-side failure - caused by sand on the rails.
- Clementi train collision - 1993 - oil spillage on track, may have interfered with normal ATP operation on the 12 trains that arrived at Clementi MRT Station in the early morning since the oil have come into contact with the ATP power system fixed into the rails. The ATP system in question is continuous ATP, which is still used on the North South MRT Line and the East West MRT Line. 156 injuries, no deaths.
- Bruehl train disaster - 2000 - too fast through turnout during single-line working and degraded operations.
- Anti Collision Device
- Automatic Warning System
- Automatische treinbeïnvloeding (ATB) – A Dutch system which could have prevented the Harmelen train disaster
- Continuous Automatic Warning System (CAWS)
- Dead man's switch
- European Train Control System (ETCS)
- Lists of rail accidents
- Train Protection & Warning System
- Train protection system
- Train Warning System – An Indian system
- "ERA Glossary" (PDF). ERA.Europa.eu. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 May 2017. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- Härkönen, Aki (2017). "Deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System / European Train Control System(ERTMS/ETCS) in Finland. Finland's national implementation plan for the European Commission in 2017: 2.2 ATP life cycle management plans for the2020s and 2030s" (PDF). p. 9.
The staggered deployment of the current ATP system is shown in Figure 2. The railway automation industry will not continue to support their old product families indefinitely. As the life cycle of the ATP system is coming to an end, there is no choice but to migrate to the ERTMS/ETCS, even if the new system is not necessarily an improvement...
- "2001 Petrie Derailment". web.archive.org. 2010-01-09. Retrieved 2019-01-16.
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- Steinhauer, Jennifer; Cieply, Michael (14 September 2008). "Rail Line Says Train Ran Signal; Death Toll at 25". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 20 December 2016. Retrieved 31 March 2010.
- "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2012-10-12. Retrieved 2012-08-19.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link) Sicherungssystem fehlt auf der Unglücksstrecke
- Elmundo.es "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2013-07-25. Retrieved 2013-07-25.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
- "Train derailment, 7/12/2014, Kaloyanovets, Bulgaria (Bulgaria)". ERail.ERA.Europa.eu. European Railway Agency. Archived from the original on 30 January 2016. Retrieved 23 November 2014.
- "Системата за сигурност на железниците е причинила трагедията в Калояновец". Starazagora.UTRA.bg. Archived from the original on 29 November 2014. Retrieved 23 November 2014.
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