Neican (Chinese: 内参, abbreviated from nèibù cānkǎo zīliào (内部参考资料),[1] lit. "internal reference reports" or "internal reference materials") are internal reports of limited circulation prepared for the high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials.[2][3][4]
According to censorship rules in China, any matter that media outlets believe would harm the image of the Chinese government, threaten social stability and unity, or other matters not suitable for open publication, such as corruption, social unrest, and large-scale business swindles, should be reported internally rather than publicly. The neican also serve to keep party leaders informed about the issues that are seen as too sensitive be reported and discussed in the mainstream media.[4] Thus they are supposed to offer more realistic and less censored version of events.[3] They are often similar in form to investigative reporting, and are prepared by the journalists working for the official media such as Xinhua News Service or People’s Daily.[4] As such, much of the information collected by the Chinese mainstream media is published in neican, not in the public outlets.[5]
The popularity of neican has been on the rise in recent years, with some estimates suggesting a several-fold increase in the last decade from 2000.[2] Some lower-level neican have become profit centers for their publishers (such as ministries), which try to increase their subscription base.[2][3]
Sometimes, the term neican is used to refer to restricted literature (books available only to individuals with certain clearances).[6]
Since CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has consolidated power, neican have been subject to censorship previously applied only to media for the general public.[7]
Criticism edit
Neican have been criticized for being slow and inefficient.[2][3] Often, they focus on information already available in the Internet, but not in the Chinese traditional printed mainstream media, which is both censored by the government, and in which self-censorship of sensitive items is heavily encouraged.[2][3] They are also seen as biased (produced by CCP members for other party members), often saying what the writers expect the superiors want to hear, and downplaying or omitting unpleasant news.[2][3] As Hu Xingdou, a professor of social science at the Beijing Institute of Technology, notes: "[...] there are some issues that even neican won't touch", for example, military affairs and high-level corruption.[3]
See also edit
References edit
- ^ Hamrin, Carol Lee; Zhao, Suisheng (1995). Decision-making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders. M.E. Sharpe. p. 114. ISBN 978-1-56324-503-9.
- ^ a b c d e f "Chinese whispers". The Economist. June 17, 2010. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2021-04-17. Retrieved 2023-12-24.
- ^ a b c d e f g Magnier, Mark (2004-02-16). "Rosy Reports From Underlings Leave Chinese Leaders in the Dark". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 2021-04-11. Retrieved 2023-12-24.
- ^ a b c Cho, Li-fung (2007). The emergence, influence, and limitations of watchdog journalism in Post-1992 China : a case study of Southern Weekend (Doctor of Philosophy thesis). Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong SAR: The University of Hong Kong. doi:10.5353/th_b4020385 (inactive 2024-04-12).
{{cite thesis}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of April 2024 (link) - ^ NING, LOU (1993-01-01). Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections. SUNY Press. p. 299. ISBN 978-0-7914-1269-5.
- ^ Theroux, Paul (1989). Riding the Iron Rooster: By Train Through China. Ivy Books. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-8041-0454-8.
- ^ Kang, Dake (31 October 2022). "In Xi's China, even internal reports fall prey to censorship". Associated Press. Retrieved 31 October 2022.